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Volume XIII Winter 1970 Number 4

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COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

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Reflections on the Quarter

President Nixon's State of the World Message

PRESIDENT Nixon's State of the World message of February was apparently intended to symbolize the continuing importance of international affairs for the United States at a time when many Americans have turned their attention to pressing domestic issues. Offered as a complement to the President's reports on the State of the Union and domestic policy, it represented a similar "accounting" of foreign policy to the nation and its representatives. As the President declared, the statement "reflects my best view at this time of where we are going and where we ought to go" in foreign relations.

From the President's message, it may be inferred that one premise and three "facts" of life govern his concept of U.S. foreign policy at the threshold of the 1970's. The premise is that the United States has a major role and special destiny to enhance the prospects for world peace. The "facts" of importance in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are: First, the old states of Europe have completed their recovery from the destruction of World War II and many new states have emerged elsewhere in the world. Second, the U.S. atomic monopoly has been replaced by a condition of parity with the Soviet Union, chiefly because of technological advances that have increased the destructive capacity of both sides and contributed to a balance of terror. Third, ideology, both democratic and communist, no longer excites the masses of the population in the most powerful states; further, communism is said to be beset by internal quarrels, and the communist powers have divergent interests.

To match each of these facts with a policy based upon reality and vision is the central thrust of the Nixon Doctrine. It has three major components: (1) "Partnership," whether in defensive alliances or in economic and technical assistance, must be the new theme of U.S. foreign policy. In those portions of his address dealing with specific regions and countries, President Nixon reveals the partnerships and partners he envisages.

(2) The change in the global strategic balance indicates that the era of American nuclear superiority has closed. Therefore, future U.S. policy should be designed to promote arms agreements: global, regional, local; nuclear and conventional. "Strength" will be maintained, at least at "sufficiency," partly through defensive (ABM) weaponry. U.S. conventional equipment and forces will be adequate to deal with potential conflict in Europe *or* Asia, with a small con-

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tingency group for the "rear" areas. The National Security Council has been reorganized to provide a series of task forces to engage in studies designed both to analyze current problems and to anticipate potential crisis situations, and is charged with the responsibility of presenting alternative policies and strategies to the President.

(3) The changing goals of states both East and West, and the Sino-Soviet conflict, make possible negotiations for the parallel resolution of issues and the building of a structure for progress. To this end, three principles of negotiations emerge: negotiations must be chiefly substantive, rather than psychological or symbolic; their basis must be the national interest rather than ideologically inspired objectives; and their interrelationships with other issues, and their implications for other areas, must be carefully calculated. The lofty goal of the Nixon Doctrine and the policies of partnership, strength and negotiation is a peace shared and maintained by all, with international relations distinguished by restraint in a climate where "habits of moderation and compromise [are] nurtured."

President Nixon asserted that "the time has passed in which powerful nations can or should dictate the future to less powerful nations." This conception, which appears to have been influenced by the experience of the United States in Viet Nam, does not accord freely with the traditional behavior of Great Powers. For example, the Concert of Europe, which preserved Great-Power peace, dictated to smaller states; indeed, this capacity undoubtedly constituted its chief advantage as a mechanism for peace among the empires of nineteenth-century Europe.

The Nixon Doctrine is based on the assumption that the United States can no longer serve as global policeman. The defense forces envisaged will be insufficient for a policeman's role, but more than those capabilities needed for an isolationist foreign policy. The general forces are supposed to be adequate for a major war in Europe *or* Asia, and a reserve force will suffice for other lesser contingencies. Given troops and equipment designed for a new standard of "1½ wars," however, the United States is likely, if previous experience is instructive, to have capabilities insufficient for unexpected contingencies.

In sum, there runs throughout the message and the Nixon Doctrine a simple formula: A Great Power cannot and should not dictate to other nations; international order requires partnerships among friends and associations among adversaries; peaceful coexistence is to be measured both by the lack of war and the extent of these associations.

The question remains: To what extent does the Soviet Union still hew to the idea that Great Powers can "dictate" the future of weaker states in the international system? In the absence of U.S.-Soviet partnerships or associations on particular issues, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to act unilaterally if the means at its dis-

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posal are calculated for the policy of partnership.

The Nixon Doctrine asserts that a Great Power can share its responsibility and reduce its responses, without somehow losing its "special" destiny or primary role. This can work only if the Soviet Union will join a global condominium. The doctrine is already being tested in Viet Nam and the Middle East. Thus far the Soviet Union has not sought to develop with the United States a working association which would safeguard the interests of the superpowers as well as those of the peoples of those troubled regions.

The French in the Mediterranean

BETWEEN November 1969 and February 1970 France launched a series of diplomatic moves in the western Mediterranean. Foreign Minister Schumann visited Tunisia to consolidate a growing rapprochement between the two countries with aid, trade and military assistance agreements. King Hassan II of Morocco was received in the Elysée to celebrate the resumption of ambassadorial relations and to bury the ghost of Ben Barka. It was announced that Libya would purchase fifty French mirage aircraft. Relations with Algeria, always central to French policy in the area, were strengthened. On February 11, the semicircle was completed with the introduction of a new element in the politics of the region: a cooperation agreement signed by France and Spain, a part of which was the sale of Mirage airplanes to the Franco government.

The French Mediterranean policy as such is not new. In its present form, it dates from the 1962 Evian agreements. But its prospects are now better than they have been for some time. The Pompidou government has abandoned the global pretensions of its predecessor and decided to concentrate on France's immediate regional environment. French policy in the Mediterranean now has a rationale: to reduce Soviet penetration, but also to replace *both* superpowers in the area.

A second change has occurred within the countries of the western Mediterranean. The three countries of the Maghreb seem to have outgrown the period of revolutionary romanticism (which Tunisia went through rather belatedly with its brutal attempt at collectivization of agriculture, now abandoned) and have settled down to a stage of internal construction in the familiar manner of modernizing regimes. The resulting receptivity to economic arguments, combined with the need to stay out of costly international entanglements, is propitious for the low-key, generous attention that the Maghreb is receiving from France. Not the least of the services France can perform is quietly to encourage Maghreb unity, rather like the policy of the United States with regard to Western Europe over the past generation, and with the similar purposes of reducing the risk of internal war and shielding the area from Soviet penetration. There is some hope that the arms race between Morocco and Algeria has come to an end with the termination of the large

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Soviet delivery program initiated in 1963.

Finally, developments in Spain have made the new entente between Madrid and Paris both necessary and promising. The economic development of Spain during the last decade, and related political changes including the advent of Opus Dei "technocrats" to power, have brought Spain closer to Common Market Europe. France can here play the role of intermediary, as clearly brought out by the communiqué announcing the February agreement.

Formidable difficulties face France in her attempt to turn the western part of the Mediterranean into a "Sea of Peace." First, the cost of such a policy is high, if not prohibitive, especially at a time when the Pompidou government is committed to making gains in the French domestic economy. The high cost of the French-Algerian "cooperation" (which is far higher than the published aid figures, as it involves disadvantageous investment and trade agreements) is due to the French wanting to make certain that their relations with Third World countries should be, both in fact and appearance, highly profitable to the latter. To gain a certificate of respectability from impeccably anti-colonialist Algeria was thought to be a diplomatic goal worth seeking, and a condition for success elsewhere in the Arab world and Africa. Algeria has thus been in a position (strengthened by the availability of the Soviet alternative) to exact a high price from France. Algerian wine is bought at about double world prices; oil, according to a warning by the EEC Commission in Brussels, at 20 per cent above the prices obtaining on the world market—and France has committed herself to maintain the oil price for fifteen years, despite a likely drop in world prices.

In addition, association agreements between the countries of the region and the European Community are now being concluded, to encompass all countries on the Mediterranean littoral, except Albania, from Yugoslavia to Egypt. But the cost to France of unprofitable investments running into hundreds of millions of francs will not be substantially reduced by the aid provisions of the Community accords, while the advantages of a protected market for French goods are disappearing with the introduction of Community preferences. Furthermore, pressures from such member countries as Italy, and from the growing number of Mediterranean associated states which sell similar agricultural products, may even endanger the favorable trade arrangements granted by France.

Such problems will be more easily solved by a Community which is not only rich, but can be made to see the problems of the Mediterranean in political terms. Two consequences follow. France's dependence on the wealth of the Community can be expected to increase, while at the same time she may be forced to modify the Gaullist formula of a *Europe des États* to one that would institutionalize the pursuit of a common foreign policy.

More substantial difficulties for

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French policy in the Maghreb arise from the fact that bipolarity is well entrenched. The total dependence of the Algerian armed forces on Soviet supplies and training is the most important case in point. The beginning of a reversal of this policy may be discerned in the government's purchase of fifty French Fouga Magister jets in 1969, together with the establishment of a flying school (600 Algerian pilots a year are now said to be trained in the Soviet Union). Another event of symbolic importance was a recent French naval visit to Mers-el-Kebir, which coincided with a visit by a Soviet trade mission. But while there are reports of Algerian dissatisfaction with Soviet products, the trend has been toward greater trade between the two countries (from $13 million in 1966 to $100 million in 1969). The Soviet Union now takes as much Algerian wine (but at world prices) as France, and a growing proportion of oil.

In sum, France faces great obstacles in the pursuit of the activist policy she has chosen in an important area on the periphery of Europe. The French policy can be no more than a holding operation, until the weight of a dynamic unified Europe, combined with a withdrawal of the Soviet presence if and when the Egyptian adventure becomes too costly, will allow France as part of a unifying Europe to create a "Sea of Peace" in the Mediterranean.

Britain and European Unification

ON December 1 and 2, 1969, the heads of government of the Common Market Six met in The Hague and, in the words of the communiqué following their meeting, drew up "a balance sheet of the work already accomplished, to show their determination to continue it, and to define the broad lines for the future." The conference, which had been summoned on French initiative, ended a long period of stagnation in the process of European integration.

The new tempo was set by speeches by Chancellor Willy Brandt and President Georges Pompidou. Both men revealed themselves as more sympathetic to Britain's EEC application than either of their predecessors had been. The characteristically "low key" performance by Pompidou was hardly a signal for euphoria in Britain, and initial reactions from Whitehall were cautious at best, but it was clear that the veto had been lifted. When Pompidou spoke of possible collaboration in the EEC on matters such as nuclear reactors and computers, he was focusing on two areas where British participation would be most relevant to France's needs. Although the melting of French intransigence made the conference a turning point in British-EEC relations, it was Brandt's forthright speech which attracted the greatest attention. His welcome for Britain in the Community would be unreserved and unequivocal. In the long saga of British approaches to the EEC, a new chapter had opened.

While the mood in Europe was moving again in favor of British entry, there were new signs that Britain was still in earnest about

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her application. The long-awaited White Paper on the possible costs of entry was published early in February. Although the document is part of the government's commitment to take the country into Europe, the prospect it portrays is something less than a bed of roses. The White Paper admits that membership in the EEC is likely to involve a substantial balance of payments cost, which will have to be met out of an expanding GNP during the transitional period. The critical question is, therefore, whether Britain's GNP will grow faster inside the EEC, and whether the extra growth will provide sufficient resources to meet the cost. Estimates of the balance of payments cost of membership would involve, says the White Paper, "an additional claim on the annual rate of growth over a period of years of less than 1% of GNP." The expectation is that the dynamic effects of membership on the growth rate should, in the long run, net economic advantages to outweigh the balance of payments costs, provided the latter were not too high.

Yet, the wide range of estimates in the White Paper is further evidence, if such be needed, that the complex equation still contains a host of unknown factors. The total cost of Britain's entry on the balance of payments is put at anywhere betweeen £100 million and £1.1 billion. The possibility of a rise in food prices by as much as 25 per cent is a more daunting prospect than even fervent anti-Marketeers had dared to depict. Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart have made it clear, moreover, that Britain will join only if a "fair" price can be determined. "Should negotiations not lead to acceptable terms for entry, Britain is, and will be, strong enough to stand on her own feet outside."

Statements such as these, and indeed the tone of the White Paper itself, may well be designed to pave the way for some tough bargaining in Brussels. On the other hand, the White Paper is of more dubious value where domestic politics are concerned. According to the opinion polls, the cost of living is the source of primary concern to the electorate at the present time. The White Paper, by prophesying a dramatic increase in the cost of food, is unlikely to reassure those who are wavering about entry into Europe—popular support for British entry has fallen sharply since its publication. If the negotiations in Brussels run into difficulties, and it seems that Britain is unable to obtain the terms she needs to make the enterprise worthwhile, the White Paper will provide some justification, at least, for withdrawal from the bargaining table. But this is not to say, as some have suggested, that Wilson is getting cold feet about Europe: nor does it necessarily mean that he is planning a sudden somersault out of the negotiating posture just prior to the election in order to leave Opposition Leader Edward Heath holding the European cards in his hand.

Actually, the omens for success are unusually favorable. In the last months of 1969, the British economy displayed new signs of vigor, and the balance of trade went into

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surplus for the first time since the Labour Government took office. The balance of payments surplus for 1969 was nearly £400 million. As a consequence of Britain's improved trading position, the pound sterling has rallied in the world money markets: on January 3 it reached its dollar parity for the first time since the immediate post-devaluation peak. On January 1 the £50 limit for British travel outside the sterling area was lifted, and more recently the Bank Rate has been reduced from 8 per cent to 7½ per cent. But the brakes on domestic consumption are still being applied, so that in the coming months Britain's export position will not be jeopardized by any fallback in world trade. There has been a welcome influx of capital into the City, and Britain has been paying her debts to the IMF well in advance of the arranged schedules.

Whether the improvement of the last few months is more than temporary is still an open question. Much will depend on the Chancellor of the Exchequer's ability to walk the tightrope between the need for greater productivity from industry and the demands for better pay from workers. More important than domestic policies will be the state of world trade. Any kind of recession could darken the picture considerably; and a prolonged cutback in investment in the industrial sector at home will hamper the ability of British manufacturers to compete inside the EEC.

Despite these caveats, several factors enhance the prospects for a favorable outcome from the upcoming EEC negotiations. The political implications of joining are not now so frightening as they were, even in 1967; decisions made in Brussels will now be more readily accepted at Westminster. The prospect of monetary integration became a reality at The Hague: the report on monetary integration from the Commission, issued in February, specifically envisages Britain's participation in such a process, with the end of the transitional period and the achievement of monetary integration neatly coinciding in 1978. Monetary integration would limit, to some extent, the shock waves of any balance of payments difficulties incurred by members. This development, together with the recent recovery of the British economy, lays to rest a persistent specter in EEC-British relations. In the military sphere, the possibility that the United States might withdraw some of its troops from Europe has infused new life into the perennial debate on the Europeans' own troop commitments. In this field, as in many others, Britain's adherence to the Treaty of Rome is seen as a necessary prerequisite for further cooperation. From the British point of view an extended market for the country's defense technology would redound favorably to the balance of payments. At all events, Britain is increasingly seen as a necessary ingredient in any kind of political unity that emerges in Europe.

The 1970's have opened auspiciously for those who wish to see further European integration. The December 1969 communiqué from The Hague specifically mentioned

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the goal of political unification, and this was the first time since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that such an explicit statement had been made. The EEC's development to date is conducive to British participation; in particular, progress toward supranationalism has been patchy at best. For Britain the belief that there is no alternative to EEC entry except penurious isolation will continue to impel her toward the Community.

The Prospects for Vietnamization

PRESIDENT Nixon assumed the direction of this country's foreign policy in January 1969, pledged to find an early and honorable solution to the Viet Nam war. In assessing his record we must allow for the difficulties of the transfer of power faced at the outset; for the burden imposed by the virtually irreversible decisions of his predecessor, such as the bombing halt in the North and the initiation of open negotiations with Hanoi; and for the weakness of his hold upon Congress and, especially, upon his own party.

Furthermore, time did not stand still internationally: developments deeply rooted in the years Nixon spent in political exile and, hence, impervious to his intervention, had continued to change the international environment. For example, the failure of Western Europe to achieve economic, not to speak of political, integration, and the damage done to the Western alliance by the withdrawal of France from the NATO military commands and the contradictory policies toward Europe of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, were accomplished facts. They could be reviewed, but not rescinded. Thus cautioned, in evaluating his policies we must concede the relatively narrow range which accumulated history left to Nixon's initiative.

The Nixon Administration received as part of its legacy the Laotian settlement of 1962, in the arrangement of which Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman played a considerable role as chief U.S. negotiator. In the fourteen-nation declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos, signed on July 23, 1962, the Kennedy Administration agreed to withdraw the U.S. military presence from Laos in return for a coalition government which included representatives of the Pathet Lao pro-communist faction. The protocol provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laotian territory. Britain and the Soviet Union, as co-chairmen of the conference on Laos, were given responsibility for assuring observance of the settlement.

Although the agreement stipulated that Laotian territory was not to be used for interference in the internal affairs of other countries, in the years that followed the Ho Chi Minh trail provided a corridor through Laotian territory for tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops to pass en route to South Viet Nam. Thus, Laos has furnished an important base and staging area for infiltration into South Viet Nam.

During the course of a television interview early in 1970, W. Averell

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Harriman declared that the Soviet Union and North Viet Nam have never abided by the Laos agreement. Prior to leaving office, both Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow conceded that the failure of the United States to hold the Soviet Union to the terms of this agreement was one of the major mistakes in the conduct of American foreign policy made by the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations.

While campaigning for the Presidency, Nixon asserted that he had conceived a plan for bringing the war in Viet Nam to an end. He did not disclose his plan at that time. Upon his appointment of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the latter's proposals for a negotiated peace in Viet Nam, published in the January 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* were widely viewed as being identical with Nixon's own conception of a Viet Nam settlement. It does not matter here whether Kissinger's analysis and proposals had come to Nixon's attention during the campaign — a memorandum upon which Kissinger's published statement is said to have been based was reportedly made available to the major Republican and Democratic candidates in advance of the nominating conventions—or whether the President's own thought anticipated the broad outlines of Kissinger's formula. It is possible, however, to deduce the President's Viet Nam policies—those that are identifiably his and have not been irrevocably mortgaged by those of his predecessors—from subsequent statements made by his Administration and from the proceedings in Paris and Saigon. His policies appeared to adhere closely to Kissinger's published proposals, so closely indeed as to suggest a virtual identity of the President's and Kissinger's views on Viet Nam.

At the heart of Kissinger's published statement was the proposal for a three-tier set of negotiations, the first tier to be reserved for negotiations between the United States and North Viet Nam, leading toward agreement on mutual troop withdrawal; the second to be reserved for negotiations between the "contending forces" in Viet Nam, i.e., the Saigon government and the Viet Cong National Liberation Front. An international conference—a third "forum"—was to develop guarantees and safeguards for the agreements worked out in the first two "forums" or "committees." If these endeavors failed, then the United States, Dr. Kissinger suggested, should seek to achieve as many of its objectives as possible unilaterally — and, *inter alia,* "strengthen the Vietnamese army to permit a gradual withdrawal of some American forces."

Any assessment of the degree to which this scheme has succeeded or failed must be prefaced by a summary of the historical circumstances surrounding its translation into policy. To begin with, some of the policies of the Johnson Administration aimed at the very objectives emphasized in Kissinger's proposals; for example, the reduction of military activities in Viet Nam and a political settlement of the conflict. Certainly, these were the objectives of President Johnson's

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negotiations in Paris. Less certainly, though quite probably, the Johnson Administration sought to obtain the Soviet Union's agreement to its Viet Nam initiatives, thus reaching out for those "international guarantees and safeguards" without which a global and lasting settlement in Viet Nam seemed infeasible. More important still, Nixon (and Kissinger) did not propose to reverse the 1968 decision of Johnson, namely, to abandon the pursuit of military victory over North Viet Nam.

Thus Nixon rested his Viet Nam policy firmly, though perhaps reluctantly, upon the precedents created by his predecessor. Indeed, he had no other choice: the re-escalation of the war would have met with an unacceptable increase of domestic opposition—a domestic opposition that had been strengthened and legitimized by Johnson's apparent surrender to its pressure.

It can now be seen that the "three forums" approach, advocated by Kissinger and adopted by the President, has thus far not been able to bring in sight the termination of the Viet Nam war. The record is unambiguous: in the Paris negotiations the North Vietnamese have not consented to the discussion of mutual troop withdrawals; the Saigon government and the NLF have not agreed upon a political settlement within Viet Nam; and the shape of international guarantees and safeguards of a Viet Nam settlement remains a moot question. Indeed, in Indochina as a whole, the Kremlin's continued logistical support of North Viet Nam perpetuates the adversary relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Whatever may have been the nature of U.S. diplomatic approaches to the Soviet Union, they do not appear to have persuaded Moscow to urge Hanoi to seek a negotiated settlement.

One year after Nixon's election to the Presidency, the emphasis of U.S. policy had come to rest on the Vietnamization of the war, i.e., the alternative sketched out in the last brief paragraph of Kissinger's detailed proposal set forth in the *Foreign Affairs* article. Since American troops withdrawn from Viet Nam are to be replaced by indigenous forces under the command of the Saigon government, the latter's political power, barring unpredictable political disasters, is bound to increase in direct proportion to the increase in military responsibilities forced upon it.

How can it be expected that the incumbent regime will grow more responsive to the demands of its political opponents in the Assembly, not to speak of the demands of those more precariously placed opposition elements that might wish —and might be in a position—to ease the transition from the present regime to a more broadly based coalition government? Yet this kind of ideological pluralist political structure would be necessary if a settlement is to be worked out by the "contending forces" in Viet Nam.

It is conceivable that, in the foreseeable future, the gap between the communist or proto-communist factions in Viet Nam and the Saigon government will widen rather than narrow. Saigon, particularly if it

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succeeds in increasing the national war effort and inspires its people to bear the principal burden of the fighting, is unlikely to agree to proposals for compromise and accommodation which would lessen the national resolve. The inevitable end-product of successful Vietnamization would be the reduction of Washington's influence over Saigon. The failure of Vietnamization would signify the failure of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. At the same time, Saigon's rulers, with all their faults, provide the one and only basis for the continued viability of the U.S. Vietnamization policy.

Events of early 1970 have disclosed once again the important strategic and political relationship between developments in South Viet Nam, on the one hand, and Cambodia and Laos, on the other. The settlement of the Viet Nam conflict is dependent upon the attainment of more stable political systems in Cambodia and Laos. One can argue that Hanoi wanted at least the earlier stages of Vietnamization, involving U.S. troop withdrawals, to proceed on schedule and, hence, ordered a lull in the fighting in the Mekong Delta. This restraint led to an increase of Hanoi's forces in the Cambodian sanctuary which frightened top officials and ultimately toppled Prince Sihanouk. So long as these states furnish sanctuaries and communication routes for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces operating in South Viet Nam, their political systems will be confronted with recurrent crises. In short, Laos and Cambodia can be decoupled from the Viet Nam conflict only by an agreement which, in fact, removes all foreign troops from their soil. Given the experience of the Laotian accords of 1962, the prospects for the implementation of such an agreement — if one could be reached—are not great.

Unless the United States can induce the Soviet Union to compel its North Vietnamese ally to forgo the use of bases, staging areas and sanctuaries, a feasible alternative might be to exploit the windfall of Prince Sihanouk's ouster. If the Laotian infiltration route is harassed and the Cambodian sanctuaries are closed or made precarious, North Vietnamese operations in the lower half of Viet Nam will lose their sustenance. This event, without any American escalation, would improve substantially the prospects for Vietnamization. Perhaps more importantly, the "three forums" approach might begin to appeal to Hanoi and its supporters.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that the weak, badly-led Cambodian army will be able to oust the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces unless the United States provides considerable assistance. Recognition of this fact prompted President Nixon to make the decision to use American troops to drive the communist forces from their Cambodian sanctuaries.

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STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL

by J. I. Coffey

FOR the past twenty years the United States has maintained strategic nuclear forces superior in size, delivery capabilities, and flexibility of response to those of the USSR; indeed, the rapid U.S. buildup of land- and sea-based missiles in the early 1960's gave it long-range strategic strike forces three or four times as large as those of the Soviet Union.[1] Any hope, however, that the USSR might rest content with powerful but inferior strategic nuclear forces seems shattered by the events of the last few years. Between 1965 and early 1969 the Soviet Union tripled the number of ICBM's deployed, and began to improve and expand its fleet of missile-carrying submarines; should Soviet intercontinental delivery forces continue to increase at this rate it is estimated that by 1973-1975 they would equal or surpass those of the United States.[2] Moreover, the Soviets have installed ballistic missile defenses (BMD's) around Moscow, and could, according to former Secretary of Defense McNamara, deploy "some sort of ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970's."[3]

[1]Between 1962 and 1966 the number of Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM's) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) remained virtually constant at 700-750, as did heavy bombers, at 150-200. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's) increased only from 100 to 340 and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) from 90 (in 1963) to 130. Over the same period, the number of U.S. heavy bombers stabilized around 650, while SLBM's rose from 192 (in 1963) to 512 and ICBM's from 250 to 934, even allowing for the phase-out of older types such as the Atlas and Titan I. (Sources for the 1962-1963 figures are: Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race* [Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966], pp. 95-104, and The Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1963-1964* [London, 1963], p. 34; for the 1966 figures, *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget,* January 23, 1967, mimeo., p. 41 [hereafter cited as *McNamara Statement, 1967*].)

[2]Remarks by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird following a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, April 17, 1969, pp. 1, 2. See also *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget,* February 20, 1970, mimeo., pp. 103-105 (hereafter cited as *Laird Statement*).

[3]*Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget,* mimeo., prepared January 22, 1968, pp. 55-56 (hereafter cited as *McNamara Statement, 1968*).

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Although the United States has taken measures to offset these enhanced Soviet capabilities, including improvement of penetration aids, development of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV's), and production of new missiles such as Minuteman III and Poseidon,[4] it is apparent that the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR is shifting — largely as a result of Soviet initiatives.

This shift has led to calls for new measures to insure continued U.S. strategic superiority. Senator Henry M. Jackson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has asked for quantitative and qualitative improvements in missiles,[5] a move in which he has been backed by Congressman Craig Hosmer and numerous military analysts and journalists. Senator John Pastore has supported the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy ballistic missile defenses capable of staving off a full-scale Soviet attack. Admiral Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, and General Bernard Schriever, former head of the Air Force Systems Command, have joined with others in suggesting that the Soviet threat warrants "higher research and development expenditures as well as the procurement and deployment of advanced weapons systems."[6] Although President Nixon has modified his earlier view that the maintenance of superior strategic nuclear forces is the best insurance of peace and the surest way to agreements on the control of arms, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has continued to insist that only U.S. superiority will achieve these aims.[7] In brief, powerful and influential elements, alarmed by the change in the strategic balance, are seeking alterations in the programmed force posture designed to maintain American superiority.

The arguments in favor of strategic superiority are weighty. Superiority could offset uncertainties in calculations of weapons effectiveness and guard against future improvements in the Soviet strategic posture (such as the introduction of MIRV's) which could threaten the American ability to inflict "unacceptable

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[5] U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings before Subcommittee on Military Applications on *Scope, Magnitude and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program*, 90th Congress, First Session, November 6-7, 1967 (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 44 (hereafter cited as *Hearings on . . . Antiballistic Missile Program*).

[6] *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge*, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Special Report Series No. 6, September 1967, p. 96.

[7] Nixon's pre-election statements are in the *New York Times*, October 25, 1968, p. 1; October 30, 1968, p. 1; references to his modification and to Laird's equating "sufficiency" with "superiority" are in *ibid.*, January 31, 1969, p. 1.

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damage." In the event of war it could reduce the level of destruction by freeing forces to strike at Soviet air bases and missile sites before weapons located there could be launched. Its loss or erosion could, in the words of General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, give the Soviets "freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war."[8] If the USSR achieved even strategic parity Moscow might, as Dr. Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University suggested, "be tempted to undertake a more extensive, more acute, and more dangerous range of risks in order to pursue its declared, long range ambition to reshape the world according to its own dogma."[9]

While the concern of these and other spokesmen over the erosion of U.S. strategic superiority is understandable, their proposals must be carefully examined because of their potential impact on the defense budget and probable implications for U.S. foreign policy. The primary question, however, is not the cost of achieving strategic superiority, or the consequence of losing it, but whether it is any longer possible for one superpower to maintain a meaningful advantage over the other.

Superiority and the Strategic Balance

Despite the buildup of Soviet strategic strike forces, the United

Table I

U.S. AND SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES, SEPTEMBER 1969

Type	*U.S.*	*Soviet*
ICBM's	1,054	1,060
SLBM's	656	110
Intercontinental Bombers	581	140-145
Number of Warheads Carried	4,200	1,350

Source: Laird Statement, p. 102. The Soviet SLBM figures are only for those mounted on nuclear-powered submarines, and do not include about 140 SLBM's carried on diesel-powered submarines or about 270 cruise-type missiles carried by some 45 Soviet submarines. These latter categories of weapons could be employed against the United States but are believed to be targeted elsewhere.

[8]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Hearings on United States Armament and Disarmament Problems,* 90th Congress, First Session (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 85.
[9]*Hearings on . . . Antiballistic Missile Program,* p. 55.

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States is still superior to the USSR not only in numbers of bombers and missiles (as shown in Table I) but also, to quote McNamara, in the gross megatonnage these can carry, and in "the number of warheads . . . capable of being reliably delivered with accuracy and effectiveness on the appropriate targets. . . ."[10] However, as McNamara went on to say, "even with our current superiority, or indeed with any numerical superiority realistically attainable, the blunt, inescapable fact remains that the Soviet Union could still — with its present force — effectively destroy the United States, even after absorbing the full weight of an American first strike."[11] What gives the Soviet Union this capacity is neither the size nor the relative invulnerability of its strategic strike force but rather the high yield of some of its nuclear warheads, the relatively few weapons needed to kill millions of people,[12] and the option of attacking U.S. cities along with, or instead of, military targets. Thus, the question confronting the United States is whether further increases or improvements in strategic offensive and/or defensive forces could so reduce damage from an attack as to make nuclear war a meaningful military option, and not a last, desperate resort.

One way of attempting this would be to build more ICBM's, with the aim of destroying a very high percentage of Soviet bombers, land-based missiles, and missile-submarines. While the number of warheads required would depend to some extent on their accuracy, range and yield, logic suggests that an attacker would have to employ at least as many re-entry vehicles as there are targets; in fact, considering faulty intelligence, uncertainties about weapons effects, and malfunctions, aborts and inaccuracies in delivery systems, more warheads than targets would certainly be required. (For example, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of

[10]Remarks . . . before United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, California, September 18, 1967, reprinted in *Hearings on . . . Antiballistic Missile Program,* p. 107. Additional testimony as to current U.S. capabilities will be found in *Statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford* [on] *the Fiscal Year 1970-74 Defense Program and 1970 Defense Budget,* prepared January 15, 1969, p. 42 (hereafter cited as *Clifford Statement*); and *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Ballistic Missile Defense System,* March 21, 1969, p. 11 (hereafter cited as *Laird Statement . . . on the Ballistic Missile Defense System*).

[11]*Hearings on . . . Antiballistic Missile Program,* p. 107. See also *McNamara Statement, 1968,* p. 52.

[12]Secretary Laird, drawing on studies made by McNamara, indicated that 200 one-megaton Soviet warheads could destroy 55 per cent of the American population—approximately 110 million people. *Laird Statement . . . on the Ballistic Missile Defense System,* p. 10.

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Defense Research and Engineering, estimated that 500 Soviet SS-9's, with an 80 per cent reliability rate, each carrying three five-megaton separately guided warheads with quarter-mile accuracy, would be needed to destroy some 950 U.S. Minuteman missiles, a ratio of about 3:2 between available re-entry vehicles and targets.)[13] To achieve the degree of superiority needed for a successful counterforce attack against current Soviet strategic strike forces would thus be extremely difficult — the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified in 1968, when Soviet capabilities were significantly less than they now are, that "it is literally impossible to buy sufficient forces . . . to destroy the enemy strike capability before it is launched against the United States."[14]

An alternative (or complementary) way of achieving superiority would be to push for qualitative improvements in existing or programmed weapons systems. Multiple warheads launched by a single missile can substitute for larger numbers of missiles, the consequent loss in deliverable megatons perhaps being offset by the lower cost per warhead. Greater accuracy in the delivery of either individual or multiple warheads may reduce the number of re-entry vehicles that have to be directed against a missile site or air base in order to insure its destruction; so far as counterforce attacks against undefended targets are concerned, it is immaterial whether this accuracy is achieved through better guidance systems for unpowered re-entry vehicles, through maneuverable warheads, or both. Increased yields from nuclear warheads may also reduce the number of re-entry vehicles to be dispatched against a single target, since higher blast pressures and greater radii of destruction can partly offset inaccuracies.[15] There are a number of ways in which the United States could enhance the effectiveness of its counterforce attacks, their advantages depending in part on the state of the art, in part on their relative cost, and in part on their comparative usefulness against Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

Equally, however, there are numerous actions that even an inferior opponent could take to increase the survivability of his

[13]*New York Times,* May 13, 1969, p. 1. See also the report to the Senate Armed Services Committee of Professor Albert Wohlstetter, summarized in *ibid.,* May 26, 1969, p. 9.

[14]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power,* 90th Congress, Second Session (Washington: GPO, 1968), Part I, p. 160. See also pp. 125-126.

[15]Multimegaton warheads may also have secondary effects, such as "blacking out" radar and inducing electron flows in communications equipment, which could enhance their disruptive impact on an opponent's offensive and defensive systems.

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forces. He could build super-hardened missile sites, whose destruction would require either more or larger-yield warheads. He could make his land-based missiles mobile or semi-mobile, and change locations frequently enough to insure that many of them could not be targeted by a potential enemy. He could shift from land-based to sea-launched missiles, carried either on submarines or in more vulnerable but considerably cheaper surface ships, as proposed for the NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. He could place larger numbers of his bombers on air alert, build long-endurance launching platforms such as nuclear-powered aircraft or cruise-type missiles, or orbit weapons of mass destruction, which, whatever their accuracy and their cost/effectiveness, could almost certainly guarantee the destruction of a few cities. If all else failed, he could (as Soviet officials earlier hinted they might do) [16] program his fixed missiles to fire on warning, thereby increasing the certitude of retaliation — admittedly at the expense of risking inadvertent war.

While the possible outcomes of U.S. efforts to achieve unquestioned strategic superiority cannot be spelled out in detail, the broad pattern is clear. As General Wheeler said, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined all types of preemptive attacks and first strikes and things of that kind, and we can find none that is attractive."[17] Or, as then Assistant Secretary of Defense Enthoven put it, "If you talk about politically exploitable superiority — the threat to attack and destroy their forces — I think they [the Soviets] have been getting survivable forces independently of what we do. I don't think that we could have bought our way out of that development at any reasonable cost."[18] Only if the possible Soviet responses are deliberately forsworn, are limited by lack of resources, or are constrained by formal or tacit arms control agreements, is the United States likely to obtain a significant advantage through improving its strategic strike forces — and even a significant advantage may not reduce damage to a level that the United States will find tolerable.

This immediately raises the question whether passive or active defenses might not be more effective than new missiles in limiting damage from a nuclear strike — perhaps so effective as to upset the strategic balance. There is little doubt that a relatively small investment in civil defense programs could save millions of lives in

[16] L. Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Soviet Defense Might and Peaceful Co-existence," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1963, p. 32.
[17] *Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power,* Part I, p. 42.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 143.

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the event of nuclear war. However, to expect that fallout shelters — or even blast shelters — could so reduce damage as to render a nuclear strike relatively harmless seems unreasonable; the USSR could, if necessary, increase the number of megatons delivered on target, change the composition of its warheads to make fallout more lethal and longer-lasting, or redesign re-entry vehicles to penetrate deeply before exploding near blast shelters. One study by the RAND Corporation indicated that even a $600 billion program to protect people, production facilities and essential supplies could not guarantee American survival against possible Soviet attacks.[19]

Nor do active defenses offer much more promise of reducing damage to tolerable levels. According to official testimony, present U.S. air defenses are "not very effective," and even the improved forces now programmed could not preclude the Soviets from killing eight million Americans.[20] Despite the effort put into anti-submarine warfare forces, it is questionable whether these could locate and destroy a high proportion of missile-firing submarines before the latter moved within range of their assigned targets. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, has testified that it is difficult to limit damage from sea-mobile systems.[21] (In fact, the newer Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, armed with a Polaris-type missile, may prove almost as invulnerable as the U.S. missile-submarine fleet, which both Admiral Moorer and Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Project Manager, Fleet Ballistic Missile, consider largely immune to Soviet anti-submarine warfare forces.[22]) Also, whatever their theoretical effectiveness, both air defenses and anti-submarine warfare forces are vulnerable to missile strikes against air bases, operations centers and communications facilities, and hence dependent on a successful defense against ballistic missiles.

At face value the potential utility of anti-ballistic missiles in limiting damage — and, in conjunction with powerful strategic strike forces, altering or even upsetting the strategic balance — seems great indeed. Without question, U.S. anti-missile missiles could safeguard against accidental weapons launchings, drastically reduce damage from attacks by small nuclear powers,

[19]Sidney S. Winter, Jr., *Economic Viability After Thermonuclear War: The Limits of Feasible Production* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-3426-PR, 1963), p. 160.

[20]*Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, Part II, p. 247.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 334.

[22]*Ibid.*, pp. 327, 334; *Washington Post*, May 12, 1969, p. 1.

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and degrade a retaliatory strike by the USSR. Whether they could reduce the damage from such a strike sufficiently to upset the strategic balance is more problematical.

In the first place, even comprehensive ballistic missile defenses, costing as much as $40 billion, could not stop the USSR from killing 10 to 20 million Americans[23]— a number which might be high enough to deter the United States from initiating nuclear war in all save the most desperate of situations. Second, the Soviets could penetrate or saturate U.S. ballistic missile defenses; by simply introducing penetration aids and multiple warheads they could then kill 40 to 70 million Americans, while if they also added 550 mobile ICBM's, the figure would rise to 90-100 million.[24] Finally, the Soviet Union could bypass U.S. anti-ballistic missiles by employing circumglobal rockets, or evade them by building up its bomber force or by introducing supersonic cruise-type missiles. As President Nixon stated, "the heaviest [ballistic missile] defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack."[25]

It is, of course, conceivable that some combination of defensive and offensive forces could give the United States so significant an advantage over the USSR as to drastically reduce damage from an attack. If, for example, the United States does install MIRV's on most of its 1,700 land- and sea-based missiles, as now planned, it could muster 5,000 to 6,000 nuclear warheads for a first strike.[26] Despite the small yield of many warheads, U.S. counterforce attacks of this magnitude could markedly degrade land-based Soviet delivery systems and enhance the ability of American ballistic missile defenses to cope with surviving Soviet forces; indeed, this is the basis for the low estimates of U.S. casualties cited previously. However, even the sea-based component of the Soviet strategic

[23] *McNamara Statement, 1968,* pp. 64-65.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Statement of the President [on Ballistic Missile Defenses]*, March 14, 1969, Office of the White House Press Secretary, p.1. See also *McNamara Statement, 1967,* p. 53; *Clifford Statement,* p. 55; and the statement of Secretary of Defense Laird to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 20, 1969, excerpted in the *New York Times,* March 21, 1969, p. 20.

[26] The United States reportedly plans to install three MIRV's on 500 of its 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's, and 10 to 14 MIRV's on each of 496 Poseidon missiles, for a total of 6,460 to 8,444 low-yield warheads. (*New York Times,* June 9, 1969, p. 35.) In addition, it will have the remaining 554 Minuteman and Titan missiles, 160 Polaris A-3 missiles carrying three warheads each, and some 500 bombers carrying an average of four warheads each, making the grand total between 9,440 and 11,424. Not all of these warheads can be—or should be—launched simultaneously, but at least half could be used in a first strike, should the United States so choose.

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nuclear forces could inflict heavy damage, especially if the remaining elements of the forty-five submarines carrying cruise-type missiles joined the more than forty equipped with ballistic missiles in attacking targets in the United States. And by the time the United States deployed anti-ballistic missiles and installed MIRV's, the USSR could further expand its missile submarine fleet, build hardened or mobile ICBM's, and develop penetration aids, multiple warheads, or both.[27]

Another possibility is that a technological breakthrough could give the United States a meaningful advantage, at least in the short run. However, past technological innovations have not decisively affected the strategic balance, in part because of the level and diversity of nuclear strike forces, in part because of the continuous search for countermeasures. (The United States developed re-entry vehicles which could penetrate Soviet ballistic missile defenses even before the USSR deployed the current generation of ABM's around Moscow.) More important, even unforeseeable — and as yet unattainable — innovations, such as laser missile defenses, or magnetic fields capable of deflecting or destroying incoming bombers, could be bypassed by means of multimegaton underwater mines, or the detonation in outer space of high-yield nuclear weapons. While any or all such innovations might require alterations in Soviet force postures or strategic concepts, there is no reason to believe that the USSR could not kill millions of Americans, should it wish to do so.

Equally, there is no reason to doubt the ability of the United States to inflict millions of casualties upon the USSR, regardless of any measures the Soviets might take. Despite recent increases, Soviet strategic strike forces remain inferior to those of the United States, and the further buildup forecast by Secretary Laird will only bring the USSR to rough equality in numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles. Moreover, while the Soviets may be ahead technically in some areas (such as an ABM that can "loiter" in space, and multiple warheads potentially capable of developing into powered re-entry vehicles[28]), they lag in others, e.g., solid-fuel missiles, modern submarines and long-range bombers.[29] According to the statements of American officials, even

[27]According to Secretary Laird, the USSR could have multiple re-entry vehicles by 1970-1972, and a formidable force of MIRV's by the mid-1970's. (*Laird Statement,* p. 104.)

[28]Testimony of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, summarized in the *Pittsburgh Press,* June 11, 1969, p. 31; *New York Times,* June 9, 1969, p. 35.

[29]*Clifford Statement,* p. 46.

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strenuous and far-reaching Soviet efforts to improve their damage-limiting capabilities — including the rapid deployment of high-thrust missiles, the development of MIRV's, and the augmentation and upgrading of their missile submarine fleet — can be largely nullified by relatively simple and inexpensive measures such as the installation of ballistic missile defenses around U.S. missile sites and air bases. Finally, even "greater-than-expected" improvements in Soviet strategic delivery forces could be offset by weapons systems which the United States has considered but not yet adopted, among them a newer and larger ICBM in a super-hardened silo, a longer-range sea-based missile, and a new manned bomber.[30] The great lesson of the current debate over U.S. ballistic missile defenses should be that it is virtually impossible for the USSR to seriously degrade the American strategic deterrent, no matter what steps it takes.

To sum up, it would appear that the United States and the USSR now have strategic nuclear forces of such size, diversity and complexity that each country can destroy the other. Furthermore, both countries have the technical skills, the industrial base and the economic resources needed to maintain this capability, despite anything the opponent can do. Under these circumstances "superiority," whether measured by "the number of warheads capable of being reliably delivered with accuracy and effectiveness on the appropriate targets" (the U.S. standard) or in "high-yield thermonuclear warheads of several tens of megatons" (the Soviet one),[31] is at best of limited value — and may be wholly illusory.

Superiority and Soviet Behavior

In one sense this situation is not new; as far back as 1963 Robert McNamara estimated that in a nuclear war *circa* 1968 "the fatalities in the U.S. [and in the USSR] would approach 100 million. . . ."[32] What *is* new, is that McNamara's prophecy has come true, and that many decision-makers are worried about

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[31] Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, California, September 18, 1967, *loc. cit.*, p. 107; Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, editor, *Soviet Military Strategy*, translated, with notes and an analytical introduction by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré and Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 296.

[32] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440* . . . (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 392.

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future Soviet behavior. In effect, it is argued, the balance of terror (if not the balance of capabilities) is absolute, the long-range strike forces of the United States and the Soviet Union cancel each other out, and the USSR is in consequence both freer and more tempted to engage in local aggression, undertake subversive and paramilitary operations, and exert military and political pressures against the allies and the interests of the United States. To what extent may this be true?

So far, Soviet leaders have given little indication that the erosion of U.S. strategic superiority might "make the world safe for aggression." Instead, they have continued to follow the line laid down in 1961 by Premier Khrushchev, who stated that the disastrous consequences of nuclear war made it completely unacceptable as an instrument of policy, and stressed the danger that limited or local wars might escalate. Although Khrushchev endorsed and promised to support "wars of national liberation" by oppressed peoples, he stopped short (both then and later) of committing Soviet forces to participation in such wars. And while there has been some rethinking of Soviet doctrine on limited war, and some questioning of the thesis that such wars would automatically escalate, there is as yet no sign that the present regime is prepared to commit its own forces against the United States or U.S. allies. The Soviets have continued to regard even armed intervention in "wars of liberation" as potentially dangerous, as well as contrary to Marxist doctrine. They have stubbornly maintained this position despite stinging attacks by the Chinese communists and despite the pressures of the war in Viet Nam.

Fear of the consequences of nuclear war is not the only factor affecting Soviet policy on the use of force. For one thing, nothing in communist ideology compels the Soviet Union to engage in military adventures, and much in it militates against such adventures; the Soviets have shown an ideological predisposition to seek to achieve their goals through political rather than military action. For another, confidence in the ultimate victory of world communism, a belief that theirs is "the wave of the future," may add to the tendency to eschew taking risks for the sake of short-term gains. For a third, there has been a tremendous shift in attitudes toward world revolution, a major drop in revolutionary *élan*. As one authority on Soviet affairs phrased it, "Soviet leaders and officials have a viable system which has been created at the cost of great sacrifice, and they are not eager for the risks of ad-

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venturous policies."[33] The Chinese communists put it more graphically: "The Khrushchev revisionists . . . are afflicted with incurable spinelessness. They are scared of revolution, shirk at sacrifice, dare not engage in a retaliatory struggle against U.S. imperialism, and even oppose the revolutionary cause of the people of all countries."[34]

Even if Soviet attitudes change with the growth of their nuclear arsenal, and they decide to employ their armed forces to extend Moscow's control, there are inherent limitations on their ability to do so. Among these are the geographic location of the USSR, which makes it difficult for the Soviets to operate effectively outside Eastern Europe; the presence along or near some frontiers of large and capable armed forces; and the existence of alliances among neighboring countries and/or with the United States. Compounding these difficulties are the virtually insoluble problems of planning and conducting sizeable conventional campaigns against an opponent possessing, or supported by, tactical nuclear weapons, which can decimate massed troops, destroy supporting weapons, and choke off the flow of reinforcements and supplies required for a continuing advance. While the Soviets may hope that fear of general war, or of the consequences of a tactical nuclear exchange, will inhibit the United States and its allies from employing nuclear weapons against invading forces, this is a thin reed upon which to rest; the conflict might escalate inadvertently, because Britain or France might, in desperation, launch a nuclear strike, or because the United States might decide to use nuclear weapons rather than accept defeat. Whatever the degree of the Soviets' confidence in the effectiveness of their deterrent, it is not likely to approach certainty — and since the consequences of a mistaken estimate would be disastrous, a feeling of certainty would seem essential.

Nor would the potential gains from small-scale actions against isolated and vulnerable areas seem worth the political costs and risks. Compared with the strength the United States can bring to bear in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and other areas of possible interest to the USSR, Soviet "forces of intervention" are small; for example, the U.S. Marine Corps outnumbers its Soviet

[33]Cyril E. Black, "Political Modernization in Russia and China," in Kurt London, editor, *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 17.

[34]Fan Hsiu-Chu, "Struggle Between the Two Lines over the Question of Dealing with U.S. Imperialism," *Ta Kung Pao,* July 26, 1965, quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 205.

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counterpart by at least twenty to one. At most, the Soviets could hope to demonstrate in support of friendly regimes (as they have in Egypt) or, by their presence, attempt to deter U.S. military operations, as the Germans did in Manila Bay in 1898. It will probably be years before Soviet forces are able to carry out airborne or amphibious landings in distant areas against even light opposition, much less successfully conduct sustained operations in the face of U.S. naval and air power.

As for attempts to exploit Soviet nuclear capabilities, whether for deterrence of "counter-revolutionary imperialist activities" or political purposes, these have not proven markedly successful, as shown by the unhindered American bombing of North Viet Nam, the successful U.S. action to force the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, and the repeated postponements and abrogations of Soviet "deadlines" for a settlement of the Berlin issue on terms favorable to Moscow. These failures may be explained by the marginal nature of Soviet interests involved, or by the potential costs of taking the more direct action needed to secure Soviet objectives, but they may also be due to the inherent difficulty of using nuclear power to achieve political gains. As Assistant Defense Secretary Enthoven testified, "it was never possible to develop a clear concept for translating [U.S.] nuclear superiority into political power or international advantage"[35]— and the Soviets cannot hope for strategic superiority.

Finally, accretions of strength, even on a comparative basis, do not necessarily signify a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy. While there are certainly forces within the USSR which make for such a policy, and which combine with national interests to motivate efforts to extend communist influence and control, it is questionable whether the impact of these forces can be directly correlated with increases in Soviet strategic power. The Soviet Union has in recent years been more cautious than during the postwar decade 1945-1955, when it was considerably weaker than it is now. Conversely, Moscow has, during the period when its ICBM force was trebling in size, discussed with Washington such significant matters as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the settlement of the Viet Nam war, and the possibility of limiting the deployment of both missiles and anti-missile missiles. Thus, it does not follow that the preservation of peace, or the improvement of relations between East and West, depend solely upon the degree of American strategic superiority.

[35] *Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, Part I, p. 125.

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This is not to argue that such superiority is meaningless. As pointed out earlier, it can serve as a guard against greater-than-expected improvements in Soviet nuclear delivery forces, and can enhance the ability of the United States to limit damage from a Soviet attack. Moreover, the visible symbols of superiority — larger numbers of delivery vehicles, higher-yield warheads, the continuing introduction of new weapons — have an impact on enemies and allies alike. There is also the psychological value, in a crisis or confrontation, of being able to inflict on an opponent heavier damage than he can wreak.

Similar — and perhaps stronger — reasons can be advanced for the expansion of American ballistic missile defenses, which are designed primarily to protect land-based retaliatory forces, and secondarily to guard against a small-scale, unsophisticated attack by Communist China.[36] For example, McNamara estimated that a somewhat stronger system of long-range interceptors, coupled with terminal ABM's around twenty-five U.S. cities, could reduce American fatalities in a nuclear war from 120 million to between 10 and 40 million, at a total cost of about $13 billion.[37] To many, this would seem a small price to pay for insurance against a Soviet attack and for the enhanced credibility of the deterrent that could result from lowering the level of potential damage.

The difficulty is that the maintenance of strategic superiority and/or the establishment of effective defenses depend largely on the forbearance of the opponent. Such forbearance cannot be counted upon. McNamara, in assessing the effect of U.S. ballistic missile defenses, went on to say that the development by the USSR of MIRV's and penetration aids would increase by 50 to 70 million the number of American fatalities, and that the further addition of 100 mobile ICBM's could result in another 30 million deaths, even following a U.S. first strike.[38] As he pointed out, it would be unrealistic to expect the USSR not to take these or other measures to restore its capability for "assured destruction"; hence, the probable result of U.S. efforts to achieve a decisive advantage in either offensive or defensive forces would be to intensify the

[36] *Statement of the President [on Ballistic Missile Defenses]*, p. 1. For a description of the so-called Safeguard system, and an estimate of its capabilities, see *Statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, The Modified Ballistic Missile Defense System,* 91st Congress, First Session, April 16, 1969, especially pp. 7-14.

[37] *McNamara Statement, 1968,* pp. 64-65.

[38] *Ibid.*

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arms race, with each side seeking to counter or offset the partial or temporary advantages achieved by the other.[39]

At best, such a contest could simply re-establish the strategic balance at higher force levels, after immense expenditures. In the process, the fears, tensions and uncertainties it generated would exacerbate relations between the United States and the USSR and increase the danger of war. Alliance relationships might also suffer, for while some among the allies might applaud measures to strengthen U.S. strategic forces, the more sophisticated have already discounted the value of "superiority"; few, if any, would welcome renewed hostility between East and West. Thus if the United States sought to retain a strategic advantage, it might pay a high price, economically and politically, for transitory and largely illusory improvements in its defense posture.

Even if the Soviets chose not to respond in kind to a buildup of U.S. forces, and an arms race did not eventuate, the cost in terms of other U.S. goals might be prohibitive. A U.S. decision to deploy comprehensive ballistic missile defenses could generate new opposition to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by states such as India and Sweden, which already are pressing the superpowers to reduce rather than increase armaments. It might also arouse dissatisfaction among allies left exposed to nuclear attacks against which the United States would be more or less safeguarded, and lead them to clamor for anti-ballistic missiles, for nuclear strike forces, or both. Under such circumstances the prospects for agreement on measures to control armaments, whether globally or in various regions of the world, would seem rather small.

As to the view that American strategic superiority will make the USSR more ready to come to the conference table — which is seemingly held by Senator Richard B. Russell, Secretary of Defense Laird and other influential Americans[40]— both Soviet Premier Kosygin and other authoritative spokesmen have categorized this "as pressure, and as meaning, too, that the United States will continue the arms race. . . ."[41] The Soviets have

[39]*Ibid.* See also *Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the SAFEGUARD Ballistic Missile Defense System,* March 21, 1969, p. 4.

[40]See, for example, the *Baltimore Sun,* April 7, 1969, p. 1; *Philadelphia Inquirer,* January 14, 1969, p. 1; and *New York Times,* January 31, 1969, p. 1.

[41]The Kosygin statement was made to Senators Pell and Gore, and reported by them to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (*Washington Post,* January 23, 1969, p. A21). For other statements, articles and reports expressing similar views, see *ibid.,* January 21, 1969, p. A11, and March 27, 1969, p. A29; also the *New York Times,* March 27, 1969, p. 46, and June 11, 1969, p. 11.

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repeatedly stated that they will agree on nothing less than "equality" with the United States. Even if their objective is only the maintenance of an "Assured Destruction Force," as former Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze suggested,[42] they might be reluctant to acquiesce in a degree of American superiority which could threaten that force. If they are, as some Sovietologists believe, unwilling to tolerate "the kind of imbalance which was so graphically demonstrated in the Cuban experience,"[43] they would be even less likely to accept permanent strategic inferiority. In either case, the United States would be confronted with the choice of forgoing agreement on measures to limit armaments or abandoning its painfully-acquired superiority, one of whose ostensible purposes was to pressure the Soviets into negotiations on arms control.

This is not to suggest that arms control is, in and of itself, the primary objective of U.S. policy, but only to point out that it — along with other objectives — may suffer from attempts to achieve strategic superiority. As long as one side is fearful that the other is seeking military and political advantages from improvements in its strategic posture, tension almost inevitably will mount, discouraging attitudes conducive to peaceful relations. One way to cut this Gordian knot is to stop the arms race. Although the political differences, the strategic asymmetries, and the vested interests of both parties will make this difficult, there are measures which may be more acceptable to both sides than futile efforts to achieve strategic advantages. For instance, the Soviet Union's agreement not to expand its ballistic missile defenses could obviate the need for the United States to install MIRV's, and the stoppage of the Soviet missile buildup could make possible the cessation or reduction of the U.S. program to deploy ABM's — as President Nixon and other officials have suggested.[44] Conceivably, the USSR might be willing to cut back on its force of MRBM's and IRBM's in return for this, plus perhaps some reductions in American intercontinental delivery systems, the common aim being to leave both countries in some crude numerical balance at lower levels of armaments.

Accompanying measures to control military forces and operations might range from setting limits to the deployment in Central

[42] *Hearings on . . . Antiballistic Missile Program,* p. 48.
[43] See the testimony of Dr. Thomas W. Wolfe, of the RAND Corporation, *ibid.,* p. 87.
[44] *Statement of the President [on Ballistic Missile Defenses],* p. 3; *Packard Statement . . . The Modified Ballistic Missile Defense System,* Chart 14.

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Europe of tactical nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, to ending the current naval practice of playing "chicken" on the high seas. The recent reaffirmation by the NATO Ministerial Council of its willingness to consider, at some future time, "mutual balanced force reductions,"[45] affords an opportunity to test repeated communist offers to withdraw or reduce troops in portions of Central Europe — including Czechoslovakia. Also, the implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty could ease, if not end, Soviet concerns about the acquisition by West Germany of nuclear weapons. To a large extent, the fears of both the United States and the USSR about possible aggression feed on the other's military policies and force postures; if the latter can be altered, perhaps the fears may in time diminish.

One should not expect that the kinds of agreements outlined above would automatically insure peace between the superpowers: the ideological differences, clashing interests and opposing objectives of the two countries will undoubtedly involve them in future controversies. Each has, however, developed an interest in avoiding confrontations that might escalate into war. This interest could eventually lead not only to the imposition of controls on the types and uses of military power but to the resolution of political issues such as the nature of relations between Israel and the Arab states and the way to "reinstitutionalize" a now-divided Germany. At the least, the cultivation of common interests would seem to merit equal priority with the maintenance of military strength. For the United States, this could perhaps offer a better route to the achievement of its objectives in the world of tomorrow.

Such alterations in U.S. and Soviet policies will be difficult to achieve. That they may be essential cannot be stressed too strongly. That they should be attempted before the United States embarks on a new armament program is the theme of this article. Prudence requires that the United States follow the advice of former President Johnson and "assure that no nation can ever find it credible to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or our allies." However, it also behooves us to heed his further counsel to do this by slowing down the arms race,[46] as a prelude to the larger-scale understanding toward which both sides have been groping during the past decade.

[45]Communiqué of the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 17, 1968, *New York Times*, November 17, 1968, p. 3.
[46]State of the Union message, January 10, 1967, *New York Times*, January 11, 1967, p. 16.

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THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE*

by Laszlo Hadik

ANY follower of European political developments will agree that events are happening faster than ever before, that the changes are greater than ever, and that many of these changes are both surprising and baffling. The meaning of any one event, let alone of the overall trend, is a matter of debate. Discussion soon surfaces the term détente, and on that concept a new discussion turns. Is there or is there not a détente? Does it signify a real improvement of relations? Can we rely on détente? All of these questions have been answered one way or another, forming the premises of the particular argument being advanced. Little, if any, effort has been spent to define détente, and much less to clarify the difference between various definitions of the concept in terms of its criteria and its content. This article will attempt to clarify the major differences between the European and the superpower uses of the term, tracing also the background of these differences.

Our uneasiness about détente is usually due to overlooking the substantially different ways in which the two superpowers on the one hand and the states of Europe on the other have experienced the past quarter-century. Despite fervent denials by U.S. officials, most recently by Secretary of State Rogers at the November 1969 NATO meeting in Brussels, the United States has become predisposed to view security in Europe in a way that favors the status quo. The Soviet Union, of course, readily denounces any attempt to change the status quo as well as any state which implicitly fails to accept it. The preservation of the status quo is thus implicit in the superpower use of the concept of détente. It is used either in the sense of the absence of tensions and threats in the East-West relationship or to signify an atmosphere in which the opposing side is disposed to make concessions.

By contrast, Europeans have come to view détente as a flexible diplomacy, flux in European relationships, and the opportunity to

*The views and opinions expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not imply the endorsement of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Department of Defense or other agencies of the United States government.

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change the political face of Europe. It has been accompanied by changes in outlook on such issues as the sources of threat and the sources of security. To Europeans, détente has the additional implication that "defense" is no longer considered the sum and total of "security." It has brought with it a willingness to explore and experiment, due undoubtedly to the success of the military alliances of both sides in providing defense for their members. European détente is thus the very process of solving outstanding issues, seeking solutions to international political problems, pursuing neglected or emerging national interests; in other words, the process of seeking "security" in Europe.

Europeans have come to differentiate between the territorial status quo, which cannot be changed without a war and which thus assures their defense, and the political status quo, which *can* be altered and in the changing of which they can see an opportunity to enhance their security. This differentiation between the two uses of status quo and, above all, between the concepts of defense and security, is little understood in the United States today.

It is the thesis of this article that Europeans are profiting from the stability provided by the stalemate of the two alliances: they are using it as a means of altering the political face of Europe so as to provide them greater "security" as well as "defense." This does not imply that they are merely interested in abolishing the two blocs, which could leave the West defenseless according to some pessimistic scenarios. Rather, because adequate defense is a critical condition for détente, it means the construction of an overlapping set of relationships suitable to the pursuit of national interests outside the realm of defense. "Security," being a function of all national interests, is a much broader concept than "defense." Since the present defense system appears to Europeans as incapable of satisfying their "security" needs, the process of creating some sort of security system has been started.

The Superpower Experience

The original concept for establishing European security after the defeat of the Third Reich was that the victorious Great Powers, including the two present superpowers, would act in concert to preserve peace and to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat. This idea was embodied in the UN Security Council setup and in the occupation arrangement for Germany. It

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assumed cooperation among the victors and the need for some measure of agreement on the shape of the European system.

It soon became apparent, however, that the Soviet occupiers in the East would institute political and social systems modeled after their own. Thus, the division of Europe between the Western and the Soviet "spheres of interest" resulted in a division based on contending ideologies. It was due primarily to the ideological basis of communism that Stalin's consolidation policies and Western reconstruction policies were each viewed as hostile by the other side. The existence and success of the respective policies made them a threat to the opposing ideological camp. In this atmosphere, the deterioration of relations between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of defensive alliances and the erection of opposing military establishments.

Peace and security in Europe became founded exclusively on the confrontation of countervailing force. As long as the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, the implicit threat of massive retaliation counterbalanced a Soviet superiority in conventional forces. When the monopoly was broken, the West responded by strengthening its conventional forces. By the late 1950's, peace and security rested largely on the balance of terror, and the arms race in both strategic and conventional weapons continued.

The ideological confrontation patterned the political reconstruction of Europe. In the West it was assumed that communism was expansionist and that Stalin was bent on further conquests in Europe. In the East it was capitalist expansionism that was feared. For its own part, the United States attempted to lead West Europeans in a policy variously known as "liberation" or "roll-back," which would be conducted against Soviet occupation of the East European satellites. Although not to be executed by force or war, this policy required a position of strength from which to negotiate. Soviet policies meanwhile depended on an effective consolidation in Eastern Europe. Restoration policies and strategies were thus based on mutually exclusive models of Europe, which could be resolved only by one side prevailing over the other.

By the mid-1950's, however, it became apparent that the balance of terror on which European security was based was extremely delicate. It was at this point, after the freezing of fronts in the Cold War, that the two superpowers began to assume concerns

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not shared by their smaller allies. Worried about the defense of their respective alliances, they began to fear the catastrophic destructive potential of a miscalculation. This soon overshadowed the potential applicability of the force held by both sides. The only cause important enough to justify the threat of nuclear war was seen to be the prevention of war itself. Thus, any possibility of a European solution based on one side prevailing over the other was dissipating. A confirmation of this came when the West failed to intervene in the 1956 Hungarian uprising, even though this event was tailor-made to the earlier policy of roll-back.

Until the mid-1960's, the decade of superpower policies in Europe can be summed up as a painstaking search first for effective deterrence and then for a stable deterrent relationship between the two power centers. Sharing an anxiety over hair-trigger responses, and a fear of accidental war or the failure of deterrence resulting from minor conflicts, the superpowers consciously constructed a stable balance. This was done in part by unilateral action, such as amassing enormous strategic stockpiles and rendering them relatively invulnerable to an enemy first strike, and also by formal or informal agreements. Among the latter, one can count the tacit recognition of spheres of nonintervention in Europe,[1] the development of certain rules of conduct in confrontations, a recognized disposition to avoid certain types of crisis action in Europe, and a number of arms control agreements such as the test ban, the hot-line and the drafting of a nonproliferation treaty.

The need to stabilize their relationship has helped to condition the European policies of the superpowers. With the exception of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it is in Europe that they have been in constant close confrontation. Because of their face-off, any local crisis has been regarded as a potential threat to the whole structure of mutual deterrence, and thus to stability at the strategic level as well. In crises, the superpowers have appeared to consider their respective allies as less conscious of the stakes involved, less capable of playing the game by the rules of the delicate balance, and less responsible in the use of power than themselves. The Soviet Union, for instance, has never given the German Democratic Republic free rein to harass West Berlin and its access routes. The United States, in turn, has been unwilling to grant

[1] "Spheres of nonintervention" should be distinguished from the oft-proclaimed "spheres of interest," for neither superpower can be uninterested in the other side, especially since ideology plays such an important role in the perceptions and policies of each.

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European members of NATO as great a share of the decision-making prerogative in crisis management and nuclear affairs as some Europeans have demanded.

From the superpower viewpoint, the stability of the system as well as the optimal effectiveness of each defensive alliance has required integration, cohesion and solidarity. They have never ceased to remind their allies that strength for both the defensive-deterrent role and the negotiating role was dependent on a unified position. Each has, therefore, looked with disfavor on independent action by members of its own alliance, while welcoming similar signs of dissension or dissolution in the opposite camp. Each has likewise viewed direct contacts between its opposite number and one of its own allies as divisive and deliberately disruptive: Soviet overtures to West Germany and France, and U.S. contacts with Rumania, and earlier with Poland and Yugoslavia, are cases in point.

Revealing also is the superpower use of the term détente. Ever since the term came into vogue, around the mid-1960's, it has had the connotation of the absence of threat or of the absence of tension caused by threat. Détente has thus been said to exist when East-West relations were improved by some mutual agreement, e.g., the test ban and the Nonproliferation Treaty. The summit meeting at Glassboro, between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin, was hailed as a sign of détente, as have been other hints that the climate for negotiated agreements between East and West was improving.

Damage to détente has been associated with acts or declarations implying an attempt to change the status quo in Europe. The Soviets have branded as destructive of détente improvements in NATO, plans that could be interpreted as giving West Germany a greater role in NATO, the implicit threat against East Germany contained in Bonn's claim to represent all Germans, and acts symbolizing a closer adherence of West Berlin to the Federal Republic. Similarly, the United States has officially denounced as incompatible with détente such acts as the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, such declarations as the Brezhnev Doctrine, and the Soviet claim of the right to intervene in West Germany under the former enemy clauses (Articles 53 and 107) of the UN Charter. In reverse, the superpowers have respectively indicated that credible tokens of détente would consist of major concessions by the other side — a reduction of the U.S. Mediterranean fleet and the elimination of U.S. overseas bases, or Soviet withdrawal

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from Czechoslovakia and permission for the inspection of arms control measures.

In the view of the superpowers, therefore, détente is a condition: there is or is no détente on the basis of some measure of tension or of the cooperativeness of the opposite side. It is on this basis that the United States has warned its European allies that the real willingness of the East to move toward détente must be first tested by its readiness to make concessions.

For these reasons the Europeans — East and West — fear that the superpowers share a view of stability and security in Europe which is both hegemonic and static. Initially, each superpower viewed the stabilization of Europe in terms of the defeat or collapse of the opposing edifice. A gain for one side was by definition a loss for the other. Since then, however, both sides have become strong enough to protect against losses, thereby denying to the other any possibility of a gain. The result is a stalemate, a freezing of Europe into blocs.

The stalemate has brought an era of peace and relative stability to Europe. It has not, however, solved Europe's problems, which include the ratification of territorial changes made after World War II, the continuing division of Germany, and the consequences of the separation of Europe itself into two ideological blocs. The superpowers have continued to hold out hope for such settlements — no longer on the basis of a one-sided rearrangement, but on the basis of negotiated agreements. Most past proposals, going back as far as the 1954 Eden Plan and the 1955 and 1959 meetings of Foreign Ministers in Geneva, proved to be non-negotiable, because they required concessions that were viewed as a loss in the Cold War loss-gain calculus of the superpowers. Others were grand designs that would have upset the balance of power. Current notions of a negotiated settlement, offered as a test of détente in a more cooperative atmosphere, are based on preservation of the balance of power and the stability which has resulted from the stalemated confrontation of two military alliances. Thus, even though the superpowers have appeared willing to discuss improvements in the political climate of Europe, their governing concept has remained that of the status quo.

Europeans have concluded that both superpowers are not only satisfied with the status quo which they cannot alter unilaterally, but also prefer its stability to the uncertainties that might be created by changing it. Neither in a friendly nor a belligerent mood has either superpower indicated serious preoccupation with

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problems that could not be solved within the framework of the present bipolar system. In the static view of the superpowers, the existence or nonexistence of détente is thus a measure of their success in making the status quo more stable and more acceptable.

The European Experience

The same twenty-five years of history are viewed differently from the standpoint of Europe. The sum total of European security interests at the outbreak of the Cold War consisted of defense and recovery, and these were to be found only in close alliance with the respective superpowers. As recipients of both military and economic aid from the United States, which guaranteed them security against aggression and subversion, West European members of NATO willingly submitted to a strict discipline. The regimes in the East were tied to the Soviet discipline on a bilateral basis both because of Stalin's methods and aims and because they were so unstable; the attraction of the strong and prosperous West to their suppressed and dissatisfied populations represented a constant threat.

It was characteristic of the Cold War era that each side viewed bloc solidarity as an attribute of strength. This gave rise to the concept of alignment, resulting in the search for unanimity where possible and in the absolute necessity of gaining respective superpower backing for individual European policies. Because room for maneuver outside the two groupings was nonexistent, in any case, European members of both alliances sought to advance their interests by eliciting support and frequently getting a commitment from the protecting superpower. The two alliances were conceived of by their members as the primary vehicle for a European political settlement. The strength provided by NATO was to be the basis for a restoration conforming to Western goals; the Warsaw Pact held out the promise of frustrating this restoration and creating a new order.

European members of the two alliances thus contributed to the division of Europe. Furthermore, they shared with their superpower protector a concern for strength and solidarity, not so much to stabilize the European confrontation as to enhance deterrence and defense. More conscious of unfinished business in Europe, they were less acutely concerned with stability than the superpowers were. Yet in the early stages of the stabilization process, Europeans too accepted the principle that the more stable the balance of terror the greater their own security.

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Awareness in both Eastern and Western Europe of the political consequences of a more secure and stable balance between the superpowers was slow in coming. These consequences were of two types. First, maintenance of a stable deterrent relationship meant that the superpowers were unable to deliver on their commitment to advance the causes of their allies. Second, stability in Europe allowed Europeans to turn their attention to the problems left unsolved after World War II, made them feel the adverse consequences of Europe's division more keenly, and set in motion a process of change in national outlook and national values.

The division of Germany into two vastly differing social and political systems, several frontier changes, the self-isolation of the East European states, and many lingering hostilities in Europe became a source of worry to those who saw in them the seeds of future conflict. The division of Europe not only violated the common bond that European states have felt despite their frequent conflicts, but showed itself as a serious obstacle to economic growth, especially in the Eastern part of the continent. Finally, elimination of the fear of war in Europe led gradually and unevenly to a changed outlook in which ideology has a diminishing role and there is greater preoccupation with welfare, greater awareness of interdependence, and a willingness to transform Cold War relationships.

The process of détente is a product of these two factors: The confrontation of military blocs has largely eliminated the danger of war in Europe, but neither the blocs nor the superpowers that lead them have become attuned to Europe's emerging needs. In effect, Europeans have begun pursuing their own interests in a variety of ways, giving rise to the enormous growth of transbloc diplomatic activity we have witnessed in the past two or three years. For analytical purposes, one might describe the process of détente as the dialectical interaction of three elements: (1) a growing dissatisfaction with the status quo, (2) gradual espousal of a flexible approach to overcome the status quo, and (3) the exploration and definition of a new system of security in Europe.

The acceptance of Europe's postwar frontiers and of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe may have seemed like resignation to the unalterable, but they were a fact nevertheless. To change the situation in the East would be seen as a threat to the national existence of the states affected, and would constitute a return to the instability of the Cold War era. Acceptance of the status quo was thus a precondition for other changes in Europe.

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However, a distinction between various levels of status quo, which had been impossible to make in the atmosphere of the Cold War, became feasible under détente. As the European nations felt more secure, changes in relationship between states of different social systems, in the perceptions and outlooks of governments, in the aspirations and declared interests of populations and leaders, and in the methods of pursuing policy were no longer inherently threatening to national security. Regimes and leaderships began to react to such changes not by clinging more stubbornly to their positions, but by adapting themselves through modifications in their own outlooks and approaches.

Such a differentiated view of the status quo has permitted the hope that a sufficient number of mutually responsive and reinforcing changes would alter the political climate of the European system, creating a new environment without a threat to peace so that a new system could be constructed. Increasing flexibility in European politics came to represent a method of changing the political status quo peacefully, and thus provides an alternative to the Cold War dilemma of an indefinite stalemate or the triumph of one camp over the other.

In the European pursuit of détente there is an implicit recognition that only by increasing the options of all European actors can the system itself be brought into flux. Some East and West European states have, therefore, acted as though they were looking toward a chain reaction of exploration, experimentation and interaction. Many recent initiatives have been designed not for quick payoff but to set in motion processes whose end result will come much later, after many other changes have occurred.

In sum, while Europeans have perceived the superpowers to be biased in favor of immobility in Europe, their own aim has become to change the status quo. They have not seen the stability established by the two blocs as an end in itself, but as a necessary and welcome condition for regaining their own independence of action and addressing some of Europe's outstanding political problems. European détente relationships, therefore, are characterized by dynamism and flexibility.

The Changed Evaluation of the Threat

There is little question that Western Europe has come to feel safer than ever before from communist attack. East European regimes, with the possible exception of the GDR, have also found

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security against both Western aggression and subversion. In fact, this state of reduced tensions is often erroneously labeled as détente, rather than the process that emerged as a result of it. It is a tribute to the performance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact — or, more precisely, to the stalemated confrontation between them — that there appears to be no present danger to peace in Europe. There is no longer even an arms race at the regional level between the two military alliances, and there has been talk of a willingness to discuss balanced force reductions under certain conditions.[2]

The existence of apparently stable peace has not, however, reduced the preoccupation of Europeans with "security." What has changed is that the threat of war no longer obscures other threats and concerns. "Security" has become a broader concept than "defense" because the national interests that determine it have grown. As new national interests have emerged and as the horizon of European governments has widened, the forms and sources of threat have also expanded. These changing perceptions required a search for means and arrangements to deal with them. For this, political instruments of security have come to encroach upon primarily military ones. Thus, the bipolar alliance system has come under scrutiny from the vantage point of the new perceptions.

At the root of European worries about the present security system is that it is so dependent on the superpowers. While the growing relationship of the alliance leaders has stabilized Europe, Europeans are aware that this may not always be the case. The superpowers have global interests. Their relations may deteriorate dangerously over some extra-European issue such as Cuba, Viet Nam or the Middle East, or as a result of some drastic internal change of regime in one or both of them. In any case, Europeans feel they have almost no control over the European policies of the superpowers at this time, and this state of affairs could pose a threat in the future.

Now that Europe has gained stability and begun to acquire a taste for the fruits of cooperation, even a minor deterioration in superpower relations could be seriously threatening to European interests. A return to the "discipline" of the Cold War or to the overt threats and heightened tension of the immobile years could

[2]Despite some continuing territorial or interstate disputes within the blocs (Transylvania, Cyprus, South Tyrol, Macedonia), there is conspicuously little belligerent action being taken by the disputants, and only in the case of Greece and Turkey can one find evidence of a state arming against its Cold War ally.

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eradicate the progress achieved in gaining mutual confidence among European states.

A more abstract apprehension is that effective mutual deterrence might fail, bringing to an end the present standoff and stability in Europe, which is a precondition for détente. This fear is based not so much on the possibility that the superpowers will in the future court the chance of nuclear war against each other, as that they may risk limited war in Europe on the assumption that such a war between their two sides could remain limited. Europeans find it not inconceivable that the superpowers will stabilize the strategic arms balance between them in such a way as to diminish the value of nuclear deterrence for their respective allies. This could destroy the bipolar defense system founded on mutual deterrence, which Europeans feel is needed as a contingency for some time to come.

As the superpower relationship has begun to take on structured form, Europeans have become apprehensive that in pursuing interests common to themselves the superpowers might violate some vital interest of a European state. This is not necessarily a fear of collusion, but simply a recognition that global powers of nuclear stature may have common interests which supersede the interests of their lesser allies. Already, the changing superpower relationship implicit in a rapid succession of agreements — the Nonproliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a proposed discussion of balanced force reductions in Europe — has strained the European ability to appraise and adjust to its effects.

Perhaps even more real than the threats so far mentioned have been the foreseeable costs existing alliance commitments will impose on Europe in the future. For one thing, the level of armaments and the pace of arms competition tend to be set by the superpowers and tailored to their demands. Both East and West Europeans estimate that a modern army has to be re-equipped once every decade in order to stay abreast of military technology. Even at present levels this is a financial cost European governments cannot be confident of justifying unless the benefits are clearly worth it. There must also be a need for remaining constantly under arms, and this need is not something most Europeans want to perpetuate.

Nonfinancial costs as well, although largely immeasurable and perhaps even illusory, are looming ever larger in European calculations. The constraints placed by Ulbricht's sensitivities upon Hungarian and Czechoslovak attempts to improve relations

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with West Germany — in other words, to pursue détente — provide a lesson that will not be lost on other European states. U.S. petulance toward France for being the first European partner to act on assumptions much like those held by the United States is another case in point.[3] The Soviet Union has dominated its allies in the name of security. Even the requirements for consultation and coordination of policy that alliance membership imposes become burdensome in a period characterized by the increasing attractions and rewards of flexible diplomacy. A capricious veto by one or both superpowers is a threat that worries Europeans.

Taking a West European situation separately for illustration, one can see a further source of threat emerging. Recently, the United States has insisted on maintaining at least the present strength of both U.S. and European forces committed to NATO. Just prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, Washington was making no secret of its desire to reduce U.S. forces. A similar "state of détente" may again raise pressures for reducing U.S. forces in Europe. Washington might make its defense guarantee contingent upon the Europeans maintaining a sufficient conventional force under arms. West Europeans would then remain in a bipolar system in which they held the major responsibility for the conventional defense of one side without a large enough U.S. presence or a European say about the use of tactical nuclear weapons to make the deterrent effect of the whole credible. European security based upon two opposing systems would thus become an anachronism, especially as neither the United States nor the West Europeans would be willing to pay the cost of keeping up a Cold War in order to assure that the other side behaves. If Western Europe's security continues to depend solely on NATO, any doubts about the cohesion of NATO in a low-threat environment constitute a potential danger.

Finally, the European search for a status quo based on new relationships is also sparked by a fear that without a European initiative the superpowers might arrive at dispositions for European security which failed to account for European interests. The worst of these would be a superpower condominium in which the Europeans were intentionally denied a major role and voice. If the superpowers should move from détente to entente and collaboration before Europeans found some substitute for the present bipolar security system, they would lose most of their in-

[3]For an analysis of French security policy, see the author's "France's New Approach to Western European Security," *World Affairs,* December 1969, p. 209.

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dependence of action to a dual hegemony. During 1968-1969, as scholars in Western Europe spent much effort devising and analyzing models of future European arrangements, there was consensus that schemes which perpetuated the division of Europe were neither desirable nor stable.

The Goals: European Security and a Security System

Perhaps the most significant common denominator of the three attributes of European détente is that they are oriented toward change, action, and the future. This implies a purpose and some sort of goal. Both the more proximate and the more distant aims relate to security and are thus interdependent. The former is sometimes defined as a European peace settlement, while the more distant vision is referred to as a European or all-European security system.

The immediate purpose apparent in the actions of détente-oriented Europeans is to address outstanding issues and disputes piecemeal, in an effort to change the political climate of Europe. These might include the improvement of international understanding and communication, the establishment of new relationships and diplomatic practices, and the solution or elimination of contentious problems between states. As models, the postwar settlements of the Saar, Trieste and South Tyrol disputes come to mind, as does the Franco-German reconciliation.

Reference to only a few examples will indicate that this purpose is neither farfetched nor without some promise. Since many of the conflict-prone problems relate to Germany, the piecemeal solution of these has become a goal of both the Federal Republic and some of its interlocutors. The recent rapprochement with Poland was marked by attention to limited specific issues. One of these is the Oder-Neisse frontier, which forms the western border of Poland with East Germany. Bonn's formal acceptance of this frontier would moderate Polish fears that any future German government might reopen claims against Poland for territories lost after World War II. Reconciliation between Poland and Germany would lessen the opportunity for the Soviet Union or others to exploit a potential conflict situation to their own ends. Claims of German revanchism would lose their credibility in Eastern Europe, and thus reduce East European dependence on Soviet "protection."

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In the course of the same Polish-West German exploration, Bonn's leaders have sought Polish guarantees for the continued freedom and independence of West Berlin — whose vulnerability to Soviet and East German threats is one of the more touchy issues in Europe. Once Poland and other East European states give such guarantees in the course of their bilateral "normalization" of relations with Bonn, it is hoped that these states will act to constrain any attempts within the Warsaw Pact to threaten West Berlin. At the same time, one of the subjects the two German governments are expected to discuss is the restoration of economic relations between West Berlin and East Germany. This would enhance the interdependence of the two units, further reducing West Berlin's insecurity.

There is a large component of economic motivation in the growing interaction between Europeans of the rival blocs. However, this does not explain the whole phenomenon. Expanding markets, cost-cutting joint ventures and technological improvements are not the only motives behind East-West economic contacts. East Europeans have their own complex urges, one of which is to achieve greater independence from the Soviet Union for their economies. Another post-Cold War preoccupation that has social and political consequences for change in Eastern Europe is the desire to better the standard of living. A broader aim is also evident in West European overtures toward the East. Deals are no longer based only on barter. The many forms they are taking reflect an effort to eliminate Eastern Europe's isolation, involve it in the growth of Western Europe, strengthen the independence of regimes from bloc constraints, enhance the position of pragmatic and flexible technocrats within the communist countries, and induce the regimes to change their aims, outlooks and opportunity expectations. In this way, it is hoped that a form of East-West interdependence will emerge to reinforce European security.

East Europeans, whose motives in calling for a European security conference are often suspected on the basis of our Cold War experiences, have their own individual purposes. One of these is to reduce the threat inherent in the German problem. Although the division of Germany may appear to them as the necessary basis for a final solution, it is not in itself a solution and the present arrangement does not offer sufficient guarantees for the future. To begin with, the GDR does not yet feel secure enough to end its self-isolation, and therefore acts to constrain the activities of its allies. Second, FRG acceptance of the two Germanys cannot be

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considered final as long as a satisfactory modus vivendi between the two entities has not been achieved. Finally, a U.S.-West German axis, which for East Europeans is the core of the NATO residue, looks to them more like a potential threat than a stabilizing factor. For this reason, they are also interested in gaining West European guarantees that NATO members will not allow the FRG to exploit the alliance and its power against East European interests.

It is clear to East Europeans that they cannot throw off Soviet dominance by force. Predominance in the region is a key factor of Soviet security perceptions. Besides, East Europeans continue to perceive the need for Soviet protection. At the same time, they are increasingly opposed to the potential for interference in their domestic affairs that Soviet predominance offers. They cannot defend themselves against Soviet forces, and therefore their only security against the Brezhnev Doctrine consists in inducing gradual changes in Moscow's perceptions of security needs toward something less paranoiac and less hegemonic and in placing constraints on Soviet intervention. For this reason East Europeans have supported the signing of bilateral agreements renouncing the use of force between states, rather than an East-West agreement between the two blocs. Such agreements are not firm obstacles, but they do have a psychological effect and thus constitute a constraint on the use of force. Much more important is the excuse such agreements would give for members of the opposing alliances to oppose, and exclude themselves from, the use of force by a predominant member of the alliance. This would tend to weaken the offensive potential of the military blocs, without necessarily affecting their defensive potential.

These are only a few of the realistic and practical measures discernible in the current détente efforts of European governments. The goal behind the détente process is more than any one of these, however. It is to change the political climate of Europe through the cumulative effects of such concrete measures so that a new security system can be developed. The concept of all-European security is not merely a slogan for this goal, but a descriptive name for a system whose form and structures are still only dimly perceived. It is possible, nevertheless, to list some of the hopes pegged on such a system and some of the functions it is to perform.

The key to some future all-European security system appears to be interdependence among all of the states of Europe. The object

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is to emphasize common interests and to build from them a web of human, commercial, technological and political ties which will be stronger than the issues that continue to divide Europeans. It is hoped that eventually states will refrain from acting in a hostile fashion in the pursuit of their interests because they have more to lose than to gain from such a stance, rather than because they are effectively deterred through the threat of retaliation. All-European security thus would be based more on cooperation and conflict resolution than on deterrence and a high state of defense preparedness.

Another element of any all-European security system would be the creation of means for resolving conflict peacefully and thus eliminating open eruption and prolonged festering. This is to be approached at first by efforts to build confidence between former opponents, to create incentives for conciliation, and to facilitate compromise. One way of changing the security system in Europe is to induce nations to change their goals from conflicting to compatible ones, thereby eliminating the fear and insecurity that derive from incompatible goals. Much of this can be achieved through harmonization of interests in such indispensable common goals as prosperity, economic development and human fulfillment, as well as the common fear of potentially suicidal war, all of which transcend divisive national interests.

There is in the process of détente an appeal to a sense of common European destiny, mutual dependence and even pride. Implicit in characteristic détente thinking is the specter of an outside threat to Europe, which endangers the security of all Europeans and therefore should concern them all. Europeans view the superpowers ambivalently, as both necessary protectors and potential overlords: they share a common interest in avoiding situations where Europe would be at the mercy of the superpowers and in preventing them from gaining domination over Europe either singly or in concert. Europeans want to be able both to prevent conflicts among themselves and to defend themselves against outside threats.

In sum, Europeans want to create a Europe that is internally and externally safe, especially from the danger of nuclear war; a continent that can exploit its full development potential, that can play a role in the world. One analyst put it this way:

> What is involved is the establishment and stabilization of a state of peace valid for all Europeans and secure within a framework in which they are relatively free to develop. Nothing but a ruling opening the

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way for equal possibilities of development for all European peoples and delimiting equal boundaries to their egoism holds forth the prospect of a peaceful coexistence not jeopardized by internal upheavals.[4]

The distinction between security and defense has led some analysts to call for two overlapping systems.[5] One would be the present system of military alliances which would continue to guarantee the inviolability of national boundaries and keep the price of using force at prohibitive levels. The other would be a security system, whose function would be to harmonize interests, resolve disputes, prevent and control crises, and provide the environment for orderly and mutually beneficial change.

In the search for a new security system for Europe there is no need for imminent structural changes, a *renversement des alliances*, or the sudden abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, although an upheaval of this magnitude may be the ulterior motivation of some. There is, however, an undercurrent to modify national goals and fears, national habits and practices, the environment and relationships, so as gradually to reduce the role of these alliances and minimize the need for them. In this sense, because the alliances represent the commitment and interest of the two superpowers — one of which is also a European state — the search for a new security system does not mean the ejection of the superpowers. All of Europe's small states are likely to insist, especially, on a role for the United States as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

The European Security Conference

Although the importance of the proposed European security conference, or pan-European security conference as it is sometimes referred to, is obscured by the fact that the Soviet Union and its East European allies have taken and maintained the initiative on this issue, it is nevertheless a significant element of the détente process in Europe. It must be understood as part of this process and not dismissed as another disruptive Soviet gambit, because the Europeans are using the conference idea as a vehicle for their own interests.

Having received the endorsement of Warsaw Pact meetings as

[4]Eberhard Schulz, "Reflections on a European Peace Settlement," *The German Tribune Quarterly Review*, December 1969, p. 1, reprinted from *Europa-Archiv*, Number 17/1969.

[5]Such a distinction has been made by André Beaufre in "Security and Defense in Western Europe," Orbis, Spring 1969, pp. 76-86.

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far back as the Bucharest meeting of July 1966, and the somewhat more reluctant endorsement of NATO at its Twentieth Anniversary meeting in April 1969 in Washington, the proposal for a security conference has been placed on the European agenda and a feverish preparatory dialogue between individual European members of the two pacts has begun. East-West contacts have, in fact, increased substantially since the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. This web of bilateral contacts being conducted under the guise of "preparatory work" has speeded up the process of change in European relationships. One might almost say that the "conference" has already begun.

The tendency of U.S. observers has been to place the idea of this Eastern initiative in the context of the Cold War rather than of the détente process and to judge it as such. Some have denounced the conference as a communist plot to create euphoria in Western Europe and bring about the dissolution of NATO and the withdrawal of the United States. The official U.S. line appears to be to downgrade both the threat and the importance of the proposed talks on the ground that they are of interest only as a device to give East European countries greater freedom of contact with the West. In any case, Washington believes that the West Europeans are not greatly interested in such negotiations.

Because the United States has taken the idea of "conference" too literally, it has been U.S. policy in NATO to approach any talks with the utmost caution and only on the basis of a list of specific topics that are "negotiable." This position is quite understandable. If a real sit-down conference were to convene without an agenda of issues that are negotiable and likely to result in agreement, there would be several possible dangers. First, euphoria might result from a great show of meaningless good will by the Soviet Union, something we suspect the Kremlin of being able to turn on and off at will. Another danger is that unreasonably high West European expectations would be dashed by Soviet belligerence, possibly resulting in a temptation to make unilateral concessions so as to restore Soviet friendliness. Third, an unstructured conference might turn into a free-for-all of recriminations and threats which would adversely affect superpower relationships and the SALT talks.

A further important reason why the United States prefers carefully structured talks is that the preparations would lead to a unified position by NATO. It is assumed that members of the Eastern bloc would put up a unified front and, therefore, a

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disorganized West could be in danger of being split. However, it is precisely because of this U.S. predilection to make the talks a bloc-to-bloc discussion that West Europeans are lukewarm about a sit-down conference. They prefer the flexible and selective approach that they have been pursuing with good results in the preparatory phase. Besides, many European leaders, including Chancellor Willy Brandt, believe NATO is not equipped to negotiate European détente, because talks between the pacts are merely alternate forms of negotiation between the superpowers. Brandt has an additional reason to oppose a sit-down conference at this time: the GDR would sit as an equal sovereign state alongside the FRG.

It is natural and reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union would try to control the actions of its allies at a conference. Whether it would be successful is open to debate. East Europeans have shown enough independence in action and motives for one to expect some divergence from the Moscow line. (One must always remember, however, that many East European security interests are identical to those of Moscow.) Given their incentive to retain some freedom of action in European security talks, they may refrain from insisting on a sit-down conference unless the preparatory activity fails to show progress. In any case, this explains why the East Europeans have always insisted on a conference of all European states rather than one between the two alliances.

It is both difficult and risky to postulate Soviet intentions. One can proceed from the worst assumption that the Soviet aim behind the security talks is to disrupt NATO and cause the United States to withdraw from Europe, leaving the field to the Kremlin. Such an assumption alone does not make the conference a threat to Western security, and it is by no means clear that all West Europeans would share the American interpretation. The conference is part of the détente process and not merely another grand design or package deal for gaining unilateral advantages in Europe. There is, of course, a remote danger that the Soviet Union could end up with a peaceful "conquest" of all of Europe, something it was unable to achieve under Stalin. Such a risk does not appear great enough so far, however, to have frightened either East or West Europeans, for whom such a "conquest" would be equally catastrophic.

It is intriguing and in a sense enticing to Europeans that the Soviet Union should be pursuing the European détente option, with all its implications, at a time when it has just gone through a

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traumatic crisis testing bloc cohesion. The thesis that the détente initiative is designed to cover up the memory of the Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Czechoslovakia is not convincing, because the Soviets must be as aware as other Europeans are of the uncertainties en route to détente. By engaging in the SALT talks and in bilateral talks with Bonn as well, the Soviets are showing an interest in détente and the process of European transformation. The question is whether they can control the process so as to gain unilateral advantage.

Implications

What do we gain by looking at the changing European scene as outlined in this article? For one thing, we can decide whether there is détente in Europe, not on the basis of the presence or absence of tension, but on the basis of whether a process of change is under way. For Europeans détente is not a comfortable state of inaction, but an often baffling and sometimes risky pursuit of various interests. Former French Premier Michel Debré epitomized this when he told the French Parliament, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that France would continue to press for détente. Just because there has been a major accident on the road, he said, did not mean that one should no longer use that road, especially if it remained the only road Europeans found worth traveling.

Perhaps the most important implication of the analysis here is that détente is aimed at a gradual transformation of the European political landscape. We should, therefore, expect further changes in outlook and relationships. To a great extent, it is again Europe's hour, made possible by our own efforts to make Western Europe safe from aggression and all of Europe safe from war. The process of détente is the European parallel to our own search for a stable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.

Risks abound in any such process, especially one which has burst out from under the pressure built up by twenty years of East-West hostility and intrabloc conformity. The Europeans are not unaware of these risks, although they may look at them quite differently. For Americans, the greatest risk is to misinterpret these events and their meaning, and thus be out of tune with our allies as well as our own long-range interests. Conceivably, we could bring the process to a halt, but only at the risk of prohibitive damage to our relationships with our own allies, the bloc countries

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and the Soviet Union. A return to the Cold War in order to have a dormant Europe would be absurd.

The chief source of our apprehension seems to be the fact that the Soviet Union is playing the détente game in Europe, even while hanging on to its hegemonic hold over Eastern Europe. There is in this asymmetry a danger of greater "dissolution" in the West than in the East. The American dilemma necessarily follows from the dual role of the Soviet Union as superpower and as European state. Are the Soviets opting for a looser Europe, or is this a predictable consequence of which they are not aware? Or, have the Soviets a different design for exploiting European détente of which neither we nor our West European allies are aware?

The one danger that does not appear to be acute is that we will be excluded against our wishes from participation in the process. Europeans, both East and West, continue to need the U.S. presence and defense guarantee, and it should not be impossible to find a U.S. role commensurate with our interests, Europe's needs, and the changing environment. This is the challenge of European détente for us in the next decade.

One way the United States can and must fulfill its role is to continue to maintain NATO as a "contingent defense system" for the protection of Western Europe and the maintenance of peace on the continent. We and NATO are committed to defending a large portion of Europe. What is this commitment worth if it does not cover our allies in the pursuit of interests they consider vital to their present and future security? Because of the changing environment, which includes a weakening bond of fear, NATO and the NATO concept might have to be modified. We must therefore work closely with our allies to adapt NATO for an equally effective but less costly and less constraining fulfillment of its defense function. We must ignore those pessimists who predict that the process of détente is merely a communist scheme to eject the United States from Europe and dissolve NATO. We cannot let all-European security mean Western insecurity. If Americans understand the process of détente in Europe and learn to participate in it, we might even find a way to reduce our own burden of European defense and thus ensure that we can carry this burden a great deal longer.

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WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: BACKGROUND TO CURRENT ISSUES*

by Wolfram F. Hanrieder

WHEN the coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats took over the Bonn government in October 1969, several major foreign policy projects required immediate attention, if not immediate action. The need for attention had two sources. In the first place, the preceding government, the so-called Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, had all along suffered from a certain immobilism in foreign affairs, which had led to temporizing over specific policy decisions. This was largely the consequence of an intricate political checks-and-balances relationship within the coalition cabinet, which allowed the more conservative CDU/CSU elements, represented by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, to act as a brake on the more innovative SPD elements, represented by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Minister of All-German Affairs Herbert Wehner. As the stagnation of Bonn's foreign policy resulting from this deadlock became even more pronounced, open and acrimonious controversy developed during the last year of the Grand Coalition, when both coalition partners began to look toward the 1969 election campaign in which they hoped to exploit foreign policy issues for political advantage.

A second reason demanding the new government's early attention to foreign affairs was that in the preceding year, during which the Grand Coalition had gradually proved incapable of responding effectively, three major international "events" had challenged Bonn's foreign policy: (1) the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968; (2) the ramifications of the Nonproliferation Treaty, impending American-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks, and Soviet proposals for a European security arrangement; and (3) the confrontation between Bonn and Paris during the "crisis of the franc" in November 1968, and its subsequent reverberations.

These events were of course related, not in a cause-and-effect

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linkage, but in the sense that their underlying causes were connected. They derived from large-scale transformations of the international system: the fragmentation of the two Cold War alliances; the resurgence of Europe; and the nuclear standoff between the superpowers, coupled with the apparent interest of Washington and Moscow in fashioning a détente based on the mutual respect of established spheres of influence. Certainly they were viewed as related in Bonn, because each of them posed serious problems for West Germany in her three traditional and interconnected foreign policy arenas. The invasion of Czechoslovakia held important implications for the question of Germany's reunification; the ramifications of the Nonproliferation Treaty and other military-strategic arrangements affected the Federal Republic's relationship with the East as well as with the United States, the major guarantor of German security; and the currency crisis—having led to a direct confrontation with France, and an indirect one with the United States and Britain—raised questions not only about the international and domestic economic position of West Germany but also about the future of a West European community and the prospects of Franco-German amity.

In what follows, I shall not attempt to predict specific policies of the SPD-FDP foreign policy team led by Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. That would be a hazardous enterprise at a time when the new government is still in the process of formulating a coherent foreign policy program. Rather, my purpose is to spell out some of the background features that emerge from the events of 1968-1969 and that impose major restraints on the future course of German policy.

I

Even before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Grand Coalition's new "policy of movement" toward Eastern Europe had been largely arrested: Bonn's own inhibitions, Moscow's unabated hostility, and the formation of a hard-line East German and Polish response to West Germany's diplomatic initiatives indicated that the success and future potential of this policy were severely limited. All the same, the Soviet invasion dealt Bonn's policy a blow which was not merely tactical.

In the first place, central assumptions of Bonn's long-range unification strategy were undermined when the liberal experiment in Prague was liquidated by the Soviet Union and its client states

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which were unwilling to allow policy deviations that might weaken the bloc's forward position in Central Europe. Moscow's resort to force in this situation made it apparent once again that Bonn's fundamental interest in changing, or at least loosening, the political status quo in Central and Eastern Europe was in direct conflict with the interests of the Soviet Union, which seemed to dictate that the status quo be maintained at all costs. The significance of the invasion was not so much its immediate impact on reunification, for even before August 21, 1968 the prospects for achieving German unity in the foreseeable future were remote. Rather, it was the feeling of frustration and resignation it engendered in Germany. What had appeared to be a rational, temperate, and at least superficially plausible reunification strategy seemed to have been invalidated by international developments, and the tenuous consensus that had been built for it at home over the years faced renewed attacks.

This is not to say that the Grand Coalition's "opening to the East" was ill-conceived. There was considerable merit, moral as well as political, in Bonn's willingness to pursue a policy of reconciliation toward Eastern Europe in the hope that increased contacts would pave the way for a future solution of the German question—or, at minimum, facilitate the rehabilitation of Germany in Eastern Europe. In any case, it was difficult to conceive of feasible alternatives that would not have condemned the Federal Republic to an increasingly outmoded, static and intransigent role in the flexible interplay between East and West that characterized the 1960's. Nonetheless, after the invasion the Bonn government was faced with a significantly different situation. Although the Grand Coalition indicated that it would continue its policy of reconciliation with the Soviet bloc, the obstacles to rapprochement were clearly more formidable than before. There was little reason to expect that meeting Soviet demands would advance the cause of German unity, since it now seemed likely that East European developments favorable to reunification would be met by the Soviets with a physical "veto." Bonn's acquiescence in Soviet demands would only further undermine the familiar foundations of its Eastern policy and arouse domestic criticism.

Second, there was a subtle but direct connection between the new *Ostpolitik* initiated by the Grand Coalition and the events of August 1968. While Moscow was not averse to a bilateral

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Washington-Moscow détente—to arrive at what Yugoslav Foreign Minister Marko Nikezic called "hegemonial coexistence"—the Kremlin was dead set against its allies pursuing dynamic and independent coexistence policies with the Western powers at the periphery of the Soviet bloc, precisely because a polycentric détente might upset the bipolar foundations for a Soviet-American understanding by erasing the clear delineation between the two power centers in Central Europe. The Soviet Union was especially sensitive to foreign-policy "deviationism" in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact for strategic reasons, since this would threaten the Pankow-Warsaw-Prague triangle, the anchor point of Moscow's "forward" policy in Europe. By making closer diplomatic relations with West Germany a divisive issue in the Soviet bloc, the smaller successes of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*—the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bucharest and Belgrade, and potentially with Budapest and Prague—helped start a chain of events that led to a larger failure.

Even so, Moscow might have continued reluctantly to tolerate the increasing economic and political contacts between Bonn and Eastern Europe if by mid-1968 Czechoslovak liberalization efforts had not posed a threat to the continued control of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. Given the new relationships between East European countries and Washington, Paris and Bonn, a drastic transformation of the Czechoslovakian domestic order most likely would have been followed by an equally disturbing reorientation of Prague's foreign policy. This was a risk the Soviet Union clearly was not prepared to take. Since Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was essential for establishing an international setting within which Prague could have extended the liberalization of its domestic policy to foreign policy, the Kremlin's clampdown on Czechoslovakia simultaneously dealt Bonn's Eastern policy a decisive blow.

Third, the "freezing" of the East European political arena against Bonn's probing actions raised the importance to Bonn of Moscow and East Berlin as negotiating partners. Fritz Ermarth suggested in 1969 that:

> After August [1968] it was most difficult to argue that the road toward new East-West relationships in Europe lies through Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest. The keys to Europe lie in Moscow, and Moscow intends to keep them. The impact of this lesson fell most heavily where it was intended to fall—on Bonn. The coalition government of the Federal Republic sensibly resisted the inclination of some West Germans to regard

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Ostpolitik as now a dead letter. But where in the past Bonn saw the most favorable prospects in courting East Europe first, the USSR second, and East Germany third, if at all, after August the USSR emerged clearly as the overwhelming dominant bargaining partner and even East Germany gained in stature after a fashion.[1]

The changed situation greatly complicated Bonn's policy at a time when the three-level Moscow-Eastern Europe-East Berlin approach, featuring a more conciliatory attitude toward East Berlin, had just been put into tentative operation. After years of frustration with a static and apparently hopeless unification program, a more dynamic policy toward Eastern Europe had provided a constructive outlet for West German political energies, especially since Bonn could make use of its economic potential, which it had long sought to convert into a political asset. But West Germany's increasing economic influence, which provided Bonn with considerable leverage in Eastern Europe, was much less effective as an instrument of foreign policy toward East Germany and the Soviet Union.

In addition, the "freezing" of Eastern Europe reversed the polycentric trend of the early and middle 1960's in the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance, which had increased the importance for German reunification not only of the East European countries but also of Germany's Western neighbors, notably France. The diminished prospects for creating de Gaulle's "European Europe," within which a solution to the German question might be achieved, renewed the pre-eminence of the Washington-Moscow relationship—at a period, however, when it appeared that the United States and the Soviet Union had tacitly agreed to respect one another's spheres of influence. The "condominium" world system to which both superpowers apparently aspire is fundamentally conservative and hence lends considerable support to Moscow's attempts to solidify the political status quo in Eastern and Central Europe. Bonn's old fears that an East-West détente would be achieved on the basis of a divided Germany thus seemed not entirely unfounded. An even more serious implication was that in the rudimentary Soviet-American condominium of the 1960's the vital interests of the Soviet Union and East Germany (as they were perceived by the governing elites) might be more complementary than those of the United States and West Germany.

[1]Fritz Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-5909-PR, March 1969), p. 121.

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Most important, perhaps, this asymmetry in the relationships between the two German states and their respective superpower partners was brought to the fore by the Soviet invasion at a time when intensified contacts between the German governments appeared to be indispensable if any progress on the German question was to be achieved. The Soviet invasion, by dramatically underlining the importance of the East Berlin regime for West Germany's reunification efforts, also showed that Bonn's hard-line posture toward East Germany during the last two decades had produced serious liabilities. Even though the Grand Coalition seemed prepared to initiate a more accommodating attitude, so as to live with East Berlin in a state of "cooperative division," the burdens of Bonn's past policy lay heavily on the Kiesinger government. During the Adenauer and Erhard years, Bonn had sought to isolate the Pankow regime from its communist neighbors and its own people and to deny the reality of the existing order in East Germany. By refusing to grant East Germany formal recognition as a state, Bonn in effect imposed harsher conditions for a normalization of relations on East Berlin than it did on the East European capitals. This punitive double standard was in a sense re-emphasized by the Grand Coalition's drastic revision of the Hallstein Doctrine as a result of exchanging ambassadors with Bucharest and Belgrade. The revision weakened Bonn's claim to be the sole representative of all Germans but did not lead to a reversal of its nonrecognition policy toward East Germany.

Despite the hostility and suspicion engendered by the long series of confrontations between West and East Germany, it was of course recognized in Bonn that German unity depended in the long run on the willingness of both German states to arrive at a mutually acceptable political order for a reunified (or even confederated) Germany. This implicitly conciliatory aspect of Bonn's policy, which necessarily had to view East Germany as a potential partner rather than as its target, was enhanced by the widespread desire to establish closer contacts with East Germany and to encourage an internal liberalization of its regime.

The contradictions between the punitive and the conciliatory aspects of Bonn's policy could be only superficially reconciled with the argument that the former was directed toward the regime and the latter toward the people of East Germany. The East German regime has not been entirely unsuccessful in gaining support for the sweeping economic, social and political trans-

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formations it has initiated since 1949. The two German state structures have evolved along very different lines during the past two decades, with a corresponding development toward divergent rudimentary "political cultures," and it is highly doubtful that the people of East Germany, given a free choice, would wish to be simply plugged into the institutional, political and socio-economic system of the Federal Republic. Unpopular as the East German regime may be in certain respects, its undeniable economic and social achievements, with which many East Germans can identify because they have made them possible with their own labors and sacrifices, make it psychologically hazardous for outsiders (and perhaps especially for West Germans) to denigrate the regime too indiscriminately.

Aside from the opposing interest calculations of the East German regime, and the overall restraint mechanisms of the Soviet bloc that bear on the German question, Bonn most likely added to its difficulties with Pankow by conducting its reunification policy over the years in a style that could not help but grate on the political sensitivities of East German decision-makers. There is a special psychological edge to the enmity between "brothers," and even the Grand Coalition's principle of "acceptance without recognition" was not sufficiently positive to cut through long-accumulated layers of ill will. Bonn's softened attitudes have seemed to stem, not from a fundamental rethinking of the German question, but from an externally imposed, and grudgingly accepted, need to adjust to changing circumstances.

All this complicated Bonn's contacts with East Berlin as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia strengthened (at least temporarily) the bond between Moscow and East Berlin, and when Bonn's relations with Washington appeared to be rather strained.

II

Contributing to this strain were the differences of opinion over the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). One need not go to the extreme of characterizing the NPT as a new Versailles or Yalta (as some of its German opponents have done) to acknowledge that the treaty reflects primarily the common interest of the sponsoring parties to forestall further nuclear proliferation—a common interest which was enunciated largely without Germany's participation, and which was viewed by key figures in Bonn as contrary to German interests in several important

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respects. Among the objections voiced to Germany's ratification of the NPT, those based on political calculations are probably the most important. It is true that the Grand Coalition played down two aspects of ratification that had preoccupied the Erhard government: the possibility of linking the Federal Republic's nuclear self-denial with progress on the German question, and the hope of obtaining nuclear co-ownership within the context of an allied nuclear force or a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). Even so, the Grand Coalition obtained written assurances from Washington that the NPT, although precluding the formation of a NATO nuclear force, would not prevent the formation of a European nuclear force in the event that a politically united Europe would come into being; the government was also careful to stress that West Germany's participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group should not be regarded as a substitute for a German role in a European nuclear force.

Two political dimensions of the NPT are especially noteworthy. The first is the unfortunate connection of the NPT with the MLF episode, which still produces subtle reverberations in Bonn; the second pertains to the European arms control schemes that the Grand Coalition had hoped to put in the service of its reunification policy.

It will be recalled that after Bonn had committed itself fully to an MLF scheme in the early 1960's, the scrapping of the MLF by the Johnson Administration caused Chancellor Erhard considerable embarrassment on both the domestic and international political scenes. Erhard, in the face of strong French objections, had consistently supported American policy (and had relied on Johnson's readiness to reciprocate) by assenting to the MLF, apparently in the hope that it would provide Bonn with a bargaining lever vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on the German question. This anticipated leverage, which was probably illusory to begin with, obviously required continued and forthright American endorsement of the MLF—especially since de Gaulle had indicated that German participation in the force, by tying Bonn too closely to Washington, would stand in the way of a "European" solution to the German question—the only kind of solution he would support. In pushing for the MLF the Federal Republic had thus run the danger of becoming diplomatically isolated on its unification policy without gaining, on the military-strategic level, more than a token of joint nuclear control.

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It was precisely the implied anti-Soviet dimension of Bonn's MLF policy that forced Washington to scrap the project, because two of the Johnson Administration's most cherished foreign policy goals—a détente with the Soviet Union and an arms control agreement—required the Kremlin's cooperation. Negotiations for the NPT were already well under way, and the Soviet Union had repeatedly made it clear that Washington would have to choose between the treaty and the MLF. Against this background, it is not surprising that the NPT idea had met with a cold reception in Bonn from the beginning. Considering the far-reaching repercussions of such an arrangement for German foreign policy, the Bonn government was probably justified in complaining that it had been insufficiently consulted; the connection between the MLF debacle and American nonproliferation efforts was hardly designed to put to rest German fears of a Soviet-American deal made over the heads of the German government.

The NPT was also viewed as affecting the opportunities for establishing European security and arms control arrangements. The various proposals for a European security pact and other military détente measures put forth in Western and Eastern Europe in the last couple of years have seemed to reflect a limited consensus within both blocs that the relevance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact was diminishing as a consequence of changing political and strategic circumstances, and that a formalized military détente would be mutually advantageous. Several of these proposals not only stressed the desirability of creating immediate arrangements for the *control* and *management* of conflict situations, but pointed out opportunities for the final *resolution* of conflict. In other words, military security arrangements were expected to further a political reconciliation through increased East-West contacts and cooperative economic and diplomatic maneuvers, thus holding out hope that the unresolved political problems of Europe, such as the division of Germany, would become more manageable.

Ever since the 1950's, these two distinct aspects and purposes of a European arms control arrangement—the military aspect, conflict control, and the political aspect, conflict resolution—had posed a painful dilemma for Bonn. Although conflict control and crisis management were even more important to Germany than to its allies because of Germany's forward position, the Bonn government invariably felt obliged to reject proposals for a European

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arms control system because such proposals seemed to portend not a genuine resolution of outstanding conflicts but the legitimization of the status quo in Central Europe. Although the East-bloc proposals of the 1960's could also be interpreted in this light, the Grand Coalition was willing to reverse the Adenauer and Erhard governments' position that progress on reunification would have to precede an East-West détente, and to at least consider putting arms control measures in the service of détente efforts which might further the cause of German unity. In fact, Bonn put forth its own ideas on a European settlement and suggested that such matters be discussed within the Harmel Committee, which was established in 1967 to assess the future tasks of NATO.

But, despite the intrinsic merit in attempts to control nuclear proliferation, the NPT does not seem to hold out much promise that nuclear self-denial on the part of Germany will lead toward a Central European settlement. For Bonn there still exist the old incongruities between aspects of conflict control—toward which the NPT may perhaps be able to contribute—and aspects of conflict resolution, toward which the NPT contributes little, not being tied to progress on political issues. Although the hesitations about the NPT expressed by the moderately conservative elements in the Grand Coalition, notably Chancellor Kiesinger, were more subtle than Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder's announcement in 1965 that Germany would renounce nuclear capabilities only if the Soviets would not obstruct German reunification, there was still a good deal of reluctance to sign the NPT without a tangible *quid pro quo*.

The disagreements between Bonn and Washington over the NPT were underlined by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the first place, the invasion demonstrated unequivocally that the Soviet Union was determined to maintain control over the part of Central Europe that lies within its sphere of influence (i.e., it was determined to oppose a resolution of conflict acceptable to Bonn), thus diminishing Bonn's major long-range incentive for acceding to European arms control measures. Secondly, the Western powers' response to the invasion demonstrated that their incentives for conflict control remained unimpaired after Czechoslovakia, because they stemmed from abiding national interests in military stabilization and political détente in Central Europe. For Bonn's allies, conflict control was and is much more relevant

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than conflict resolution, since they have no major political demands to make on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This lack of congruence between the interests of West Germany and those of her allies is one of long standing, but it was re-emphasized by the Soviet invasion. The invasion had a much more damaging effect on the prospects for conflict resolution than on the prospects for conflict control: President Johnson was eager to resume bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control and continued to press Bonn for its signature on the NPT.

The entire question of the NPT and arms control arrangements highlights a trend that began with the various disengagement proposals of the 1950's: All major participants in the East-West dialogue on arms control use "security policy" to articulate and advance political objectives. Although Pierre Hassner's observation that "Today, the search for a European security system has nothing to do with any direct search for security . . . and can be based only on political objectives,"[2] is something of an overstatement, this general phenomenon has led to a situation not only where technical military matters are subject to political guidance—which is the way things should be—but where the solution to political problems is sought in pseudo-military arrangements. This trend toward translating political concerns into military-strategic rhetoric poses special problems for Bonn, because in this area the Germans must speak softly indeed. Bonn's implied threats of the past to carry a big stick through joint nuclear control, or to obstruct progress on a détente by opposing the NPT, met considerable opposition from her allies as well as her opponents; the more cautious attitude of the Grand Coalition on this question stemmed from a realistic reappraisal of the limits and opportunities of German policy.

The international system's shift from Cold War to coexistence reduced Germany's leverage within the alliance, and Bonn could never have hoped (even if it desired) to emulate de Gaulle's independent political and military course. Instead, the German government was forced to make painful choices between Paris and Washington—without being able to exploit this pivotal position, owing to contractual, political and psychological restraints.[3]

[2]Pierre Hassner, *Change and Security in Europe, Part I: The Background*, Adelphi Paper No. 45 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1968), p. 4.

[3]This does not mean that the political elements in Germany which opted for either a pro-American or pro-French foreign policy stance had their positions aligned with those of Washington or Paris. As Fritz R. Allemann pointed out in

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Unwilling and unable to loosen her indispensable security ties to the United States, West Germany incurred the opposition of France and the Soviet Union—the countries holding the keys to those German foreign policy goals that (unlike the goal of security) the United States could not significantly advance by herself.

III

In a sense, Bonn's reduced political leverage within the Western alliance was one of the contributing causes that led to the currency confrontation of November 1968. Some of these causes deserve a brief summary, not only because they provide background for the currency crisis but also because they indicate some linkages between it and the ramifications of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Nonproliferation Treaty.

After de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, Adenauer and de Gaulle developed a special understanding that Bonn would, as much as possible, support France's Atlantic and European policy if France would support Bonn's Eastern policies. France sometimes ignored this understanding (as when de Gaulle recognized the Oder-Neisse line in 1959), but it seemed solidly based on the mutual assumption that France and Germany were equal partners in a common European enterprise, an assumption also reflected in the provisions of the Franco-German friendship treaty of 1963.

Undoubtedly, Ludwig Erhard was remiss in failing to nurture this special relationship with greater devotion and circumspection. But the larger reasons why de Gaulle allowed the understanding to lapse were essentially beyond Bonn's control because they stemmed from fundamental shifts of power and alignment in the international system: Germany, which had played a crucial role during the Cold War phase of the postwar era, lost some

1967: "The 'Gaullists,' while eager to move closer to Paris, did not at all see eye to eye with President de Gaulle's Eastern European policies and were rather frightened by his visions of a Greater Europe embracing the Communist East. The 'Atlanticists' were lured by the dream of German participation in nuclear defense and of a kind of 'special relationship' between the United States and the Federal Republic, even long after it had become clear that Washington had dropped the MLF concept and was as interested as de Gaulle himself in furthering an understanding with the Soviet Union and with Moscow's Eastern European allies. To a large extent, the controversy between these schools of opinion was something like a tragi-comedy of errors: the German clients of France and America still fought out battles which their foreign friends had already abandoned. In reality, however, these battles only masked a fight for power which had little to do with ideological labels." "The Changing Scene in Germany," *The World Today*, February 1967, p. 54.

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influence in Western councils during the coexistence phase and was at times viewed (especially during the Kennedy Administration) as an irritating obstacle to a more flexible American global policy. France, on the other hand, gained considerable leverage from the fragmentation of bipolarity because the new international system provided Paris with a range of opportunities to restore flexibility and dynamism to French foreign policy.

An essential element of de Gaulle's reorientation of French policy was a loosening of ties with the Western alliance and a corresponding establishment of closer contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Both dimensions raised some awkward problems for Bonn. To be sure, de Gaulle's argument that the division of Germany could be overcome only through the reconciliation of Eastern and Western Europe was also being voiced in Bonn and was reflected in the more flexible Eastern policy of the Erhard and Kiesinger governments. But the French and German approaches were not coordinated, nor were their underlying purposes altogether complementary. The principles of "détente, entente, cooperation," which de Gaulle held out to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, clearly implied the exclusion of the United States from a European settlement—a prospect that was unacceptable to Bonn.

The lack of policy coordination added a competitive edge to French and German efforts to revitalize relations with the East. In this competition Germany was at a distinct disadvantage. Bonn's flexibility was curtailed by close alignment with the United States; the Germans were seriously handicapped in seeking a rapprochement by the burdens of the past as well as by the ineptness of their previous policies; and the hostile relations between Bonn and Moscow deprived Bonn of effective access to the center of Soviet power in the Kremlin. With each new Gaullist success in Eastern Europe, there was an increasing suspicion in Bonn that de Gaulle intended to place German reunification policy under French tutelage (with France acting as a broker rather than as Bonn's partner) or, even worse, that de Gaulle was toying with the idea of returning to his postwar plan for a Franco-Soviet understanding.

The end of the Franco-German understanding on Eastern policy affected all aspects of Franco-German relations (which were already strained because of other issues, such as the future of the Common Market), and disagreements became even more

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pronounced after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This event, which undermined German as well as French assumptions about future developments in Eastern Europe, reportedly gave rise to serious recriminations between de Gaulle and Kiesinger: de Gaulle echoed the Soviet argument that West Germany was to blame for the invasion because its aggressive economic policy and great economic power would have exerted an irresistible drawing power on an independent Czechoslovakia, and Kiesinger remonstrated that de Gaulle's encouragement of centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet bloc had caused more trouble than any German policies.

When, a few months afterward, the crisis of the franc pitted French interests directly against German interests, strong emotions were aroused on both sides. Both sides viewed the immediate economic issue as inextricably tied to fundamental political questions. De Gaulle clearly intended to impose his will on Bonn once again and to extract concessions that would leave French prestige and political-economic maneuverability unimpaired. The Germans felt that their prosperity was well earned, and that they were being asked to pay the price for the inflation in France, caused in part by the exorbitant costs of such Gaullist trappings of power as the *force de frappe,* which, in turn, were being used by de Gaulle to impose his foreign policy conceptions on Bonn.

Most likely, de Gaulle's decision not to devalue the franc was influenced by the humiliating circumstances in which the devaluation would have been carried out and by his resentment of the way the strength of the German economy was translated into political power at the November 1968 Bonn meetings. The irritations that had been building up on both sides during years of controversy clearly made the outcome of the currency confrontation a question of national prestige, and lent the crisis psychological as well as economic and political significance. While de Gaulle "lost" at the Bonn conference, the Germans also paid a heavy political price for their "victory." Their demonstration of economic power created a community of interest among France, Britain and the United States, since all three countries suffered from balance of payments difficulties that would have been ameliorated by the revaluation of the mark, and since de Gaulle's decision not to devalue the franc provided a welcome breathing spell for the ailing pound and dollar. Thus Bonn found itself in the uncomfortable and unusual position of being opposed

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by its three major allies simultaneously—a position even more awkward than having to choose sides between Washington and Paris.

Most damaging in the long run was the blow dealt to the remnants of Franco-German amity. In taking uncompromising and psychologically charged stands on the revaluation issue, both sides showed a lack of imagination and circumspection. The Germans, deeply aware of and frustrated by the disparity between their economic power and their political influence, found in the currency crisis an irresistible opportunity to demonstrate to their allies (and to themselves) the continuing importance of Bonn in Western councils. De Gaulle, who had consistently nourished German frustrations by brusquely treating Bonn as, at best, the junior partner of the Franco-German entente, approached the crisis with his usual arrogance, taking it as a matter of course that rules of reciprocity would be suspended in favor of France.

The Germans also paid an economic price. There was by no means unanimous agreement in West Germany that the government's refusal to revalue the mark was based on sound economic reasoning. Since the taxation of exports and the subsidy for imports (to which Bonn had agreed as a substitute measure for revaluation) applied only to manufactured goods—it excluded services, agricultural products and capital transactions—the burden of the government's decision was placed primarily on export-sensitive sectors of the economy without much benefit accruing to the German consumer. The government was consequently accused of sacrificing the interests of German export industries for the purposes of German foreign policy. Most monetary experts viewed the taxation of exports as at best a stopgap measure, which, by leaving open other options for the future, was intended to strengthen the government's hand during negotiations on more fundamental reforms of the international monetary system.

The Pompidou government's decision of early August 1969 to devalue the franc by 12.5 per cent followed in the wake of a new "crisis of the franc" in early May, which was the direct result of de Gaulle's resignation and followed roughly the same pattern as the crisis of November 1968. During the May 1969 crisis, the Bonn government renewed its pledge not to revalue the mark—a decision a government spokesman called "final, unequivocal, and for eternity"—but in contrast to November 1968, there was relatively little international agitation and acrimony.

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The repercussions of Bonn's refusal to revalue were mainly felt in domestic politics, where the opponents of revaluation (most prominently, Finance Minister Strauss and Chancellor Kiesinger) engaged the proponents (most prominently, the Economic Minister, SPD member Karl Schiller) in a bitter battle that extended all the way through the election campaign in September.

The French devaluation move, however, once again raised intricate issues between Paris and Bonn, largely in the context of the Common Market's farm pricing system. The major problem, intensely discussed in Brussels among the finance and agricultural ministers of the Six, was how to adjust the Common Market's uniform support levels for farm prices to the devaluation of the franc. Since EEC farm prices are based on a unit of account equal to one American dollar, French farmers would have gained by the amount of the franc's devaluation, with the result that overall price increases would have diminished the anti-inflationary effects of the franc's devaluation and pushed EEC farm surpluses (already high because of price supports) to even higher levels. The solution finally accepted—suspension of uniform support levels for farm products and a twenty-eight-month "isolation" of the French agricultural market—had several important implications.

In the first place, the sealing-off of the French farm market required Pompidou to reverse temporarily de Gaulle's policy of insisting on a common agricultural policy among the Six, with the result that painfully forged agreements were being watered down and the cohesion of the Market was suffering. Second, it set a precedent that could work to Britain's advantage in seeking Common Market membership: Once exceptions were made on the sensitive issue of farm products for France, a country that had all along insisted on the speedy establishment of a common market for agricultural products, exceptions might also be made for Britain, whose major economic reservations about joining EEC were centered precisely on the fear that agricultural obligations resulting from membership would raise food prices in Britain. Moreover, President Pompidou had previously demanded that prior to a reopening of negotiations on British membership, the Common Market members would have to agree on final farm financing regulations, a condition which seemed much more difficult to meet now that the common farm program was suspended. Finally, the August 1969 negotiations in Brussels

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demonstrated again that some of the issues dividing Germany and France could not be attributed solely to the personal idiosyncrasies of the decision-makers in Bonn and Paris but stemmed primarily from genuine economic and political conflicts of interest.

These conflicts of interest, especially within the context of the Common Market's agricultural financing system, became evident again as a result of the Grand Coalition's last major decision (made a day after the September 28 elections),[4] which effected a *de facto* upward revaluation of the mark. In order to forestall a new monetary crisis, the caretaker Bonn cabinet instructed the German central bank to cease its buying-and-selling operations —which had maintained the parity of the mark within the one per cent parity fluctuations allowed by the International Monetary Fund—thus detaching the mark from its internationally agreed "pegs" and letting the rate "float" upward. In short, the Bonn government temporarily allowed supply-and-demand factors to determine a new parity level. Over the next four weeks, the central bank guided the mark on a steady upward course by feeding out dollars, and on October 24, the new Bonn government under Chancellor Brandt officially revalued the mark by over 9 per cent, thus returning the German currency to the fixed-parity system. While these steps were strongly welcomed by Bonn's trading partners, the revaluation of the mark automatically reduced the income of German farmers because of the Common Market's farm financing rules; and West Germany's EEC partners were extremely reluctant to aid the Bonn government in compensating German farmers for an estimated $425 million annual loss, thus further aggravating tensions within the Market at a time when the Pompidou government was determined to settle the agricultural issue to France's satisfaction before agreeing to consider Britain's entry.

[4]The results of the 1969 elections were as follows:

	Percentage of Votes	Bundestag Seats
CDU/CSU	46.1%	242
SPD	42.7	224
FDP	5.8	30
NPD	4.3	—
Others	1.1	—
Total	100.0	496

The SPD-FDP coalition cabinet established consisted of eleven members of the SPD (including the Chancellor), three members of the FDP, and one nonparty member.

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IV

The magnitude and range of the issues that emerge from the developments of the last few years will tax the ingenuity and stamina of the new Bonn government to the utmost—both on the international and on the domestic political scene.

On the international scene, the continuing reverberations and unresolved challenges of the events of 1968-1969 immediately placed the Brandt government in a *Zugzwang* situation—a situation forcing Bonn to make specific foreign policy moves—as exemplified in the October decision to revalue the mark officially. At the time of this writing, December 1969, several issues are pressing in on it, none of which can be resolved separately or on an *ad hoc* basis because they are too closely interconnected and require a coordinated set of responses. Above all, the SPD-FDP coalition is committed to making renewed efforts toward a solution of the German question—efforts whose maximum feasible aim for the foreseeable future is not the reunification of Germany on the basis of "self-determination," but at the most a loose East-West German "confederation" with an acceptable and stable status for West Berlin.

This "new" *Ostpolitik* is based on a long-range strategy which is once again consciously focused on Bonn's three major political arenas in the East: East Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. With respect to East Germany, the new West German government has already signaled its willingness to initiate a more accommodating and realistic policy by (1) dropping its traditional claim to sole representation of all Germans (which amounts to the final scrapping of the Hallstein Doctrine and its diplomatic sanctions against Third World countries that recognize East Germany), and (2) coining the slogan of "two German states within one German nation," which implies the acceptance of the East German government as an equal partner of the Bonn government but falls short of the recognition of East Germany as a foreign state under international law.

In its approach to Eastern Europe, Bonn has persuasively expressed the desire for rapprochement by taking concrete steps which buttress its credibility: For example, a bilateral Polish-West German renunciation-of-force agreement, coupled with the recognition of the territorial status quo (that is, acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line), has been officially endorsed by Bonn and seems a real possibility. Understandably, the German govern-

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ment has been extremely reticent about renewing efforts toward rapprochement with Czechoslovakia, since the continuing process of reconsolidating Soviet control in Prague would subject an active German policy to the charge of meddling in communist-bloc affairs and would jeopardize Bonn's entire *Ostpolitik*.

With respect to Moscow, the new government was convinced at the start that West Germany's attempts to improve relations with the Kremlin would have been discredited if her leaders had persisted in dragging their feet on the Nonproliferation Treaty or had unearthed new objections to her accession. Significantly, as soon as the Bonn government announced its readiness to sign the treaty, both Washington and Moscow completed the process of ratification, thus clearing West Germany of the onus of blocking a major step toward East-West détente. Nonetheless, the progress from signature to ratification by the Bundestag may not be rapid and may become geared, at least tacitly, to developments on other issues of critical importance to Bonn.

Outstanding among those issues are the security position of the Federal Republic, as it may be affected by the future viability of NATO and the outcome of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, and the (indirectly) related question of the future size and functions of the Common Market. Undoubtedly, the new government is determined, as has been every preceding German government, to make close German-American cooperation within and outside NATO the backbone of German security policy. Helmut Schmidt, the new Minister of Defense, has long been recognized as one of Bonn's most sophisticated analysts of strategic questions, and all indications suggest that the Brandt government will press for effective German-American or NATO consultative arrangements on allied strategy and contingency planning. Bonn recognizes, however, that the preliminary as well as subsequent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks will extend over a considerable period of time, and that it would be too early (and politically inadvisable) for Germany now to express political-strategic concerns beyond the legitimate desire to be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.

The new government has been far less reluctant to spearhead the drive for an enlarged membership of the Common Market, and especially for the inclusion of Britain. Both the Social Democrats and Free Democrats have for a long time called for the entry of Britain into the EEC, and the Brandt-Scheel foreign policy program assigned a prominent place to it. German efforts

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in this direction were at least partially successful at the Hague EEC "summit conference" in early December, when France agreed to begin negotiations by the middle of 1970 at the latest with the parties seeking admission, provided that the difficulties of finally reintegrating the agricultural sector of the Common Market could be ironed out among the present members. Even so, these discussions over British accession will, similar to the Soviet-American arms limitation talks, most likely extend over several years; meanwhile, the Brandt government is clearly determined to engage in an active Eastern policy.

The entire Common Market issue is related, at least indirectly, to the possible repercussions of the Soviet-American arms limitation talks. There was wide speculation in Europe in the summer and fall of 1969 that these talks might lead to the limitation and control of nuclear arms within NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as to military disengagement measures that might significantly reduce American conventional forces in Germany. In such circumstances, a reported British proposal for nuclear sharing within an enlarged West European community, which would provide an independent European deterrent based on British and French nuclear forces, might prove attractive to Britain's future EEC partners. Because France is notably unenthusiastic about German access to nuclear decision-making, an intricate bargaining relationship may develop between London, Paris and Bonn, in which Britain's accession to the Common Market may be a crucial element. Obviously, the mere possibility of such developments would have a direct bearing on Bonn's security and Eastern policies, and would add new significance to the October 1969 Warsaw Pact proposal for a European security conference.

The feeling of flux and the expectation of new opportunities that permeate Europe in the winter of 1969-1970 raise intricate issues for Bonn on the domestic political scene. The senior partner in the various Bonn coalition governments for two decades, the Christian Democrats have not yet fully adjusted themselves to the unaccustomed role of opposition party. Nonetheless, they are clearly determined to act as a vigilant, exacting and vociferous critic of the SPD-FDP coalition, not least on foreign policy questions. The government's decision to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and to advance with determination its new German and Eastern policies stirred up a lively debate in the Bundestag, where the new coalition commands only a slim majority. At the same time, the CDU/CSU leadership is divided over the party's

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unimpressive showing at the September elections (a fact demonstrated at the party conference in Mainz in November), and the heterogeneously constituted CDU/CSU may be especially vulnerable to the centrifugal forces that assail a political party after its removal from office. Many of the younger, up-and-coming leaders see in the enforced role of opposition an opportunity to reorient and revitalize the party and purge it of the entrenched leadership. CSU leader Franz-Josef Strauss has adopted a wait-and-see attitude which is implicitly and potentially directed not only against the SPD-FDP government—whose foreign policy conceptions he views with extreme skepticism—but also against the CDU's top leaders who stand in the way of his aspirations to become Chancellor. Even with a weakened and as yet insecure opposition, however, the Brandt government will have to exercise extreme caution in seeking to build and maintain a solid domestic consensus for its foreign policy departures.

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WEST GERMANY'S OSTPOLITIK: I, INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS*

by Josef Korbel

THE results of the national elections in the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1969 and the formation of a new government coalition, composed of the Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, opened another phase in the perennial efforts of the Bonn government to solve the complex problem of divided Germany. The new coalition is committed to a vigorous pursuit of constructive contacts with the German Democratic Republic which it expects will lead, on some far-off day, to the ultimate goal of reunification. The start is impressive and appears promising. However, "words, words, words" may again — as often in the past — serve only to obscure the Hamlet-like distance between dreams and realities. The complexity of this problem extends in many respects beyond the control of the new government. This study will attempt to judge the prospects for intra-German developments in the light of past experience and in the context of Bonn's overall policy toward the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.

I

The reunification of the country was for twenty years one of the principal goals of the West German government's foreign policy. Its strategy has now undergone a drastic change.

Konrad Adenauer based his policy on two assumptions: reunification, according to the Potsdam Agreement, was a responsibility of the Big Four, and Germany must be rehabilitated politically and economically and integrated with the West *before* she could challenge Soviet control over East Germany. He explained his attitude in his memoirs: "If we do not cooperate with the West the reunification will not progress one step. The reunification in freedom will come only in the framework of a resolute policy of the West."[1] He wanted to act from a position of

*EDITOR'S NOTE: A second article by Dr. Korbel, treating of West Germany's relations with the East European countries, will be published in the Summer 1970 issue of ORBIS.

[1]Quoted from Rainer Waterkamp, "Politische Optionen für Europa-und Deutschland-Frage," *Aussenpolitik*, January 1968, p. 24.

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strength and to expose the absurdity of a divided Germany by a complete isolation of the Soviet satellite. In 1962 he did offer Moscow — more as a gesture than in expectation of any positive results — a ten-year *Burgfrieden* (truce) on the German question, if East Germany were granted some freedom and later permitted to hold a referendum. The Soviet government ignored the proposal.

Experience has proved Adenauer's approach to be a failure, if indeed he ever sincerely believed in its effectiveness. Every major step he undertook, such as West Germany's joining the Western European Union, NATO and the EEC, led to a deeper and deeper estrangement of the two parts of Germany. The Hallstein Doctrine, only partly effective in execution, seriously limited Bonn's diplomatic maneuverability in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the West failed him in his "resolute policy" toward the Soviet Union. Various international conferences and diplomatic notes addressed by the Big Three to the Soviet government brought German reunification no closer, and in the past few years the repetitious statements of the NATO Council of Ministers on the subject have become mere diplomatic routine. The FRG could no longer expect an initiative or substantial assistance from its Western allies on this vital issue.

It was the other side of the Iron Curtain that initially appeared to press for specific steps toward reunification. Walter Ulbricht and Soviet leaders advanced proposals such as direct contacts between the two German governments, establishment of an All-German Council, preparation of a new constitution, and finally free elections. These advances were turned down because the West suspected that the last measure would be sabotaged and that the others would imply recognition of the Pankow regime and would facilitate subversive activities and infiltration by the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in West Germany.

Outside government circles, the Social Democratic Party in March 1959 published its own plan for reunification. In many aspects it paralleled Ulbricht's proposal, including reduction of armaments, denuclearization of both parts of Germany, and withdrawal from NATO and the Warsaw Pact; but after the construction of the Berlin Wall the SPD repudiated its own plan and moved step by step closer to the position of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Later it resumed the initiative in proposing a few modest contacts with the GDR. Toward the end of

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1964, it published an eight-point program on some practical intra-German questions, such as visits, local traffic and exchange of newspapers, but Ulbricht failed to react. In spring 1966 the SPD engaged in correspondence with the SED, this time at the latter's initiative, to arrange two meetings in July, one in Hanover and another in Karl-Marx-Stadt (once called "Red" Chemnitz). After prolonged wrangling, which necessitated a change in the West German law that would guarantee "free passage" to communist leaders entering the FRG, Ulbricht called the plan off.[2]

Erhard's government (October 1963-December 1966) proved to be more flexible in its Eastern policy than its predecessor and achieved more progress than it is generally given credit for. In March 1966 it addressed a "Peace Note" to 115 nations, including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, offering to all of them a proposal on disarmament and to the latter, in particular, treaties of nonaggression. Even though the Chancellor expressed himself against a policy of "small steps," which in his opinion involved the danger of recognizing the status quo, he in fact advanced from position to position, always, however, within the framework of the rigid Hallstein Doctrine. Trade missions were exchanged, with obvious political significance, with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland (not with Czechoslovakia), and on three occasions West Berlin signed agreements with Ulbricht's representatives covering Christmas and Easter visits to East Germany. Some members of Erhard's government (Gerhard Schroeder, Erich Mende and J. B. Gradl) conceded the eventuality of discussing with Poland the Oder-Neisse boundary — after the reunification of Germany. Erich Mende, then Chairman of the FDP, advanced a number of constructive proposals and on one occasion even stated that the Hallstein Doctrine was obsolete.[3]

The GDR government, sensing a change in Bonn's position from immobility to some flexibility, renewed its emphasis on the necessity of normalizing relations between the two Germanys, but interjected a new element that was meant to make unification impossible: it insisted that the matter was not a national but a social and class question. In April 1966 Ulbricht came up with a proposal to establish a confederation, which, however, would be preceded by an understanding between the workers' organizations

[2]For the text of letters, see *Die Internationale Politik, 1966* (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1967), pp. D 177-188. For an analytical study, see Gerhard Wettig, "The SED-SPD Dialogue: Communist Political Strategy in Germany," ORBIS, Summer 1967, pp. 570-581.

[3]*Die Welt*, April 5, 1966.

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in both parts of Germany and by social changes in the western part.

To solidify Ulbricht's international stature and establish the permanency of Germany's division, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Cooperation with the GDR toward the end of 1964. As the Bonn government intensified its efforts aiming at the isolation of East Germany, Ulbricht's regime in the latter part of 1966 opened a counteroffensive, addressing notes to the United Nations and to all European governments. It knew that some aspects of its proposals would attract the attention of many chancelleries. Besides asking for recognition by Bonn and for the preservation of existing boundaries, it proposed that both Germanys renounce acquisition of atomic weapons and disarm, and that Europe guarantee its own security. Gromyko supported Ulbricht's diplomatic activity by ferocious attacks in the UN on West German "revanchism" and "militarism."

II

After the CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition had taken over from Erhard's government in December 1966, its first policy statement suggested that it would attempt a more flexible and constructive approach to *Ostpolitik* in general and to the problem of German division in particular.[4]

In contrast to Adenauer's past concepts but in partial harmony with Erhard's, the Kiesinger government acknowledged that reunification could be achieved only in agreement with the Soviet Union. Scores of speeches made by Kiesinger, Brandt and other representatives of the coalition government manifested their determination to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and cooperation with the East European countries without trying to isolate the GDR.[5] A study of Soviet reactions to Bonn's approaches over the past three years yields an impression of erratic responses, at one time implying willingness, and at another time refusal, to negotiate. It is hard to tell tactical games from real intentions. A flavor of this diplomatic gamesmanship can be gained by a recapitulation of FRG thrusts and Soviet responses.

In July 1967 Bonn presented the Soviet Union with a sweeping plan of fourteen points, the central one being a proposal to sign a

[4]For the text of the governmental declaration, see *Die Internationale Politik, 1967* (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1968), p. D 15 ff.

[5]For full texts, see *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,* Bonn, December 1966-September 1969.

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treaty renouncing use of force. Confidential diplomatic notes were exchanged and the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn paid several visits to the German Foreign Minister. Moscow seemed interested in Bonn's proposition but attached other demands to treaty negotiations, most of which were in conflict with Bonn's Eastern policy. The Soviet Union asked the FRG to renounce access to nuclear weapons, to regard West Berlin as a special political entity, to invalidate the Munich Agreement *ab initio*, to recognize the inviolability of existing European frontiers, including the GDR's, and to normalize relations between the two Germanys. In addition, the Soviet government reaffirmed its right, based on the Potsdam Agreement and Articles 107 and 53 of the UN Charter, to intervene in West German internal affairs in order to prevent the alleged development of militarism and nazism on FRG territory. A treaty renouncing use of force could then be negotiated with all East European countries, including East Germany.

This was a comprehensive package, apparently meant to seize the initiative from Bonn and to restate in the main the Soviet demand for the legitimization of the status quo. The Soviet government violated the confidential nature of these exchanges when on July 11, 1968 *Izvestiia* published one of its notes to Bonn; the latter then felt compelled to make all the negotiations public.[6] This occurred in the midst of mounting Soviet pressures on Czechoslovakia: Moscow obviously wished to divert the world's attention from Czechoslovakia to West Germany by renewing its attacks on Bonn. Contrary to these moves but probably with the same diversionary intent to increase the confusion in Bonn, Ulbricht made a statement on August 9 expressing willingness to negotiate all outstanding issues with the FRG.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia caused consternation and profound depression in West Germany. The press questioned the soundness of the basic assumptions of the Bonn government's policy: Was détente a realistic concept? Was there any chance of a true improvement in Soviet-German relations? What were the motives for the Soviet move? What was its relation to the security of the FRG? In particular, what was the significance of Moscow's

[6] *The Policy of Renunciation of Force: Documents on German and Soviet Declarations of the Renunciation of Force, 1949 to July 1968* (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, July 1968); and *Für Frieden und Entspannung. Eine Dokumentation über die deutschen Bemühungen um Frieden und Entspannung, 1949 bis August 1968* (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, September 1968).

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reviving, in connection with the Czechoslovak crisis, the two articles of the UN Charter, considered obsolete by the 1960's?

The government was no less outspoken than public opinion in condemning Soviet actions. Kiesinger asked the Western allies for an immediate summit meeting; although he was rebuffed, he did receive an assurance from the United States, France and Great Britain that any unilateral Soviet intervention in West German internal affairs would be met with an "immediate allied response."[7]

Bonn's official indignation over the occupation of Czechoslovakia was qualified by repeated statements that the government had no alternative to the policy of détente. On the day of the invasion, Kiesinger declared before his Cabinet of Ministers that "there [was] no possibility of changing this policy, nor [was] there any reason to do so." He assured the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, on September 2, that the government's Eastern policy was based on cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Bundestag passed a resolution giving full support to the government's policy, but it injected into the situation one of the thorniest problems in Soviet-German relations by stating that "the recognition of the other part of Germany as a foreign or as a second sovereign state [was] out of the question."[8] This was, of course, not a new policy, since every West German government had repeatedly insisted on its right to exclusive representation of Germany as a whole.

In spite of the tensions between Moscow and Bonn that preceded and followed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, both sides showed signs of wanting to resume contacts and negotiations. Kiesinger and Brandt reacted favorably to the Warsaw Pact countries' appeal at a Budapest meeting in March 1969 (originally made at a Karlsbad meeting in April 1967) calling for a European security conference. Furthermore, great significance was attached by Bonn to Brandt's meeting with Gromyko in New York in October 1968 on the occasion of the UN General Assembly session. The Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, S. K. Tsarapkin, after three months of absence, resumed his visits to Brandt and reportedly expressed the wish of his government for improvement of relations with the FRG and even for reopening discussions about signing a treaty on renunciation of force.[9] Negotiations were also conducted toward the end of the year on establishing a direct airline service between

[7] *New York Times*, September 18, 1968.
[8] *The Bulletin* (Bonn), October 1, 1968; a supplement.
[9] *Die Welt*, January 11, 1969.

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Moscow and Frankfurt, and it was reported that the Soviet government offered to construct a pipeline for delivering oil and natural gas to West Germany.[10]

This trend was not reversed by a temporary crisis over Berlin in March 1969, when Gustav Heinemann was elected President of the FRG over vigorous Soviet protests. On the contrary, Bonn appeared to be impressed by Gromyko's speech before the Supreme Soviet in July when he expressed interest in improving Soviet-West German relations and indicated willingness to negotiate the problem of West Berlin.[11]

III

Basically, the grand coalition government, in its policy toward East Germany, appeared to uphold three political principles as proclaimed by its predecessors: the exclusive representation of Germany, the Hallstein Doctrine, and nonrecognition of the GDR. However, as time went by it became increasingly clear that not only had the SPD been consistently ahead of the CDU in its thinking about intra-German relations, but Kiesinger himself was less adamant than his predecessors in sustaining these fundamental conditions respecting contacts with the Ulbricht regime.

Presenting his new Cabinet to the Bundestag in December 1966, Kiesinger indicated that he would pursue a more flexible approach to the division of Germany. The Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, was eager to explore new opportunities for contact at all levels, and his party associate, Herbert Wehner, now Minister for All-German Affairs and probably the most innovative member of the Cabinet, appeared to serve as the standard-bearer for a new, vigorous strategy. Almost immediately after his appointment to the new government, Wehner pleaded for alleviation of the consequences of division, and then made an apparently material but tricky concession to East Germany:

> One must recognize the right of the people in the other part of Germany to determine their social system through their own free responsibility even if their choice should be in contrast with majority opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany. . . . Should the present system democratize itself, i.e., should the populace be given a possibility of free and secret elections . . . should the GDR government also receive from the people a democratic mandate, I see no reason why the Federal government could not reconsider its currently justified policy of non-recognition.[12]

[10] *Ibid.*, May 6, 1969.
[11] For details, see Radio Free Europe Research, USSR: International Relations, "The Second Thaw in Soviet-West German Relations," September 16, 1969.
[12] *Europa-Archiv*, January 10, 1967, p. 3.

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Subsequently, much to the annoyance of Kiesinger, he substantially altered the meaning of free elections by saying that he would be satisfied if East German elections were conducted like those in Yugoslavia. He added that "an Austrian solution" for German neutrality was also "quite possible."[13]

There were other signs that Bonn was taking a more conciliatory attitude toward Ulbricht's government. After twenty years the government and most of the press stopped referring to the other part of Germany as Middle Germany, or the Soviet-occupied zone, or the "so-called" GDR, and began to use the term East Germany. Herbert Wehner even used the official name, the German Democratic Republic. Kiesinger in 1967 acknowledged receipt of several letters from Willi Stoph which had previously been returned unopened, and consented to address his answers to the Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers. These were little niceties that had significant political implications under the prevailing tension and in the absence of direct contacts. Kiesinger even went beyond the point of official correspondence by agreeing to a meeting of representatives of the two Germanys at the ministerial level. This, however, has never taken place: Stoph branded one of his letters as "arrogant, brutal, aggressive, adventurous."[14]

During the first twenty months of Kiesinger's government, until the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the FRG vigorously pushed its Eastern policy; within the framework of détente toward all countries of East-Central Europe, it proposed to take "practical steps" of cooperation with East Germany. The strategy of Adenauer's era was reversed: in Kiesinger's view, reunification was to result ultimately from a détente and ceased to be a precondition to a general European settlement.

In April 1967, addressing himself indirectly to the Seventh Congress of the SED, Kiesinger proposed such "practical steps" as resumption of movement between the two parts of Berlin, easing of currency exchanges, reunion of families, an increase in trade, joint technical commissions, cultural and scholarly contacts, and free exchange of books and newspapers. At the same time Willy Brandt sent a letter to the SED inviting it to join in a dialogue with the SPD on problems of the divided nation.[15]

Brandt even expressed doubts about the wisdom of the Bonn

[13] *Washington Post*, February 1, 1967.
[14] *Die Welt*, June 22, 1967.
[15] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 13, 1967.

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government's insistence on its exclusive right to represent the whole German nation, because in his view such a position was damaging to "the attainment of all-German goals in the sense of self-determination." He urged the government to start "from the current facts," such as the incorporation of Eastern territories in the Polish state and "an existing government" in East Berlin even if it was not based on the will of the people. "This has nothing to do with recognition," he stated.[16] Kiesinger was reported to have said in a confidential circle that "of course, there [is] a State over there. As a jurist, I can give you all criteria about it, and they have been met."[17]

In August 1968, the West German government issued a permit allowing East German newspapers to be sent freely to the FRG, without waiting for reciprocity, and waived security measures that had limited travel. Thus, for instance, collection of information was no longer punishable, and visits of East German officials to the FRG and participation by West Germans in political events in the GDR were sanctioned by Bonn.

These steps certainly did not imply even a partial recognition of Ulbricht's regime, but additional political measures or statements undermined the other two principles of Kiesinger's government, the Hallstein Doctrine and the sole-representation claim. At the beginning of 1967, Bonn opened diplomatic relations with Rumania, and one year later resumed them with Yugoslavia, even though both countries recognized the GDR. Later on, in the first half of 1969, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Southern Yemen and Cambodia recognized the GDR. (The FRG's relations with some Arab countries have been suspended since 1965 and with others since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.) Nevertheless, Bonn abstained from invoking the Hallstein Doctrine, declaring the recognition of East Germany only an "unfriendly act." Thus, not only has the doctrine lost its original thrust and intent of exposing Ulbricht's government to international isolation, but the principle of exclusive representation was further weakened. For, much as Bonn insisted on maintaining this policy, in Belgrade, Bucharest and Phnom-Penh the German people are represented not by one but by two German governments.[18]

[16]*Frankfurter Rundschau*, November 15, 1967.
[17]*Ibid.*, November 3, 1967.
[18]East Germany continues to be heavily underrepresented in comparison with West Germany. Ulbricht's regime is now recognized by sixteen states, mostly communist, and maintains seven general consulates in the Third World, as well as eleven trade missions and nineteen trade representations. West Germany, on the

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The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia injured intra-German relations and put in serious jeopardy Bonn's political efforts, the final goal of which remained reunification. The Soviet Ambassador to the FRG advised Kiesinger that "nobody will ever be allowed to break as much as a single link away from the community of socialist countries." When the Chancellor inquired whether the statement meant that Soviet Russia would consider as a hostile act any attempt to reunite Germany by peaceful means, Ambassador Tsarapkin replied that the Federal government would have to recognize the present situation in Europe.[19] The Brezhnev Doctrine thus directly affected relations between Bonn and Pankow, since any attempt to increase political contacts might be interpreted as a move to incite a "counterrevolution" in East Germany. In Kiesinger's sarcastic words, "the reunification of Germany could not become a reality unless the Federal Republic, too, were included in the socialist camp." The Soviet doctrine made the idea of recognizing the GDR even more remote. In spite of this grim outlook, he reiterated his proposal that representatives of both parts of Germany be appointed to all-German commissions on a parity basis, with the task of preparing the ground for subsequent agreements, including mutual renunciation of force.[20]

The SPD was no less shaken than the CDU by events in Czechoslovakia. To Herbert Wehner they emphasized the dangers of the division of Germany, now maintained by the Brezhnev Doctrine. Yet he, too, argued that Ulbricht's participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not require the FRG to ignore him. On the contrary, talks must be continued as a matter of common sense and political responsibility.[21]

Such pronouncements reinforced the impression that Bonn's alternatives with respect to Ulbricht's government were limited, and that it could only keep on trying to establish contacts without any assurance of finally achieving reunification.

IV

Walter Ulbricht was, of course, fully aware of the strength of his position toward the West German government. The moment Kiesinger and Brandt began to apply a flexible policy in intra-

other hand, is represented by ninety-two embassies, 165 general consulates, and 304 consulates. Radio Free Europe Research, "GDR: Foreign Relations," May 5, 1969.

[19] *The Bulletin* (Bonn), October 1, 1968, p. 5.

[20] *Ibid.*, June 24, 1969.

[21] *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, August 26, 1968; *The German Tribune*, October 26, 1968.

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German relations and proposed major political concessions, the East Germans began to put more formidable obstacles on the road to a rapprochement. Whereas Kiesinger's government changed Adenauer's immobility to flexibility, Ulbricht's regime abandoned its earlier apparent willingness to negotiate directly with Bonn in favor of freezing intra-German relations at the lowest possible level. Ulbricht condemned Kiesinger's policy of undertaking "practical steps" and accused the Bonn government of being "revanchist and socially reactionary." He reconfirmed the old demands for normalization of relations, denuclearization and reduction of armaments by one-half in both Germanys, a European security pact, and recognition of existing boundaries. He introduced a novel proposal to guarantee the neutrality of both Germanys.[22] It made no sense, in his opinion, to negotiate on secondary issues.

Then he introduced several measures to counterbalance Kiesinger's attempts and deepen further the German abyss. In February 1967, the East German government adopted a Nationality Bill, according to which East Germans would become "citizens of the GDR" and not be simply "Germans" any more. He refused to renew the old arrangements for holiday visits in East Berlin. In March, he ordered the Evangelical Church of Germany, one of the last links between the two Germanys, to hold separate meetings in East Germany, and in September 1969 the break was made formal. Contacts between performing artists, writers, doctors and athletes were reduced to a minimum. He ordered postal, telegraph and telephone communications between the two parts of Germany to be treated as though two separate German states existed. At the Seventh SED Congress he appealed to the working class in West Germany to join the SED in a class struggle against Bonn's capitalism, the annihilation of which was a precondition to any negotiations on reunification.[23]

In April 1968 a new constitution was adopted by the GDR. It emphasized the social cleavage with West Germany and proclaimed the GDR as "a socialist state of the German people," acknowledging the existence of two Germanys with two different social systems and setting as its goal a reunification on the basis of democracy and socialism. To symbolize the separation, the Secretariat for All-German Affairs was renamed the Secretariat for West German Affairs.

[22] *Europa-Archiv,* November 25, 1967, p. 14.
[23] *Neues Deutschland,* April 18, 1967.

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East Germany's propaganda machine worked overtime to prove that the GDR was pursuing a consistent policy of stabilization, peace and disarmament, while the FRG government was committed to a policy of militarism and revanchism and the whole of West Germany was in the grip of a renewed Nazi danger.[24]

Ulbricht continued to demand that West Germany recognize West Berlin as an independent political entity and introduced several measures to make Bonn painfully aware of Berlin's precarious geographical separation from the FRG and the fact that the GDR controlled all surface access to the city.

At the beginning of 1968, Ulbricht's government resumed the harassment of personal traffic through East German territory, a policy it reapplied later at various times. In March it announced that National Democratic Party (NPD) members would be prevented from passing through the GDR. One month later it expressed the intent of applying the same measure against the members of the Cabinet and other high officials of West Germany. Then in June it issued an ordinance requiring all Germans from the FRG and West Berlin to present a passport and request a visa for crossing the East German border, and imposed a surtax charge for freight transport through East Germany. Kiesinger and the three Western powers protested and introduced some countermeasures against East Germans' travel, but such retaliation was not likely to displease Ulbricht since it promoted his purpose of isolating West Berlin and insulating East Germany from the disruptive influences of West Germany.

In the struggle for West Berlin, Ulbricht lost important points in March 1969 when the election of a new FRG President was scheduled for the city. Ulbricht's government issued a decree forbidding the electors to travel to West Berlin and threatened serious consequences if they tried to come by air. The Soviet Union attempted to reach a compromise solution, but Bonn stood steady against the pressures and was supported by the three Western allies. The elections took place in dignified tranquillity. Some observers detected in the Soviet attitude the first sign of Moscow's concern over Ulbricht's intransigence, a sign reinforced in July by Gromyko's statement of Soviet willingness to negotiate with the West on the question of Berlin.

Ulbricht's reaction to Bonn's political initiatives in intra-German relations has been effective in frustrating the FRG's

[24] *Centers of Conflict. The attitude of the two German states to international problems* (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, n.d.).

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strategy if for no other reason than that he enjoys the position of *beatus possedens* and has been acting from the assumption that possession is nine points of the law. Moreover, after a number of years and a considerable effort, his regime has won some degree of international respectability. In addition, as the Hallstein Doctrine has been removed from the arsenal of Bonn's diplomacy, he has developed a counter-doctrine of his own by exercising pressure on some communist governments (e.g., Hungary and Czechoslovakia) to resist Bonn's efforts toward establishing diplomatic relations with them.

V

West German public opinion appears to have vacillated in its attitude toward the problems of reunification. A survey, conducted regularly by the *Institut für Demoskopie,* shows over a period of fourteen years an upward curve of answers to the question: Which, in your opinion, is the most important question we in West Germany should at present occupy ourselves with? In 1951, the year of economic strains, only 18 per cent of the respondents gave preference to reunification. Later the percentage indicating this preference varied from 23 in 1952 to the high point of 47 in 1965. In 1969 the question of Germany's reunification as the most important problem dropped to 44 per cent. Curiously, the preservation of peace and East-West détente was rated most important by a rather small but fairly steady minority ranging between 10 per cent (1965) and 26 per cent (1962).[25]

In 1956 the partition of Germany was considered "intolerable" by 52 per cent; in 1962 by 61 per cent; and in 1963 by 53 per cent.[26] Then, a sudden drop occurred: in 1965 the proportion finding it intolerable declined to 38 per cent, and in 1966 to 26 per cent.[27]

Between 1952 and 1965 about half of the respondents believed that reunification would be achieved by peaceful means, and around 40 per cent were of the opinion that there was no prospect of reunification.[28] In the period between 1952 and 1959 the ma-

[25]Elisabeth Noelle and Erich P. Neumann, editors, *The Germans. Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966* (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), p. 459. *The Bulletin* (Bonn), June 18, 1969.

[26]Noelle and Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

[27]*Die Zeit,* March 28, 1967.

[28]Noelle and Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

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jority thought security vis-à-vis the Russians was more important than German unity.[29]

In 1966 only one-tenth of the population considered recognition of East Germany "unavoidable" as a means to unification, and the thesis that unification would come through a hardline policy was supported by only 19 per cent. In the fall of 1967, 90 per cent of the population were in favor of starting and continuing direct negotiations with the GDR; 50 per cent expressed the belief that one day the GDR would be recognized by the FRG, and 53 per cent expected reunification within thirty years.[30]

Another study, undertaken in the summer of 1967 and concerned with the attitude of such German elites as academicians, journalists, parliamentarians and representatives of special interest groups, showed that an overwhelming majority agreed that reunification depended on better relations with the Soviet Union and East European states. Some 90 per cent, on the other hand, attached as much importance to defense as to détente. A majority favored an economic union between East and West Germany (with the exception of a strong CDU opposition), and all categories of respondents favored an exchange of speakers between political parties.[31]

These surveys indicate, though by no means conclusively, that West German public opinion has become increasingly aware of the realities concerning the division of the country. Such a trend was apparent to this writer when he discussed the problem in Bonn in the spring of 1968. While German officials, understandably enough, supported the attitude of the government, Bundestag members of the three most important parties (CDU, SPD and FDP) showed decreasing interest in the problem, and the intellectuals and the young generation were ready to face the reality of separation for an indefinite period. It was occasionally suggested that the new generation in East Germany, brought up in a communist society, was estranged from its democratic counterpart in West Germany. Some scholars recalled the many centuries during which Germans lived in small separate states, and pointed out that when they were united for a short period between 1871 and 1945 they became a menace to Europe instead of playing their traditional role of bridge between the West and East.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 462.
[30] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 7, 1967.
[31] John W. Keller, "German Elites and Foreign Policy" (mimeo., n.d.), pp. 9, 11.

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It would be difficult to ascertain who led whom in this changed attitude toward intra-German relations: the government or the people. There is little doubt, however, that the people supported the Kiesinger-Brandt policy and were perhaps even ahead of the government's thinking and actions.

VI

If the political initiatives of the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition failed to register demonstrable progress, its economic and cultural policies toward the GDR yielded some positive results. Both governments, for different reasons, have always attached considerable importance to intra-German trade. Bonn saw in it a political instrument for attaining closer cooperation which would eventually facilitate reunification, even though trade with East Germany represented only a negligible part of its foreign commerce. East Berlin, on the other hand, needed the products of West German industry but was careful to insulate the trade from political influences. Thus, trade passed through periods of rapid upward trends, sharp declines and stagnation.

The stipulation of the Potsdam Agreement that occupied Germany be treated as one economic entity was never enforced. The limited trade between the Soviet and Western zones of occupation was almost completely eliminated by the Berlin blockade in 1948-1949. After the two German governments had been established in the fall of 1949, two conventions, the Frankfurt Agreement of October 1949 and the Berlin Agreement of September 1951, laid a foundation for trade between the two countries. They regulate it to this day. Imports and exports are limited by quotas and conducted as barter trade, negotiated from the West German side by the Trusteeship Office for Interzonal Trade and from the East German side by representatives of the Ministry for Foreign and Interzonal Trade. It is a rather complex operation, made more difficult by the discrepancies between the private enterprise and the state monopoly economies and by the foreign trade practices of the two partners. In addition, East Germany shows a permanent deficit balance since it almost regularly falls short of its export commitments. Other obstacles stem from political considerations, such as West Germany's periodic insistence on treating West Berlin as part of the FRG, and East Germany's insistence on negotiating trade agreements directly with Bonn, a request that has been repeatedly denied because such

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a concession would imply partial recognition of the Ulbricht government.

Though the Treaty of Rome imposed severe restrictions upon EEC members in their trade with other countries, a special protocol, recognizing Germany as an economic entity, confirmed Bonn's right to treat West German-East German trade as an interzonal arrangement in order to permit the East's exports to enter the West without customs duties and to free the importation of agricultural products from the limitations imposed on other members of the Common Market.

In the period between 1950 and 1960, interzonal trade increased by five times and then, for the next three years, it dropped for political reasons. It represented for West Germany only 1.8 per cent of her world trade, while for East Germany the West German market constituted 8.5 to 11 per cent of its overall trade.[32]

In 1964, interzonal trade resumed an upward trend, and in one year, 1966, it rose by more than 21 per cent; yet, the old difficulties continued to impede further development. Three-quarters of East Berlin's foreign trade remained tied to the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and the remaining quarter was about equally distributed between West Germany and other noncommunist countries.[33]

The Leipzig Fair, which has enjoyed a distinguished international reputation for several decades, is a good indicator of the growing attractiveness of East Germany — the tenth largest industrial country of the world and the seventh largest in Europe — to export firms the world over. Until 1967 individual West German firms participated in the Leipzig Fair on a private basis and on their own initiative. In March 1967, however, the FRG Minister for Economics, Karl Schiller, urged businessmen to send their exhibits to Leipzig, and an official of the government for the first time visited the fair.[34] One year later, he expressed readiness to meet his East German counterpart, and in August 1969 the

[32]*Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* October 22, 23, 1965.

[33]For statistical details, see *Statistisches Amt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Ostblock,* No. 1, pp. 5-6; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, *Yearbook of International Statistics 1966* (New York: United Nations, 1968), pp. 294, 299 fn.; *Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries, 1964-1967,* U.S. Department of State, Research Memorandum, REU-71, December 26, 1968, pp. 29, 34. For a detailed study of intra-German trade, see Dr. Emil Hoffman, *Die Zerstörung der deutschen Wirtschafts Einheit* (Hamburg: Holsten-Verlag, 1964); and Michael von Berg, *Probleme des Ost-West Handels,* Volume I (Berlin; Berichte des Osteuropa-Instituts, 1963).

[34]*Frankfurter Allgemeime Zeitung,* February 7, 1967.

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GDR government for the first time invited Klaus Arndt, State Secretary in Schiller's ministry, for an official visit to Leipzig.

Recent information, though still inconclusive, points to a sharp increase in intra-German trade. Toward the end of 1968, the two parts of Germany signed a long-term agreement which envisages more than doubling trade by 1975. Bonn offered generous terms to East Germany and received in return an assurance that the latter would respect West Germany's access to Berlin, a pledge that is important not only for business but also for political reasons.[35] As a result, trade rose considerably in the first half of 1969; FRG exports increased by 36 per cent and imports by 16 per cent, and it was anticipated in Bonn that by the end of the year the total would reach $875 million as compared with $725 million in 1968.[36]

Cultural and scientific contacts, on the other hand, ran into serious obstacles, for the obvious reason that they carried political implications. They have served as important links in the truncated relations between the two parts of Germany. It would be particularly offensive to the avid German reader, theater and concert devotee, or scholar to sever these cherished ties completely. A survey shows an inverse ratio between Ulbricht's reputation abroad and the extent of intra-German cultural programs. In times of political isolation, he attempted to present East Germany to the West European world as a country of culture, performing arts, literature and scholarship. As he gained an increasing number of tributes, particularly from British and French intellectuals and from numerous delegations visiting East Germany, and increasing influence among the Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, Ulbricht began, in early 1966, to curtail cultural arrangements with West Germany. He had become aware of their political significance when, for instance, tours of the Weimar German National Theatre and *Dresdner Staatskapelle* in West Germany and of the Hamburg Symphony Orchestra in East Germany were greeted with enthusiastic ovations. The Ministry of Culture in East Berlin considered these visits "not safe."[37]

By means of cultural exchanges, East Germany gained a measure of international respectability and lessened her political isolation. On the other hand, she was compelled to swallow

[35]*The Bulletin* (Bonn), December 10, 1968; *New York Times*, December 7, 1968.
[36]*Die Welt*, August 27, 1969.
[37]*Ibid.*, February 3, 1966.

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political germs carried, wittingly or unwittingly, by cultural visitors from West Germany.

After two years of stagnation, theater exchange tours were renewed in the first part of 1968.[38] Then, in protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Bonn canceled a number of planned visits. Some exchange programs of minor cultural and scholarly figures and institutions were resumed toward the end of 1968. Among the few activities distinguished for their quality were the regular seminars on Bach in Dresden and Goethe in Weimar, for which a limited number of West German scholars were permitted to travel to East Germany.

Bonn tried hard to arrange a free exchange of books and newspapers but encountered insurmountable difficulties. It permitted unrestricted importation of books from East Germany, and free entry of East German newspapers on a trial basis from July 1, 1968 until March 31, 1969. The principle of reciprocity suffered from the fact that some 26,000 titles are published every year in West Germany while only 8,000 are printed in East Germany, and because the Ulbricht regime carefully controls the importation of books and has not permitted any West German newspaper to be circulated in the GDR.

Thus, in culture as in politics, the final word remains with Walter Ulbricht. He can open the door or close it at will, according to his view of the opportunities and interests of the moment.

VII

In summary, the three years of Kiesinger's taking "practical steps" in intra-German relations witnessed some limited successes in trade, cultural and scientific contacts, with certain indirect political implications. However, his pragmatic method in the sphere of politics stiffened East Germany's attitude, aware as Ulbricht was of its potential danger to the future of a separate, communist GDR. Thus, neither Adenauer's posture of toughness nor Kiesinger's conciliatory effort has succeeded in moving the Bonn government closer to its final goal of reunification.

The public, exposed to daily press reports and scholarly studies, has become increasingly aware of the intricacy of the problem and Bonn's inability to solve it on its own terms. The wisdom of Bonn's fundamental demands, such as exclusive representation and adherence to the Hallstein Doctrine, was open to question.

[38] *Kultur Telegram* (Bonn), March 1968.

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For instance, the following question was put to the German elites: "What extreme demands or claims could both East and West Germans give up in order to improve intra-German relations?" The answers varied and did not shed much light on this particular question, but suggestions ranged from Bonn's obligation to give up the Hallstein Doctrine and the demand for free elections, to the GDR's obligation to desist from demanding recognition, renounce the three-state theory, and tear down the Berlin Wall. Almost all elites supported the idea of giving up the right to exclusive representation, but the CDU parliamentarians opposed it overwhelmingly, only 18.2 per cent being in favor.[39]

Scholars carried out an intensive exchange of views on these controversial issues of intra-German relations. One study, probably reflecting a general feeling, summed up the problem in one sentence: "Germany's reunification is not a problem of political actuality."[40] Another study pointed to the growing estrangement of East Germans from West Germany and raised the important question whether the Western world was still interested in supporting reunification, since its desire for a détente and for agreement on atomic armaments overshadowed specific German interests, and since the question of reunification was no longer linked to these major goals of the West.[41]

Though there still exists a powerful body of political opinion in Bonn which rejects any overtures to East Germany, a growing number of people wish to go "the whole distance and accommodate Ulbricht's demands."[42] This latter attitude is probably best expressed in Professor Waldemar Besson's provocative and discerning study, in which he focuses on national identity, a touchy question among West Germans. He is critical of the juridical position which starts with the assumption that the German Reich did not cease to exist by its capitulation in 1945, disregarding the fact that the FRG Basic Law is founded on this position. German identity, he maintains, cannot rest on this assumption in the face of the actual existence of two German states. He differentiates between political and cultural unity, for the latter will survive as long as the German language is used. He

[39]Keller, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[40]Heinrich Berchtoldt, "Kiesinger und die deutsche Aussenpolitik," *Aussenpolitik*, December 1966, p. 707.

[41]Kurt Birrenbach, "Aktuelle Fragen der Deutschland-Politik," *Europa-Archiv*, April 25, 1967, pp. 268-271.

[42]Melvin Croan, "Bonn and Pankow: Intra-German Politics," *Survey*, April 1968, p. 84.

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points to the differences between the two parts of Germany, which have developed divergent social policies. Reunification, according to Besson, carries certain risks to the democratic structure of the FRG. Moreover, world politics would not "tolerate a redrawing of the political map of Central Europe within the foreseeable future." He concludes audaciously that "a mutual recognition of the two German states is the only way to achieve a normalization of relations between Eastern and Western Europe."[43]

Some Social Democrat politicians have developed similar thoughts, risking the wrath of their opponents and some parts of the public. Carlo Schmid, for instance, wrote that relations between the two parts of Germany "should be normalized step by step" without West Germany's worrying about whether such steps could lead to permanent division.[44] After returning from an official visit to Warsaw, Klaus Schuetz, West Berlin's Mayor, wrote in *Die Zeit* on June 27 that in his conversation with the Poles both sides proceeded from realities such as the existence of the GDR as a state, of the Polish boundary, and of West Berlin as a part of the FRG.

VIII

It was in this environment of a changing mood, of a greater awareness of "realities," that the FRG election campaign was held in the spring of 1969. The CDU took a positive but cautious attitude toward the problem of intra-German relations. Its campaign was directed toward conservative voters and stressed the need for West German security, which it said was being threatened from the East. The SPD, feeling free from the restrictions of sharing governmental responsibility, returned to the progressive outlook it had adopted in the past when in opposition. Its leaders spoke of "regulated coexistence" with East Germany and proposed negotiations between the two governments, but at the same time they were not willing to regard the GDR as a foreign country. The FDP took a stand similar to the SPD's. However, it advanced some more specific ideas, such as abolition of the Hallstein Doctrine and renunciation by the Federal Republic of the right to sole representation. It also stated that "no German territorial claims must be allowed to stand in the way of a peaceful order between East and West in Europe."[45]

[43]Waldemar Besson, "Where is Germany?," *Modern World,* 1967, pp. 108-120.
[44]*Deutschlands Weg in die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Hande & Spenersche Verlag, 1968), p. 79.
[45]*German International* (Bonn), July 7, 1969, p. 15.

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The results of the elections did not give the SPD-FDP coalition a clear mandate to proceed toward normalization of relations with the GDR. However, slim as its majority is, the government has an opportunity to take the lead in "educating" the public and putting its program to the test. Chancellor Brandt's first official declaration acknowledged "the territorial integrity" of the East European states, including the GDR, but affirmed that to recognize the latter was "out of the question." However, he wished to open negotiations with East Germany on the assumption that "two German states exist" as parts of the same nation and, therefore, "their relations with each other can only be of a special nature."[46] Without reading his mind, one cannot even speculate whether he spoke as a statesman or an experienced politician. Significantly, his new government abolished the Ministry for All-German Affairs and replaced it with the Ministry of Intra-German Relations.

Brandt knows that the path to his goals will be long and arduous. The final outcome will depend in large measure on the course taken by the powerful opposition party and on the response of the Soviet Union, the GDR and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

If the SPD and FDP put their election campaign declarations into action this will mean resuming negotiations with Moscow on a pact renouncing the use of force, ratifying the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and promoting a conference on European security. With respect to East Germany, it will mean recognition of the territorial integrity of the FRG's eastern neighbors, inviolability of borders, abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine, and "regulated coexistence" of the two German states — in short, at least a *de facto* recognition of the GDR. The program represents a giant step forward, but much depends on whether it will be accepted by the other side.

For years, Moscow and Pankow have bombarded their captive audiences as well as the West Germans with ferocious propaganda about revanchism, militarism and reactionary forces in the FRG, lumping them all together and disregarding the differences between the views of individual parties. NPD victories in some state elections were to them convincing signs of a revival of nazism. Moscow, if not Pankow, may now have to "eat crow." The NPD was heavily beaten in the national elections, and the new coalition parties are ready to submit far-reaching proposals.

[46] *New York Times*, October 10, 1969.

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There were signs during the election campaign that the Soviet Union was adjusting its policies so it would be ready for a possible new post-election climate in West Germany. Some FDP and SPD leaders were cordially received in Moscow in the summer of 1969. Moscow made a gallant gesture by sending fifty red roses, caviar, Crimean champagne and vodka to Gustav Heinemann, Socialist President of the FRG, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday anniversary.[47] The Soviet press, belatedly copying the practice of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, even referred to some "progressive" forces in West Germany, separating them from "capitalist" and "imperialist" elements. The Soviet government appeared to prefer and indirectly encourage an SPD victory. Indeed, after the elections, Brezhnev, in the presence of Ulbricht, welcomed the results. Ulbricht, on the other hand, only stressed the old demands toward West Germany.[48] The man who has thrived on the division of Europe, on tensions, on the dismemberment of the German nation, was clearly upset by the prospect of being pressured into a defensive position by both Bonn and Moscow. As the new government develops a wide-ranging *Ostpolitik* diplomatic offensive — in particular, toward the problem of intra-German relations — it might turn out that the last thing Ulbricht ever wanted was the recognition of the GDR.

Predictions would be risky and out of place here. Moscow is saddled with a number of problems: China, the quality of its own leadership, the consequences of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the need for tranquillity in Central and Eastern Europe and in Europe in general, and some accommodation with the United States, to mention only a few. These problems may compel the Soviet government to seek a stabilization of its relations with West Germany. In addition, there is little doubt that all East European countries, except East Germany, would welcome, because of their own political and economic interests, an understanding between Moscow and Bonn. On the other hand, the occupation of Czechoslovakia may indicate a Soviet determination to frustrate all Western efforts, including those of the FRG, that seek a normalization of East-West relations. Moscow may be pursuing a policy of status quo for its own purposes and in the light of its understanding of peaceful coexistence, as it has done in other

[47] *Ibid.*, July 29, 1969.

[48] *Die Welt*, October 7, 1969. (EDITOR'S NOTE: Events in intra-German affairs have moved swiftly since the beginning of 1970 and will be considered in Dr. Korbel's article in the Summer 1970 issue of ORBIS.)

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situations. It obviously cannot afford to expose Ulbricht to a position of isolation and political defeat.

The many contingencies impinging on the German problem permit only one confident conclusion: intra-German relations have entered a new phase.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND: THE PARTY REACTS TO CHALLENGE*

by Stanislaw Staron

THE Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party met in Warsaw with much fanfare in the third week of November 1968. Following the pattern long established by the Soviet Union, it was preceded by an intensive publicity campaign in all the mass media and by all manner of special meetings attended by party activists and the rank and file. Foremost in these preparations was a concerted effort to dramatize the event as an important milestone on the road to socialist construction.

When the appointed time arrived, 1,764 delegates and over a hundred guests from nearly forty fraternal parties gathered in the Congress Hall of the Palace of Culture to commence their deliberations.[1] For the next five days participants listened to and promptly applauded the presentations by eighty-six native and a number of foreign speakers. Among the former all levels of the party were thoughtfully included, the lengthy orations of top-echelon leaders being interspersed with the shorter presentations of lesser dignitaries and of several worker and peasant delegates. The general tone of these pronouncements was decidedly optimistic, with their major emphasis uniformly on the positive achievements of the system and the hopeful outlook for the future. Although, on the negative side, imperialist machinations and internal threats were religiously registered and duly anathematized in nearly all speeches, the relative restraint of these remarks was unmistakable. Of more than usual import were the statements made by several foreign visitors which, behind the façade of messages of good will and commitments to unity, were symptomatic of the latent turmoil in the communist brotherhood following the Czechoslovakian debacle.

The labors of the delegates came to an end on the proverbial

*The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to the Russian Research Center of Harvard University for a 1968/1969 Research Associateship during the term of which this article was prepared.

[1]The exact number of the foreign delegations was 37. The Soviet, Bulgarian and East German delegations were headed by the First Secretaries; those of Hungary and Rumania by other Politbureau members; the Czechoslovak delegation by an alternate member. Yugoslavia was conspicuous by its absence.

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sixth day after secret elections of the new ruling party organs and a closing speech by the First Party Secretary (in which the lengthy resolution — previously distributed to the delegates — was summed up). The partially reconstituted and somewhat rejuvenated leadership stood now armed with the new grand strategy and a new mandate for the next four years.[2]

This introductory account of the Fifth Congress is, of course, only skin deep. The outward optimism of party spokesmen for the occasion contrasts sharply with the political realities of the situation. For the congress came about in the wake of a series of political developments particularly distressing to the party. On the one hand, the open expressions of discontent with the policies of the government in 1968 — as in the case of the writers' protests and students' demonstrations — lay bare the unpalatable truth of the system's failure in its quarter-of-a-century quest to win an overwhelming political consensus; on the other hand, and more dishearteningly, it became apparent at the same time that this lack of consensus plagued even the inner circle of the party.

Parallel to these difficulties — and compounding the leadership's task in resolving them — were the salient international events of the Arab-Israeli war and the Czechoslovakian intervention. Responding to this writing on the wall became the top-priority objective for the party's leaders. The subsequent purges and use of legal punishments were only the most dramatic of their measures. The main thrust of the new policy was to strengthen the reins of the party over the processes of political socialization in general and the educational system and mass media in particular, with the express purpose of improving and speeding up the work of ideological persuasion.

It is only natural that the above generalizations belie the complex multitude of factors at work in this important change of the party line. Without pretensions to comprehensiveness, we will discuss some of these factors.

An examination of the phenomenon of internal dissension in a ruling communist party confronts the almost insurmountable problem of obtaining the necessary data. This is due to both ideological and structural reasons. The ideological image of the party as a homogeneous elite group of similarly motivated members of the proletariat striving in unison toward the same end has far-reaching consequences for communist polities. It tends to

[2]For the day-by-day account of the proceedings of the Congress see *Trybuna Ludu*, November 12-18, 1968.

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lead not only to a persistent habit of mind, especially in the elite, of insisting that the party is in fact united at all times, but also to an attitude of looking upon any form of dissension as outright subversion. Structurally, the noncompetitive political system with its monopolistic controls over the flow of information makes it possible for the ruling elite to go a long way in sustaining this ideological fiction in the society at large. At the same time, since men will not agree on all issues at all times, party leaders being no exception, and since internal conflicts among the ruling elite have to find some expression, a subtle technique of voicing such disagreements, without destroying the mystique of party unity or violating the rules of communist semantics, has developed. As one insightful observer recounted: "Conflicting views are expressed between the lines, by means of slight variation in the standard formulae — so slight, indeed, that only the initiates have even an inkling that conflicts are in fact being voiced."[3] Contrasted with this muffled idiom of elite communication, and compounding the difficulties of interpretation, stands the hyperbolic *lingua franca* of the purges. In view of these circumstances analysis of internal tensions in the ruling communist elite is bound to be highly speculative, its conclusions tentative and always subject to re-evaluation on the basis of later developments.

That the Polish United Workers Party went through a severe crisis in leadership in 1968 can hardly be disputed. It is the details of this intraparty contest that are not quite clear. The subsequent argument will cautiously attempt to provide an interpretation of the indicative changes in leadership and policy of the party during the year of the Fifth Congress. The underlying assumption of our analysis will be the commonsense contention that modifications in party line and changes in the composition of leadership are most intimately related phenomena — the two sides, as it were, of the same coin. It will also be stipulated that the ruling Polish elite has been for more than a decade subject to internal tensions of various kinds, which were typically engendered by the liberal elements in the party on the one hand, and by the hardliners on the other. From his ascendancy to power in 1956 until 1968, Gomulka managed to hold the balance of power and appearances of unity without resorting to overt confrontation. At the same time, under his leadership the liberal Polish October reforms were gradually abandoned while the official party line continued to harden

[3]See Alfred Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," *Soviet Studies,* January 1966, pp. 273-285.

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(although never enough to satisfy the zealot authoritarians).

The main significance of the 1968 changes in Poland lies in the fact that they represented a fundamental departure from the regime's past performance in coping with the problem of intraparty dissension. For the first time since 1956, "the revisionist threat" was met in the open with the purge following. Moreover, it came to pass that among those purged were nearly all the Jewish members of the party elite, thus infusing the whole issue with both anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic overtones. Lastly and importantly, the policy of open suppression of party and nonparty liberals was ostensibly launched as a direct response to anti-government student demonstrations. In the light of these considerations we propose to structure our examination under the respective headings of (1) the Jewish question, (2) the student question, and (3) the party unity question.

The Jewish Question

In 1939 the population of Poland stood at nearly 35 million, and 10 per cent of it was Jewish. In June 1967 the number of Jews in Poland was estimated not to exceed 30,000, or 0.1 per cent of the population of over 32 million. These figures, pregnant as they are with tragic memories of the holocaust, point more than any other factor to the grand paradox of contemporary anti-Semitism in Poland. It seems, prima facie, inexplicable that this minute minority should suddenly become a threat to the body politic serious enough to make it the prime target of a concerted large-scale attack. Assuming, as one must, the basic rationality of the policymakers, what are the relevant facts that would illuminate, if not explain, governmental policy toward the Jews in Poland after the Arab-Israeli war?

It might be appropriate to commence the analysis of that policy by examining the timetable, as it were, of the official acts bearing on the issue. The outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities seems to have caught Polish officialdom completely unprepared. Although the mass media had been engaged for some time in discussing "the growing threat of Israeli aggression" in conformity with the Soviet foreign policy line, this was done more or less perfunctorily. Since the news coverage of unfolding military operations included information from diverse sources, it was possible for a discriminating reader to make up his own mind about the situation. The subsequent generally favorable reaction of the public to the Israeli vic-

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tory, whatever its motivations, dramatically highlighted the inadequacies of official propaganda efforts.

On June 12, 1967, Poland broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, and a week later an internal anti-Zionist policy was inaugurated by the First Party Secretary himself. In a June 19 speech to the delegates of the Trade Union Congress, Gomulka issued a solemn warning to those who "applauded the Israeli aggression," adding that Poland would not tolerate a fifth column in her midst.[4] On July 1 the Gomulka pronouncement was reiterated by Defense Minister Marshal Spychalski in an address to the Military Political Academy. These ex cathedra utterances were soon followed by an intensification of the mass media anti-Zionist campaign, which was now fraught with anti-Semitic overtones. It appears from the available evidence that as yet there were no dismissals of high Jewish officials. The first such dismissal came about on December 20 with the firing of the editor-in-chief of no less a paper than the national party daily *Trybuna Ludu*, and of a deputy editor of the popular daily *Zycie Warszawy*.[5]

Not until after the mass anti-government student demonstrations in March 1968 did the purge of leading Jewish personalities in Poland's political and cultural life begin in earnest, to the accompaniment of acrimonious attacks in the mass media. The Jews, as it happened, were rather conspicuous among the leaders of the demonstrating students and among the faculty members and writers sympathetic to the students' cause. It also happened that the fathers of several Jewish student demonstrators (as was, incidentally, the case with the fathers of several non-Jewish students) held important positions in the party or government. These facts were immediately seized upon by certain newspapers as a rationalization for interpreting the demonstrations as a "Zionist-Revisionist" plot.[6]

On March 19 the First Party Secretary, addressing 3,000 Warsaw party activists, delivered the official analysis of the demonstrations.[7] His speech was in many respects equivocal, yet fraught with grievous consequences for Poland's Jewish population. On the one hand, Gomulka refused to play to the gallery and declined to put the responsibility for the disturbances squarely at Zionist doors, explicitly stating that Zionism was not a major threat to the

[4]*Radio Free Europe Situation Reports*, June 22, 1967.
[5]UPI, Warsaw, December 20, 1967.
[6]Most notably *Slowo Powszechne*, March 11, 1968, and *Kurier Polski*, March 12, 1968.
[7]*Trybuna Ludu*, March 20, 1968.

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Polish polity. He pointed out that the government's anti-Zionist campaign "may have been misunderstood by some in the past," adding that the party was against anti-Semitism as well as against Zionism. All of this would indicate an intention to play down the Zionist issue.

On the other hand, Gomulka's classification of the Jews in Poland in three categories (the Zionists with allegiance to Israel, the "cosmopolitans" with allegiance divided between Israel and Poland, and the "most numerous group, the true native sons"),[8] and his references in the main body of his speech to the "Jewish origin of the majority" of the instigators of the student demonstrations, could have been interpreted in the peculiar parlance of the communist communication as an oblique official sanction for the continuation of the purge. The First Secretary may well have been trying to please too many people; or perhaps his understanding of the problem was less than adequate. Whatever his intentions, the next eight months bore witness to a wholesale elimination of Jews from the party and other hierarchies of the state. True enough, these dismissals were now part of a wider purge, and the ostensible reasons, when given, were more likely to be Revisionism or anti-Partism than Zionism, but the fact remains that the Jews bore the brunt of this treatment.[9]

The intensive purge of Jews from top-level positions soon spread to include all strata of the Jewish minority.[10] The extent of this commoners' witch-hunt is difficult to assess since, unlike the dismissals of notables, it was not reported in the press. Suffice it to note that the emigration of Jews skyrocketed in the period under consideration.[11] The personal accounts of refugees, even if one

[8]*Ibid.* Gomulka suggested that the first group should leave Poland, advised the second group to "avoid the fields of work in which national affirmation is crucial," and bestowed unqualified praise on the third.

[9]For a detailed account of the purge see Paul Lendvai, "Poland: The Party and the Jews," *Commentary,* September 1968, pp. 56-66.

[10]Zenon Kliszko, a Politbureau member and reputedly one of the closest associates of Gomulka, speaking at the Twelfth Plenum against the excesses of the anti-Zionist campaign, corroborates this view. To wit: "In some Party organizations, especially of government employees, an atmosphere of struggle against Zionism is being artificially maintained. . . . A Jew is identified with a Zionist, and what is worse, a critical, justified suspicion against specific actions of a Party member becomes generalized suspicion. Particularly severe measures are applied in cases of minor violations which are sometimes ignored when committed by others." *Trybuna Ludu,* July 9, 1968.

[11]The Polish Press Agency announced that since the Arab-Israeli war 5,264 Polish Jews had emigrated to Israel. Significantly, the occasion for this disclosure was a pronouncement that on September 1, 1969 more restrictive emigration regulations would come into effect. There are many indications that more than half of the Jews in Poland before the Arab-Israeli war have now emigrated.

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allows for understandable exaggeration, point to a gloomy, if impressionistic, picture of the situation.[12]

So much for the highlights of the official Jewish policy in Poland between the Arab-Israeli war and the Fifth Party Congress. Before the rationale of this policy can be discussed, a historical perspective must be added. Two sets of historical phenomena are particularly relevant. One pertains to the past attitudes of Poles to Jews and the other to the past attitudes of the Jews toward communism. It is generally known, if at times exaggerated, in the Western world that prewar Polish society was severely affected by the malaise of anti-Semitism. It is less well known that a small minority of the Polish Jews saw in communism an ideology of the universal brotherhood of man and looked up to the Polish Communist Party as a possible deliverer from their predicament.[13] In a country where the popular sentiment was overwhelmingly anti-communist and anti-Russian, this pro-communist (and, incidentally, pro-Soviet Union) posture of not a few Jews was bound to intensify the already existing antagonism and was, in fact, exploited for that purpose by the purveyors of anti-Semitism.

Then came the Nazi attack on Poland. Almost at once a mass exodus of the civilian population, fleeing eastward before the rapidly advancing enemy forces, was set in motion. Among the refugees were naturally many Jews, especially those who were more actively engaged in Polish (and Jewish) politics. Soon they found themselves under Russian jurisdiction following the Soviet occupation of the eastern part of Poland. Refugee and indigenous communists in the territory promptly offered their services to the new authorities. Among these collaborators were Jewish communists. Many more Jews, however, came to bear the brunt of Stalin's indiscriminate policy of terror toward the multi-ethnic population of the area.[14] Twenty-odd months later, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the refugee flight eastward was resumed, although this time on a much smaller scale. Thus a considerable number of Polish communists came to spend the war years in the Soviet Union.

[12]See, for instance, Philip Ben, "Poland's Jews—The New Untouchables," *The New Republic,* June 18, 1968, pp. 13-15.

[13]Lendvai, *op. cit.,* p. 57, notes that in the early 1930's the Jews constituted 10 per cent of the population of Poland, but accounted for 25 per cent of the Communist Party membership. On the other hand, since the prewar Polish Communist Party was very small, its Jewish component constituted but a minute fraction (perhaps less than 1 per cent) of the total Jewish population.

[14]When mass deportations of populations into the Soviet Union took place in the first months of 1940, the latter group found itself well represented among a million-and-a-half deportees.

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In Nazi-occupied Poland the policy of restructuring the vanquished nation to fit the requirements of the master race for an undifferentiated mass of slave laborers was ruthlessly put into operation, soon to be compounded by savage measures to crush the growing resistance movement. At the same time, the plan for "the final solution of the Jewish question" was beginning to take shape. The preliminary phase was the concentration and isolation of the Jewish population in ghettos, to be followed in 1942 by wholesale destruction. Much has been written about the attitude of the Poles toward their Jewish brethren during these tragic and desperate years. Perhaps more time will have to elapse before a comprehensively documented and objective history of these events can be produced. From the perspective of the present study it is enough to note that the Nazi policy of the physical isolation of the Jews engendered its mental counterpart in the collective consciousness of the two persecuted groups. Worst of all, although threatened by the common enemy, they had to fight their battles separately. In the end, over six million Polish citizens perished. Half of them were Jews.

In the meantime, in the embattled Soviet Union, plans were being made by the Kremlin for postwar Poland. After failing to gain support for his schemes from the London-based Polish government-in-exile, Stalin decided to proceed alone. At his bidding stood the only-too-willing cadre of Polish communists in the Soviet Union and the small but vigorous communist underground in Poland. Among the Moscow-based Polish communists the Jews formed a sizeable minority, the influence of which went far beyond its numbers due to the group's relatively superior educational background. The Jewish membership in the communist underground in Poland, on the other hand, was understandably infinitesimal.

The leaders of these two divergent communist groups were destined to become the ruling elite of the reborn Polish state. The Moscow faction, armed with the most persuasive credentials, i.e., Stalin's backing, tended from the beginning to dominate the alliance, at first behind the façade of party unity. Not unnaturally, the numerous Jewish members of the group came to occupy an array of important posts in the party and state hierarchies. With the advent of the hardline Soviet policy toward the satellites in 1948, the "Moscow" group openly took the reins in the struggle against the "nationalist deviationists." Notable among the leading ex-

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ecutors of this policy were some Jewish members of the cabal, who thus earned for themselves a reputation as Stalinists.

After Stalin's death, in the midst of perplexing uncertainties, a realignment of forces gradually took place in Poland's political arena. Encouraged by the first harbingers of the "thaw" in the Soviet Union, many policymakers abandoned their Stalinist posture altogether and sought alliance with the previously discredited liberal elements in the party. Some of these new converts were Jewish. As things stood on the eve of the Polish October (1956), the arrangement of political forces was too complex to warrant generalizations about the specific role played in events by the Jewish members of the party elite. It did transpire, however, that the so-called Pulawy faction (the inner circle of the "Muscovites" which, as we have noted, was dominant in the past decade and which included not a few Jews among its leaders) seemed to have won Gomulka's favor, with the result of securing for its membership — now pruned of the most notorious Stalinists — the spoils of (Gomulka's) victory.[15]

Gomulka's own record so far as anti-Semitism is concerned was impeccable throughout the first decade of his ascendancy. Thus his June 19, 1967 pronouncements must have come as a surprise not only to his Jewish comrades but also to the general public. Why was he not more restrained in his speech? First, the generally negative reaction to official policy on the Arab-Israeli war, from a population which could hardly be considered pro-Semitic, was an unmistakable sign of the regime's past failure to win political consensus. This rude awakening was further aggravated by the uninhibited display of pro-Israeli sentiments on the part of some of the Jewish members of the communist elite, which dramatized the flimsiness of loyalties even among the party's most trusted members. Moreover, the First Secretary may have been subjected on this occasion to pressures from the "native" (that is, those who spent the war years in the communist underground in Poland) party members who had been known for a long time to resent the prominence of the "Muscovites," and especially the Jewish "Muscovites," in high party councils. Under these circumstances and in view of Gomulka's firm pro-Soviet commitment, which may have become a *sine qua non* of his own survival as a leader, it was natural for him to issue a strong warning to those who openly

[15]For an interesting analysis of the 1956 party transformations, see Witold Jedlicki, "Chamy i zydzi" ("The Bumpkins and the Jews"), *Kultura* (Paris), December 1962, pp. 3-41.

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defied the major premise of the party credo and threatened his precarious grip over the body politic.

Still, subsequent events did get out of hand, especially after March 1968, when the purge of Jews assumed the proportions and the character of an indiscriminate witch-hunt.[16] It would appear that a number of factors were now at play, among which the pro-Israeli sentiments of the Polish Jews were no longer paramount. The Polish Ides of March demonstrated beyond any doubt that the majority of Jewish party leaders, irrespective of their individual political pasts, had become the core of the liberal faction. These "revisionists" had to go. The intensity of the purge was aggravated by the now openly anti-Semitic machinations of the "native" party faction, whose leaders saw, at last, a chance of gaining ascendance. It should also be remembered that as a social phenomenon the purge has dynamics of its own. Once set in motion it tends to gather momentum and spread. The 1968 purge of the Polish Jews was also fed by the dormant anti-Semitism of the older segments of the population.

The Student Question

In the academic year 1937-1938 the number of students in Polish institutions of higher learning was 49,534. Thirty years later the corresponding figure was 288,788.[17] In prewar Poland the number of scholarships available to students was negligible and the colleges and universities (as well as high schools) charged tuition. Since the war all public education has been free, and in 1967-1968 76,326 students received full or partial stipends from the state and other public sources.[18] During the same period, as a result of war losses and border shifts, the population decreased from just under 35 million in 1939 to 25 million in 1945, and then reached 32 million in 1967. The spectacular increase in the number of students in a country that also suffered tremendous losses in material resources represents unquestionably a great achievement for the communist government, for this explosion was the direct result of the vastly increased opportunities at all educational levels provided by the state. Students, as is usual in communist systems, came to occupy a somewhat privileged posi-

[16]Despite attempts by party leaders close to Gomulka to prevent such abuses, as in the Twelfth Plenum. *Supra,* footnote 10.

[17]*Rocznik Statystyczny 1968* (*Polish Statistical Yearbook 1968*) (Warsaw, 1968), p. 443.

[18]*Ibid.,* p. 460.

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tion in postwar Polish society. Yet, in March 1968 many thousands of them risked expulsion, draft and worse to defy the government in a series of direct confrontations.

Prior to 1966 there were no serious indications of trouble for the regime from student quarters. True enough, the ambitious attempts of the party to win the student masses to its program were disappointingly unsuccessful, but the general posture of this group was characterized by political indifference, not by opposition.[19] For several years the policy of gradually whittling away the 1956 liberal reforms evoked no major public protestations from students. It was not the students but the intellectuals, especially the writers among them, who became the vanguard of opposition to the hardening line of party policy.[20] It would appear, however, from the perspective of subsequent events and on the basis of official information recently disclosed, that already in 1964 there existed in the philosophy and economic departments of Warsaw University a loosely organized, small group of disaffected communist students.[21] This was no ordinary company. Its participants, predominantly sons and daughters of party notables, apparently took it upon themselves to play the role of the party conscience. Moreover, they emulated and were inspired by several distinguished faculty mentors. These professors and lecturers (Bronislaw Baczko, Zygmunt Baumann, Wlodzimierz Brus, Leszek Kolakowski and Adam Schaff), all prominent party ideologues in the past, were now engaged in advocating — in their different ways — a "humanistic" version of the Marxist model and, perhaps less directly, a more liberal party program.

The early activities of this oppositionist student circle, subsequently known as the Commandos, seem to have been limited to private discussions of the various schemes of political reform and to less than clandestine dissemination of confidential information among other students. Such, for instance, was the case with the Kuron-Modzelewski "Open Letter to the Party" in 1965. It was a

[19]See Zbigniew Jordan, "The Ideologies of Polish Youth: From Revolution to Withdrawal," *East Europe,* January 1964, pp. 2-11.

[20]As in the case of the "Letter of 34." In March 1964, thirty-four prominent intellectuals protested against censorship in a letter to the Premier. See "The Affair of the Polish Intellectuals," *East Europe,* June 1964, pp. 34-37.

[21]For the official interpretation of the student demonstrations, see Henryk Jablonski, "Zaburzenia studenckie w marcu 1968 r." ("The March 1968 Student Demonstrations"), *Nowe Drogi,* May 1968, pp. 18-39, and *Prawo i Zycie,* November 17, 1968. In quite another vein, Zygmunt Baumann, a purged Professor of Sociology at Warsaw University and recent emigrant to Israel, accuses the regime of deliberately provoking the student demonstrations as a pretext for the purge in his "O frustracji i kuglarzach" ("On Frustration and About the Jugglers"), *Kultura* (Paris), December 1968, pp. 5-21.

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comprehensive memorandum highly critical of the current party policy which proposed, in the name of Marxism, far-reaching democratic reforms.[22] There is no evidence to indicate that the influence of the Commandos on the students at large was anything but marginal. Admittedly, in 1966 the group marshaled enough support to turn a large student gathering commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Polish October into an anti-government demonstration, at which Professor Kolakowski delivered a scathing criticism of the past decade of party rule.[23] When subsequently several of the most vocal demonstrators and members of the group were suspended by the authorities, about 1,000 students, as well as 160 faculty and staff, signed a protest letter demanding that the suspensions be rescinded.[24]

The influence of the minute Commando group should not be exaggerated. Due to their family background and their *modus operandi,* they never achieved the status of bona fide leaders even at their own university; nor were the thousands of students throughout the country an undifferentiated and gullible mass ready to be swayed by whatever was proposed. The wildfire spread of the March protests clearly indicates that among students dissatisfaction with the curbing of intellectual freedom was rampant. Contrary to the official version of the events, the minute group of oppositionists at Warsaw University merely served as a catalyst, setting in motion forces not of their creation.

To better understand the nature of the March 1968 student disorders, it might be appropriate to examine briefly their immediate antecedents. Two developments were of special significance: the closing by the authorities in January 1968 of performances of the nineteenth-century play, *The Forefathers (Dziady)* by Adam Mickiewicz, and the passing of the protest resolution by the Warsaw branch of the Writers Union a month later. *The Forefathers,* a classic of romantic literature portraying the oppression of Poland by Tsarist Russia, had been for years a standard piece in the repertoire of the theaters, and the numerous productions of the play (since 1955 there had been seventeen separate productions with hundreds of performances) had passed unnoticed except by the drama critics. This time around,

[22]Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, *List otwarty do Partii* (*An Open Letter to the Party*) (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1966). (Reviewed in ORBIS, Fall 1967, pp. 925-929.)

[23]Kolakowski was promptly suspended from the party. Jablonski, *op. cit.,* p. 22.

[24]The suspended students were soon reinstated. *Prawo i Zycie,* November 17, 1968.

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however, the many anti-Russian lines in the play met with thunderous applause from overflowing audiences. After a dozen performances it became known that at the government's bidding the thirteenth would be the last. Not surprisingly, the closing presentation of the play gave rise to an anti-government demonstration. The police promptly intervened, arresting some fifty participants, among them many students. Although all the arrested were released the next morning, several student participants were immediately suspended by university officials. On February 29, an extraordinary meeting of the Warsaw branch of the Writers Union was called to discuss the closing of the play. In a heated discussion the general issue of censorship of literary works was raised and the official policy came under heavy attack by a number of well-known writers. In the end a strongly worded resolution demanding the immediate reopening of *The Forefathers* and a general liberalization of "cultural policy" was passed by a two-to-one majority.[25]

That there existed a close liaison between the writer and student oppositionist groups can hardly be disputed. The accounts of the writers' meeting and the content of their resolution were soon spread among students by word of mouth and through leaflets.[26] In the subsequently tense atmosphere of growing discontent only a spark was needed to set off the explosion. It was duly provided by the student drafters of a protest resolution demanding the reinstatement of the suspended students and generally reiterating the writers' postulates. Then, despite explicit official interdiction, a mass meeting of Warsaw University students was called by the activist dissenters for March 8. At the appointed time a large number of students (the First Secretary's own estimate being "about 1,500") gathered in front of the administration building to present their demands to the rector.

The government's original plan was to engage the protesters in a dialogue with a detachment of worker activists — bussed for the occasion from their Warsaw factories — in the hope that the latter would persuade the students to go home. When this ingenious

[25]For the official interpretation of the antecedents of the demonstrations, see Wladyslaw Machejek, "Zaczelo sie od *Dziadow?*" ("Has It Started with *The Forefathers?*"), *Zycie Literackie,* March 24, 1968, pp. 1, 11. According to the First Secretary "out of 431 participants, 356 cast their votes. The majority resolution received 221 votes and the Party sponsored resolution 124 votes." *Polityka,* March 23, 1968.

[26]Even before the writers' meeting, on February 16, the Diet received a letter signed by 3,145 students protesting the closing of *The Forefathers.* Gomulka remarked in this connection that only 1,409 signatures were legible. *Trybuna Ludu,* March 20, 1968.

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stratagem failed to work, a large force of Warsaw police reinforced by crack anti-riot-trained units entered the university enclave to disperse the protesters. In the process violence erupted and a number of persons were injured, some of them seriously; the official account cites a figure of thirty students who required hospital treatment and "many more workers and policemen."[27] Then the demonstrators surged to the streets and force was used again. It appears from many accounts that a great deal of police brutality was required to quell the disturbances.[28] During the next few days student demonstrations spread to other institutions of higher learning in Warsaw and to other cities. According to official sources they were most severe in Krakow (the second largest academic center in Poland and the seat of the oldest university) and Wroclaw. It is impossible to ascertain the extent of nationwide student participation. The number of arrests indicates that it must have been considerable.[29]

As a result of firm police action and other measures, student disturbances subsided by the end of March. The penal measures that promptly followed fell into several categories. In addition to short-term prison sentences and fines meted out by the courts and administrative tribunals, there were numerous expulsions and suspensions from the universities and draft reclassifications. Moreover, a number of parents of protesting students were held responsible for the sins of their sons and daughters and dismissed from their jobs. The trials of the chief troublemakers, postponed until later, took place in the fall and winter of 1968-1969.[30]

[27]*Ibid.*

[28]The interpellation in the Diet signed by five Catholic (Znak Group) deputies asked: "What was the government proposing to do to put an end to police brutality in dealing with the protesting students?" On April 10, speaking from the floor of the Diet, the Premier denied the allegations of brutality, stating that "force was used only when necessary." *Zycie Literackie,* April 21, 1968.

[29]On March 19 Gomulka cited the following figures: arrested, 1,208 (including 367 students); released for lack of evidence, 687 (including 194 students). (*Ibid.*) Three weeks later Premier Cyrankiewicz listed the number of arrests as 2,739, of whom 1,850 were released. *Trybuna Ludu,* April 11, 1968.

[30]From October 1968 through February 1969 seven separate trials were held. Twelve of the accused were found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from one-and-a-half to three-and-a-half years. They were, in order of sentencing: Krzysztof Topolski, Jozef Dajczgewand, Slawomir Kretkowski, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Jan Litynski, Jacek Kuron, Seweryn Modzelewski, Adam Michnik, Henryk Szlajfer, Barbara Torunczyk, Wiktor Gorecki and Adam Zambrowski. One of the accused, Andrzej Duracz, was acquitted. (*Prawo i Zycie,* November 17, 1968; February 9, 23, 1969. Reuters, Warsaw, February 24, 1969.) Similarly dealt with were the subsequent student protests at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. To wit: "Reuters (May 5, 1969) reported that five former students were sentenced in separate trials to prison terms ranging from six to eighteen months and fines of 1,000 zlotys each for distributing leaflets opposing the invasion of Czechoslovakia (names following)." *East Europe,* June 1969, pp. 51-52.

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Accustomed as we are nowadays to the frequency and furor of student demonstrations in the West, we should not lose the perspective of place in interpreting the Polish March events. The dramatis personae in Poland were the same, but how different were the circumstances of their performance! First, it should be realized that the risks the Polish students incurred were incommensurably more severe than those of their Western counterparts. Incurring the wrath of the powers-that-be in a communist polity has consequences that go far beyond formal punishments. Where the government controls nearly all the sources of livelihood, a politically disgraced person has a grim future indeed. Most students have as yet to develop such a saintly (or communist?) indifference to rank and riches as to contemplate such prospects with equanimity. Moreover, it should not be forgotten for a moment that we are dealing here with a noncompetitive political system which brooks no political opposition whatsoever, a system which avowedly and as a matter of principle denies to its members of opposing persuasions freedom of speech, press and peaceful political organization, the very prerequisites for articulation of grievances.

What were, under these circumstances, the motivations of the protesters? Was their action merely a spontaneous outburst of youthful emotions incognizant *à outrance* of political reality? One can only speculate. This writer is of the opinion that the traditional romantic style of Polish insurrectionism went out of style with the tragedy of the Warsaw uprising. The down-to-earth posture of the masses in the October 1956 events supports this view. And so does, by and large, the actual behavior of the student protesters in 1968. (For instance, no anti-Soviet or anti-Marxist slogans were used in the demonstrations.) Thus, it appears that the protesters had reasons to believe their actions would not be entirely hopeless. First, there was ample evidence of widespread discontent among the intellectuals. Second, and perhaps more important, there were strong indications that the party itself was divided, with its leaders steering a precarious course to remain in power. (The fact that the most vocal student critics counted in their ranks many an offspring of a party notable must have been encouraging.) Last but not least, there was the inspiring example of Czechoslovakia for them to emulate. In other words, the students did not feel alone, either in the society at large or in the party. Their failure to induce liberal reform was also the failure (and a reason for the fall) of the liberal faction in the party. The

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following discussion of intraparty strife will make it clear why their efforts were doomed.

The Party Unity Question

The main thrust of the foregoing argument has been to point out a vital connection between the purge of the Jews and the student protest, on the one hand, and the intraparty strife, on the other. It has been suggested that the Jews were ousted from their party and state positions at least ostensibly because many of them were deeply involved in the activities of the liberal faction. This purge, we have also argued, was urged on by the "native" faction in the party, not in the least perhaps because its members resented the pre-eminence of the Jews and, at the same time, saw in their removal a chance of strengthening their own position. The students went to the streets partly because they were aware of some support in high places as well as encouraged by the uncertainties of the intraparty dissension. Their demonstrations, in turn, were not only a catalyst of the purge; they also provided a convenient intra-elite rationalization for the subsequent tightening of party reins over members and the society at large.

It might be well to begin our examination of the 1968 intra-elite tensions with a quick look at the party record in this respect since the October 1956 liberal transformations. It can hardly be disputed that during the course of eleven years of Gomulka's ascendancy (to the end of 1967) the party consistently moved away from its initially liberal posture. As a result, in less than a decade Poland's reputation in the West changed from that of number one liberalizer among the East European communist states to that of a leading hardliner. While the latter judgment may not have been wholly justified, the fact remains that many of the liberal reforms of 1956 had been whittled away by the regime by the end of 1967. This hardening of the party line took place gradually and without resort to a purge. The 1968 changes in party leadership and policies, however, represented a striking shift in strategy for dealing with the "revisionist menace."

The 1958-1967 tightening of party controls over Polish society has been explained at times in the West as a series of specific concessions by the regime to pressures from the Soviet Union or to anticipation of such pressures. It is not difficult to provide a rationale for this interpretation. The most salient element in East European politics is the preponderance of the power of the Soviet

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Union. From Moscow's point of view, Poland, because of her geographic position and the size of her population, ranks after East Germany as the most important among the East European communist states. Under these circumstances, the first principle of realistic policy for the Polish leadership to pursue would appear to be winning the Kremlin's confidence.

In Poland, the policy of closest friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union has always been officially presented as a *sine qua non* for the existence of the Polish state and as a prerequisite for the success of "socialist construction." More specifically, since the major Western powers, with the recent exception of France, have failed to recognize formally the permanency of the territorial settlement with Germany — in which Poland obtained her present western territories — the Soviet Union has been credited as the sole protector of Poland's western borders against the "revanchist designs" of West Germany. Thus, it has been asserted, it was natural for Gomulka to yield to the Kremlin's pressures in matters of both foreign and domestic policies. It should be remembered, however, that this interpretation, plausible as it may be, is not verifiable, since no incontrovertible evidence has come to light so far (and is most unlikely to come to light in the future) of such Soviet pressures being specifically applied.

Another explanation for the hardening of the party line during the 1958-1967 period was the First Secretary's own predilection for the extreme authoritarian model. How tenable is this view? Gomulka's past record admittedly does not stamp him as a shining liberal. At the same time, it provides no evidence that he has ever had any inclination to be a Stalinist despot. What is publicly known about his character suggests basically a middle of the road mentality. While there may be an authoritarian streak in his temperament — "an antidote, as it were, to Polish anarchism," as one keen observer recently noted[31]— within the confines of his uncompromising commitment to the basic tenets of communism he has always displayed the qualities of a down-to-earth pragmatist. Quite typically, his increasingly anti-liberal policies were characterized, until 1968, by the singular absence of ruthlessness.

Whatever its explanation, Gomulka's hardening line met with opposition from the repeatedly thwarted liberals in the party and earned him the noxious, although perhaps undeserved, reputation of being the Kremlin's lackey among certain segments of the

[31]Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 21.

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population. At the same time, his largely permissive disposition in dealing with known party liberals brought upon him the wrath of the hardliners in the party who would not be satisfied with anything less than heroic measures in meeting the "revisionist threat." Thus by 1968 Comrade Wieslaw (Gomulka's *nom de guerre*) was in the unenviable position of having to fend off threats to party unity (and his ascendancy) from both left and right.

As noted earlier, the purge of the "revisionists" was launched immediately after the March 1968 student demonstrations. It was brought to completion with changes in the top party organs in formal elections during the Fifth Congress of November 1968.[32] Quantitatively the purge was not large: among the notables, no more than a few hundred were involved. Most affected, apart from party organs and some ministries (particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), were the universities, scientific establishments, film industry and press. Those purged were individuals with diverse political pasts. Yet as a group they clearly possessed certain dominant characteristics. Among the older and more important members were many prewar communists and sympathizers who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union. Some of these held high positions in the regime during the Stalinist period only to turn over a new leaf after Stalin's death. A majority were Jews. Nearly all were members of the intelligentsia in terms of education and, to a lesser extent, social origin. A few were intellectuals par excellence, with several leading Marxist theoreticians among them. There is no evidence to suggest that this liberal communist grouping possessed even a semblance of organizational structure. It must be viewed rather as an amorphous company of similarly thinking people whose contacts with each other were informal and personal. Nevertheless, the 1968 official incantations against the "revisionist enemies" (even if one allows for some ritualistic flamboyance) and their subsequent purge attest to the fact that the influence of the liberal oppositionists was far from insignificant.

Much less has been known with any certainty about the hardline faction. While the purges and their rationalizations provide hard-core evidence for the examination of the liberal opposition, no direct documentation is available to verify even the fact of existence of a hardline opposition. At the same time there seems to prevail among Western specialists in the field an ex-

[32]For a detailed analysis of these changes, see Jerzy Ptakowski, "The Fifth Polish Party Congress," *East Europe*, January 1969, pp. 3-8.

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traordinary degree of consensus in writing about this faction. Although admittedly derived from indirect and fragmentary evidence, this Western view of the hardline opposition commends itself as a plausible hypothesis.[33]

According to this view there already existed in the mid-1960's in the top echelons of the party a distinguishable grouping of hardline critics of Gomulka's policies, the so-called Partisan faction. More homogeneous than the liberal faction, it was composed of former participants in the wartime communist underground, some of them survivors of Nazi concentration camps. Its members were mainly of proletarian origin and their educational background was generally not impressive. Moreover, it is asserted that the Partisans had a leader in the person of the then Minister of the Interior, General Moczar, himself a noted wartime partisan commander.[34] Moczar's other official post, appropriately and helpfully, has been that of Chairman of the Veteran's Association.

As has been noted earlier, the "native" component of the Polish communist elite had in the past always been outranked by the "Muscovites" in the power structure of the party. Frustrated for over two decades, the Partisans were thus said to be ready to make a bid for power whenever an auspicious moment arose. The Arab-Israeli war and the student demonstrations provided that opportunity. The plausibility of the Partisan hypothesis was strongly reinforced by the post-March events. In the hue and cry against the Revisionist and Zionist enemies, it was apparently this group that led the way.

Moczar's own position was soon stated in an interview with the Polish Press Agency.[35] In it he delivered the strongest, although still somewhat oblique, attack on the Muscovite group ever uttered by a party official, singling out by name a number of long disgraced Jewish Stalinist party leaders. Most significantly, he also made an appeal for the unity of all communist and noncommunist patriotic forces.[36] Three months later, in the Twelfth Plenum of

[33]See, for instance, A. Ross Johnson, "The End of the Post-October Era," *Survey,* July 1968, pp. 87-98, and Leon Szulczynski, "Sukcesy i porazki Mieczyslawa Moczara" ("The Ups and Downs of Mieczyslaw Moczar"), *Kultura* (Paris), January 1969, pp. 113-127.

[34]The only official mention of Mieczyslaw Moczar in this connection came on February 8, 1969 when Gomulka explicitly denied "the provocative lies of the enemies of Poland about Comrade Moczar." *Trybuna Ludu,* February 14, 1969.

[35]*Trybuna Ludu,* April 13-15 (one issue, Easter holiday), 1968.

[36]An appeal to patriotism in this context was not devoid of nationalistic and even anti-Russian undertones: Speaking of these disgraced Stalinists, Moczar used a phrase "these gentlemen who came from Moscow in the uniforms of Polish

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the Central Committee, Moczar was made an alternate member of the Politbureau. Was this party accolade an indication of his and the Partisans' success? A number of considerations suggest otherwise. First, his party promotion deprived him of his ministerial post with its vast bureaucratic apparatus. Second, his active participation (if any) in the Plenum was not mentioned in the press. Was this a sign of ostracism? Third, important speakers in the Plenum (Gierek, Kliszko) made a strong condemnation of the excesses of the purge. And finally, the Fifth Congress in November did not promote Moczar to full membership in the Politbureau. Thus it would appear that Moczar and his Partisans have lost their bid for power, if indeed they ever made one.

Let us now consider briefly the substance of the 1968 changes in the party line. The general import of the transformations was to strengthen intraparty controls as well as to tighten the grip of the party over society. As has been usual in communist polities, these essentially repressive measures were advocated on both ideological and utilitarian grounds: presented as the only "correct" course of action clearly set forth by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, they were then variously argued as imperative for prudential, commonsense reasons. In seemingly endless and painfully repetitious exhortations, the security and well-being of the nation and of the socialist community of states, Poland's friendship with and debt to the Soviet Union, the imperialist machinations and the revisionist menace — all of these and more were invoked in support of the new policies.

What were these policies? We will begin with the changes affecting the party itself. First, there was the purge of the liberals and the anathematizing of their posture as revisionism. Revisionism itself was conveniently defined in countless official pronouncements in a catch-all manner as "a movement which under the guise of improving socialism seeks to destroy it by using the tactics of 'softening'; in the process revisionism serves as a rallying center for all the reactionary forces in society and plays into the hands of the imperialist enemies of Communism and Poland."[37] Moreover, to make the message absolutely clear, both the First Secretary's report to the Fifth Congress and the subse-

officers," which to the Polish ear, well-trained to read between the lines of official pronouncements, clearly implied their alien and noncombatant status. It would appear that not a small number of rank-and-file party members and sympathizers look upon Moczar as a potential leader who could and would pursue a policy more independent of Moscow than the present First Party Secretary's policy.

[37]*Nowe Drogi*, November 1968, p. 67.

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quent congressional resolution gave ample space to a discussion of the meaning of democratic centralism, stressing in unequivocal terms the importance of the centralist aspect of the doctrine. Another related and interesting pronouncement of the congress admitted the party's past neglect of the ideological education of its members and proposed extensive remedies to make up for this deficiency.[38] It would appear, thus, that the Polish United Workers Party has emerged from its 1968 trials and tribulations more united and more disciplined. The price was high indeed.

The bracing of party controls over society was most evident in the case of the educational system and mass media. The institutions of higher learning came to receive, and not unexpectedly, most attention. Changes in this area related to admission policy, curriculum and organizational structure. The official policy of the party on admissions has always favored applicants of proletarian origin.[39] The argument for this preferential treatment stated that the children of workers and peasants are severely disadvantaged in comparison with those of working intelligentsia since they have never had the convenience of a cultured home environment. Admission arrangements to make up for this inequality varied in the past; the most recent formula awarded a certain number of points for each grade in competitive examinations with additional points for a proletarian origin. In the spring of 1968 the points for social origin were significantly increased. Since the demand for available openings has always greatly exceeded the supply, the proletarian's gain meant the intelligentsia's loss. To take care of other disadvantaged categories, such as the children of the military and police personnel stationed in sparsely populated areas, and presumably to accommodate the less brilliant offspring of party notables, 10 per cent of the openings were pre-empted for the patronage of the rectors. The new formula was applied to the June 1968 entrance examinations with the result of increasing by a few per cent the enrollment of disadvantaged students. The new admission policy was explained as necessary on the grounds that the previously used formula had failed to work.[40] It was also duly noted that students of proletarian origin were conspicuous by their absence in the March demonstrations. Whether this policy

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

[39] See Roman Mistewicz, "Spoleczno-polityczne aspekty przyjec na studia wyzsze" ("The Socio-political Aspects of the Admission Policy in Higher Education"), *Nowe Drogi*, July 1968, pp. 32-44.

[40] Between the 1960/1961 and 1967/1968 academic years the proportion of students of worker origin declined from 27 to 26 per cent, and those of peasant origin from 19.3 to 15 per cent. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

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will strengthen the party's control over the universities is impossible to say, but it was introduced for that purpose by leaders suspicious of the intelligentsia and imbued with the Marxist mystique of the unity of proletarian consciousness. Significantly, the 1968 congressional resolution proposed compulsory (but paid) manual work during summer vacations for all first-, second- and third-year students.

Curriculum changes proposed the introduction of political science as a required subject for all students. The content of these courses was designed to "acquaint the students with the socialist theory and practice, with the great heritage of Marxism-Leninism and with the critique of the bourgeois political, economic and social doctrines." In a more general vein the congressional resolution asserted:

> It is necessary that the university authorities be the guardians of the correct realization of the educational objectives, never allowing the abuse of the freedom of scientific inquiry and discussion to spread political and social doctrines contrary to socialism. Every member of the faculty must be expected to possess not only the academic qualifications but also a "didactic" ability and moral-ideological virtues which will make him fit to educate the youth in the spirit of the socialist university.[41]

Structural changes were concerned primarily with reassignment of authority within the institutions of higher learning. In general, the role of the faculty in hiring and firing and other decision making has been drastically reduced by increasing the prerogatives of the administration, reducing the formal requirements for teaching positions, and placing the party and student organization representatives on various university committees. The process of politicization of the universities was thus greatly accelerated.

The tightening of controls over the mass media is more difficult to ascertain. After all, these vehicles of political persuasion have always operated under the closest supervision of the authorities, not least through the omnipresent system of censorship. The change is in quality controls. The major thrust of the new policy was to stress the absolute necessity of political involvement for all image-makers. Not surprisingly, the creative arts received the brunt of this treatment. To quote the congressional resolution: "We will determinedly promote the dissemination of those works of art which contribute to the strengthening of the socialist viewpoint and socialist human relations. At the same time, the Party

[41] *Nowe Drogi*, December 1968, p. 134.

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will firmly resist all the reactionary and anti-socialist works fraught with pessimism and nihilism."[42]

Summary

The net result of the 1968 Polish transformations was a substantial shift toward a tougher party line.[43] Challenged by the liberals, pressured by the hardliners, and lacking in popular support, Gomulka found himself in March 1968 at a crossroads. The developments in Czechoslovakia had made it necessary to take sides within the communist commonwealth. Gomulka decided to cast his lot with the Soviet Union. The liberals had to be thrown to the lions. Assured of Moscow's support, the First Secretary could now deal with his hardline aspirants to power. He emerged, if anything, stronger from the ordeal. But the intraparty contest is likely to continue. Apart from the usual ideological tensions, the Polish Communist Party is bound to experience in the near future a complete takeover by the younger, much better educated generation of communists who entered its ranks in the postwar period. In the meantime some of the old-guard leaders may continue to show signs of restlessness, sensing in the uncertainties of the lame duck period a chance for themselves to obtain control.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[43] The overall tightening of political controls may have had some effect on the June 1, 1969 elections to the Diet. By comparison with the 1965 elections the regime scored considerable gains. The numbers and percentages of abstentions, invalid ballots and votes against the list of the Front of National Unity (the only list available) decreased from 666,487 (3.38%), 13,840 (0.07%) and 226,324 (1.15%) in 1965 to 506,430 (2.39%), 7,766 (0.04%) and 161,569 (0.79%) in 1969, respectively. (*Trybuna Ludu*, June 2, 1965 and June 3, 1969.)

There is yet another respect in which the party improved its position in the last elections which requires some elaboration. Under the present electoral law the voters are presented with one list of candidates in multimember districts. The number of candidates in each district exceeds the number of seats by one-third. The ballots are headed by the notables; expendable candidates who are invariably political nonentities are placed at the bottom. The voter has a choice of either entering a secret cubicle to cross out some names or casting his vote with an unaltered ballot. In the latter case he is assumed to have voted for the first two-thirds of the names on the ballot. In actual practice the overwhelming majority of voters do just that. Altering the ballot to vote for the nonentities and against some party leaders is still officially counted as a vote for the Front of National Unity but must be viewed as a form of protest. Here again the percentage of these votes declined from 3.42 in 1965 to 2.35 per cent in 1969.

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THE SHORT-LIVED LIBERAL EXPERIMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALISM

by Galia Golan

IN August 1968 the Soviet Union invaded and subdued Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin claimed that anti-socialist forces had become entrenched in Prague, posing a threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia and to the security of the Warsaw Pact countries. In fact, the Soviet Union moved to halt a program of reforms which had brought the Dubcek regime to power in Prague less than eight months earlier. This article will attempt to explain why these reforms created anxiety in Moscow and prompted such dire action and a reversal of Soviet policy. To do this, we will examine the reforms, their origins and the process by which they became official policy.

I

Until 1963 Czechoslovakia was known, not unjustly, as the model satellite: the party had refused to "de-Stalinize" after the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956, and both Stalinist methods and leaders continued to rule in Czechoslovakia almost unchallenged. Eventually, however, Stalinism began to crack at the seams. In the summer of 1962 the once progressive and even prosperous Czechoslovak economy suffered a series of setbacks, and the third five-year plan had to be abandoned in midstream.[1] Among other things the quality of goods declined to the point where Czechoslovak products had difficulty competing on foreign markets and were even refused by certain COMECON trading partners. The export problem was particularly serious because of Czechoslovakia's dependence upon imports of raw materials and foodstuffs, the latter necessitated by the failure of agriculture to reach even pre-1938 production figures.[2] Shortages of goods resulted, causing consternation within the party and among the general population.[3]

[1]*Rude Pravo,* August 14, 1962; J. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 94.

[2]*The Economist,* October 27, 1962; *Hospodarske Noviny,* No. 20, 1962.

[3]The Czechoslovak public had been enjoying the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe until this crisis; the people were, therefore, particularly dissatisfied by the return to a system of long queues, power rationing, shortages, and

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At the same time pressures were building within the party for at least some de-Stalinization. These pressures came mainly from Slovak communist intellectuals, whose grievances as Slovaks were intimately connected with grievances against the Stalinist era, when the cream of the Slovak Party was purged (on charges of "bourgeois nationalism") and the party was absorbed, for all intents and purposes, by Prague. Slovak communists demanded a redress of these errors, rehabilitation (posthumously where necessary) of their victimized colleagues and leaders, and removal of those men still in power who shared the responsibility for past injustices. Concomitant with these forces for change were pressures, often merely indirect, from an embarrassed Moscow urging the Stalinist Czechoslovak Party to carry out at least a token de-Stalinization. The result was that the Twelfth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) of December 1962 agreed to review the "Prague trials," study solutions to the economic problem, and introduce de-Stalinization.[4]

By taking these basic decisions, the party opened the floodgates to demands and criticism which led to a revolutionary reform program. Starting with demands for renunciation of Stalinist malpractices responsible for the trials, party intellectuals, mainly Slovaks, subjected literally every sphere of Czechoslovak society to severe criticism in the name of anti-dogmatism. Everything from the economic system, characterized by one party economist as subject to the "cult of the plan," to the misrepresentation of Masaryk and Kafka in communist histories and the lack of contact with the West, came under fire.[5] Demands for change were made concerning almost every aspect of the Soviet model of socialism, including the dictatorship of the party and the all-pervasive nature of political-class considerations.

One of the most significant aspects of this wave of criticism was that these complaints and demands appeared in a controlled press and even in the organs of the party — most frequently in the organ of the Slovak Party, *Bratislava Pravda*.[6] The de-Stalinization drive

meatless days in restaurants. Cf. *Christian Science Monitor,* April 20, 1963, and *The Economist,* October 27, 1962.

[4]*Rude Pravo,* December 10, 1962.

[5]Examples of this broad attack are the articles by Szanto, Selucky, Filip, Mnacko, Goldsteuker, Chorvath, Novomesky, Rosenbaum and Stevcek in *Plamen, Literarni Noviny, Kulturni Tvorba* and *Kulturny Zivot,* and many speeches at the Slovak Writers Union Congress of 1963.

[6]Party theoretical journal *Nova Mysl,* under the liberal editorship of Cestmir Cisar, and on occasion even the Czechoslovak Party daily *Rude Pravo,* carried liberal demands. Cf., for example, *Rude Pravo* editorial, August 20, 1963, and *Nova Mysl,* April 1963.

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was a party affair, a movement for reform from within; and as this drive gained momentum, one change led to another. For example, in response to pressures from the liberals, Novotny agreed to certain personnel changes: the old Slovak Stalinist, Karol Bacilek, who had played an active role in the purges of Slovaks in the 1950's, was replaced as First Secretary of the Slovak Party by the moderate-liberal Alexander Dubcek.[7] Dubcek in turn accorded the Slovak press and party press a great deal of freedom, a measure which evoked public condemnation from Novotny.[8] This liberal press policy led to publication of a speech by journalism professor (and former *Bratislava Pravda* editor) Miro Hysko in which Premier Viliam Siroky came under sharp attack for his role in the purges of Slovaks.[9] Siroky did not survive this attack, sanctioned by its publication in the official Slovak Party organ. Three months later his government fell and he was replaced by a Slovak, Jozef Lenart, who was much more acceptable to both Slovaks and liberals.

This was but one manifestation of the increasing momentum of the reform drive. Novotny himself was pressured not only to rehabilitate past victims and purge some of those responsible for injustices, but to agree to genuine reforms which would guarantee that such miscarriages of justice would not occur again. He apparently felt threatened by this review of the past and still more threatened by the demands for reform.[10] By December 1963 he was so embattled that it seemed he was about to be toppled by the liberals. Leonid Brezhnev, representing Premier Khrushchev, came to Prague and from all appearances saved the faltering dogmatist. Brezhnev journeyed to Slovakia to talk with the critical Slovak leaders and succeeded in arranging a compromise. Novotny stayed on, but apparently on the condition that he accede to some of the liberals' demands, permit thorough de-Stalinization, and institute genuine reforms aimed particularly at revitalizing the economy. Moscow was interested in securing stability in Prague and in strengthening the formerly dynamic Czech economy, upon which the Soviet Union and most of its allies depended for a large number of items.

[7]Central Committee Plenum, April 3-4, 1963 decision. (*New York Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*, April 26, 1963.) The regime informed the Czechoslovak public of the replacements and rehabilitations only gradually. *Rude Pravo*, May 14 and August 22, 1963. Novotny opposed Dubcek, principally because he did not want Bacilek removed as Slovak First Secretary.

[8]*Rude Pravo*, June 13, 1963. This issue contained Novotny's speech in Kosice, which Bratislava television reportedly refused to broadcast at the last minute.

[9]*Bratislava Pravda*, June 3, 1963.

[10]See his defense of his past actions in *Der Stern* interview, November 10, 1963.

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Novotny remained in power, but the nature of the compromise became clear over the next two years as reforms were introduced in one sphere after another of Czechoslovak society. The ideological basis implicit if not explicit in these reforms was a re-examination and reformulation of the post-socialist but pre-communist stage of development. Czech and Slovak liberals came to the conclusion — admitted on at least one occasion by Novotny himself — that this socialist stage prior to the transition to communism was likely to last a long time.[11] Given this unforeseen situation, the existing institutions were not suitable for this period.[12]

The Stalinist-type command system economy was one of the institutions the reformers wanted to jettison. They argued that, while this system had been suitable for the first stage of extensive economic development, it was no longer effective and, in fact, was counterproductive in a socialist economy with a broad industrial base.[13] Liberal economists argued that the Czechoslovak socialist economy had entered a second stage in which concentration must be shifted from an "extensive" to an "intensive" system, i.e., to improved productivity, efficiency and quality. They argued that the highly centralized, administratively determined, quantitative system had stifled initiative, led to a decline in both productivity and standards, unfulfilled demand ("suppressed inflation," some called it), foreign trade imbalances, waste, and a lack of progress. The "cult of the plan," with its concern for gross output instead of economic values, reliance upon directives rather than economic instruments, politicization of the economy (e.g., the cadre system), party interference in and control over all aspects of the economy, and political rather than economic criteria in foreign trade and investment, had sapped the strength of the Czechoslovak economy.[14]

More basic than the rejection of the command-economy idea,

[11]Novotny's speech to Thirteenth Party Congress, May 1966. *Rude Pravo*, June 7, 1966.

[12]Cf. articles by Michal Lakatos, *Pravny Obzor*, January, 1965, and *Bratislava Pravda*, April 1967; Michal Suchy, *Otazky Marxisticky Filosofie*, October 1964; A. Kopcok, *Bratislava Pravda*, July 8, 1963; Zdenek Mlynar, *World Marxist Review*, December 1965; Jiri Strinka, *Kulturny Zivot*, November 26, 1965; V. Blazek, *Literarni Noviny*, November 20, 1965; and M. Kusy, *Bratislava Pravda*, October 19, 1966.

[13]Ota Sik, *Nova Mysl*, October 1964, and *Politicka Ekonomie*, January 1966. There were those like Eugen Loebl (*Kulturny Zivot*, September 28 and October 5 and 12, 1963) who argued that the command-economy system had never been valid but was merely a Stalinist distortion of Marxism.

[14]Extensive economic discussions were conducted in almost all the economic and literary journals by Loebl, Selucky, Sik, Brcak, Goldmann, Korda, Plachy, Kozusnik, to name only a few of the liberal participants.

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though related to it, was the realization that the whole concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its counterpart, the Leninist concept of the party, might also be unsuitable bases for the pre-communist socialist society.[15] Czechoslovak liberals asserted that socialist society, too, is composed of various "strata" or groups. These are not "classes" in the strict Marxist sense of the word, for socialist society is a classless proletariat society. Nonetheless, groups not only exist but often bring with them conflicting interests. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the suitable form of government for such a society. There is, of course, no need for a dictatorship of the proletariat over other classes when the latter have been eliminated.[16] The rationale for a dictatorship having disappeared, a new form of government must be found; given the various strata of society, this must be a form which provides room for all interests — conflicting or not. In other words, this form must be democratic.

Rejection of the governmental form of the dictatorship of the proletariat posed a still more serious problem: What would be the role of the party? The Leninist concept of the leading role of the party as the vanguard, the embodiment of the proletariat, was designed, like the dictatorship of the proletariat (and, in a sense, like the command economy), for the revolutionary stage of development. It was a concept suited for the seizure of power and elimination of the opposition. It, too, lost its rationale once socialist society was established. Even the monolithic nature of the Leninist party was outmoded: the differences in socialist society manifested themselves within the party itself, conflicting with each other within the framework and ideals of the party. Socialist society, then, demands a new conception of the role of the party, as well as a new conception of the party itself.

The reforms, those enacted and those under consideration, were the outcome of ideological considerations. But they were influenced by another factor — one that has more to do with the nature of the Czech nation than with Marxism. While it was the more impulsive, emotional Slovaks who spearheaded the drive for reforms, it was the realistic, legalistic Czechs who formulated them. The Czech liberals were anxious lest the Polish experience be repeated in Czechoslovakia. They did not want a sudden burst of liberalization measures which later could just as swiftly be

[15]See authors listed in footnote 12.

[16]This was pronounced accomplished when Czechoslovakia became a socialist country with the adoption of a socialist constitution in July 1960.

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withdrawn. They preferred a slow, meticulous formulation of legal revisions with the idea of institutionalizing the changes and altering the very structure and fiber of society. This plodding, undramatic, but thorough undertaking made the reforms appear most promising and full of potential significance.

II

The economic reforms were perhaps the most radical ones accepted. Building on the ideas of the Soviet economist Lieberman, as well as on those of East German economic reformers, Czechoslovak economists went several steps farther.[17] They designed a reform known as the "improved system of planned management" which would place the economy on a market-determined, profit basis as distinct from the former plan-directed, volume-oriented system.[18] Enterprises were to be independent, not only from directives and quotas but also from financial support from the state. They were to be dependent upon their gross income to cover their expenses, including wages. In this way the enterprise would be forced to gear production, in structure, costs and assortment, to the demands of the market, for only from its profits would it cover its costs. Unsuccessful enterprises were to close. This dependence of an enterprise on its own means was intended to provide incentive for workers, as well as for increased productivity and technological advance, since wages were to be paid out of the gross income. A bonus system would also be introduced for special contributions to the increased income of the enterprise. Investments were to be financed partially by the plant's own resources and partially with the help of credits from the state bank.[19] These credits were to be awarded on the basis of the economic effectiveness of the project and the ability of the enterprise to repay.

[17]The principles of the reform were published in *Rude Pravo,* October 17, 1964; they were passed by the party in January 1965 and introduced experimentally in various plants in 1965. In 1966 certain aspects of the reforms were introduced throughout the country, and in January 1967 the entire reform was to be implemented.

[18]For the details see *Rude Pravo,* October 17, 1964; Lenart speech, *Rude Pravo,* February 2, 1965; M. Sokol, *Czechoslovak Economic Papers,* "Change in the Economic Management in Czechoslovakia," September 1967; and *Main Reports and Documents Concerning the New System of Management of the National Economy in Czechoslovakia,* Resolution of the Central Committee of the KSC on the Main Principles for Improving Economic Planning and Management and on the Work of the Party (Prague: Prago Press, 1965).

[19]The state bank was to be reformed into a commercial institution instead of merely an accounting house. Ota Sik, at a Symposium at the Austrian East and South-East Europe Institute, September 28-October 1, 1965, Radio Free Europe Research Paper, January 8, 1966.

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Interest rates would be more or less uniform, although the bank was free to set the conditions of the loans on the basis of the ability of the plant to repay quickly. Interest payments, like all other expenses, were to come out of the plant's income.

Wages were to be differentiated according to the workers' tasks and merit, instead of the former system of wage-equalization. While the level of wages was to depend on the success or failure of the plant, prices were to be flexible, depending upon the market's supply and demand structure. The market must be competitive, with foreign as well as domestic goods vying for the consumer's attention. Although the goal was free prices, a transitional three-category system would be used in which prices would be either fixed, flexible within limits, or entirely free.

The role of the state, the central authorities, and the plan were to be clearly delineated and limited to guidance. Neither the government nor the party was to interfere in plant operations or in the basic planning of the enterprise. The latter was to be free to choose its own suppliers and to determine its own yearly operational plan. The state was to limit itself to long-term plans designed principally to predict trends in supply, demand, costs and resources, so as to provide overall long-range coordination for the economy as a whole. This long-range plan was to be worked out on the basis of suggestions from various agencies of the government and the enterprises, in accordance with scientific methods of market research. The state was also to establish minimum wages,[20] price categories, and levies, and make certain key investments. (This last function was to be the exception rather than the rule.) It would thus guide overall wage, price and investment developments.

Organizationally, the production base (industry and construction) was to be divided into branch enterprises and trusts (some one hundred in all) which would form the central management for groups of enterprises within their jurisdiction (organized vertically in terms of total complex production process, e.g., the engineering industries; organized horizontally in trusts, uniting enterprises of the same sector of production, e.g., food industry, power). The branch (or trust) would coordinate overall branch matters, provide information guidelines to its enterprises, assure through research and development the scientific-technological progress of the branch as a whole, and be responsible for the

[20]Enterprises were to receive loans from the state bank to cover minimum wages if they should suffer economic setback.

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delivery of supplies to other sectors of the economy. The branch would be run by a directorate consisting of the enterprise managers and special advisers (for marketing, production, and the like) and headed by a director elected from among the enterprise managers. The enterprise was to maintain its autonomy within the branch and be responsible for its own finances and operations.

Of particular importance would be the plant managers themselves. To cope with the increased authority and responsibility given their position under the new system, qualifications and standards were to be raised. In addition to political maturity, plant managers were expected to have technical knowledge, initiative, and a "business sense." An institute for management training was to be formed with the idea of profiting from Western management methods as well as those of the socialist states.[21]

The key to the whole system was the rule of the market mechanism. Economic values and instruments (prices, levies, credit) were to replace administrative direction and arbitrary indices. A free competitive market, responsive to the world market, would direct the enterprise toward greater labor productivity, technological progress, and satisfaction of demand. These criteria were to be applied to every enterprise in Czechoslovakia, not only to industry, internal and external trade, and services, but to all endeavors including journals and social and cultural organizations. Profitability and economic effectiveness must be the objectives even of theaters and newspapers, although details were to be worked out with regard to state subsidies and guarantees.[22]

III

Economic reforms were to be accompanied by reforms in the social and cultural spheres. A new labor code introduced such revolutionary concepts (for a communist state) as mobility of labor, abolition of the work book, elimination of the cadre system, worker access to his personal files, protection by contracts, rights to take grievances to court, and other practices which served to give the worker greater freedom, protection and rights vis-à-vis the enterprise.[23] Coupled with this, the trade unions were to undergo reforms designed to make them representative of the workers' in-

[21]A management institute was founded in 1965 by the newly created State Commission for Management and Organization.

[22]Leopold Lev, "The State Budget in 1966," *Finance a Uver*, January 1, 1966.

[23]Labor Code, effective January 1, 1966 (Law 65 of June 16, 1965), *Sbirka Zakonu* (*Collection of Laws*), Vol. 1965.

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terests in factories (and in government decisions) rather than agencies of the state.[24] In fact this was the purpose behind all of the reforms and proposed reforms for mass organizations, including the youth organization (CSM) and women's groups. These organizations, originally designed as part of the complex of "transmission belts" for the benefit of the state and the party, were to be freed of supervision from above and the role of serving the regime. They were to become real interest groups representing their members.[25] Student leader Jiri Mueller went so far as to suggest that mass organizations be permitted an independent political role, but his idea was left for later discussion.[26]

A minor reform in the health system gave patients the right to choose their own doctors, even if they were located in another district.[27]

The educational reform was much more significant, for it was conceived to eliminate a large number of Soviet-designed practices which had destroyed the once exemplary quality of the Czechoslovak educational system.[28] The overburdening of students through their obligation to work in "youth brigades" or to attend political events or meetings was to be discontinued. Teachers' tasks were to be depoliticized and the qualifications of the teachers raised, in part by the abandonment of the cadre system. Textbooks were also to be depoliticized and subject matter and teaching methods were to be modernized. The structure of the schools was to be changed to permit gifted students to receive greater attention and earlier specialization. A "differential" approach was to replace the Soviet-type "unified" system. The humanities were to be restored to their rightful place in balance with the natural sciences. The basic schools were to be extended from eight to nine years with greater demands placed on the last two years. The high schools were to be detechnicalized and there was to be a return of the pre-communist-type *gymnasia* for university-bound students and a system of technical and vocational secondary schools for others.[29]

At the higher education level, reforms reintroduced entrance exams and pre-communist degree titles and eliminated the cadre

[24]Central Committee Plenum, January 1965 decision. *Rude Pravo,* February 4, 1965.
[25]Cf. *Praca,* January 25, 1966.
[26]*Student,* January 26, 1966.
[27]For the new health law, see *Sbirka Zakonu,* Vol. 1966, Part 7, March 20, 1966, pp. 74-91.
[28]*Rude Pravo,* October 24, 1964; C. Cisar, *Socialisticka Skola,* No. 4, 1964.
[29]*Rude Pravo,* October 24, 1964; Cisar, *op. cit.*

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system. As in the pre-communist system, the rector was to be elected by secret ballot (not appointed by the state), and students were to gain a seat in the ruling body of the university. Studies were to be depoliticized, the humanities reinstated, and teaching methods and teacher qualifications upgraded.[30] Education was to be given greater priority in the allocation of funds, and wage differentials under the new economic system would, it was hoped, encourage youth to continue their studies and gain greater specialization or higher degrees.[31]

Related to reforms in the social sphere were signs of de-Stalinization in the attitude toward religion. The imprisoned Archbishop and several other persecuted clerics were released from prison, although they were forced to retire.[32] The various religious groups were given slightly greater freedom to publish and instruct without prejudice to their adherents. Dialogues between the state and the major faiths, between Catholic and Protestant leaders, and within the Jewish community, were permitted, as was greater contact between Czechoslovak religious groups and their counterparts abroad. Even anti-religious propaganda and instruction was revised to make up for the moral gap it was believed socialism had left in the forming of the youth.[33]

The cultural world, too, underwent reform. Without formally ridding themselves of the state censor, the intellectuals continuously expanded the bounds within which they could publish. Under the influence of party liberals, such as Education and Culture Minister Cestmir Cisar, the Czechoslovak press, radio and television became bold forums for the exchange of ideas and even criticism of everything from the communization of Sokol to the Russians.[34] The change was clearly felt in Czechoslovak films and the theater; and several books, short stories, vignettes and novels, commencing with Mnacko's controversial *Belated Reportages,* be-

[30]*Sbirka Zakonu,* Vol. 1966, Part 7, March 30, 1966, pp. 66-73.

[31]*East Europe,* August 1965, pp. 43-44; *Rude Pravo,* June 1, 1965.

[32]Prague Radio, October 14, 1963; *New York Times,* October 4, 1963. Archbishop Beran was later named a Cardinal.

[33]M. Machovec, *Osvetova Prace,* No. 26, 1965; J. Lion, *Svobodne Slovo,* December 4, 1966; V. Gardovsky, *Veda a Zivot,* February 1966.

[34]Cf. *Zivot Strany,* March 1965; *Rude Pravo,* June 25, 1965, for party decisions in these areas. Prague Radio: cf., for example, October 6, May 12 and 14, and December 9 and 12, 1965. Radio Bratislava: December 10 and November 20, 1965. Radio Brno, November 24, 1965. Cf. also *RFE Research,* "The New Look in Czechoslovak Radio Program II, January 1966—January 1967," February 14, 1967.

Czechoslovak television began "Westernizing" by importing or cooperating with Western programs. (*East Europe,* August 1963, p. 43, and April 1966, pp. 12-14; *Rude Pravo,* June 18, 1965.) One of the most interesting of these programs was a frank discussion with Austrians televised in January 1965.

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gan to appear alongside avant-garde poetry.[35] A press law, passed in 1966 to protect some of these newly-won freedoms, was designed to give editors a legal basis for complaints against censorship, though it by no means included all of the clauses demanded by the liberals.[36]

IV

The reform movement could not help but affect the political-governmental sphere as well. Reforms were introduced in the legal and judiciary systems designed to give defendants greater rights and protection; the all-powerful Soviet-type prosecutor-general was downgraded in favor of greater rights for the defense attorney. Qualifications were raised for all persons connected with the law, from investigators to judges, thus doing away with the former system under which one- and two-year crash courses made party hacks into lawyers. Citizens were given greater recourse to the courts even for administrative matters, and the judicial system was reorganized to free investigating organs from political interference. The prison system was reorganized and modernized.[37]

The government itself was reformed to accommodate the economic reforms and to improve the quality and nature of its work. Government organs, from the cabinet down to the locally elected national committees, were given greater responsibility and independence — on the top level, independence from the party; on the lower levels, from the center.[38] The local national committees were granted a degree of financial autonomy so that they could gain and protect their political independence.[39] The Slovak government regained its cabinet and some of its former authority. The role of the Slovak Board of Commissioners and the rights of other Slovak organs were redefined and upgraded. The role of the National Assembly was revised to make this lawmaking body more

[35]To list just a few examples of "new wave" films: *Petr and Pavla, The Shop on the Main Street, Loves of a Blonde,* and two particularly controversial avant-garde films, *The Celebration and the Guests* and *Daisies.* In the theater, the reforms were reflected in satires like J. P. Pick's *How I Was Murdered,* Petr Karvas' *The Scar,* Vaclav Havel's *The Garden Party,* and Josef Topol's *The End of the Carnival.* Prague students elected visiting Alan Ginsburg "Majales King" at their May Day Festival in 1964.

[36]Law No. 81/1966, effective January 1, 1967.

[37]New Civil and Penal Codes and new laws regarding judges and lawyers were enacted; a public prosecution act and an administrative procedures act were passed. These were laws numbered 36/1964, 56/1965, 57/1965, and 71/1965.

[38]*Rude Pravo,* Party Theses, December 23, 1965. On the national committees, see *ibid.,* March 28, 1964; on the National Assembly, *ibid.,* May 29, 1964; for Slovak National Council Law No. 124/29, June 1964, *ibid.,* May 22, 1964; see also the new election bill, No. 114/1967, November 30, 1967.

[39]*Rude Pravo,* March 28, 1964.

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effective. The committees of the Assembly (and of the Slovak National Council) were given greater powers to initiate laws, amend or return government-proposed laws, review the constitutionality of laws and decrees, supervise implementation of laws through hearings and requests for reports, and oblige government members to appear with regard to legislation under consideration.[40] In conjunction with these increased powers for the elected organs, a new election law was passed offering a certain amount of choice at the nominating level and room for more candidates than positions on the ballot.[41]

In the political sphere, there were demands for changes as radical as those secured in the economic sector. If the economists wanted a market system, the more politically-oriented wanted democracy. Liberal party intellectuals demanded a National Assembly composed of persons truly representative of the people and the conflicting interests within society. Opposition must not only be permitted but institutionalized and protected by law. While most considered the idea of Western-style political parties outmoded, it was argued that the various groups or social organizations in society could serve much the same purpose — without the pre-socialist aspect of parties as representatives of class interests. Some believed it was the duty of the Communist Party to be above politics and the government, to harmonize the conflicting interests, and to protect the long-range goals of socialism, as a sort of arbiter or ideological body. Thus while communism would remain the goal, above opposition and protected by the party, the road to communism and the policies and methods within socialist society would be debatable and democratically decided.

Although these ideas were merely discussed, they provoked strong demands for an end to the communist monopoly of power as provided for in the constitution. The party decided, therefore, to sponsor and enlarge a committee of experts, which had originated in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, to study possible reforms of the political system.[42] This committee, according to its chairman, Zdenek Mlynar, and young secretary, Petr Pithart, was commissioned to make proposals regarding such issues as the electoral system, the formulation of political lines, social

[40]*Rude Pravo,* May 29, 1964. On occasion, after this reform, the Assembly did amend and even return some government bills. Prague Radio, April 12, 1965 and February 9, 1966; *Rolnicke Noviny,* December 14, 1966; *Mlada Fronta,* March 1, 1967; *Lidove Demokracie,* February 3, 1967.

[41]Law No. 144/November 1967.

[42]*Rude Pravo,* July 6, 1967.

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engineering and sociology, relations between man and institutions, the function of law and public opinion, nationalities problems, and the role of the communist party in a socialist society.[43] The starting point for the study was "the necessity to analyze social reality as far as the division into social and common interest groups is concerned, and . . . to propose the [most] suitable forms for the movement of society." The committee was to take into consideration the development of other political systems, "including the plurality of parties in the West . . . and the aspect of the so-called division of power and the control functions of the pluralistic political system."[44] Of primary interest would be the question of substantive guarantees for the democratic formulation of policy and civil rights. The objective was to be the formulation of a model for a "socialist" constitution — despite the fact that Czechoslovakia already had a "socialist" constitution as of 1960.

All of the above reforms or steps toward reform were achieved only with great difficulty and lengthy debate, particularly within the party. Novotny himself was not in favor of them, but was pressured into accepting them. He sought to limit these hard-won measures, if for no other reason than that his power base within the party lay with the conservatives; it was those middle-level conservative party functionaries who had the most to lose by the reforms. In effect, Novotny sought to block implementation of the reforms or to restrict them so that they could not have the originally intended effect. Throughout the reform period, the movement suffered numerous setbacks, such as the expulsion of liberal philosopher Ivan Svitak from the party and his job in 1964;[45] the expulsion from the university and sudden drafting of rebellious student leader Jiri Mueller into the army in 1966; the suppression of certain avant-garde films such as Vera Chytilova's *Daisies* in 1966; and the dispatch of Cestmir Cisar to Bucharest as Ambassador in the same year.[46]

The difficulties began to mount in 1967, however, when it became evident that Novotny was returning to former methods, successfully blocking implementation of enacted reforms, and trying to stifle the reform drive. The most serious problem,

[43] *Ibid.*, and Bratislava Radio, May 22, 1967.
[44] J. Kroupa, interview with Mlynar, *Student*, September 27, 1967.
[45] The Svitak affair may have had one positive result: the new Party Statutes of 1966 forbade the expulsion of a member without permission from his local party group. At the time of Svitak's dismissal, his local party group in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, where he worked, protested vigorously.
[46] Students held a protest meeting over Cisar's removal (*Die Welt*, November 27 and December 1, 1965).

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perhaps, was that of the economic reforms, since they were the most urgently needed. Party conservatives had succeeded in adding so many compromise measures and restrictions to the reforms — in the name of smoothing the transition to the new system — that, in fact, it was difficult to say that the new system had been introduced at all. Such things as supplementary levies, subsidies, surcharges, preferential credit policy, profit equalization through taxation, administrative interference from the center (including subordination to and use of the branch directorates as agencies of the government), directives, wage and price ceilings and controls, all distorted the effect the economic instruments were to have had in connection with a market mechanism. The market mechanism itself could not function since free competition and supply and demand pressures could not exist side by side with subsidies and discriminating practices designed to remove inequalities among plants and avoid inflation.[47] Liberal economists persisted in demanding that the new system be implemented without hindrances and subterfuges.

At the same time Slovak Party liberals pressured the government for greater autonomy for Slovakia and implementation of the measures approved to enlarge the role of the Slovak national organizations. They argued for a federal system, harking back to the ideas or promises of such persons as Smeral and Masaryk to strengthen their case.[48] The youth, too, criticized the conservative tack taken by the regime. Thus, in November 1967 when the regime used brutal police tactics to break up a peaceful youth demonstration against poor conditions in hostels, students responded with more demands for political reform.

The intellectuals expressed their dissatisfaction most effectively. After a series of setbacks — for example, the total lack of implementation of the press law, the suppression of the youth journal, *Tvar*, at the end of 1965, the arrest of two young in-

[47]Cf., "General Conditions of Enterprise Management," *Hospodarske Noviny*, July 29, 1966. Complaints were heard from Sik, Kozusnik, Loebl, Kanturek, Kraus, Kovacik, and most liberal economists. See *Kulturny Zivot*, January 20, 1967; *Kulturni Tvorba*, January 5, 1967; *Nova Mysl*, July 11, 1963; *Reporter* (Prague), October 20 and November 3, 1967; and *Plamen*, April 1967. The branch system itself produced a tendency toward monopolization, and this form of organization was to give way to enterprise independence in the Dubcek reform era.

[48]*Reporter*, June 14, 1967; H. Koctuch, *Slovenske Pohlady*, January 1967; *Historicky Casopis*, December 1967; J. Mlynarik, *Historicky Casopis*, October 1956; Daniel Rapant, *Slovenske Pohlady*, April and November 1967; *Nova Mysl*, June 13, 1967; *Predvoj*, February 23, 1967; and *Kulturny Zivot*, March 10 and May 5, 1967.

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tellectuals,[49] and the muzzling of the liberal journals with regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict (with overtones of anti-Semitism reminiscent of the 1950's) [50]— the writers came to their Fourth Congress pessimistic but determined to resume the campaign for liberalization begun four years earlier at their Third Congress. Speech after speech criticized the regime, urged reform, and even demanded constitutional change in the direction of real democracy.[51] Novotny's response was to expel three of the more outspoken intellectuals from the party, and in September the government seized the union's journal, *Literarni Noviny*.[52] The intellectuals responsed by refusing to write for the government journal, and the Slovak Writers Union sent a protest to party ideology chief, Jiri Hendrych.[53]

These pressures from all groups interested in reform, the Slovaks, the youth, the writers and the economists, together with the party liberals' growing realization that Novotny had returned to former methods and that there was no longer any possibility of real reform under his leadership, led to the dispute at the October 1967 Party Central Committee plenum and achieved the replacement of Novotny at the January plenum.[54] Dubcek, a moderate-liberal who realized that the only hope for Slovak rights lay with democratization of the whole system, was brought to power by the liberals. His function was to implement the reforms, revising them where necessary in order to preserve their original purpose and spirit.

V

With the coming of the liberals to power the focal point, the

[49]The two were writer Jan Benes and television camera man Karel Zamecnik. They were tried in 1967 for supplying information to emigré journalist Pavel Tigrid, who was also tried *in absentia*.

[50]The regime's anti-Israel moves had a dual aspect in the eyes of the public, and of the intellectuals in particular. They bore too much resemblance to the era of the trials and thus seemed to be a sign of a return to those days. In addition, the people sincerely and openly sympathized with Israel, seeing her as the modern-day counterpart of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Therefore, the regime's stand seemed to be one more instance of policy taken without regard for the wishes of the people. Cf. on this topic L. Mnacko, *Ma'Ariv* (Israel), August 13, 1967; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 11, 1967.

[51]*IV Sjezd Ceskoslovenskych Spisovatelu* (Prague, 1968), carries all the speeches.

[52]*Rude Pravo*, September 28, 1967, carried the Central Committee decisions of the September 26-27, 1967 plenum. Ivan Klima, Antonin Liehm, Ludvik Vaculik were expelled; Jan Prochazka was deprived of his candidate membership in the Party Central Committee.

[53]*Kulturny Zivot*, November 3, 1967; Aleksander Prlja, *Nejdeline Informativne Novine* (Belgrade), December 10, 1967.

[54]For perhaps the best account of these plena, see Mencl and Ourednik, *Zivot Strany*, Nos. 14-18, 1968.

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very nature of the "revolution," changed. Until 1968 this had been a "revolution from above," a struggle within the party, conducted almost exclusively by party members, whether intellectuals, Slovaks or economists. This fact is not to be minimized, for in a monolithic one-party system change can come only from within the ruling elite. In this sense the Slovaks played an important role as perhaps the only built-in, organized group within that elite.

The public for the most part had regarded the struggle as party-infighting, unlikely to change their lives significantly. Indeed, workers tended to oppose the economic reforms, for they viewed with alarm the income insecurity that might result from the differentiation of wages and the closing of unprofitable plants. Conservatives in the party had encouraged such fears, obfuscating the positive elements of the reforms. The youth, particularly the students, seemed to be the only exception to this public indifference. As we have seen in the case of student leader Jiri Mueller, the students early realized the potential of the liberals' struggle within the party and sought to have their own demands included.[55]

Once the liberals gained power, with their promise of a new policy and their effort to win popular support and participation, the public slowly began to comprehend the possibilities of the situation. What had been a purely party affair became a public matter, and the people with increasing confidence began to exert pressure to ensure fulfillment of the party's promises. Thus the focal point of the "revolution" shifted to the masses; through spontaneous popular action the "revolution" became a mass movement. Workers took matters into their own hands by electing workers' councils to operate in place of, or to supervise, their ill-qualified plant managers. Farmers formed a social interest group designed to play a political as well as a social role. The students and numerous youth groups broke off from the regime youth organization, CSM, and founded independent organizations. Independent clubs (*quasi* parties) sprang up in many walks of life. Religious and national minorities began to form their own organizations. The mass media not only demanded the repeal of censorship but operated as if there were no censorship, and it

[55]For example, from 1963 on students and young workers turned the traditional May Day poetry reading at the statue of Czech poet Macha into demonstrations with definite political overtones. In 1966 a number of youths were arrested and tried for these disturbances.

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served as both the leader of, and the platform for, popular opinion. As the struggle spread beyond the intellectual elite to the masses, the mouthpiece for the struggle passed from the specialized journals of the intellectuals to the mass media.

Similarly, as the struggle left the confines of the party, the students, as one of the best informed and best organized groups outside the party, assumed a certain degree of leadership over the "revolution," serving as a natural bridge between the people and the party liberals with whom they had earlier cooperated. One of the outstanding successes of this period was the genuine alliance that began to develop between the intellectuals, particularly the students, and the workers.

Another new phenomenon, only barely discernible in the early period, was the split within the ranks of the Slovaks who had been united with the Czech liberals in the earliest stages of the struggle against Novotny. Once Novotny was ousted (and even before then), some Slovaks became interested in the liberalization movement only as a means of gaining Slovak rights. This group, led by Gustav Husak, was only mildly interested in democratization and concentrated its efforts on federalization of the Republic. It actually opposed certain aspects of the reforms. A second group of Slovaks, like Dubcek, believed that Slovak rights could be safe only within a genuine democracy, and they, therefore, continued to concentrate on winning reforms.

With regard to the reforms proposed by the liberals in the previous period, some underwent slight changes while others were completely revamped by the movement from below.[56] In the area of economic reform one of the main tasks was to remove the limitations on the new system, both organizational and substantive, introduced by the Novotny regime. Aside from this, the most significant innovations were (1) the introduction of enterprise councils as elected bodies, composed of workers and outside experts, which ranked above management of each enterprise, and (2) enterprise independence. The liberals' plans to transform mass organizations into genuine interest groups were overtaken by the spontaneous creation of independent organizations and clubs, some of which demanded representation in the National Assembly. The Slovaks' demands for autonomy were accepted and prep-

[56]The regime's program, what might be called the minimal plan, was contained in the party's Action Program (*Rude Pravo*, April 10, 1968). Subsequent innovations were rarely contained in official decisions or laws (given the short time the liberals were permitted to operate freely), but the ideas and proposals were broadly publicized in press, radio, television, and meetings all over Czechoslovakia.

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arations for the federalization of the Republic were begun. In the cultural sphere, preliminary censorship was abolished[57] and freedom of expression was at least theoretically granted.

As in the previous period, most of the reforms were directly dependent on those in the political sphere. The demand for a new constitution was accepted, and the suggestions pressed by the liberals in the early period served as a model for envisaged changes. Demands from below merely gave greater weight to the most radical of the liberals' earlier proposals. The primary problem remained the concept of the party's role, though it was clear that an opposition of some kind was to be an essential element of any reform. In sum, the exact content of the political reforms remained unclear. In the face of outside pressures, the regime felt it necessary to retreat on a number of points, delay on others, or simply suspend plans until the country's international-political position could be settled.

VI

In view of these developments and the nature of the reforms, one can understand why the Soviets and their more conservative allies were so concerned about developments in Prague. Ulbricht had long kept a watchful eye on what one of his supporters called, as early as 1964, "revisionism in Prague."[58] Poland almost immediately felt the repercussions, which upset the delicate balance Gomulka had been barely able to maintain between warring factions in his party. The upshot in Warsaw was the strengthening of the conservative, arch-nationalist, and anti-Semitic forces of Interior Minister General Moczar. The Hungarians had less to fear since Kadar had gradually liberalized his regime over the past several years, copying and even improving on some of Czechoslovakia's reforms. For this reason Kadar could act as a mediator and perhaps even a restraining force on Moscow and the other concerned parties, without, however, defying them by openly supporting Dubcek.

Yugoslavia had for many years watched with optimism the reform movement in Prague. Although Tito is himself something of a conservative obstacle to similar radical reforms accepted by the Yugoslav party in 1966, he gave Dubcek full and open support in the latter's efforts to resist Soviet interference in Czechoslovak

[57]Law 68/June 1968, amendment to Law 81/1966.

[58]East German Party Secretary Sindmann, to Central Committee Plenum, February 3-7, 1964; cited by Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

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internal affairs. It was this last point that attracted Rumanian support as well. It is true that Ceausescu is one of the most conservative leaders in Eastern Europe, that Rumania's reforms were in the area of foreign affairs, and that her breakaway from the USSR was prompted by purely nationalist, economic, Stalinist-oriented interests. Yet Rumania today, like Yugoslavia, bases her policies — indeed her independent existence — on the concept of the right of every socialist country to determine its own affairs. On this basis, and this basis alone, she pledged her support to Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union had many reasons to fear developments in Prague. The greatest fear apparently was the threat the Soviets sensed to their concept of the leading role of the party. Because the Soviet model of socialism is based primarily on this concept, they found it difficult to conceive that communists could stay in power if they gave up the party's monopoly. In Soviet eyes a continuation of developments in Prague could only lead to the collapse of communist rule there and, consequently, the loss of Czechoslovakia as a dependent and loyal ally. Protestations of immediate loyalty and devotion to the Warsaw Pact could hardly assuage these fears, for Moscow could not be sure that the party would continue to rule in Prague and thus be prepared to fulfill its promises of allegiance. Even if the party did succeed in staying in power, Moscow must have been worried that Czechoslovakia's reforms would lead her to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Given her industrial potential and her geopolitical position, a loss of the Soviet influence and favored economic position over Czechoslovakia would have been a much more serious setback for Moscow than the loss of Rumania or Yugoslavia.

While foreign policy realignment and anti-Russian sentiment were never a part of the reform movement, the Soviets and their conservative allies probably realized that eventually Czechoslovak reforms were bound to influence foreign policy considerations. This might have been the outcome of the economic reforms, though at this stage Prague sought only profitable economic relations and hard-currency credits, not a reorientation of trade in favor of the West. Her products still could not compete in Western markets, and her own markets as well as raw material imports were still more securely, if not more profitably, tied into the socialist bloc. Moscow probably assumed that as Prague sought original solutions to its problems and tried to construct its own model of socialism — all the time serving Czechoslovak national

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and traditional interests — it would sooner or later begin to formulate its own foreign policy, too.

However accurate this judgment, Soviet opposition to and attempted interference with Czechoslovak reforms tended to hasten the appearance of demands for genuine national independence. Thus Soviet actions were in the main counterproductive, but entirely understandable if one considers that the Kremlin found it imperative to avert the serious danger of the party losing power in Czechoslovakia and socialism coming to an end there — with all the consequences such developments would hold for the Soviet system of alliances.

The USSR also feared the impact the reforms in Czechoslovakia would have — indeed, already were having — on the rest of Eastern Europe, inside the Soviet Union itself, and on the Soviet model of socialism. This was no small concern, for Moscow did not view this situation merely as one of liberalization but as a process leading to the downfall of socialism. It is difficult to know whether Ulbricht and Gomulka looked this far ahead, since they had already been forced to deal with repercussions stemming from the Prague "revolution." There was little question, however, that they wanted to eliminate this source of both immediate and still graver future challenges.

Some claim that Brezhnev decided to invade not because he feared the specific reform program in Prague but because he could not tolerate a socialist country which tried to take its own path to socialism. If true, this would represent a change in policy since Khrushchev's "many roads to socialism" era, however one views Khrushchev's devotion to that rather pragmatic yet vague concept. There can be little question today that there was a change in the Kremlin's policies in 1968. The invasion stood in glaring contradiction to the Soviet policy painfully hammered out over the previous twelve years. Yet one cannot help but believe that the *content* of Prague's chosen road to socialism, rather than the mere choice of another road, was the determining factor.

We cannot know whether Khrushchev would have refrained from invading if he had been in power and feared that the party was in danger; nor do we know whether Brezhnev would have invaded had he thought the party could maintain itself in a pluralistic system. We do know that the Soviets did not want to invade, for the same reason that Khrushchev did not take more forceful steps against Rumania. Such action would seriously endanger Moscow's chances of regaining its position as the leader of

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the world communist movement. Despite their initial brief effort at conciliating the Chinese, the new Kremlin leaders had not changed their objectives in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nor had they given up their efforts to line up support for a reassertion of their leadership over the international movement. Wavering and conflict within the Soviet leadership finally produced a victory for the faction which believed that the danger in Prague was greater than the danger to Moscow's position. Perhaps correctly, though reluctantly, it was concluded that force was the only way to ensure Moscow's hold on Eastern Europe, and that such a show of force would forestall any serious move against the USSR's hegemony. As Stalin before him, Brezhnev gravely considered the effect the invasion would have on the international movement.

This extreme and almost unbelievable move was a serious blow to the Soviet effort to capture the imagination and support of peoples in the Western world. The Czechoslovak experiment offered a hope for those Marxists who sought a humane system suitable to the industrialized and democratic society of the twentieth century. Neither the Yugoslav nor the Rumanian experiment provided such a model. The Soviet Army made sure the Czechoslovak experiment would not become a model. By their action against Czechoslovakia, even more than their repression of Hungary twelve years earlier, the Soviets have diminished the appeal of their own model for peoples everywhere.

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SOVIET-AMERICAN MILITARY AID COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD*

by Stephen P. Gibert

IN the beginning of the postwar era there was nothing subtle about Soviet foreign policy. Openly revisionist, it was designed to create a belt of satellite nations around the borders of the USSR. The military might of the Soviet government was the principal instrument of this policy, and areas occupied by the Soviet Army, from Berlin to North Korea, were brought quickly under the sway of communist regimes dependent upon Moscow. In the Mediterranean-Middle East area, however, Soviet expansionism was thwarted. In the first test case, that of Iran, the United States countered the Soviet challenge with political pressure backed up by stern warnings and UN support.

In Greece and Turkey in 1947, the United States first began employing foreign aid as a means of bolstering the resistance of recipient countries to Soviet policies. Turkey, emboldened by American economic and military aid, and by American diplomatic support, refused to accede to Soviet demands concerning the Dardanelles and the Turkish eastern territories. In Greece, American assistance helped prevent a communist-supported insurgency from toppling the government. Thus in the early years of the Cold War an American policy was shaped and subsequently put to use all around the periphery of the communist world — a policy of creating alliances and mutual assistance pacts, and supporting the members of these arrangements with both economic and military aid.

When some six to seven years later the Soviet Union began to reappraise its policy toward the less developed nations, American aid diplomacy received the supreme compliment of imitation. As it had become for the United States, foreign aid became a principal foreign policy instrument of the Soviet Union. First hesitatingly with limited economic aid, then more boldly with military aid as well, increasing the number of recipients and the

*This article is based on a chapter in Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969). Used with permission.

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amounts involved, Soviet aid diplomacy began to compete with the United States in the less developed world.

The decision of the Soviet government to engage in aid diplomacy was brought about not only by the failure of communist insurgencies in the less developed countries. It also resulted from the growing realization among Soviet military leaders that nuclear confrontation with the United States must be avoided. During the period of the Korean War, when the United States launched an extensive expansion of its military forces, Soviet leaders began to acknowledge that a clash between the two superpowers might destroy both. This new appraisal of conflict led the Kremlin to search for methods to continue the offensive against the Western powers in the former colonial areas, without risking nuclear war. Ideologically, this took the form of differentiating between types of wars, condemning nuclear strategic war and limited wars, and supporting "wars of liberation." Pragmatically, it resulted in the USSR's entrance into foreign, particularly military, aid diplomacy.[1]

By 1967, as the Arab-Israeli conflict starkly revealed, military aid was serving as a principal instrument for the major powers in their desire to influence the course of events in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Challenge and response, competition and coexistence, intrusion and penetration became the key terms describing the motives of the Soviet Union and the United States in their worldwide military aid diplomacy. This article will examine this competition and estimate the effect of American military aid diplomacy on Soviet arms aid policies.

Priority Regions in Soviet and American Military Aid Programs

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have concentrated a large part of their military aid in those countries which are proven allies or "satellites." Significant amounts of Soviet aid have gone to East European countries, North Korea, and, in earlier years, Communist China. Currently an undetermined but undoubtedly substantial amount of aid is being furnished to North Viet Nam. The United States formerly directed the bulk of its military aid to its West European allies and Japan. More recently, the principal recipients have been South Korea, China (Taiwan)

[1]For discussion of the use of military aid to support wars of liberation, see Stephen P. Gibert, "Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Aid Policy," Orbis, Fall 1966, pp. 839-858.

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and South Viet Nam. Any comparisons of the rival American and Soviet arms aid programs must begin, therefore, by emphasizing that the observations are limited to the less developed, relatively uncommitted countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. It is in these "nonaligned" or "Third World" countries that the military aid programs of the two superpowers are in competition.

Since the objective here is to analyze military aid diplomacy in the Third World, countries completely identified with either the Soviet bloc or the United States have been omitted. These include North Korea, Mongolia, North Viet Nam, South Korea, South Viet Nam and Nationalist China. Had such countries been included, of course, the aid totals would have been larger than those presented in this article.

Table I lists fifty-four Third World countries that received American military aid during the period 1956 through 1967. Large recipients included Brazil, India, Iran, Laos, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey. Currently Thailand is the Third World country receiving the largest share of U.S. military aid allocations.

TABLE I

ESTIMATED UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: FY 1956 - FY 1967

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Country	*Amount*	*Country*	*Amount*	*Country*	*Amount*
Afghanistan	$ 3.2	Guinea	$ 1.0	Morocco	$ 26.7
Argentina	23.5	Haiti	3.2	Nicaragua	8.4
Bolivia	15.8	Honduras	5.0	Niger	0.1
Brazil	160.8	India	200.0	Nigeria	1.0
Burma	35.0	Indonesia	59.8	Pakistan	750.0
Cambodia	87.1	Iran	627.6	Panama	2.3
Cameroon	0.2	Iraq	41.3	Paraguay	5.1
Chile	67.2	Israel	52.0	Peru	63.8
Colombia	57.9	Ivory Coast	0.1	Philippines	262.5
Congo-Kinshasa	16.1	Jamaica	0.8	Saudi Arabia	33.0
Costa Rica	1.7	Jordan	48.0	Senegal	2.6
Cuba	7.5	Laos	150.0	Sudan	0.7
Dahomey	0.1	Lebanon	8.8	Thailand	600.0
Dominican		Liberia	4.9	Tunisia	16.3
Republic	14.1	Libya	12.4	Turkey	1735.5
Ecuador	29.0	Malaysia	0.4	Upper Volta	0.1
El Salvador	4.7	Mali	2.8	Uruguay	33.8
Ethiopia	95.8	Mexico	1.5	Venezuela	6.4
Guatemala	10.8				

Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts* (Washington: March 1968), pp. 14-15. Figures for countries whose aid totals could not be adapted from this document were derived from articles in the press, principally from the *New York Times*.

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TABLE II

ESTIMATED SOVIET-BLOC MILITARY AID TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: 1955 THROUGH 1967

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	Estimated Military Aid
Afghanistan	$ 260
Algeria	200
Cambodia ... between 5 and	10
Congo-Brazzaville	1
Cuba	750
Cyprus	28
Ghana ... between 10 and	15
Guinea ... at least	6
India ... between 600 and	700
Indonesia	1,200
Iran	100
Iraq ... at least	500
Laos ... between 3 and	5
Mali ... at least	3
Morocco	20
Nigeria ... between 10 and	15
Pakistan ... between 5 and	10
Somali	35
Sudan	N.A.
Syria ... at least	300
Tanzania ... between 5 and	10
UAR	1,500
Uganda	N.A.
Yemen	100
Total up to:	$5,768

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967,* Research Memorandum RSE-120 (Washington: August 14, 1968); Joshua and Gibert, *op. cit.,* pp. 23, 45, 73, 102. Soviet-bloc military aid to the Middle East countries (Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, UAR and Yemen) provided after the June 1967 war is not included.

Its total aid is still slightly less than that of Iran and Pakistan, however, and much less than that of Turkey, the largest Third World recipient.[2]

During approximately the same period of time, the Soviet bloc[3]

[2]The current emphasis on "forward defense countries" in U.S. military aid allocations will raise Thailand's total even higher. Of $500 million requested for FY 1969, $365 million was allocated to countries "which, because of their geographical proximity to the USSR and Communist China, are exposed to the direct threat of Communist aggression." See U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts* (Washington: March 1968), p. 7.

[3]The terms "Soviet aid" and "Soviet-bloc aid" are used interchangeably. All Soviet-bloc aid except for a small fraction has been aid from the USSR itself; only Czechoslovakia among the bloc countries has contributed a measurable amount of military aid. "Soviet bloc" refers to the USSR and the members of the Warsaw Pact. The use of the term is merely a convenience; it does not imply monolithic unity among the Warsaw Pact nations. Military aid by Communist China is not included in Table II.

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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF REGIONAL PRIORITIES IN SOVIET AND UNITED STATES MILITARY AID

Region	*Estimated Total Aid*		*Percentage of Total Program*		*Number of Recipients*	
	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.
Middle East	$2,748	$2,602	48	48	8	10
South/Southeast Asia	2,185	2,148	38	40	6	10
Latin America	750	523	13	10	1	21
Africa	85	126	1	2	9	13
Totals	$5,768	$5,399	100	100	24	54

aided twenty-four Third World nations. Major recipients of Soviet arms were the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, India and Cuba. Currently (1969) few if any weapons are being provided to Cuba and Indonesia, but India and the UAR continue to receive substantial Soviet military aid. Cairo in particular relies heavily on Moscow's willingness to provide both weapons and training for Egypt's military forces. Table II lists Third World nations that have received Soviet military assistance, with estimates of the amounts of aid converted to American dollars.

Table III illustrates the regional emphases in the American and Soviet programs. Again disregarding Soviet aid to other communist countries, and examining allocations only to the relatively uncommitted states of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, it is clear that Soviet assistance has been directed principally toward the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. In Latin America, only Cuba has received Soviet military aid. In Africa, on the other hand, the small amount of Soviet aid has been disbursed among nine countries.

We find some interesting similarities and contrasts between the Soviet and American military aid programs. In terms of amounts of military aid allocated, the regions are ranked in the same order for the two superpowers. For both countries, the Middle East has been the area of most importance, whereas Africa has received the least amount of military aid. The fact that the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia have received more than 80 per cent of the total U.S. and Soviet allocations suggests the importance the superpowers accord to these regions in their competition for influence in the Third World.

A second comparison of the two programs indicates the relative

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concentration of Soviet efforts, in contrast to the dispersion of American aid. Although the total amounts involved are nearly the same for each donor for the twelve-year period, the Soviet Union has concentrated its $5,768 million in only twenty-four recipient countries, averaging approximately $240 million per recipient. The United States, on the other hand, has spread its $5,399 million among fifty-four recipients, with an average of approximately $100 million per recipient. These figures suggest that the Soviet government targets its aid with objectives in mind which differ basically from the goals pursued by the United States. The USSR chooses recipients that may be expected to agree with Soviet policies or to maintain friendly relationships with the Soviet Union. United States aid goes not only to countries allied with or sympathetic to American goals and aims, but also to countries tending to oppose U.S. policies. The United States expects that such countries receiving American aid will at least preserve their own independence and thus contribute to a stable, noncommunist world.

Logically, it can be assumed that large amounts of aid will give the donor country greater influence in the recipient country than a small amount of aid. If this is true, it would appear that Soviet aid is designed to secure for the Soviet Union a position of significant influence in a limited number of recipient countries, while American aid appears designed to maintain at least a minimum aid relationship with a large number of countries. Of course such a conclusion is tentative in that analysis of the competing aid programs must take into account qualitative as well as quantitative factors. But it is evident that the USSR and the United States tend to pursue somewhat different aid strategies.

To some extent, the relative dispersion of American military aid and the relative concentration of Soviet military aid are affected by the special position occupied by Latin America in the foreign policies of the two donors. Where Latin America is concerned, the United States appears determined to maintain its preeminent influence, and the Soviet Union seems to accept this status. It has been frequently argued that Soviet foreign policy may be distinguished from Czarist Russian diplomacy in that the former is unlimited in scope and worldwide in its interests and ambitions, whereas Czarist aims centered on areas of the world geographically adjacent to Russia. Michael Karpovich supports this point of view. He argues that "pre-revolutionary Russian imperialism was essentially no different from the imperialism of the

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other great powers," but the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is radically different: it is global in scope, "seeking to achieve a number of aggressive aims simultaneously in various corners of the earth. This alone sharply distinguishes Soviet policy from the policy of the Tsars, who, as a rule, pursued limited aims. . . ."[4] However, while Soviet ideology proclaims a worldwide policy of spreading communism, Moscow's military aid program indicates that Soviet policy, like that of imperial Russia, still emphasizes regions adjacent to the USSR and is still cautious about moving into distant areas such as Latin America. In this light Soviet aid for Cuba is an exception to the general conduct of Soviet foreign policy, for in aiding Cuba Moscow sought to extend its influence thousands of miles from the Russian homeland.

American aid to Latin America during the period 1956 to 1967 has totaled only $523 million. Yet every Latin American country received at some time or another during those years at least token aid from the United States. This contrasts with other regions of the world where American aid has been much more selective. The inclusion of all Latin American countries in the U.S. military assistance program goes far to explain the relative dispersion of U.S. efforts. Were Latin America excluded, the U.S. program spread would resemble that of the USSR more closely. It also points up the importance accorded by the United States to maintaining good relations with the countries of the Western Hemisphere, especially since there is no "rational" need to arm them.

Africa, like Latin America, appears to be a low-priority region in Soviet military aid diplomacy. To some degree the small amounts contributed to Black Africa by the United States and the Soviet Union, less than 2 per cent of their total combined allocations, are due to the inability of relatively backward societies to absorb large amounts of military aid. The generally small armed forces of the African countries lack sufficient training to utilize sophisticated and costly weapons systems. The token aid also reflects Africa's geographical remoteness from both donors and its inability to affect drastically the military security of the superpowers. The USSR has extended a total of $85 million to nine African countries; the United States has contributed approximately $126 million to thirteen African recipients. Both

[4]Michael Karpovich, "Russian Imperialism or Communist Aggression?," in Robert Goldwin, editor, *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 659-660.

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Washington and Moscow appear to accept a situation in Africa where neither is predominant and where competition is muted and hence cheap in terms of military aid.

The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is most intense in the critical regions of the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. To those two regions the bulk of each donor's military aid flows, and as the superpowers vie for influence and prestige there is the serious risk that their military aid policies will contribute to escalating local conflicts into a clash between them. In South and Southeast Asia the presence of Communist China, hostile to both the United States and the Soviet Union, complicates an already dangerous rivalry. Nevertheless, both superpowers continue to accord high priority to the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. Eighty-eight per cent of the American military aid commitment to the less developed world has gone to these areas, as has 86 per cent of the total Soviet military aid program.

The substantial amounts of arms aid Moscow has allocated to the Middle East and Asia argue against the view that the Soviet Union, unlike Czarist Russia, pays little heed in its foreign policy to geographical considerations. On the contrary, most Soviet aid has gone to countries adjacent or close to Russian borders. The only major recipient in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia which is far removed from the Soviet Union is Indonesia. Through military aid the Soviet government appears determined to extend its influence throughout the Russian rimlands in the south and east, and to exclude the United States from these areas if possible.

The extensive U.S. aid commitments in the Middle East and in South and Southeast Asia were designed to bolster the containment-encirclement policy pursued by the United States toward the Soviet Union for the past twenty years. The creation of military alliances such as CENTO and SEATO, accompanied or followed shortly by American military aid, has been the principal technique by which the United States has sought to contain communist expansionism. Neither of the protagonists appears willing to concede these two vital world regions to the predominant influence of the other. It is to be expected that they will continue to give this regional emphasis to their military aid programs. On this assumption, the analysis of Soviet-American aid rivalry must turn to examining the sources of aid on a country-by-country basis,

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noting how the challenges of one donor are met by responses from the other.

The Sources of Military Aid

From the inception of the Soviet military aid program in 1955 to Moscow's extensive rearmament of Middle Eastern states following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet government has aided twenty-four of the less developed nonaligned countries. During approximately the same number of years, from 1956 through 1967, the United States extended military aid to fifty-four Third World nations. In Latin America, the United States has been the sole source[5] of military aid for twenty of the twenty-one recipients. After Castro achieved power, the USSR became the sole source of military aid for Cuba, and the United States discontinued its Cuban program. In other world regions, however, neither of the superpowers has achieved the position of sole donor. Table IV cites the number of countries in each region which received military aid from either or both of the two donors and indicates the number of "sole source" versus "dual source" nations in each world area.

Table IV

NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITHIN REGIONS RECEIVING AMERICAN AND SOVIET AID: A COMPARISON OF THE SOURCES OF AID, 1956-1967

Source of Aid	*Middle East*	*South and Southeast Asia*	*Latin America*	*Africa*	*Totals*
Soviet Union Only	5	0	0	5	10
United States Only	7	4	20	9	40
Both U.S. and USSR	3	6	1	4	14
Totals	15	10	21	18	64

It will be observed that the Soviet government has been the sole source of aid to only ten of the sixty-four aided countries; of the twenty-four countries receiving Soviet arms assistance during these years, fourteen also received military aid from the United States. It is assumed that donor countries wish to achieve maximum influence in recipient countries. If it is further assumed that donors

[5] "Sole source" as used here refers only to the United States and the USSR; it does not include third donor countries such as Britain, France, Germany and Communist China.

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enhance their influence by becoming the sole source of aid for the recipient, then the United States has been much more successful than the Soviet Union.[6] Forty of the sixty-four countries relied solely on the United States for military aid. Expressed differently, 58 per cent of the Soviet aid recipients also received American aid, while only 26 per cent of the countries receiving U.S. military assistance also received aid from the Soviet Union. Again, however, the achievement by the United States of a sole-source position is primarily due to the fact that all Latin American countries received U.S. assistance at some time or another in the history of the aid program, while only Cuba has been a Soviet recipient. In the Middle East three of the fifteen aid recipients obtained military aid from both donors. None of the South or Southeast Asian countries relied solely on the Soviet Union. In Africa, four of the eighteen countries obtained military aid from both donors.

Although there are several important exceptions to the general rule, it is usually true that countries tend to rely on one or the other donor rather than on both. As Table IV indicates, fifty of the sixty-four aided countries relied on a single aid source. Of course, if military aid to the close associates of the donors were considered — the aligned in contrast to the nonaligned states — the tendency toward sole-source aid would be even more striking. Viewed from the perspective of nonalignment, it is remarkable that so many countries rely on one or the other military aid donor. The commonly held belief that neutrality enables countries to "blackmail" the United States and the USSR and receive aid from both is certainly a myth in terms of military aid commitments over the past dozen years. Most countries, willingly or not, have "chosen sides" in accepting military assistance.[7]

If small aid recipients are disregarded, the tendency for countries to "choose sides" is unmistakable. Eight of the fifty-four U.S.-aided countries and eleven of the twenty-four Soviet-aided nations have received more than $100 million in aid. Of these substantial aid recipients, only two, India and Iran, have obtained more than $100 million from both donors. This seems to indicate that com-

[6]On the other hand, if it is assumed that influence is a function of the size of the donor's program in the recipient country, the USSR has been more successful, since Soviet programs are on the average about twice as large as those of the United States.

[7]The same point is made by David Beim, "The Communist Bloc and the Foreign Aid Game," *Western Political Quarterly,* December 1964, pp. 795-799. In recent years, however, certain countries have succeeded in getting aid from both the USSR and the United States. Among the important states aided by both sides are Pakistan, India and Iran. In 1969 Iran emerged as a principal target of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East.

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petition between the United States and the Soviet Union over India and Iran is especially acute.

In contrast to India and Iran, nearly all of the remaining twelve mutually-aided countries have received preponderant aid from one or the other superpower. Afghanistan, for example, received $260 million from the USSR, but only $3 million from the United States; Iraq, $500 million from the Soviets, but only $41 million from America; Indonesia, $1,200 million from Moscow, as against $60 million provided by Washington. Pakistan obtained $750 million from the United States, but only between $5 and $10 million from the Soviets. In essence, even in those instances where recipients have not chosen sides — that is, have received aid from both superpowers — they have relied on either the United States or the Soviet Union, but not on both. This fact makes the position of India and Iran all the more unusual.

Why have aid donors chosen certain countries to aid and not others? Why have aid recipients tended to choose aid from Moscow or Washington, but ordinarily not from both? To answer these questions, it is necessary to look at the three classes of recipients as revealed by Table IV: first, those countries that received aid only from the USSR; second, those that received aid only from the United States; and finally, those that received from both. What criteria determined the choices made by the donor countries? Are there regional differences which affect the selection by each donor of its recipients?

It is clear that since the Cuban missile crisis both sides regard the bulk of Latin American countries as suitable recipients only for U.S. military aid. The Soviet government has aided, and continues to aid, only Cuba. Latin America thus offers an example of an area where neither protagonist competes in the same country. Because the United States has given every indication that it will not "tolerate" another situation like the Cuban one so close to home, it seems probable that there will be no aid competition between Washington and Moscow in the Americas. In fact the USSR, faced with such a hostile response from the United States, might even continue to moderate further its Cuban military aid programs. Latin American countries, accordingly, will not likely be areas of competition in the Cold War in terms of military aid: the "stakes" will be low for each side, and the amounts of aid allocated will remain small. To the extent that aid is stepped up by Washington, it may be as a result of competition with Western nations, not the Soviet Union — for the United States sometimes

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finds it more difficult to exert pressure against Latin American countries receiving aid from U.S. allies, such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom.

In Black Africa, with the exception of arms aid to Ethiopia and Somali, the military aid programs of the two donors have been inconsequential. Most African countries have relied on one of the two, but not on both. Five countries (Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Somali, Tanzania and Uganda) have received aid only from the Soviet government, nine (Congo-Kinshasa, Cameroon, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta) only from the United States, and four (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Sudan) from both donors. Africa, like Latin America, is accorded low priority in the aid diplomacy effort.

Soviet and American military aid competition has been lively only in the Somali-Ethiopia region of east Africa. There Soviet-aided Somali and U.S.-aided Ethiopia confront each other with military forces far superior to those either could sustain were it not for the rivalry between the two superpowers. The Soviet assistance program in Somali is larger than that in any other sub-Saharan country. This is especially significant, since the largest American recipient in Africa, Ethiopia, is the chief target of Somali's irredentist ambitions. Somali sought Western aid during the 1960-1963 period, but the response was not acceptable, primarily because the Western offer was conditioned upon the newly independent state not accepting aid from other sources.[8] Somali instead accepted a larger and unrestricted Soviet offer of arms. The United States continued to aid Ethiopia. Thus the pattern made familiar elsewhere, of one local rival receiving military aid from Moscow and the other from Washington, was once more repeated. It is this type of phenomenon, not the "blackmail" one, which tends to result in large military aid programs.

South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East differ from Latin America and Africa not only in quantities of military aid received but also in the intensity of the competition between the donor countries. In South and Southeast Asia, Washington has been the sole source of aid for four of the ten recipients (Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), but none of the countries has received aid solely from Moscow. Six (Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos and Pakistan) have obtained aid from both the United States and the USSR. In the Middle East the United States has been the sole donor to seven countries (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey), the Soviet

[8] *New York Times*, December 17, 1963.

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Union to five (Algeria, Cyprus, Syria, UAR and Yemen), and both countries have aided Iran, Iraq and Morocco.

Thus while the Middle East follows the Latin American and African pattern in that the majority of recipients have "chosen sides" as between the two donors, South and Southeast Asia form the one region where mutually-aided countries outnumber sole-source countries. What special situation exists in South and Southeast Asia to account for this? The answer is probably that the donors face a common threat to their positions of influence in Asia: China. All three of the largest noncommunist Asian countries — India, Pakistan and Indonesia — have received military aid from both the Soviet and American governments. Both donors have to some extent viewed this aid as a means of bolstering opposition in these countries to the influence of China, or possibly even against Chinese aggression or penetration. Regardless of whether these fears are real or imagined, and whether or not the recipient governments share them, concern over possible Chinese moves has prompted both donors to furnish large amounts of military assistance to Asian countries.

Pakistan has not only benefited from the American-Soviet military aid rivalry by securing assistance from both donors; it has obtained aid from Communist China as well. During the Indian-Pakistani border war in 1965, while both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to remain neutral, and urged that the conflict be settled as expeditiously as possible, Communist China openly backed Pakistan and voiced veiled threats of renewing the Sino-Indian border war. China also sent Pakistan approximately eighty MIG-19 fighters, some bombers, and tanks.[9] In August 1967 Moscow began to provide military assistance to Pakistan.[10] With this agreement Pakistan apparently accomplished the impossible. It had succeeded in securing aid from China despite its adherence to the SEATO alliance, which was directed against China. It had succeeded in securing aid from the Soviet Union, despite the Soviet commitment to India. Finally, it continued to receive aid from the United States, despite the fact that both Communist China and the USSR had become active in Pakistan. No better illustration of the successful "playing off" of the three protagonists, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China, could be found. This was possible only because all three rivals saw the subcontinent as vital to their military and political positions in Asia.

[9]The Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1967-1968* (London, 1967), p. 32.
[10]*Washington Post,* August 6, 1967.

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The Middle East has been the largest aid recipient region for both donor countries. It is clear that both view the region as extremely important in their worldwide struggle for influence. But since Communist China is not a threat in the Middle East, the pattern there tends to follow that of the lesser-priority areas: most of the countries are aided by one or the other of the superpowers, relatively few by both. To a significant degree this situation has been brought about because of the Arab-Israeli hostility. The intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict has made it difficult for the two donors to avoid choosing sides. The Soviet government has clearly done so: its aid has favored those countries most hostile to Israel, especially Egypt, Iraq and Syria. American aid has supported those countries less aggressively oriented toward Israel, such as Turkey and the "conservative" Arab powers. The second largest Soviet aid recipient in the Middle East — Iraq — was initially aided by Moscow primarily to wean it away from the American alliance system.

In summary, where an external regional adversary, from the point of view of the donors, exists as China does in Asia, the military aid programs tend to be large and to some degree mutual. Where an intraregional enemy, from the point of view of most of the recipients, exists as does Israel in the Middle East, the donors tend to compete for the role of exclusive source of aid and the aid programs also are large. Where an area is clearly in the military sphere of influence of one or the other superpower, as Latin America is, the absence of genuine competition holds down the total aid program, and the source of aid tends to be exclusive. Finally, where recipients face neither indigenous nor external rivals, as in the case of Africa, the aid donors tend to limit their aid. This is especially true if they view the area under consideration to be of marginal importance in world politics.

Foreign Policy Orientations of Military Aid Recipients

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have declared that their military aid programs are intended to support their foreign policy objectives in Third World countries.[11] To measure their success, an analysis of roll-call voting in the United Nations by

[11]See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts* (Washington: May 1967), p. 7; T. Bulba, "International Significance of the Development of Communism in the USSR," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (*Communist of the Armed Forces*), December 1964, p. 37; and unsigned editorial, "Fifty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution; Thesis of the Central Committee, CPSU," in *ibid.*, July 1967, pp. 37, 41.

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Third World recipients of American and Soviet military aid has been undertaken with the purpose of comparing recipient positions on important roll-call votes with the positions taken by the superpowers. This approach rests on the belief that a government's voting record on questions before the United Nations is as objective a measurement of its international political position as can be devised.[12]

The test was applied to voting in the United Nations by Third World countries during the period 1958 to 1964 and considered two categories of issues voted upon: political and security issues affecting nations generally; and trusteeship and colonial questions of particular interest to Third World governments.[13]

Table V lists all Third World nations which received military aid valued at one million dollars or more during the 1958-1964 period. It then compares the "scores of agreement"[14] between aid donors and aid recipients. It will be observed that, except for Cyprus, the ten countries aided exclusively by the USSR agreed with the Soviet Union most of the time. Algeria, with an agreement score of eighty-one, was the nation most in agreement with the USSR on political and security issues.

Except for Laos, the nine countries aided by both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed more often with Moscow than with Washington.[15] While it was to be expected that governments

[12]Obviously measuring the degree of identification on UN roll calls between aid donors and aid recipients is only one method of estimating the military aid-foreign policy nexus. The test implies correlation only, not causality, since it cannot be ascertained whether aid recipients agreed with aid donors because they received aid, or received aid because they agreed with donor policies.

[13]Roll calls selected were from both committee and plenary sessions of the General Assembly. They had to meet at least one of the following criteria: (a) the division on the roll call was such that 20 per cent or more of the voting governments were opposed to the majority position; and (b) the Soviet Union and the United States voted differently on the issue. These criteria were designed to ensure that only "politically significant" roll calls were included in the sample, and to screen out those on which there was little or no disagreement. The distinction between "political and security" roll calls and those on questions concerning non-self-governing territories and trusteeships, hereafter referred to as "colonial" roll calls, is that of the UN Secretariat, as reported in the annual volumes of the *Yearbook of the United Nations.*

[14]The "scores of agreement" presented in Table V are a measure of the percentage of times nations agreed with the Soviet Union or the United States on the 102 roll calls examined. The method employed assigns weight to abstention votes as against positive and negative positions. It also allows for the fact that not all governments voted on all 102 roll calls, since several were not UN members throughout the entire period and since there were occasional absences. The formula used to compute the scores of agreement is that devised by Arend Lijphart, "An Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review,* December 1963, pp. 909-910.

[15]The fact that Cyprus has not supported Soviet policy in the United Nations, despite receiving military aid, may be explained because Cyprus did not become

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aided exclusively by Moscow would have high agreement scores with the Soviet Union, it is surprising that nearly all mutually-aided nations had higher scores of agreement with the Soviets than with the United States.

Considering the thirty-five nations aided exclusively by the United States, it was found that twenty-eight had higher scores of agreement with Washington than with Moscow. Six, on the other hand, agreed with the Soviets more than with the Americans despite the fact that the United States was the exclusive military aid donor. Jordan was precisely neutral in its voting.

The results indicate a strong relationship between military aid policy and attitudes, as expressed in UN voting, on political and security issues. The Soviet government has tended to be "rewarded" by military aid recipients to a somewhat greater degree than has the United States. Foreign policy attitudes definitely correlate with receipt of military aid.

But while Cold War problems may be of paramount importance to the Soviet Union and the United States, Third World nations perhaps are more intensely concerned with the colonialism issue than with matters of international political security. With few exceptions, Third World countries are former colonies of European powers, and they tend to view the issue of colonialism and national self-determination emotionally. Just as the Cold War has split the United Nations, so has the conglomerate of problems labeled "colonial" questions. In recognition of the importance of these issues, Table VI presents the scores of agreement with the Soviet Union and the United States of Third World military aid recipients on colonial roll calls in the UN. Following the same procedures as with the political and security roll calls, twenty-one "important" votes on colonial issues from 1958 to 1964 were selected for analysis.

All ten nations that received military aid exclusively from the Soviet bloc had high scores of agreement with the Soviet Union on colonial votes. The aid recipients mutually assisted by Moscow and Washington also showed strong agreement with the USSR. Laos, the one Soviet recipient which was not in majority agreement with the Soviet Union on political and security questions, had a relatively low agreement score on colonial roll calls as well.

However, the thirty-five nations receiving aid solely from the United States did not show high scores of agreement with

an aid recipient until 1964. The Laos case was also exceptional in that some Soviet aid went to the neutralist incumbent Laotian government, some to the combined neutralist-Pathet Lao forces, and some to the Laotian communist guerrillas.

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Washington. While only six of the thirty-five failed to agree with American positions on political and security questions, most of the thirty-five disagreed sharply with the United States on colonial issues. Three Latin American nations and Turkey, the Third World beneficiary of the largest amount of U.S. military aid, were the only states in substantial agreement with the United States.

Comparing the findings in Tables V and VI, it is clear that the USSR has succeeded in identifying itself with the positions of the less developed countries on colonial questions, but not to the same degree on roll calls involving political and security issues. In the case of the United States, the opposite holds true. U.S. positions on political and security questions generally coincided with those taken by Third World countries relying on U.S. aid. There was, however, virtually no identity in the positions of the United States and Third World countries on colonial issues. While political attitudes may be swayed by military aid diplomacy, the issue of colonialism is so intensely felt as to override other considerations. Aid recipients may modify their positions on international security questions to conform to those of the donors of aid; they do not do so on colonial problems. For both superpowers military aid appears to be a significant but not a decisive factor in affecting the foreign policy orientations of aid recipients.[16]

Twelve Years of Aid Competition: Conclusions

Analysis of twelve years of American-Soviet military aid competition in the Third World reveals a rather remarkable degree of similarity between the superpowers in their arms diplomacy, despite some differences in strategy and objectives. Perhaps the close resemblance of their policies reflects a recognition on the part of both of certain common phenomena which affect arms aid decisions. It may be that the similarity in policies is but one manifestation of a shared superpower situation. Whatever the case, the approaches of the two donors to military assistance are sufficiently alike to permit generalizations applicable to the foreign policies of both in the Third World.

The Soviet and American governments have invested approximately the same dollar value in military aid over the twelve-year period from 1955 to 1968. Viewed in terms of dollar amounts,

[16]For a discussion of variables other than military aid which correlate with voting positions in the United Nations, see Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), Chapter 6. Also see Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, "Measuring International Alignment," in Julian Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen, editors, *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970). The authors found that the four most reliable indicators of international alignment were military commitments, votes in the UN, diplomatic recognition patterns, and exchanges of diplomatic visits.

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TABLE V

SCORES OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN AID DONORS AND AID RECIPIENTS ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY ROLL CALLS IN THE UNITED NATIONS: 1958-1964*

Aid Recipient	*Aid Donor*	*Percentage Agreement with USSR*	*U.S.*	*Aid Recipient*	*Aid Donor*	*Percentage Agreement with USSR*	*U.S.*
Algeria	USSR	81	19	Dominican Republic	U.S.	21	83
Cyprus	USSR	41	62	Ecuador	U.S.	24	77
Ghana	USSR	62	40	El Salvador	U.S.	23	81
Guinea	USSR	80	22	Ethiopia	U.S.	57	46
Somali	USSR	57	48	Guatemala	U.S.	20	83
Sudan	USSR	64	37	Haiti	U.S.	27	74
Syria	USSR	73	27	Honduras	U.S.	16	86
Tanzania	USSR	75	25	Iran	U.S.	34	72
UAR	USSR	72	30	Israel	U.S.	19	81
Yemen	USSR	71	30	Jordan	U.S.	51	51
Afghanistan	USSR-U.S.	71	34	Lebanon	U.S.	54	47
Cambodia	USSR-U.S.	59	44	Liberia	U.S.	35	68
Cuba	USSR-U.S.	69	32	Libya	U.S.	59	42
India	USSR-U.S.	62	43	Mexico	U.S.	37	66
Indonesia	USSR-U.S.	68	35	Nicaragua	U.S.	9	92
Iraq	USSR-U.S.	71	30	Pakistan	U.S.	35	68
Laos	USSR-U.S.	28	74	Panama	U.S.	24	78
Mali	USSR-U.S.	80	28	Paraguay	U.S.	15	87
Morocco	USSR-U.S.	75	26	Peru	U.S.	17	84
Argentina	U.S.	17	84	Philippines	U.S.	25	77
Bolivia	U.S.	27	74	Saudi Arabia	U.S.	64	38
Brazil	U.S.	25	78	Senegal	U.S.	39	61
Burma	U.S.	64	41	Thailand	U.S.	23	87
Chile	U.S.	23	81	Tunisia	U.S.	54	48
Colombia	U.S.	17	84	Turkey	U.S.	18	88
Congo-Kinshasa	U.S.	40	60	Uruguay	U.S.	19	84
Costa Rica	U.S.	18	83	Venezuela	U.S.	25	77

*Includes all Third World nations which received military aid valued at one million dollars or more from either the Soviet Union or the United States during the 1958-1964 period. The Aid Donor column lists the source or sources of aid. Scores of agreement may total more than 100 per cent since the USSR and the United States were not in total disagreement on all roll calls. Aid relationships after 1964 are not included.

TABLE VI

SCORES OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN AID DONORS AND AID RECIPIENTS ON "COLONIAL" ROLL CALLS IN THE UNITED NATIONS: 1958-1964*

Aid Recipient	*Aid Donor*	*Percentage Agreement with USSR*	*U.S.*	*Aid Recipient*	*Aid Donor*	*Percentage Agreement with USSR*	*U.S.*
Algeria	USSR	100	0	Dominican Republic	U.S.	61	50
Cyprus	USSR	88	25	Ecuador	U.S.	68	50
Ghana	USSR	93	21	El Salvador	U.S.	50	50
Guinea	USSR	97	23	Ethiopia	U.S.	87	29
Somali	USSR	100	0	Guatemala	U.S.	67	38
Sudan	USSR	93	18	Haiti	U.S.	74	26
Syria	USSR	93	7	Honduras	U.S.	50	63
Tanzania	USSR	100	0	Iran	U.S.	85	25
UAR	USSR	95	15	Israel	U.S.	63	37
Yemen	USSR	91	22	Jordan	U.S.	91	22
Afghanistan	USSR-U.S.	98	17	Lebanon	U.S.	91	22
Cambodia	USSR-U.S.	81	20	Liberia	U.S.	88	26
Cuba	USSR-U.S.	90	26	Libya	U.S.	95	19
India	USSR-U.S.	91	24	Mexico	U.S.	76	38
Indonesia	USSR-U.S.	95	16	Nicaragua	U.S.	20	80
Iraq	USSR-U.S.	95	19	Pakistan	U.S.	83	31
Laos	USSR-U.S.	61	60	Panama	U.S.	65	40
Mali	USSR-U.S.	100	22	Paraguay	U.S.	64	36
Morocco	USSR-U.S.	95	19	Peru	U.S.	47	59
Argentina	U.S.	67	38	Philippines	U.S.	88	26
Bolivia	U.S.	66	56	Saudi Arabia	U.S.	96	32
Brazil	U.S.	55	50	Senegal	U.S.	91	9
Burma	U.S.	95	20	Thailand	U.S.	72	43
Chile	U.S.	68	48	Tunisia	U.S.	92	18
Colombia	U.S.	55	45	Turkey	U.S.	25	85
Congo-Kinshasa	U.S.	89	11	Uruguay	U.S.	74	32
Costa Rica	U.S.	68	53	Venezuela	U.S.	76	38

*Includes all Third World nations which received military aid valued at one million dollars or more from either the Soviet Union or the United States during the 1958-1964 period. The Aid Donor column lists the source or sources of aid. Scores of agreement may total more than 100 per cent since the USSR and the United States were not in total disagreement on all roll calls. Aid relationships after 1964 are not included.

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regional priorities have been similar: Africa and Latin America are low-priority regions, while South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East receive the great bulk of Soviet and American weapons. The reasons for area priorities also seem to be similar. Both the United States and the Soviet Union appear to regard Latin America as within the U.S. sphere of influence; both appear to believe that Africa is too underdeveloped and geographically remote from their respective power centers to warrant providing African states with more than token military aid; both are sufficiently concerned about Communist China to engage in active military aid programs in South and Southeast Asia; finally, both seem to believe that the Middle East is of sufficient importance to justify keen, and at times risky, competition in that region of the world.

Most aided countries have in the past relied on one or the other donor country but not on both. This was partly because the donors seem to have insisted on this condition as a price for military aid, partly because the recipients tended themselves to "choose sides" in the Cold War, and partly because both donors were motivated to aid nations which were friendly to them.

A common problem faced by both donors is that the weapons furnished by them may be used against third countries with which the donors are attempting to maintain good relations. The United States has furnished large amounts of weapons to Pakistan and more limited supplies to India; the USSR has reversed the order and favored India with considerable military aid while limiting aid to Pakistan. Neither the United States nor the USSR has any wish to see the arms they furnish used by Pakistan and India against each other. Their aim has been to make the subcontinent strong against possible Chinese influence or penetration, but neither can prevent use of the supplied weapons in hostilities between the recipient countries. This is the most serious difficulty confronting both donors: the purposes for which they give military aid frequently do not coincide with the purposes for which the recipients desire the aid, nor with the uses to which the weapons may be put. The numerous and intense rivalries in the Third World inevitably drag the donor countries into local quarrels in which they have no interest. This explains why both superpowers tend to avoid committing themselves fully to Third World causes and to maintain relationships through economic aid and other instruments even when heavily arming rival protagonists.

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The original motive for the American military aid effort was to contain Soviet expansionism along the rimlands, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean region. Today American military aid is still justified as a means of containing communism. But apparently the Soviet threat has receded in the minds of many recipients. Moscow has encouraged this development by adopting more conciliatory policies toward certain American aid beneficiaries in the Southwest Asian-Middle Eastern areas. This more flexible Soviet approach has taken the form of extending aid to Iran, offering economic assistance to Turkey, and providing at least token military aid to Pakistan.

Voting trends in the United Nations suggest that as more countries become recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there will be a tendency for these countries to move closer to the position of the Soviet Union in world politics. They will be more likely to identify with the Soviet side in voting on colonial issues. They will tend also to defer to Soviet opinion on political and security questions affecting nations generally.

After twelve years of military aid rivalry, no conclusive statement can be made as to which of the two governments is "winning" the struggle for influence. The one point which stands out is that the USSR for many years has been expanding its aid programs to the Third World, whereas the United States in 1967-1969 entered a period of retrenchment in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. This has given the Soviet government more leeway for maneuver. In the normal course of events, further aggrandizements of Soviet military influence in the Third World must eventually lead to a U.S. reaction. Perhaps instead of stepping up American military aid, the United States will choose to develop alternative instruments of competition tailored to solving the truly desperate social and developmental problems facing most Third World nations.

This policy will not be possible for the United States, however, unless it can persuade the less developed countries to decline "opportunities" to obtain Soviet military assistance. Developing nations must be convinced that maintaining large military forces diverts scarce resources from more pressing needs. Unless they come to this conclusion, and accordingly seek economic and other forms of aid rather than arms, the Soviet-American military aid competition for influence in the Third World seems destined to continue.

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A SCHEMA FOR THE ANALYSIS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC AND TOTALITARIAN REGIMES

by Samuel J. Bernstein

THE Soviet and American governments are rivals. During twenty years of competition, this rivalry has been extended to almost every dimension of foreign policy. Academics and professionals alike have weighed the consequences of the failures and successes of the antagonists: "the balance of power in military force and technology is probed and analyzed; rates of economic growth are compared and debated; scientific achievements in space and on earth are trumpeted and deprecated; anxious count is kept of the annual crops of grain and engineers."[1] Although the study of these international phenomena is significant, they are also part of a wider domain of interest involving the total performance of the respective nations. The latter, in turn, depends on the workings of the political systems. The key decisions and actions taken in all areas of competition are made through politics. Consequently, the nature of the political system may determine national activities in diplomacy, strategy, economics or science.

When we speak of the rivalry between the two superpowers we are concerned with two areas of competition: specialized foreign area competitions, and competition between the respective domestic political systems. While much has been written about the former,[2] the comparative aspects of the latter have been neglected. Generally those who have devoted themselves to analyzing domestic systems have tended to stick to approaches that prevent genuine comparison. Hence, a gap presently exists in the study of the comparative politics of the United States and the USSR.

This article seeks to aid in bridging this gap by proposing a conceptual scheme with which to identify and measure the concept of totalitarianism, compare it with democracy, and illustrate

[1]Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (fifth edition) (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 3.

[2]See, for example, D. H. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1961), Volume II.

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some of the differences between them by reference to Soviet and U.S. politics.[3]

We begin by defining the domain of interest, totalitarianism, within the broader frame of reference of dictatorship. From here we proceed to identify modern totalitarianism as a particular subtype of dictatorship and correlate it with specific states of political and socio-economic development. We then formulate a model, based on the constructs of power increments and political saliency, for the comparison of totalitarianism and democracy within the development context.[4] Finally the schema is applied, in an illustrative fashion, to two case studies of U.S. and USSR domestic politics.

Definition of the Domain of Interest

Dictatorship, A General Phenomenon

A dictatorship is the rule of a person or a group of persons occupying the formal roles of government who arrogate to themselves power and exercise it without restraint through governmental and extragovernmental machinery.[5] This general definition is so formulated for two reasons: (1) It envisages dictatorship as a phenomenon located only on the level of formal government and on no other level of social organization. As such, it encompasses the many social and political situations which may lead to dictatorship or to the serving of dictatorship but does not make any one or two of them necessary conditions for dictatorship. Thus the authoritarian (quasi-dictatorial) family may lead, as some have maintained, to a more ready acceptance of political

[3]For some recent empirical studies which have sought to compare political systems, see Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems: Q Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey," *The American Behavioral Scientist,* November 1965, p. 3; P. Gregg and A. S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey," *American Political Science Review,* September 1965, p. 602; I. A. Adelman and C. Morris, "A Factor Analysis of the Interrelationship Between Social and Political Variables and Per Capita Gross National Product," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* November 1965, p. 555; Bruce Russett, "Delineating International Regions," in J. David Singer, editor, *Quantitative International Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1967); and Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development, Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson Polsby, *et al.,* editors, *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).

The basis for trying to conceptualize a tool by which to measure and compare totalitarian and democratic political systems rests on this literature. However, in one aspect it differs: whereas the above literature is empirical without much theoretical underpinning, the primary purpose of the present piece is theoretical.

[4]Karl von Vorys, editor, "New Nations: The Problem of Political Development," *The Annals,* March 1965.

[5]F. Neumann, *The Democratic and Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), Chapter 9.

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dictatorship,[6] but dictatorship may also be promoted (and more frequently, perhaps) by the decay of traditional authority or by the very undermining of the authority of the father.[7] (2) The definition does not compel us to distinguish artificially among dictatorship, despotism and tyranny as is often done. It rather abstractly defines the phenomenon in terms of its essential characteristics and thereby implicitly points up the imprecision of the latter two.

Although "tyranny" and "despotism" are rejected as meaningful subtypes within the general definition of dictatorship, this is not to be taken as meaning that there are no substantive and significant distinctions to be drawn. For it is evident that, if the concept is to be useful, particularly for the analysis of contemporary dictatorships, certain distinctions must be made as to the kind and scope of power wielded by particular dictatorial regimes. To do this we formulate three conceptual types of dictatorship.

The Simple Dictatorship. The first is defined by its exercise of power through the control of the traditional means of coercion only: the army, the police, the bureaucracy and the judiciary. We call this type a simple dictatorship[8] because there is no need for more extensive controls, regardless of the exact nature of the dictator—military, bureaucratic junta or caudillo. The need for absolute control over only the traditional means of coercion stems mainly from two factors: the general political unawareness of the masses in that particular political system, and the centralization of political power in the hands of small cliques which gain importance by their close association with the dictator. Although the masses of people may have to pay taxes and serve in the army, they have, otherwise, little to do with political life. Hence, the only social controls that may be needed are those governing these instruments of coercion. Many times this involves the bribery and corruption of those few individuals who are responsible for securing the masses' compliance with the norms of the political system. To a great extent Franco Spain and the control of colonial possessions by imperialist powers are characteristic of this type of dictatorship.

The Charismatic Dictatorship. The simple dictatorial regime is compelled, or at least feels compelled, at times to go beyond

[6]T. W. Adorno, *et al., The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950).

[7]See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

[8]Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

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control of the traditional means of coercion. This occurs when parts of the masses become aware of the political process and aggregate their interests to form informal political structures in order to articulate their respective demands to the dictatorial regime occupying the formal structures of government. Extension of control by the dictatorial regime in this instance takes a personal format whereby all groups—politically articulate or not—are made to feel that they are being led by the dictatorship as Moses led the ancient Israelites through the desert to freedom. The charismatic dictatorship concept is therefore formulated to cover the noninstitutionalized control by the political regime over the parts of the masses tending to become politically articulate. A mere mention of a few recent and contemporary charismatic leaders will suffice to flesh out this concept: contemplate for a moment the prominent but notorious names of Lenin, Hitler (before 1934), Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah.

The Totalitarian Dictatorship. Although charismatic dictatorship is in part popularly based, its existence is nevertheless quite precarious for two reasons. Control over the traditional implements of social coercion grows more inadequate for effective control as the masses grow more politically articulate—a result which almost always is associated with increasing socio-economic development—and the charismatic influence is of a noninstitutionalized nature. Hence to remain in control in an environment of changing socio-economic or political conditions, the charismatic dictatorship must institutionalize its control over society and the individuals and groups that compose it. The concept covering dictatorial regimes' increased institutionalized social control may be called totalitarian dictatorship or totalitarianism. In totalitarianism the political regime preserves its existence by exercising control over the educational process, the means of communication, and in general over the society's political and socio-economic institutions, in addition to its control over the traditional elements of coercion and its charismatic attraction. The purpose of this increased control is to subject the whole of society and the private lives of its individual citizens to the domination of the political regime.[9] That totalitarian dictatorship is a phenomenon to be treated separately from charismatic dictatorship is demonstrated by two facts: (1) up to the twentieth century charismatic dictatorship did not necessarily lead to totalitarian dictatorship, consequently the latter is not necessarily the result of a genuine

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

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charismatic dictatorship; (2) totalitarianism is a unique political phenomenon identified with distinct socio-economic correlates, and hence must be analyzed autonomously.

Our task now is to define in greater detail the crucial components of totalitarianism. This sets the intellectual base for the formulation of a conceptual model within which totalitarianism and democracy can be compared.

Essentially, five characterizing factors define the totalitarian system.[10] The first of these is the transition from a state based on the rule of law to a police state. In the area of substantive rights, the presumption in favor of the rights of the citizen and against the coercive power of the state is reversed. The most prominent feature of totalitarian political systems is the power of executive agencies to interfere at discretion with life, liberty and property.

The second factor is the transition from a diffusion of power in a number of federated states and/or in the divided functions of governmental agencies to the concentration of power in the totalitarian regime. This concentration may vary in degree as well as form.

The third factor, and more crucial than the previous two, is the existence of a monopolistic state political party. This factor distinguishes totalitarianism politically, for the first two factors are also to be found, although in lesser degree, in simple and charismatic dictatorships. The need for such a party arises because the traditional instruments of coercion are not capable of totally controlling an industrial society, especially "since bureaucracies and armies may not always be reliable."[11] As an instrument of control, the monopolistic state party is a flexible instrument which provides the force to control the machinery of state and society and to perform the gigantic task of cementing together the various segments of society. The latter function is social-psychological in nature and is carried out within the context of what is commonly called "the mass society."[12] In order to accomplish this task, the totalitarian regime has to assume a democratic posture so as to give the appearance that it is representing the interests of all segments and balancing them off equitably. It is forced to practice the ritual of democracy, even though the substance is totally missing, in order to manipulate the various groups of society into a

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 244.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 744.
[12] See W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 227.

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semblance of unity under the domination of the regime. As used here, the substance of democracy implies that a society is able to make genuine choices at regularly recurring intervals as to who will occupy the formal roles of government and what are the political norms and the extent of their application.

The fourth factor characterizing the totalitarian dictatorship is the transition from pluralist to totalitarian social controls. Society at large ceases to be distinguished from the formal political roles, i.e., it becomes almost totally permeated by the latter through the latter's effective control over all organized political, economic and social institutions. In this context Erving Goffman's analysis of the "total institution" may serve as a model metaphor for the total society.[13] For totalitarianism the control of society is as important as the control of the formal government is for simple dictatorship. Control of society is achieved by the following techniques:[14] (1) The leadership principle—to enforce guidance from the top and responsibility to the top. (2) "Synchronization" of all social organizations, not only to control them, but to make them serviceable to the state. (3) Creation of graded bureaucratic and popular elites (so as to enable the rulers to control the masses from within and disguise this manipulation from without) by supplementing the state bureaucracies with private leadership groups from the various strata of the population. (4) Atomization and isolation of the individual, which requires weakening the traditionally identifiable primary groups, such as the family, religious, work and leisure groups, and replacing them with huge and undifferentiated mass organizations, such as the Communist Youth and the Nazi Youth, to leave the individual isolated and more easily manipulated. (5) Transformation of cultural values into propaganda commodities.

The final factor in totalitarianism is reliance upon terror: i.e., the nonpredictable or noncalculable use of violence as a permanent and credible threat against individuals or groups attempting to violate the political norms of the totalitarian system or upset it. It must be stressed, however, that the totalitarian dictatorship is not to be defined merely in terms of the rule of violence. Without violence it could not survive, but neither could it endure for any length of time without considerable identification by the oppressed people with their rulers.

[13]Erving Goffman, *Asylums* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1961).

[14]Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

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These are the crucial features of the most repressive of political systems. Their total effect is to distinguish totalitarianism from other types of dictatorship by destroying the dividing line between the state (the formal political roles) and society, and by totally politicizing society through the machinations of the monopolistic party. As a distinction, it is one in kind and not merely one in degree. Simple and charismatic dictatorships exercise their power primarily through the traditional instruments of coercion; moreover, the application of power is governed by abstract but calculable rules, although its execution may be arbitrary. Totalitarianism aims for the absolute negation of these principles. Power is generally not exercised through the traditional coercive agencies of the society—the courts, administrative bodies and army—but primarily through the secret police and the party. These agencies apply their power in a least calculable or "anomic" fashion in order to maintain certain desired levels of social regimentation not demanded by either the simple or charismatic dictatorship types.

With the defining characteristics of totalitarianism formulated, we can proceed to correlate the concept with the corresponding features of political and socio-economic development. This is undertaken for two reasons: (1) to get a clearer understanding of the relationship between totalitarianism as an extreme means of political control and the requisite levels of socio-economic and political development with which it is associated; and (2) to formulate an abstract frame of reference by means of which modern totalitarianism may be compared with democracy.

Democracy, Dictatorship, and Political and Socio-Economic Development

For the purposes of this study, socio-economic development is divided into six levels as posited by Pontzen, and political development into four levels as posited by Organski.[15] Although these boundaries are somewhat arbitrary, the theoretical dividing lines are not drawn hard and fast; thus, appropriate adjustments can be made for subsequent operationalizations in future analyses. The intellectual basis for setting them forth here is that it aids in the ordering of available historical data and adds to our own

[15]Theodore C. Pontzen, "A Comprehensive Model of Socio-Economic Development at all Levels," Peace Research Society Papers, VIII, The Hague Conference, 1967, p. 123; A.F.K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (second edition) (New York: Random House, 1965), Chapter 1.

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understanding of the concepts of democracy and totalitarianism. In order to save time and space, the stages of socio-economic and political development and their characteristics are plotted in Table I and correlated graphically with the three subtypes of dictatorship and four subtypes of democracy.

Some commentaries on the six levels of socio-economic development may be useful for the present analysis:[16]

Primitive Society. Primitive peoples often do not act or react when faced with constraints; they submit passively to internal (feudalistic) or external (colonization) stimuli. They do not realize that changes are possible in the shape of personal accumulation. Hence, UNESCO statistics show no significant development in these societies.

Emerging Society. Some individuals realize that the traditional acceptance of "things as they are" can be overthrown. Moves in that direction are irregular, haphazard, unskilled. In many instances, leaders create nationalistic attitudes among their followers. Handicraft is encouraged, as well as more intensive agricultural and other food productions.

Uprising Society. Nationalism becomes a driving force, whether under individualistic or collectivist formulas. The latter allow for higher growth rates than the former, especially when it comes to the determination of "terms of trade," externally, and to the widest distribution (even on a low level) of available goods internally. In both cases part or all of the society must undergo a prolonged period of autarchy, self-restraint, coercion and unconditional acceptance of hardship. At this level, collectivist methods seem to be more efficient than individualistic ones.

Competing Society. When a sufficient degree of industrialization has been achieved, more and more individuals become conscious of their personal capacities and will strive for (or defend) their right to decide for themselves in socio-economic matters. Various forms of competition develop, with more or less protection for those who are not so gifted or equipped. Political and other changes will take place frequently as a reaction to, or as compensation for, problems not satisfactorily solved.

Coordinating Society. Democratic countries like Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, and communist countries like Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are examples of how highly developed areas lead to the coordination of various trends and methods, with more or less interference from governments.

[16]Pontzen, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

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TABLE I—THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CHARACTERISTICS WITH THE TYPES OF

Six Stages of Socio-Economic Development (Pontzen Terminology)	*Defining Characteristics*	*Four Stages of Political Development (Organski Terminology)*
1. Primitive Society Example: Berber tribesman Bedouin tribesman	Feudalism predominates; people do not feel compelled to do anything about their economic needs. Maximum economic growth, 2% per year.	No development
2. Emerging Society Example: New African nation-states	Feudalism overthrown, under economic or other constraints. Maximum growth rate, 4% per year.	1. The politics of primitive unification
3. Uprising Society Example: Cuba Brazil	Industrialization sets in, under individualistic or collectivist methods. Maximum growth rate, 12% per year.	2. The politics of industrialization
4. Competing Society Example: China (contemporary)	Competition takes place either among individuals (private enterprise) or between individuals and collectivities (class struggle). Maximum growth rate, 8% per year.	
5. Coordinating Society Example: Sweden Soviet Union Japan	State owned, cooperative and private enterprises, with or without overall framework planning, develop side by side and submit to coordination. Maximum growth rate, 5% per year.	3. The politics of national welfare
6. Saturated Society Example: U.S. in year 2000 Western Europe in 2000 Soviet Union in 2000	Owing to automation and adjustments to changing needs, economy ceases to be primary occupation. Growth rate: proportional to requirements.	4. The politics of abundance

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OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Defining Characteristics in terms of Governmental Concerns	*Correspondence with Possible Dictatorship Subtypes*	*Correspondence with Possible Democracy Types*
	Simple dictatorship	No democracy
Primary concern: National unification establishing central political rule over a national territory; maintaining this rule; forging national economic unification. Expanding citizens' focus of orientation from tribe to national level.	Simple dictatorship with increasing emphasis on popular support. Rise of charismatic dictatorship.	Liberal or aristocratic democracy
New leaders from the masses take power and mass of citizenry incorporated into the nation. Primary concern: Aid economic development. Shift in political power from traditional elite to industrial managers. Assist in the accumulation of capital. Urbanization.	Charismatic dictatorship with increasing expansion of control.	Bourgeois democracy
	Developing totalitarianism	Trade union democracy
The politics of fully industrialized countries. Primary concern: Protect masses of people from the hardships of industrial life. Keep economy running smoothly. Provide higher standards of living. Aid the disadvantaged.	Mature totalitarianism	Mass democracy
Primary concern: Cushion adjustments of social reorganization to make automation possible, but also responsible.		

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Saturated Society. No examples are available at present. However, countries now in the fifth stage may attain the next level around the year 2000.

From the foregoing taxonomical analysis it is assumed that socio-economic development and political development are inextricably bound together. It is further assumed that political development is the thermostatic control for socio-economic development and not merely its concomitant.[17] Given the above assumptions, political development may be defined in terms of its control over socio-economic development. It is conceived as the increase in effective governmental control over the expanding utilization of a nation's human and material resources for the achievement of its social, economic and political goals,[18] with the increasing control viewed as a function of the incorporation of increased human and national resources into the economy for the fulfillment of national goals.[19] Within this conceptual framework, the political development process embodies a respective government's base and potential ability to increase its power to control events and situations in society commensurate with the increase in the number of people and material things being brought into the socio-economic and political systems. In the following section we propose a developmental model, based on the above ideas, which permits the comparison of totalitarianism with mass democracy.

The Model

To represent the increases in governmental power needed to control socio-economic changes the power increment concept is posited. It comprises the respective government's ability to control domestic socio-economic change without fatal responses to itself, to mobilize the nation's human and material resources to achieve national goals, and to secure the population's compliance with the norms of the political system. As so conceived, the three components of the power increment concept correspond to the three Parsonian functions of adaptation, integration and compliance. Its operational referrents are a regime's coercive and persuasive

[17]Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* September 1961, p. 493. In this article Deutsch develops the thesis that effective political development is at the heart of the social mobilization process.

[18]Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Chapter 2. For the role mass movements have to play in this process, see Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," *American Political Science Review,* June 1961, p. 281.

[19]See Edward Tiryakian, "A Model of Societal Change and Its Leading Indicators," in Samuel Z. Klausner, editor, *The Study of Total Societies* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1967), p. 69.

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capacities. For a simple dictatorship, the power increment is defined operationally in terms of the regime's limited coercive capacity, indicated by its control over the traditional elements of coercion: army, judiciary, bureaucracy and police. As already noted, for a simple dictatorship there is no need for more sophisticated capacities, hence it would rank low on a power increment measure of types of political regimes.

For charismatic dictatorship the power increment is defined as (1) the regime's capacity to control the traditional implements of coercion and (2) its persuasive capabilities, particularly as employed by the charismatic leader to influence the masses. Hence, at least theoretically, it ought to rank higher than simple dictatorship on the power increment measure. However, as reality indicates, the charismatic regime's control over the traditional coercive elements may be far inferior to that of an effective simple dictatorship. In fact this may be—but is not necessarily—one of the reasons for relying on charisma as an added base of power. In addition, its ability to control by the persuasive elements may not be effective. Thus, even though the charismatic dictatorship works from two power bases, it may not engender greater stability than a simple dictatorship. This is particularly true when considered in light of the fact that charismatic dictatorships are generally associated with higher stages of socio-economic development, in which there is a greater number of politically articulate groups.

For totalitarian dictatorship, the power increment is defined as the political regime's capacity for complete control of the political system's coercive and persuasive capacities. For the regime's coercive capacities, it includes social control through traditional coercive elements, and increased social control through a secret police. For the regime's persuasive capacities, it includes institutionalized control over the means of communication and a monopolistic state party whose organizational aim is to persuade the society to comply with the norms set down by the formal political regime. Symbolically, the power increments of a totalitarian regime may be represented as P.I. $= \Sigma CP + \Sigma CC$ at time X: when CP is the regime's capacity to persuade and CC is the regime's capacity to coerce. CP is composed of $c.p._1$, $c.p._2 \ldots c.p._n$, and CC is composed of $c.c._1$, $c.c._2 \ldots c.c._m$. In terms of the power increment measure, totalitarianism will rank higher than simple and charismatic dictatorships because the number and the weights of the components c.p. and c.c. will be greater.[20]

[20]David Willer, *Scientific Sociology: Theory & Method* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 6-7.

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Power increment, however, is an empty concept if considered alone without reference to the political saliency level of a particular national population. Power, either increased or decreased, must be applied on someone or something.[21] Moreover, there is generally a correspondence between the amount of power applied and the need for its application—a relationship defined in terms of the number and importance of those on whom power is applied. Consequently, the coordinate construct of power increment is political saliency. It is determined by the existence of politically articulate interest groups in any political system and their own power increments to assist in either obtaining compliance to political norms or engendering resistance to them. For simplicity it is defined as a simple mathematical proportion of the number of interest articulating groups weighted over the total population and the power increments of the interest groups. An articulating interest group may be identified as any body which publicly expresses a position on a political issue—as reported in the mass or private media—and the weighting factor represents the significance level attached to the groups. This, in turn, is measured by the frequency and intensity of public statements. As an aggregate figure it is represented by a mean score of all the significance weights assigned to each of the particular interest groups identified. The power increment of the population is identified by such things as general strikes, student unrest, avoidance of tax payments, existence of legitimate controls on the power of government to silence dissent, existence of legitimate means by which excesses in government control may be questioned, and the proportion of eligible voters who vote. Symbolically, political saliency is represented as:

$$\text{P.S.} = \frac{\sum_{I=1}^{N} \alpha(I)}{M} + \text{p.i.}_1 \left[\sum_{I=1}^{N} \alpha(I) \right]$$

with I=the interest articulating group

$\text{p.i.}_1 \left[\sum_{I=1}^{N} \alpha(I) \right]$ =the power increment of the interest group population in the society

and M=total population.

[21]Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), Chapter 5.

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TABLE II

THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF POWER INCREMENTS AND POLITICAL SALIENCY



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Proceeding further, we seek to demonstrate that a linear relationship exists between the level of power increments and political saliency. This is represented graphically in Table II in order to show the nature of the relationship over time.

Symbolically, this process relationship may be represented as the following base hypothesis: that power increments are functionally related by some constant to political saliency.

P.I. = K (P.S.). Therefore the change in one would demand a change in the other by some constant proportion K. Symbolically,

$$\Delta \text{ P.I.} = K \Delta \text{ (P.S.)}.$$

Stability would obtain and be indicated by the proportion of $\frac{\Delta \text{ P.I.}}{\Delta \text{ P.S.}}$ approaching or equaling 1.

Symbolically,

$\frac{\Delta \text{ P.I.}}{\Delta \text{ P.S.}} = 1.$ When the proportion does not equal 1, by definition stability would not obtain. Symbolically,

$$\frac{\Delta \text{ P.I.}}{\Delta \text{ P.S.}} < 1.$$

Consequently, the greater the political saliency of interest groups in a population, the greater the power increments needed to control that population. For societal balance to obtain,[22] the level of increments of power must be functionally related (in the sociological sense) to the level of political saliency.

By derivation: (1) *In a totalitarian political system the numerator values of power increment will be more than .5 and will tend to approach 1; the values of the denominator, political saliency, will tend to approach .0.* This accounts for the tremendous power inhering in a totalitarian political regime in the form of the regime's institutionalized control over the socio-economic and political structures of society. It also explains the system's potential to remain stable. (2) *In a democratic political system the values in the numerator and denominator would tend to approach .5.* This accounts for the importance of society's ability in a democratic political system to make genuine choices and thus to control the kind and the degree of power increments being applied on it. Again, as in the case of totalitarianism, this hypothesis explains the stability of the system with all its factions articulating different interests.

[22]R. Kahn and E. Boulding, editors, *Power and Conflict in Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 1-11.

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This brings us to the comparison of the U.S. and USSR political systems. In terms of the development schema presented here, both countries are catalogued within the politics of the welfare stage and the coordinating societal frameworks. Both have ostensibly different forms of government—one totalitarian, the other democratic—and thus have arrived at their present stages of socio-economic and political development through different political means. How can one explain in a meaningful theoretical way, even if only in the narrow interpretive sense,[23] the developmental and contemporary political differences between the United States and the USSR? To arrive at an answer, we propose to use the political saliency and power increment model.

In this regard our analysis will not adopt the usual position that the confrontation between liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship is a case of good versus evil. Such popular comparisons result from "moralizing" about political systems and hinder a clear understanding of their functions. Nevertheless, as the model indicates, totalitarianism is characterized by a definite negation of democracy. The differences between them are to be explained in terms of power increments and political saliency.

Application to U.S. and USSR Politics

The model will be applied to a contemporary political analysis of the United States and the USSR in order to illustrate that the Soviet totalitarian polity, even as presently constituted, continues to emphasize importance of power increments, whereas the American democratic polity continues to emphasize the importance of political saliency and the concomitant balance between power increment and political saliency. Two points of comparison will be used: one involving the relationship between individuals, groups and the political system, and the second involving a comparison of leadership profiles.[24]

In America the growth of a modern economy and rapid communications, and particularly the combined potential for mass well-being and the social expectation of it, have produced a great consciousness of social inadequacies which cannot be corrected by spontaneous social change. As a result, there has developed social pressure for increased intervention by the government into societal affairs, with a consequent accumulation of power in the formal governmental roles of the political system.

[23]See Willer, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[24]The discussion on these two points is based on Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

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At the same time, however, that pressure has been matched by the emergence and consolidation of large-scale social organizations (private business corporations and unions) whose purpose is to protect their constituencies from any governmental intervention. For example, labor welcomed the Wagner Act but fiercely opposed the Taft-Hartley Act as unwarranted interference. Similarly, big business approved the Taft-Hartley legislation and the tariffs but violently objected to the Wagner Act and the antitrust acts. This illustrates the dynamic character of the balance relationship between political saliency and power increments in democratic political systems. It also reflects the inherent tension between political systemic efforts effected by the regime occupying the formal roles of government and specific private group efforts which contribute to the political stability of the system.

By contrast, changes in relationships between the Soviet political system and groups in that society come from a different direction and have different causes. Soviet society is relatively underdeveloped, or rather, quasi-developed; nevertheless it is almost always ranked among the developed nations because of the impres-

TABLE III

PRIMARY OCCUPATIONS
OF ADMINISTRATION LEADERS

	Truman 1949 N-65	*Eisenhower 1953 N-68*	*Kennedy 1961 N-75*
	Per Cent		
Electoral politics	5	6	14
Government bureaucracy	48	23	21
Civil	*35*	*10*	*12*
Military	*13*	*13*	*9*
Private	39	54	42
Business	*15*	*28*	*11*
Law	*14*	*13*	*11*
Education	*3*	*6*	*16*
Other	*7*	*7*	*4*
Mixed	8	17	23
Private—electoral	*5*	*7*	*10*
Private—government bureaucracy	*3*	*10*	*13*
Total	100	100	100

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sive growth of its heavy industry.[25] The dominant force in its political system, the Communist Party, still defines for itself and for the groups that compose its society the major tasks of social reform.

[25]See the following table for a comparison of the industrial production of the United States and the USSR for 1962 based on estimates. For sources of the industrial and consumer tables see *Statistical Abstract of the United States* for 1963, *UN Statistical Yearbook 1962,* and Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.,* Appendix.

INDUSTRIAL DATA, 1962

	USSR	*United States*
Steel	76,300,000 metric tons	89,213,000 metric tons
Pig Iron	55,300,000 metric tons	61,324,000 metric tons
Iron Ore	128,100,000 metric tons	72,946,000 metric tons
Oil	186,200,000 metric tons	355,000,000 metric tons
Natural Gas	75,200,000,000 cubic meters	375,088,000,000 cubic meters
Coal	517,000,000 metric tons	381,408,000 metric tons
Electric Power	369,000,000,000 kwh	855,490,000,000 kwh
Cement	57,000,000 metric tons	56,718,000 metric tons
Paper	2,800,000 metric tons	14,831,000 metric tons
Cotton Fabrics	4,900,000,000 sq. meters	7,753,992,000 sq. meters
Woolen Fabrics	469,000,000 sq. meters	255,847,000 sq. meters

At the same time, 40 per cent of Soviet labor was engaged in agriculture. Of the population of 220 million, 108 million were residents of rural areas. The overall Soviet living standard was far below those of the Common Market countries, not to speak of the United States.

For a comparative analysis of consumer economic data on the two countries consult the following table.

CONSUMER ECONOMIC DATA

Consumer goods (1962 sales figures)	*USSR*	*United States*
Refrigerators	812,000	3,775,000
Washing machines	1,734,000	3,795,000
Radios	4,068,000	12,000,000
Television sets	1,997,000	6,485,000
Vacuum cleaners	586,000	3,713,000
Motor vehicles (trucks, cars)	578,000	8,173,000
Footwear (produced)	490,000,000	619,407,000
Work time required for purchase of consumer goods (1961 estimates for an average worker)		
Bread (1 lb.)	11 minutes	5 minutes
Sugar (1 lb.)	1 hour, 24 minutes	3 minutes
Butter (1 lb.)	3 hours, 11 minutes	19 minutes
Man's suit	86-350 hours	21 hours, 8 minutes
Man's shoes	62 hours, 20 minutes	3 hours, 48 minutes
Eggs (1 doz.)	3 hours	14 minutes
Potatoes (1 lb.)	13 minutes	1.5 minutes
Beef (1 lb.)	1 hour, 45 minutes	27 minutes
Milk (1 qt.)	34 minutes	7 minutes
Pork (1 lb.)	approx. 2 hours	16-24 minutes
Cigarettes (20)	13 minutes	7 minutes

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These involve institutional changes as well as the rearing of a new communist man, both considered prerequisites for the construction of communism.[26] Many of these projects are dictated by the country's persistent backwardness, and others by the continuing revolutionary commitment of the political elite. In part, however, the definition of these tasks may be a reflection of the political elites' collective sense of vested interest in continuing to dominate society.[27] This is particularly significant, for Soviet society has developed beyond what Walt W. Rostow calls the "take-off" point, and the new technical intelligentsia, having become a crucial part of the society, now "crave for a say" in the formulation of policy. How do the more traditional Soviet political elites "manage" the new technical bureaucrats and their demands for political saliency? The response may be formulated by comparing the statistical profiles of Soviet and American political leaders.

For the United States we will examine the primary occupations of administration leaders in order to show the correspondence between the politically salient groups and appointments of individuals from their ranks to executive posts. Table III gives this breakdown for the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations.[28]

As the figures in Table III suggest, the President's principal subordinates generally come from the most diverse backgrounds. And, although each administration embodies a slightly different combination of interests, one can always be assured that almost all of the politically salient groups are represented.

A similar analysis of the affiliations of Soviet leaders reveals that they are more politically homogeneous. That is, most Soviet political leaders come up through the common channel of the party "apparat." Since this is the only real channel of political advancement, even technical bureaucrats have to become involved with the "apparat" in order to achieve political saliency. Although there is a growing percentage of Soviet leaders with specialized training, the increase in their political saliency is not attributable to their advanced education alone but also to their association with the party mechanism, i.e., cooptation into the party mechanism

[26]See Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
[27]That the collective leadership has this vested interest, although the extent of the domination may change, is expressed as an underlying theme in J.J. Schwartz and W.R. Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review*, September 1968, p. 840.
[28]See Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

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so as to avoid disenfranchisement. The requirement to "coopt" the technocrats reveals the tense relationship between the new technocrats and the political system and the method of "managing" those seeking to become politically salient. Rather than striving for increased political autonomy, decentralized political articulation and the consequent balance between political saliency and power increments, the Soviet political system still aims for continued increases in power increments in the formal roles of the "apparat" through cooptation of those potentially politically salient into the power sector. For the present the politically salient are the technocrats, and they are being coopted.[29]

The evidence seems to indicate that so far there has been no real convergence of political systems. For the future it suggests that

TABLE IV

PRIMARY INSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS: PARTY PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARIAT COMBINED[30]

Institutional Connection	*Stalin 1949 N-15*	*Malenkov 1953 N-18*	*Bulganin-Khrushchev 1956 N-21*	*Khrushchev 1962 N-21*
	Per cent			
Party apparat	54	61	67	81
Ideologue	*7*	*11*	*14*	*20*
State bureaucracy	33	28	24	19
Industrial	*20*	*17*	*14*	*5*
Police and military	13	11	9	0
Educational Background				
Higher	40	57	71	76
Technical-Scientific Institute	*33*	*45*	*53*	*52*
Economics, Marxism-Leninism and humanities	*7*	*12*	*18*	*24*
Incomplete higher and secondary	34	21	14	19
Seminary	*13*	*5*	*5*	*9*
Technical	*13*	*11*	*5*	*10*
Primary	13	11	6	5
Less	13	11	9	0

[29]Milton Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *American Political Science Review*, September 1968, p. 839.
[30]Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

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in the Soviet Union, as a result of continued socio-economic development, groups such as the technocrats are raising the political saliency level of the population. In turn the holders of power are forced to coopt the increasing numbers of salient groups into an expanding power coalition which is reflected in the growing increments of power. Consequently, the ruling coalition is likely to grow larger and more unmanageable, with factions emerging within it; the national politics of the Soviet Union may then approximate the one-party politics practiced in the southeastern United States—both systems being characterized by a ruling coalition with many factions "politicking" over the allocation of values.[31]

Conclusion

In this article we have had three objectives: (1) to formulate a definition of the concept of totalitarianism within the broader phenomenon of dictatorship; (2) to indicate a model schema by which to tie the concept of totalitarianism (in the contemporary sense) to particular identifiable levels of political and socio-economic development; and (3) to define the characteristics of totalitarianism within this frame of reference in abstract terms in order to permit its comparison to democracy. For a preliminary comparison we employed two short application studies of U.S. and USSR politics.

There are five advantages which seem to accrue from this approach for future study: (1) It permits the concept of totalitarianism to be treated within the rubric of systems approaches for the study of comparative politics. (2) It permits comparative studies of democratic and totalitarian systems by employing measuring terms common to both. (3) It permits talking about totalitarianism from a theoretical perspective without moralizing about it. (4) It permits identifying a common development trend line which, although gross in nature for the present, seeks to explain the development syndrome and to set a base for indicating future stages of political and socio-economic development and their association with the various forms of totalitarianism and democracy. (5) It provides a conceptual frame of reference for which empirical referrents may be formulated for purposes of evaluation and verification.

[31]David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1959), pp. 129-131.

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DE GAULLE AND BLACK AFRICA

by Dorothy Shipley White

THE freeing of French Black Africa from colonial domination differed from the freeing of other parts of European empires acquired in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Except in Madagascar in 1947 and in minor instances elsewhere, little fighting or bloodshed occurred. The French states south of the Sahara (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauretania, Middle Congo, Oubangui-Chari, Niger, Senegal, Tchad, and the two United Nations Trusteeship countries allotted to France, the Cameroon and Togo) all became free with no resistance from France and not even harsh words -- save in the case of Guinea. This was due in part to the fact that the French wars to preserve the empire in Indochina and Algeria sprang from causes and circumstances not present in Black Africa. To begin with, the peoples of Black Africa had not wakened to the idea of independence as early as those of North Africa and the Far East, where nationalist feeling, in some cases beginning even before World War I, had developed rapidly in the interwar period and became irrepressible after World War II. In addition, certain initiatives of the French governments in Black Africa between 1940 and 1961, though applied belatedly, were most helpful. Finally, many in France and Africa attribute the ease of transition to the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, who began very early, before most of his contemporaries, to perceive the approaching end of colonization. This article concerns de Gaulle's evolution as a decolonizer, and examines its extent and importance.

I

In early life Charles de Gaulle was surrounded by a family, associates and a public opinion largely conservative in character. Most people in France, and indeed in the world, in the 1890's and early 1900's did not question the European right to conquer and hold colonies among less "civilized" peoples. If the Socialists in France criticized this belief, the main grounds for their criticism was that colonialism seemed only to benefit the dominating

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capitalist classes.[1] Only in 1918 did Woodrow Wilson issue what Secretary of State Robert Lansing called his "self-determination dynamite." Even the French Communist Party did little to oppose colonialism until after the October Revolution of 1917. Most people thought of black Africans as belonging to an inferior race.

Though de Gaulle was undoubtedly surrounded and influenced by these attitudes in the first two decades of the twentieth century, he based his later position on principles developed in the 1920's and 1930's. Early in his written work appears the principle he adopted as a guideline for his life—the belief that every decision, military or civilian, must depend on the circumstances of the individual case. There could be no general rules for action which must govern the judgment of the chief.[2] This belief underlies de Gaulle's continual reliance on circumstances, *les contingences,* when making his decisions. He once wrote: "The moving troublous torrent of circumstances escapes systems as water passes through a net."[3] Furthermore, he accepted the soldier's role in carving out an empire and holding it, for the soldier was "the cloak of France."[4] Colonial native soldiers could be especially useful in fighting for their own homelands,[5] but they had also held an important place in World War I in fighting in Europe for France. They might be needed there again. After all, the colonies existed to serve France.[6] These beliefs did not seem odd at the time.

De Gaulle had his first colonial experience on the General Staff of the Army of the Levant in Beirut, Lebanon, from late 1929 to the end of 1931.[7] While stationed there he traveled all over the Near East, summing up his experiences in a letter to his friend, Colonel Nachin, in June 1930:

[1]Henri Grimal, *La Décolonisation, 1919-1963* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965), pp. 31-33.

[2]Charles de Gaulle: *La Discorde chez l'Ennemi* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1944; 1st edition, 1924), p. 2; "Doctrine a priori ou Doctrine des Circonstances," *Revue Militaire Française,* Nouvelle Série, January-March 1925; "L'Action de Guerre et le Chef," *Revue Militaire Française,* Nouvelle Série, March 1, 1928; *Le Fil de l'Epée* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1944; 1st edition, 1932), pp. 1-3, 11-14, 24-26, 71, 98, 126-127, and elsewhere. De Gaulle was born on November 22, 1890.

[3]"L'Action de Guerre et le Chef," *op. cit.,* p. 300.

[4]Charles de Gaulle, "Le Flambeau," *Revue Militaire Française,* Nouvelle Série, March 1, April 1, 1927, p. 111; *Le Fil de l'Epée, op. cit.,* pp. 91-92.

[5]*Le Fil de l'Epée, op. cit.;* Charles de Gaulle, "La Philosophie de Recrutement," *Revue d'Infanterie,* April-June 1929, pp. 514-519.

[6]The author has searched all of de Gaulle's early articles and books that can be found. Even in the 1930's there is little or nothing to indicate interest in the people of the colonies.

[7]Georges Cattaui, *Charles de Gaulle: L'Homme et son Destin* (Paris: Fayard, 1960), p. 36.

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The Levant is a crossroads where everything passes by: religions, armies, empires, merchandise, without anything's being changed. It is ten years since we came here. My impression is that we have scarcely penetrated the country at all, and that its people are just as much strangers to us—and vice versa—as they ever were. It is true that in our work in this country we used the worst method, stimulating the people to raise themselves, and having encouraged them, we absolved ourselves of further responsibility, though nothing had been achieved here, neither the Nile Canal, not the Palmyra aqueduct, not a Roman road, nor an olive orchard, without the use of force. In my opinion it will be our destiny to come to that [force] or else to leave this region.[8]

A little later, he wrote:

There are people here who have never been satisfied with anything or with anybody, but who submit to the will of someone stronger than they if it is expressed, and there is a mandatory power [here] that has not yet seen what view it should take of its mandate.[9]

Already de Gaulle felt uncertainty about the French position in the Levant.

In 1934, in *Vers l'Armée de Métier,* he indicated for the first time that a day might come when the empire could not be held. Although, under the French, riches, learning and liberty had grown in the colonies, he said there was also a movement of ideas, passions and interests "whose manifest purpose is the end of our domination." He hoped France could hold her overseas lands up to a point of "progress" when "wisdom comes to the élites and loyalty to the crowd, when peoples today not really resigned, will accept union with France freely. Until then the French must remain masters, under penalty of losing all." Colonial troops, under proper conditions, might aid France, yet France must not count *only* on native aid; nonpolitical professional forces such as de

[8]Lucien Nachin, *Charles de Gaulle: Général de France* (Paris: Editions Colbert, 1944), p. 56.

[9]Gaston Bonheur, *Charles de Gaulle* (Paris: Gallimard, 4th edition, 1958), p. 84. While in the Levant, de Gaulle and a comrade-in-arms wrote a book on the history of the French Army in the Near East: Chef de Bataillon Breveté de Gaulle et Chef de Bataillon Breveté Yvon, de l'Etat Major des Troupes du Levant, *Histoire des Troupes Françaises du Levant* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1931). The book is purely military in content and holds only one statement of interest to us here, namely, that there is hostility to the French among both Turks and Arabs, apparently as a result of ideas of national unity arising out of the Great War. This had caused some resistance to the Mandate, but after all, everything was worthwhile, for the French presence had done so much to bring *la Paix Française* to the countries of the Levant and that, in turn, would bring prosperity. About this time de Gaulle also wrote a report on the Kurd nation, but it has been impossible for the author to find it, although several Near East specialists have assured her of its existence.

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Gaulle advocated through the 1930's were also necessary to counteract the German menace.[10]

Thus, de Gaulle was ahead of most public figures in foreseeing the end of colonization. Did he perhaps know of Albert Sarraut's book of 1931 in which the distinguished Colonial Governor had written: "The sparks have begun to be lighted like signal fires in the mountains," or again, "the crisis of colonization has begun everywhere"?[11] Still, until World War II, de Gaulle, maintaining his position, believed that the empire must remain under France. He saw the French desire for far-off risk, felt the trials, passion and death of French soldiers in foreign lands;[12] he even noted once that people in the colonies were beginning to think of freedom, but otherwise he wrote little on overseas problems. He was still an entirely military man,[13] trying his best to obtain for France the army she would need in future battles against Germany.

II

Immediately after de Gaulle's flight to England in June 1940, he appealed to the people of France to continue their resistance to the enemy, basing his argument on the empire's vast and unused resources. In his speeches of the next few months there are a dozen or more references to these trump cards that France still held. Of course the empire must remain French, he said.[14] At the end of August 1940, Governor Félix Eboué of Tchad brought over his colony to join Free France on the first of the "Three Glorious Days."[15] As other states gradually joined his movement, de Gaulle became more and more certain that the empire would help France to victory. "France, now France, great France, go forward!"[16] he cried. From Brazzaville in his declaration of the constitutional bases for the Free French Movement, he said it was clear the em-

[10]Charles de Gaulle, *Vers l'Armèe de Métier* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1944; 1st edition, 1934), pp. 90-94, 98-100; "Comment faire une Armée de Métier," *Revue Hebdomadaire,* January 12, 1935, p. 139.

[11]Albert Sarraut, *Grandeur et Servitude Coloniale* (Paris: Editions de Sagittaire, 1931), pp. 31, 69, 219.

[12]Charles de Gaulle, *La France et son Armée* (Paris: Plon, 1938), pp. 204-207.

[13]General Pierre Rondot, interview with the author, January 20, 1967.

[14]Charles de Gaulle, *Discours aux Français* (Paris: Office Français d'Edition, 1944), I, 63-88 (hereafter referred to as *Discours*).

[15]Dorothy Shipley White, *Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, Free France and the Allies* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964), p. 173. The expression "The Three Glorious Days of French Africa" referred back to the days of the same name at the time of the Revolution of 1830 (J.P.T. Bury, *France 1840-1940* [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949], p. 48). On the other two "glorious days" the Cameroon and the French Congo came over to Free France.

[16]*Discours,* I, 58.

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pire would continue as part and parcel of France. The empire behind him, he felt confident.[17]

In June 1941, a Free French-British army entered Syria and the Lebanon, both mandated to France by the League of Nations in 1924, in order to recover the Levant from the Vichy government and prevent its use by the Germans. As their soldiers crossed the borders, both French and British governments issued proclamations declaring Syria and the Lebanon independent, though because of the Mandate and the wartime emergency there would be delay in the transmission of powers.[18] This proclamation was de Gaulle's first admission of the necessity of independence for a French territory.

On October 23, 1941, de Gaulle spoke before the Royal African Society in London, pointing out the great developments in communications, economic unity and moral solidarity in Africa as a result of the war. This revolution, he said, "would reveal Africa to herself and would certainly open the way to a great future."[19] A careful observer of the General, Paul-Marie de La Gorce, has felt this speech was a small beginning in de Gaulle's evolution toward acceptance of decolonization.[20]

Félix Eboué certainly influenced this evolution. Eboué, a native of French Guiana, was the first Negro to be named governor of a colony. Soon after he had brought over Tchad to the Free French cause, de Gaulle named him Governor General of French Equatorial Africa. At the end of 1941, Eboué issued a circular to his administrators outlining new policies toward the natives, including not only greater freedom for them, but also development along the lines of their own cultures rather than according to the old "assimilationist" ideas of conformity to French traditions.[21] However, France would remain an important factor in the French

[17]Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre* (Paris: Plon, 1956), II, 182; I, 313-317, 675-676. In general, the English version of this book has been used because it is officially approved. (*The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959], I, 105-107.) However, the English version does not contain the Documents published at the end of each French volume, so it is often necessary to cite the French original. Hereafter the French version will be referred to as *Mémoires* and the English as *Memoirs*. See also White, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205; de Gaulle, *Discours*, I, 56-58, 61-68, 74-76.

[18]White, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-250; William L. Langer and Everitt S. Gleason, *The Undeclared War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 508. Thus by promising independence the armies went into Syria "with a piece of sugar in one hand and a gun in the other," to quote Lord Wilson. De Gaulle, *Discours*, I, 160-169; *Mémoires*, I, 412-416, 431, 435-436.

[19]*Discours*, I, 204-207.

[20]Paul-Marie de La Gorce, interview with the author, March 1966.

[21]Ulrich Sophie, *Le Gouverneur Général Félix Eboué* (Paris: Larose, 1950), pp. 56-61.

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colonial picture, for she applied better than other colonizing powers that "touching increment of love" so necessary in all human work.[22] In mid-1942 de Gaulle sent Eboué the approval of Free France for a program of reforms including modified work laws, new statutes for "evolved" natives and special "communes" for them.[23] Since previous suggestions for reform had not been carried out, Eboué really began the righting of native grievances.[24]

Still, reform did not mean independence, and on the radio in June 1942 de Gaulle said that any attack on the sovereignty of France would be "odious," for the colonies belonged to no one if not to France. The empire's war with Germany was "a single battle for a single country [France]," so it represented Wendell Wilkie's hope that it might be "the birth pains of a new and better order."[25]

In December 1943 de Gaulle took formal steps toward reforms in the empire by issuing a Declaration on Indochina which gave its peoples greater liberty in accordance with their own traditions and made them citizens of the French Union, with better economic conditions, more freedom to enter state and army employment, improved educational advantages, and additional freedoms of press, assembly and belief.[26] Days later, speaking at

[22]De Gaulle, *Memoirs,* I, 109-110; *Journal Officiel de la France Combattante* (Paris: Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1946), *Débats,* Tome Unique, p. 7; Félix Eboué, *La Nouvelle Politique Indigène de l'Afrique Equatorial Française* (Brazzaville [probably]: Presses de l'Imprimerie Pfister, 1941), p. 58.

[23]Eboué, *loc. cit.; Journal Officiel de la France Combattante,* August 28, 1942, pp. 46-48; de Gaulle, *Mémoires,* II, 347-348. A "commune" is the smallest territorial division of the French administrative system. It is ruled by a mayor and a municipal council.

Evolué (evolved) is the term given to a native who has attained a certain degree of education and, therefore, in the eyes of the French, of "civilization."

[24]Charles de Gaulle: *Discours de Guerre* (Paris: Egloff, 1944), I, 294; *Discours,* II, 127; *Mémoires,* I, 675-678; Hubert Deschamps, *Méthodes et Doctrines Coloniales de la France* (Paris: Colin, 1953), pp. 167-176; Vincent Confer, *France and Algeria: The Problem of Civil and Political Reform 1870-1920* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 116. The most important reforms needed had to do with the laws requiring forced labor, the penal code for natives more severe than that for Europeans, the electoral system by which most natives as second-class citizens were in the Second College that voted only for minor offices, the decree that prevented them from holding government or army offices, and the inadequate and entirely French education given them.

[25]*Discours,* II, 73-74, 87, 127.

[26]France intends to give a new political statute to Indochina in the bosom of the French community in which, under a federal framework, the liberties of the different countries of the Union will be extended and consecrated, in which the liberal character of the institutions will be accentuated without losing the mark of Indochinese civilization and traditions, and in which the Indochinese will have access to all employments and functions of the State. An economic reform will correspondingly insure prosperity to the Union on the basis of both customs and fiscal autonomy and will also aid the prosperity of neighboring states." (De Gaulle, *Mémoires,* II, 608-609.)

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Constantine in Algeria, de Gaulle granted large groups of Moslems in the First College, about 10,000 in all, the right to retain their personal "status"[27] and still become French citizens, and also to vote for representatives to the French Parliament. Besides this, most Moslems in the Second College were now to have a number of representatives in their assemblies equal to those of the First College.[28]

These measures represented a real departure from colonial practice, even though they did not concern Africa south of the Sahara. They opened a breach in the wall between Europeans and natives, undoubtedly reinforcing native hopes for freedom. If, as de Gaulle once said, "it is ideas that lead the world," then, he wrote later, it was natural that "a thrill of hope and liberation made these Africans tremble" as the world drama, the war and the work of the Gaullists altered conditions in Africa and led "thousands of black men in cabins and forests, in the deserts and along the great rivers of their continent, men hitherto oppressed by servitude, to raise their heads and question their destiny."[29] In his *Memoirs* the General recalled the need for reforms at home and in the overseas lands, and the empire's help during the war, adding "How could I doubt moreover that on the morrow of the conflict now setting the world aflame, the passion for freedom would rise like a ground-swell" and that it would have repercussions everywhere. There must be new beginnings on different levels. His government must take the initiative with the colonies — and speedily.[30]

Responding to this call, René Pleven, Commissioner for the Colonies, summoned a conference in Brazzaville of French administrators of the African colonies for the consideration of reforms. The meeting could only be consultative, for de Gaulle's movement was not yet a true government, but it would be the first meeting to consider political and social matters in Africa; previous ones had dealt only with economic problems.[31]

[27]Statute law is restricted to the enactments of a legislature. Thus the "personal statute" of the Moslems of Algeria indicates the position to which the French National Assembly had assigned them in view of their religion and national customs. They were definitely second-class citizens, for unless they would give up their national customs, which the religion of Islam forbade them to do, they could not aspire to French citizenship. The change indicated in de Gaulle's plan for them was, therefore, very great.

[28]De Gaulle, *Memoirs,* II, 206-207; Michael K. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1960), pp. 23-29.

[29]*Memoirs,* II, 35-36.

[30]*Ibid.,* pp. 205-206; J. Aubame, *Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime* (Paris: Direction d'Eugène Guernier, 1950), V, 183.

[31]Grimal, *op. cit.,* pp. 123-124, 127; *Journal Officiel de l'Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Débats,* Session of March 15, 1944, p. 4.

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There were good reasons for holding the conference, for the Gaullists wished to break with the racial discrimination and exploitation of Vichy's colonial policies, and, in addition, the problem of nationalist movements was rapidly developing, especially in North Africa and the Far East, many of them influenced, no doubt, by the anti-colonial sentiment in the United States and Russia. This feeling had been clearly expressed in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, which had proclaimed the right of every nation to choose its own form of government. An African conference could support this principle and also the suggestions for the internationalization of the colonies contained in the plans being considered for the United Nations.[32] But opinion about colonial problems was undergoing at least some change. The Provisional Consultative Assembly at Algiers was showing a more liberal attitude[33]— deputies there had already said that the old idea that the colonies were made for the "Metropole," the Mother Country, was false and that a newer, more democratic spirit of service must imbue French leaders in overseas lands — though, of course, there could be no question of letting colonial territories go free. Not even a federal character was possible for them, because they had no representative organizations as yet and "no one could construct a roof before the house was built under it."[34]

III

The Brazzaville Conference opened in January 1944 with the Colonial Governors of Black Africa and their aides as its members. A few observers and diplomats from other African countries and a

[32]The Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 1942) took up the question of internationalization of colonies and of their passing under the control of the future organization of nations. (Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. 124.)

[33]The Gaullist movement in the early 1940's had the following changes in name, management and publications: The Comité National de la France Libre, 1940-1942, published its proceedings in the *Journal Officiel de la France Libre.* Its name was changed to the Comité National de la France Combattante in 1942-1943, and it published the *Journal Officiel de la France Combattante.* In turn this became the Comité Français de Libération Nationale in 1943. Under this title it set up an Assembly (the Assemblée Consultative Provisoire) first in Algiers and then in Paris, and published its *Journal Officiel de l'Assemblée Consultative Provisoire* from November 1943 to August 1945. In time this CFLN became the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française. It continued to exist and to publish its *Journal Officiel* until the Assemblée Constituante was elected in November 1945. When the constitution this body drew up was voted down, a second Assemblée Constituante was elected in June 1946 and continued to publish its *Journal* as had the first Constituent until it completed its work in October 1946, after which the Assemblée Nationale of the Fourth Republic took over, publishing its *Journal Officiel* as had been done under the Third Republic.

[34]*Journal Officiel de la France Combattante,* Session No. 3, November 10, 1943, pp. 14-15; Session No. 11, November 24, 1943, p. 17.

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delegation from the Algiers Assembly were also present.[35] Commissioner Pleven opened proceedings by saying the conference would treat the African as an individual, or as a member of a family or other group, and also consider his evolution in the French world and his future ascent to political personality. France's faith in her African mission would give her the will, force and ability to live up to her responsibilities to the colonial peoples without sharing them with "anonymous institutions." In colonial France, Pleven said, there are no peoples to free, no racial discrimination to abolish. The peoples under France "do not wish to know any other independence than that of France."[36] He was clearly hinting here at the possibility of colonial control by the United Nations.

After a brief greeting by the President of the Algiers Assembly, Félix Gouin, de Gaulle spoke. He mentioned the need for a new commitment to French sovereignty and a new effort to achieve material and human progress, for if the native populations under France did not profit morally and materially under French control, they could not advance toward participation in the management of their own affairs. If any power should lead them, it should be France, with her genius "for initiatives that lead men by steps towards the heights of dignity and fraternity, where some day all can unite." From the base in her colonies, France could now begin her liberation from her enemies. She had the will for a new beginning and must make her own reforms of structure through her sovereignty.[37] Later he wrote that after this "the route was traced and needed only to be followed."[38]

All of these speeches pointed toward the old French colonial doctrine of "assimilation"— a doctrine variously interpreted as a matter only of laws and decrees, or as the absorption of colonial peoples into the culture, customs and even the reflexes of the French nation. But many people, including administrators of the colonies, already doubted the validity of this doctrine; even de Gaulle had said that it was impossible "to make Frenchmen" of some of the native peoples.[39] The new doctrine of "association" indicated the need of respect for native customs, and the belief that

[35]République Française, *La Conférence Française, Brazzaville, 30 janvier, 1944—8 février, 1944* (Paris: Ministère des Colonies, 1945), pp. 10-14 (hereafter referred to as *Brazzaville Conference*); Henri Laurentie, interview with the author, February 23, 1968.
[36]*Brazzaville Conference*, pp. 17-22.
[37]*Ibid.*, pp. 17-22, 27-31.
[38]*Memoirs*, II, 208-209.
[39]J.-R. Tournoux, *Pétain et de Gaulle* (Paris: Plon, 1964), p. 310. De Gaulle referred then to the Arabs of North Africa.

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power might be transmitted, as in the British colonial system, through the influential natives of a district. There must be recognition of the great differences between the various colonies.[40]

After a week's work in writing its "recommendations" to the Algiers Assembly, the Brazzaville Conference made a preliminary statement of principle that seemed to nail down the lid on future freedom:

> The purpose of the work of civilization accomplished by France in the colonies removes every idea of autonomy, every possibility of evolution outside of the French Empire bloc; even the establishment at a distant time of self-government in the colonies is to be ruled out. . . .

However, the report went on to say:

> The desire is that the political power of France shall be exercised meticulously and with strictness over the lands of its Empire. The desire is also that the colonies should enjoy great administrative and economic freedom. It is also desired that the colonial peoples should experience this liberty and that their sense of responsibility should be developed little by little so that they may find themselves associated in the management of public affairs in their countries.[41]

The only explanation so far advanced of the evident contradiction in these statements is that Raphäel Saller, then Governor of Somaliland, had proposed making all the natives of the African colonies French citizens with voting rights equal to those of the citizens of the metropole. This had been done in the West Indies in 1848 and in the "four districts" of Senegal in 1916. It was Saller who inserted the phrase in the Report of the Conference removing all question of self-government, but his view was opposed by those who wished the Africans to evolve in the framework, and within the limits, of their own customs rather than as French citizens. Those who did not agree with him managed to insert in the report the second part of the statement quoted above. Their point of view was reinforced by a recommendation on another page pointing out the necessity of increased representation for the colonies and insisting that the colonies should elect men to the assembly that was to be charged with writing France's postwar constitution.[42] This recommendation would be extremely important later.

[40]Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[41]*Brazzaville Conference,* pp. 32-33. René Viard, in writing about these principles, remarks that no one ever formulated with a force equally deprived of nuances the principle of the subjection of colonized peoples to their metropole. *La Fin de l'Empire Colonial Français* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1963), p. 14.

[42]*Brazzaville Conference,* pp. 33-34; Viard, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

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The political section of the report was followed by social recommendations which were considerably clearer and more specific. They contained the statement that natives could not be evicted or forced to work without regard for the law, and that all forced labor was to be eliminated after five years. Furthermore the "indigénat," or code of laws for natives, which set up different penalties from those imposed on Europeans for the same offenses, was to be gradually eliminated. More posts would be opened to natives, with equal pay to that of white men, though they would not be allowed to serve in posts of command. Eboué's principles were taken as models — but not insisted on. Educational facilities would be increased, and there were suggestions for public works, social hygiene, medical assistance and posts that would be open to women.[43]

These ideas having been committed to paper, the Conference of Brazzaville ended. There had been no consultation with Africans during the week of work, for the only black man present was Félix Eboué, who was there as Governor General, not as a representative of his race. Apparently no one thought the "subject peoples" might make additional claims. Still René Viard later wrote that the conference really marked the beginning of the end of the empire, even though its members did not have that intention in mind. It was the snowslide that triggered the avalanche.[44]

Within a year a storm of criticism pelted the heads of those who had gone to Brazzaville. Some deputies in the Consultative Assembly thought the conference had gone too far in appeasing the natives. Others, including Gaston Monnerville, now Commissioner for the Colonies, spoke of "the reforms we have already talked about too long," for little or nothing had been done to implement the recommendations made at Brazzaville. On the other hand many French colonials were hostile because of the increased importance of the natives among whom they lived. Some of the social reforms were carried out, and in general people began to talk more sympathetically of the natives' rights and of their plight.[45]

For some time after Brazzaville de Gaulle's ideas on colonial matters, at least those publicly expressed, did not change. His

[43] *Brazzaville Conference,* pp. 36-62.

[44] *Ibid.,* pp. 10-14; Viard, *op. cit.,* pp. 27-30.

[45] Viard, *op. cit.,* pp. 15, 29; *Journal Officiel de l'Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Débats,* Session of March 19, 1945, pp. 560-572; Session of March 20, 1945, pp. 579-593.

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speeches stressed the continuance of the empire as the "French Union," its administration taking various forms. The century, he felt, would be that of the "independence" of colonial peoples but changes would be slow.[46]

IV

When the war with Germany ended, de Gaulle presided over France as President of the Constituent Assembly. Yet when he believed that, with the government as then organized, he could not obtain for France the regime he considered necessary, he resigned his post on January 20, 1946 and began his "Retreat in the Desert."[47] The first Constitution proposed by the Assembly was voted down by the people on May 5, 1946, and a second Constituent Assembly prepared another which was ratified on October 13, 1946. Among its provisions were those for the Union Française, an organization that would take the place of the former French Empire during the lifetime of the Fourth Republic. While de Gaulle felt the Union had been patterned in accordance with his design, he was critical of the way it was finally set up, as, indeed, he was of all of the plans for the Fourth Republic.[48]

By 1946 there was in the government, and especially in the National Assembly, a trend toward reaction against Gaullist liberalism. Former Premier Edouard Herriot even said in the Assembly that if France gave her citizenship to all the peoples of her colonies, as she was planning to do, she would become "the colony of her colonies."[49] During and after 1946, French colonial policy generally reflected the old idea of "assimilation" even though it had "a window open on independence" because of the representation in Parliament now granted to the native peoples. As at Brazzaville, there was a contradiction, for the preamble of the new Constitution recognized the possibility of independence while the section of the main text dealing with the colonies expressed the clear will of France to keep her territories. It was certain, too, that the natives had not reaped most of the benefit of the reforms

[46]De Gaulle, *Mémoires,* III, 340-341, 554; *Memoirs,* III, 253-254; Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages* 1940-1946 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946), pp. 453-454, 503.

[47]E. Chetrit and J.-P. Timsit, "La Retraite au Désert ou la Pensée du Général de Gaulle," Mémoire présenté à l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de l'Université de Paris (Manuscrit tappé, direction de M. Jean Touchard, April 1, 1962), pp. 6-8; de Gaulle, *Memoirs,* III, 318, 324-326.

[48]*Memoirs,* III, 142-143; *Mémoires,* III, 647-652; *Discours et Messages,* pp. 734 ff.; Paul-Marie de La Gorce, *De Gaulle Entre Deux Mondes* (Paris: Fayard, 1964), pp. 460-461; Chetrit and Timsit, *op. cit.,* pp. 98-102.

[49]*Journal Officiel de l'Assemblée Constituante,* II, Vol. 22, August 27, 1946, part 2, Vol. 3, 3334.

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promised them in the first, more liberal draft of the Constitution — the one jettisoned by the vote of May 1946. De Gaulle himself, in the suggestions and criticisms he made in his public speeches in the late 1940's, did not allude to total independence for the colonies, only to their development toward self-administration.[50]

During the 1950's de Gaulle lost hope of an imminent return to power and made fewer public speeches. The ones he did make contained little reference to overseas lands. On one occasion he noted that Africa was becoming "conscious of her condition and emerging from her lethargy." Still he insisted that France must be strong and keep the Union so as not to lose the rank of a great power.[51] Even on long voyages to Africa and Oceania in 1953 and 1956, there seemed to be no change in his ideas for the overseas territories. The purpose of France overseas was to "open souls and instruct intelligences," and to give each territory its proper place according to its own individuality, with a growing share in the control of its own affairs. He was aware of the rapidly growing independence movements in many countries, and attributed them to Africans who had lived in Europe and who, returning to their own lands, had spread ideas of autonomy and independence among other native groups. To restrain this tendency, new bonds with the metropole were necessary. French civilization must not die out in these lands. The Union, once developed, could really change the destiny of the metropole, safeguarding both the Union and French civilization. France must take the lead in countering any efforts to separate her from her Union.[52]

Even though de Gaulle did not modify his public position about the overseas lands during the "Retreat," the problems of colonization must have occupied his attention.[53] By the middle 1950's decolonization was proceeding apace throughout the world. In the late 1940's India, Indonesia and other countries had shaken off the bonds of colonialism, and by 1956 three of France's chief colonial territories, Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia, had achieved their independence, the first by a bloody struggle, the others by negotiation.[54] What de Gaulle and Albert Sarraut foresaw in the 1930's was coming to pass.

[50]Chetrit and Timsit, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102; Lamine Guèye, *Itinéraire Africain* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1966), pp. 136-146, 147-170.
[51]Chetrit and Timsit, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-94, 97-98.
[52]*Ibid.*, pp. 70-73, 97-104; Documents de l'Agence France Presse, Speech at Bamako, March 8, 1953, Agence France Presse, No. 1986, March 14, 1953.
[53]Chetrit and Timsit, *op. cit.*, p. 2; W. W. Kulski, *De Gaulle and the World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 334.
[54]Grimal, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205, 216-217, 326-335.

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In Black Africa many of the planned reforms were not carried out, though it is true that the "indigénat" and forced labor had been suppressed soon after the war. Former Governor Laurentie, who had been Secretary General of the Conference at Brazzaville, admitted: "From 1945 on, the 'spirit of Brazzaville' was uneasily assimilated by the French political milieux, which showed a tendency to react against the policies followed by France toward her former colonies."[55] The position of the French government was not improved by other events such as the Conference held at Bandung, Java, in 1955 at which thirty nations of Asia, Africa and the Near East discussed the world situation and dealt with problems of national sovereignty, racism and colonialism. This meeting alarmed all nations still holding colonies or dependencies: they had better act before action was forced upon them. The French government, smarting under losses in the Far East and North Africa, recognized that it must try to prevent the other states of the Union from slipping away.

One result of this situation was the passage of a law by the French National Assembly on June 23, 1956 called the *Loi-Cadre*, the Framework Law, now generally known as the "Defferre Law," after the name of the then Minister of France Overseas, Gaston Defferre, who, together with Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, then a Minister of State in the French government, had done a great deal to guide the law through the Assembly.[56] The *Loi-Cadre* called for universal suffrage, a single college of electors, administrative decentralization, and deliberative powers for the Territorial Assemblies of the Union, hitherto merely consultative. It also made possible access by qualified natives to all government posts in the colonies. The decrees of application of the law, issued between January and March 1957, were even more liberal. Local Assemblies could vote budgets, deliberate on administrative projects, and acquire some legislative powers as well. New Councils, elected by the Local Assemblies, would be composed of Ministers, and presided over by the "Territorial Chief," or Governor, who would be the official representative of France. The Federations of West Africa and Equatorial Africa were to continue as "Groups of Territories," with a coordinating role.

The *Loi-Cadre* represented a great advance for the Africans; in fact, some of the Africans thought of it as an irreversible step

[55]Henri Laurentie, interview with the author, February 23, 1968.
[56]République Française, *Texte de la Loi, #56-619 du 23 juin, 1956, et Décrets d'application (de 1957)*, p. 2.

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toward freedom. But it had its limits, for the suggested plan, its drafters said, must not be overstepped for a number of years. No solution was suggested for certain problems: the relations between the Territorial Chief and the elected Council members who were to act as the executive authority were not specified, nor were the relations between groups of states. Finally, it was unlikely that all Africans would continue to accept what was offered them, namely, merely comanagement, and, indeed, some were soon opposed to the law.[57]

It is hard to determine to what extent this law was operative before de Gaulle's return to power only a little more than a year after the decrees of application were issued. Defferre believes that the law had great possibilities and that in about five years or so it would have led to complete independence for the French states of Black Africa.[58] But its very passage indicates a major shift in French opinion, a change that no doubt prepared France for the complete independence of the overseas territories carried through by de Gaulle between 1958 and 1961.

V

In May 1958, when de Gaulle returned to power as a result of events in Algeria and the governmental crisis in Paris, the atmosphere around colonial affairs changed immediately. When his investiture as Premier appeared all but certain, de Gaulle remarked in his first Press Conference, on May 19, that the problem of the French in their relations with Africa had not yet been solved.[59] Since he felt that Algeria was a separate case, and because of the seriousness of the rebellion there, he put his attention on that country first.[60] Next, he turned to Black Africa. On August 20, 1958, he began a voyage of 20,000 kilometers through the Dark Continent. He intended to replace the Union with a new form of relationship between France and her territories.

At Mahamasina in Madagascar, on August 22, he first outlined his design for the "Community," his new conception. It would have a President elected by the territories and the metropole; an Executive Council in Paris, composed of the Chiefs of the ter-

[57]Grimal, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-350; Louis Terrenoire, *De Gaulle et l'Algérie* (Paris: Fayard, 1964), p. 48; Albert Tevoedjre, *L'Afrique Revoltée* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958), pp. 18-22.

[58]Gaston Defferre, interview with the author, February 9, 1968.

[59]French Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York, *Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle* (1964), Press Conference of May 19, 1958, p. 6.

[60]Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 334; Terrenoire, *op. cit.*, p. 48; André Passeron, *De Gaulle Parle* (Paris: Plon, 1962), pp. 150-160, 164.

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ritorial governments and of the Ministers who would deal with matters common to all; a Senate, with delegates from the Legislative Assemblies of the territories and the metropole; and a Court of Arbitration. Each territory could decide whether to remain a territory or become a state, in either case to have its own administration and internal government. France, as the "federative power," would care for defense, management of its economy including that of raw materials, foreign policy, currency, justice, higher education, communications and cases requiring special agreements. De Gaulle regarded this Community as eminently suited to the modern age. He was certain Madagascar would want to join France in taking this step toward "a great common future," when the referendum to be held on September 28, 1958 would give all the states of French Africa the opportunity to decide their future.[61] He added, in another speech later that day, that each territory in the Community could, within five years, revise its status through the vote of its representatives and a referendum of its people, in conjunction with the other members of the Community. Thus, it could become an "independent" state.[62] De Gaulle was admitting publicly for the first time that a French territory could, by its own motion, become completely independent of France within five years.

In these first speeches in Africa he seemed confident that all the states of the Union would join France in the Community. He thought it was in their interest to do so. But in admitting the possibility of complete independence, he showed too that he had reached a turning point in his beliefs, possibly as a result of long reflection during his retirement as well as of world events. If, as most of his close associates say,[63] he had felt all along that decolonization was inevitable in time, still he may have wished that it would come more slowly with adequate time available to educate the African masses more fully. But bloodshed must be avoided. What had happened in Indochina and Algeria must not occur in Black Africa. In addition, is it possible that by indicating this mode of progress toward independence, de Gaulle wished to set an example for Algeria to follow?[64]

At Brazzaville on August 24, he declared that the Africans must

[61]Passeron, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-456.

[62]Bibliothèque Nationale, Reserve Room, Collection of de Gaulle Speeches, Speech to the Assembly of Madagascar, August 22, 1958.

[63]The author has talked with a considerable number of the early close associates of the General. Very few of them have disagreed with this opinion.

[64]Suggestion by a member of the French Foreign Office, interview with the author, January 26, 1967.

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have complete responsibility for their own affairs. In the world of today, "vast *ensembles*" for economic, political and cultural affairs were necessary. If the Africans wanted independence, they could take it immediately by secession, or at any time thereafter by the method suggested in Madagascar. Of course, they had a right to it. Thus, only two days after his first speeches, he had eliminated the five-year restriction as to independence — a tremendously important step, a real bombshell.[65] At his next stop, Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, de Gaulle still felt certain of the success of his plan for the Community.[66] But the very same day, at Conakry, Guinea, a fly appeared in the ointment.

After a warm reception given de Gaulle by the people of Conakry, a meeting was held in the old white Assembly Hall near the President's Palace on the shady main street of the city, with Sékou Touré, President of the Council of Guinea, as the speaker. Touré, a man of great ability, had risen to power through his work with African trade unions rather than through an education in France, the route taken by most other French African leaders. Associated at first with the large reformist party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, he later assumed the leadership of Guinea's Parti Démocratique Guinéen, by which time his ideas and those of other Guinéen leaders had changed. When their party had its Fourth Congress in Conakry on June 4, 1958, it voted for immediate and total decolonization of a unified Africa. They felt the internal autonomy offered by the *Loi-Cadre* was inadequate, possibly even potentially divisive. Though they still wanted some association with France, it must be with a France that acknowledged the independence of Guinea and the equality of all nations in any federation or confederation that might be set up. Otherwise they would reject membership in it.

On July 18, 1958, Sékou Touré sent a communication to the French government expressing these views, and he reiterated them in public on July 28.[67] So his opinions were known, or should have been. And he himself was certainly aware that on August 8 the French government had considered setting up a "community" rather than a "federation" or "confederation" and had made it

[65]Alexander Werth, *The De Gaulle Revolution* (London: Robert Hale, 1960), p. 255; Bibliothèque Nationale, *loc. cit.*, Speech at Brazzaville, August 24, 1958.
[66]Bibliothèque Nationale, *loc. cit.*, Speech at Abidjan, August 25, 1958.
[67]Yves Guéna, *Historique de la Communauté* (Paris: Fayard, 1962), pp. 60-61; Sékou Touré, *Expérience Guinéenne et Unité Africaine* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1962), pp. 11-18, 25-27, 49-50, 70-74; Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 18, 301.

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clear that a state that did not wish to join the new association would be cut off from France with "all the consequences." The Africans, in general, were said to have been much annoyed by this thinly-disguised French threat.[68]

On August 25, in his speech before the Guinean Assembly with de Gaulle present, Touré laid the blame for the retardation of Guinea squarely on colonialism. Guineans had felt very deeply, he said, the injustices and inequalities to which they had been subjected. Their first need was for dignity, and they preferred "poverty in freedom to riches in slavery." They would always proclaim their right to independence, but they also wished to retain cultural and economic interdependence with France. The "mature" people of Guinea would say "yes" to France in the referendum on September 28 if the new association was constructed on liberty, dignity and fraternity. The new constitution must proclaim their right to independence, equality, and the possibility of "divorce" from the Franco-African marriage. Touré wanted a federation with all states on an equal basis, including France.

Replying briefly, de Gaulle said he did not blush for what France had done for Africa. Africans ought to have self-determination. Guinea could say "no" on September 28, and France would raise no obstacles. But Guinea must, of course, expect the consequences. He ended by saying that if he, de Gaulle, ever returned to Conakry, it would be to "celebrate" France's common action with Guinea; if not, he would never lose the memory of the "great, beautiful, hard-working, noble" city of Conakry.

De Gaulle's tone is said to have been "noble," Touré's rough and hostile — his tone being worse than his words.[69] In addition Touré had made unalterable demands. He would play the game but only according to his own rules.

With the positions on both sides so well known, why do the French seem to have been taken unawares, reacting as if a grenade had been thrown? A member of de Gaulle's entourage had had a copy of the Guinean leader's speech for several days and others had seen it, but apparently no one recognized its importance and no one brought it to the General's attention. On his part, Touré

[68]Touré, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-74, 127-128; Georges Chaffard, *Les Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967), II, 189-190, 194-195; Guéna, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

[69]Guéna, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73; Bibliothèque Nationale, *loc. cit.*, Speech at Conakry August 25, 1958; Passeron, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-460; Touré, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-90; Chaffard, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198.

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does not seem to have realized that "federation" or "confederation" would be achievable through the Community, and that real possibilities of independence, immediate or almost immediate, lay open to the Africans from now on. Nor did he realize what secession from France "with all its consequences," economic and other, would mean.[70] He felt the French plan would promote "Balkanization" of Africa, and, after all, he had only asked for the "possibility" of independence by "divorce" from the Community. To him, that was not an extreme demand. But de Gaulle, as one writer says, slammed the door on Touré and "the harsh slam shook the entire house."[71]

After this exchange of words, de Gaulle and Touré, both angry, scarcely spoke, and the French leader left Conakry refusing Touré even the normal courtesies of departure. The Guineans voted "no" on September 28, and the French left Guinea within two months, taking with them all their people except a few technicians, as well as their property, and destroying all facilities they could not remove. They took, said a Guinean leader, "all that would have made independence possible."[72] Even before the referendum, attempts were made to bring the leaders of France and Guinea together, but every effort failed. Both sides were intransigent.

Had Touré not spoken so categorically, the breach, still unhealed after ten years, might not have occurred. Had he been put on the Constitutional Committee of the French Assembly, as some of the French leaders had urged, would that have made a difference? He would then have had a chance to discuss matters before the confrontation with de Gaulle. But he had been angry at the "veiled menaces" of August 8, and he would not soften his stand.[73]

De Gaulle decided with lightning speed to cut Guinea off from France. Naturally, the French government could not treat a seceding state in the same manner as a state joining the Community, but the destructive policy employed toward Guinea met with great criticism in France and elsewhere, although some felt that it had been justified since other African nations took care, at least for a time, to remain in the French association. Yet the

[70]Guéna, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69; Touré, *op. cit.*, p. 130; Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. 357; Chaffard *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192; 203, 207-208.

[71]Touré, *op. cit.*, pp. 86, 93; David Schoenbrun, *The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), p. 264.

[72]Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. 357; Chaffard, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200; Tibou Tounkara, Chief of Information in Guinea, interview with the author, October 1966.

[73]Chaffard, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-182, 190.

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dissolution of the Community began only a year or so later. Guinea had proved that an African state could survive, however painfully, without French aid. After independence, the new state of Guinea became an international figure in the United Nations, so the Guinean image rose, while the image of France declined, sullied by her harsh policy toward a former colony.

In Dakar the next day, when de Gaulle spoke, demonstrators appeared with placards demanding independence. De Gaulle told the Senegalese they could take independence with the consequences, but if they did not take it, they were welcome to help set up the Community for the new age of *ensembles*, of construction for Africa and France. If they said "yes," they would be brothers taking the road together toward great destinies. The General's speech was moving, one of the most moving of his trip — *possibly because of his deep disillusionment of the day before.* He cried out to them, "The road is open, the light is before us!"

After some hesitation, the Senegalese rejected the demonstrators and joined the Community.[74] And after minor delays, the other states did likewise and the Community became a fact. Its institutions reflected de Gaulle's hand, but the question of who would exercise the common functions was not defined. It was clear, however, that only France would be a fully independent state. Regrouping of the rest was left until later. The plan was not actively contested in France.[75]

Although only Guinea had refused to join the Community, the referendum of September 28, 1958 marked the final phase of the decolonization of the French Empire. The Executive Council held only seven meetings in 1959 and one in 1960; the Senate met once in July 1959; the Court of Arbitration did not live long enough to have a case put before it.[76] Both sides were responsible for this early decline.

In the Community, France seemed to be on the same level as her overseas partners. But could the Community Council fix France's share of the budget at a figure higher than the metropole

[74]Bibliothèque Nationale, *loc. cit.*, Speech of August 26, 1958, at Dakar; Guéna, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[75]Guéna, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 73-77, 88-91. Ordinances to establish the Community were set up in December 1958, with a new organization, the Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération, replacing the Fonds d'Investissement et de Développement Economique et Sociale (F.I.D.E.S.), that had functioned since 1946. The members of the Community at that time were the Cameroon and Togo (both UN Trusteeships), Senegal, Mali (Soudan), Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Tchad, Madagascar and Mauretania.

[76]Guéna, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

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could pay? Would there be confusion between the official personalities of the French Republic and those of the states of the Community that might lead to the latter's profit? In the Community France would not be represented in the African states; her President would act only as the Representative of the Community as a whole. The states of the Community would send representatives to the Community but not to France. Only French nationality was to be mentioned on passports used by the various states, for the Community did not have an international personality and its citizens were citizens of France. Were they also citizens of their own countries? Where did the authority of the Ministers of the Community begin? Why were all the Ministers to be French? The states were all becoming conscious of their personalities, with flags and presidents of their own, and they wanted to insist on their own ideas—even as to whether the Community should eventually become a federation or a confederation. There were endless possibilities for confusion and discord, and fears for the future, because, after all, France had reserved a large section of governmental powers for herself. Would the states of the Community always agree to that?[77]

The answer to that last question came swiftly. In September 1959 the Mali Federation — a recent combination of Senegal and the old French Soudan — requested independence. Article 78 of the Constitution provided that a single state could receive, by Community transfer, each of its powers until it had received all. This method was much less cumbersome than the regular one of referendum and approvals; since it avoided the referendum route, de Gaulle felt safer in using it, for Guinea had voted 95 per cent against joining the Community, and a repetition of such a vote would be unfortunate. So de Gaulle agreed to Mali's request, although he feared it would mean a succession of similar requests and the virtual end of the Community. He made one stipulation: agreements of cooperation should be signed with France at the time of the transfers. A change in the Constitution would allow states seeking independence to remain as members of the Community, if they should wish to do so.[78]

De Gaulle was right about the other states. Negotiations soon began with the states of West and Equatorial Africa. At first it looked as if many of them would stay within the Community and sign agreements of cooperation with France. However,

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 94-110.
[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74, 124-135.

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Houphouet-Boigny, leader of the Ivory Coast, wished to set up an African community without France, and a number of states followed his line, though they hoped French aid would continue. Eventually the only states remaining within the Community were the Central African Republic (formerly Oubangui-Chari), Congo-Brazzaville (Middle Congo), Gabon, Madagascar, Senegal and Tchad.[79]

The Community now has little or no life. There are no meetings of the President with the government of the Community, the Senate disappeared at the end of the terms of its members, and all relations between France and the states of French Africa are now conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. But what is called the *Coopération* has survived. It is directed by a Ministry that parcels out the aid, financial and technical, given by France to her former colonies. In the states formally still within the Community, there are detachments of the French Army to aid in defense, and in all of the former French African colonies a common language and culture remain. There is something ineffaceable in the relations between France and her former colonies, even though many of them have shed her control. No one can ignore the fact that West Africa has been greatly influenced by the former French presence. Aid is now the cement of the remaining structure, and the continuity and authority of the Fifth Republic under General de Gaulle have given the passage to independence favorable conditions. Thirteen states have kept a certain friendship with the metropole even though they may differ at times on policies and issues.

VI

As we have noted, the evolution of de Gaulle's ideas on colonization, initially affected by the attitudes of people around him in his early years, was guided primarily by one principle: that one's decisions and actions must depend on the circumstances — *les contingences* — of the individual case. The first detectable change in his outlook took place while he was stationed in the Levant from 1929 to 1931. At that time he became aware that the empire could not be maintained forever in the face of the uncertain aspirations of the "subject peoples." There is no evidence in his writings or from his associates to indicate that there was any

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-150, 154. The Ivory Coast drew into its "entente," the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey. The differences between the arrangements with each state or group of states formed after this point are beyond the scope of this article.

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further alteration in his position until after the Second World War had begun. The war caused him to view the empire as the hope for France — with the empire behind her France could emerge from her defeat. But he also saw the need for reform in order to retain the loyalty of the various territories. Eboué must have helped bring him to this understanding, and by 1943 the General was ready to concur in fairly large freedoms for Indochina and more voting power for the people of Algeria. The first real case of independence — that of Syria and Lebanon — could not take effect at the time of its decree, because of the war and the Mandate, and undoubtedly the matter was badly tangled in the General's mind due to his belief that the British wanted part of the French Empire. He apparently believed that these two "mandated" countries would retain close bonds with France, even after they were declared "independent."[80]

The Brazzaville Conference, though based on René Pleven's plan, could not have taken place without the approval of de Gaulle as head of the Provisional Government. It is difficult to know how much the General influenced the workings of the conference. A close associate says he left instructions for the work of the conference before returning to Algiers after the opening ceremonies. Another man, also in a position to know, denies that he instructed or communicated with it. The man closer to him and more likely to know was the one who thinks he *did* influence it. De Gaulle certainly approved of the meeting, even though he apparently had nothing to do with its main contradiction: the statement that self-government was never to be permitted in the colonies and the desire expressed almost immediately thereafter to lead the peoples of the empire toward self-government. In the long run, this "great equivocation" seems to have had little effect on the results of the conference. De Gaulle himself ignored it, saying later, "At Brazzaville we took a turning for the Empire."[81] Moreover, there were some practical results from Brazzaville, the most significant being its support of native representation in the assembly elected to draw up France's new constitution.[82] Thereafter the native peoples had a political voice with which to make known their grievances. The attention given to native traditions and mode of life by Eboué was also vitally important, as was

[80]Werth, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[81]J.-R. Tournoux, *La Tragédie du Général* (Paris: Plon, 1967), p. 175; Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[82]Viard, *op. cit.*, p. 29; Guèye, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

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the insistence on the suppression of forced labor and the *indigénat.*

The Brazzaville Conference was not merely "the fruit of necessity" and a concept that was "not new."[83] It stood out in the minds of most people as "the spirit of Brazzaville"— the beginning of decolonization. For de Gaulle, Brazzaville seems to have been the beginning of his conversion to full independence for the colonies, though certainly he felt at the time that he must return all of her colonies to France at the end of the war. When he left office on January 20, 1946, he wrote "our territories are in our hands," as if he had carried out a promise to himself and to France.[84] Yet after Brazzaville decolonization was irreversible, for it had provided, as de Gaulle said later, "a charter of colonial liberties." He had clearly forgotten its limitations.[85]

During the "Retreat in the Desert," de Gaulle felt decolonization was impossible. Such a move would require a strong government and prestigious international ranking for France, and under the Fourth Republic France had neither.[86] But after his return to power he initiated the loosening of colonial bonds so quickly that it seems fair to conclude that the matter of the colonies had been much in his mind. Two days after he had suggested the Community, he eliminated the time restriction on independence, and thus the territories that desired it could be free whenever they chose.

De Gaulle still hoped the African states would stay within the Community. Would it have made a difference if he had retained less power in the Community for France? He had gone beyond the *Loi-Cadre* but not the whole way to independence, and the Africans were not willing to accept this limitation for long. "Freedom" to de Gaulle probably meant "freedom under France," as it had to Pleven at Brazzaville. It is clear that he was not altogether pleased with what he had to do: he is said to have remarked that the time for decolonization had come and it was for him to show the way, adding, "It is not funny at my age and with my training . . . . but I have decided within me . . . . it is a difficult game that we are playing — it has nothing joyful in it for me."[87]

[83]Jacques Arnault, *Du Colonialisme au Socialisme* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1966), pp. 26-27.
[84]*Mémoires,* III, 645.
[85]Kulski, *op. cit.,* p. 332.
[86]Maurice Schumann, Minister of Scientific Research, interview with the author, March 8, 1968.
[87]Tournoux, *La Tragédie,* p. 348.

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Jean Lacouture has written that the General was "like a man carrying on his shoulders the heavy burdens of a long destiny."[88] But he could still take on those burdens and change his course when *les contingences* demanded it. Although he told African leaders in August 1958 that it was impossible to conceive that France would continue to aid nations that opted for independence from her, did he not reverse his position a little later with regard to a number of nations?

General de Gaulle is always controversial. There are those who believe neither in what he does nor in his intellectual honesty. Jacques Arnault says that "to pretend to offer what one can no longer refuse was the soul of his policy."[89] Others have denied his liberalism — his desire to accord more freedom to dependent peoples — but most of those with whom the author has spoken, both Gaullists and anti-Gaullists, feel that he gave not only the initial but the most crucial impetus to decolonization, and that he had a real interest in the dependent peoples.

Among those who have put their opinions in print, Henri Grimal thinks de Gaulle's role was a decisive one for decolonization, though colonial nationalisms provided the spark for this "speeding-up of history."[90] René Viard says the General was the first to give the colonial peoples under France a glimpse of their freedom, but he thinks the Fourth Republic was chiefly responsible for the dissolution of the empire, for the *Loi-Cadre* opened the doors to independence.[91] This may be true, but the door was already ajar after the first black representatives were elected to the Constituent Assembly, where they were able to exercise a modicum of political influence. This representation was foreshadowed at Brazzaville and was arranged while de Gaulle was still in office. If a man less convinced than de Gaulle of the eventual necessity of decolonization had held the reins in 1944, would it have been possible to make even that wavering and uncertain beginning at Brazzaville?

There is no doubt that many other men played a great part in decolonization. Mendès-France worked out the freeing of Indochina and later of Morocco. Edgar Faure conducted the negotiations concerning Tunisia. Defferre was in part responsible for the *Loi-Cadre*, and there were many other less well known figures who

[88]Werth, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
[89]Arnault, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
[90]Grimal, *op. cit.*, pp. 337, 394.
[91]Viard, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149.

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had a share. But de Gaulle was present at the beginning and at the end, and we know that decolonization had been in his mind for a long time as a future necessity — even though he thought of it as something that should not occur with undue haste.

No doubt the public utterances and the private thoughts of the General were different. In France in the 1940's and early 1950's he could not have pushed colonial independence publicly. It was only after the freeing of the colonies of Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia, and the war in Algeria and the hopelessness of that situation, that French opinion began to change. How much it changed is impossible to say, but certainly by the late 1950's the opposition to de Gaulle's decolonization policy was much weaker than it would have been only a few years before.

De Gaulle had described the twentieth century as one of "the independence of the colonized peoples," but in his mind the end of the century was still far ahead. He felt he had been generous, and possibly that was why the events at Guinea hurt him and angered him. In a sense he triumphed, for the fourteen states to which he granted independence, except for Guinea, are still fairly close to France. No doubt aid from France has tied the states to their former metropole, but aid has been reinforced by close ties to the French and to French civilization. Does France get more than she gives financially? It is hard to say. David Schoenbrun has written that de Gaulle made decolonization look like a victory for France.[92]

"Decolonization," de Gaulle once said, "is to our interest and therefore it is our policy."[93] But in his writings, in addition to his interest in the strength of France, a sympathy for the black race comes through, a feeling that independence ought to come to Africa. Perhaps he felt the release of "subject peoples" was in the interest of both sides. Long ago, he had written: "Old world, always new, that received from century to century the deep mark of France and which waits in secret for her to come again to show the way."[94] Under de Gaulle's leadership, France showed the "way" to the inevitable freeing of Black Africa. Without him that "way" would have been longer and more tortuous.

[92]Schoenbrun, *op. cit.*, p. 271; Kulski, *op. cit.*, pp. 324-325.
[93]Tournoux, *La Tragédie*, p. 379.
[94]Chetrit and Timsit, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

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AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST LEADER: HO CHI MINH BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW

by N. Khac Huyen

HO Chi Minh was a realist endowed with a good knowledge of history. Imbued with his country's past experiences, he shared the Vietnamese sinophobia, a deep distrust felt by all Vietnamese for Chinese influence, deriving from nearly ten centuries of Han rule. Yet, as a small country with a giant neighbor which to all intents and purposes remains the "Middle Kingdom," Viet Nam, for reasons of survival, could not afford to antagonize China.

By training and inclination, Ho had a warm spot in his heart for the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, the country of his youth, and the land of Lenin, his idol. "Leninism is not only a miraculous 'book of the wise,' a compass for us Vietnamese revolutionaries and people," wrote the late DRV President, "it is also the radiant sun illuminating our path to final victory, to Socialism and Communism."[1] Ho also witnessed the Soviet Union's metamorphosis from an underdeveloped country into one of the leading industrialized nations of the world. There was much to learn and a great deal to gain from close collaboration with Moscow.

Nevertheless the pragmatic leader of North Viet Nam followed a middle-of-the-road policy, uncommitted to either China or the Soviet Union. His neutral position guaranteed Hanoi independence and abundant economic and military aid from both communist colossi. DRV relations with Communist China and the USSR can be divided into four phases beginning with the proclamation of the People's Republic in Peking on October 1, 1949, after which Viet Nam was no longer "in the grip of the enemy encirclement and was henceforth geographically linked to the Soviet bloc."[2]

[1]Bernard B. Fall, editor, *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 24-25.

[2]Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 22.

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1949 TO 1956: PERIOD OF CHINESE INFLUENCE

After the establishment of the communist regime in China, one of Mao Tse-tung's first diplomatic acts was his recognition of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) as an independent state. The new ruler of China answered Ho's appeal for help in resistance against the French by dispatching one of his ablest commanders, General Lo Kwei-po, to Viet Nam to serve as military adviser to the Vietnamese Liberation Army, as well as a large number of Chinese experts and technicians to work in various administrative capacities. While Chinese officers taught guerrilla tactics to the Viet Minh troops in Ho-controlled areas, numerous Viet Minh cadres went to China for military training. Besides furnishing personnel, Peking also supplied Ho with foodstuffs, arms and ammunition which arrived in large quantities at the conclusion of the Korean armistice. Chinese assistance thus enabled the Viet Minh to launch a general offensive against the French which led to their victory at Dienbienphu.

China's prestige was riding high in North Viet Nam when a conference on Indochina was convened in Geneva in 1954. At Geneva, besides political guidance, the Vietnamese even had to rely on their Chinese colleagues to make arrangements for hotel and food services. It was Chou En-lai who prevailed upon Pham Van Dong, the head of the DRV delegation, to abandon his stubborn demand that the Khmer and Lao "resistance governments" be given recognition and thus prevented a deadlock at the conference. After the settlement of the Indochina war, Hanoi continued to follow Peking's advice and received Chinese assistance for the reconstruction of war-torn North Viet Nam. Chinese advisers and technicians enjoyed great influence in the DRV, and the ambassador from Peking appeared to be the most popular diplomat in Hanoi.

The 1953-1956 period was one of land reform, a process which had been carried out in China and slavishly imitated in the DRV. Chinese patterns, such as the anti-landlord campaign, people's courts and public executions, were copied without modification. Fanatic Viet Minh cadres, under the supervision of Chinese advisers, thrust Maoist reforms down the people's throats, victimized landlords and poor peasants alike, and pitilessly eliminated hundreds of thousands of persons including party members. Instead of abundance and prosperity, the result was poverty and hunger, terror and confusion. The campaign was disastrous, adversely af-

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fecting farming and programs of rehabilitation and industrial reconstruction.

In September 1956, the Lao Dong (Communist) Party Central Committee admitted that grave errors had been committed during the execution of the agrarian reforms and promised to correct them. The Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee also issued a communiqué announcing that the party would extend and safeguard democratic liberties and work toward improving the living conditions of the workers, soldiers, cadres and officials. It was not by sheer coincidence that the rectification campaign occurred at the same time as the "de-Stalinization" process in the Soviet Union. The Lao Dong Party's prestige had dipped to an extreme low, and, more importantly, drastic changes had taken place in the Kremlin. Thus it was Khrushchev, not Ho Chi Minh, who should have received credit for this temporary relaxation.

The brutal land reform campaign affected people in every position. Among the famous victims were Truong Chinh, the Party Secretary General who had closely identified himself with the program, and Ho Viet Thang, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture in charge of the campaign. While the latter was dismissed from his post, Truong Chinh, at a session of the Central Committee held late in October, was forced to make a public confession admitting major errors and to resign from his office. With a view to salvaging the party, Ho himself assumed the post of Secretary General. However, the correction campaign and the dismissal of Truong Chinh, who served as a scapegoat for Ho Chi Minh, did not appease the people, whose furor had reached the boiling point. Outraged peasants revolted in many parts of the country. On November 4, 1956, at the very moment when Soviet troops and tanks moved into Budapest to suppress the Hungarian Revolution, 20,000 peasants in five villages in Nghe An Province, Ho Chi Minh's birthplace, armed with sticks and knives, marched against regular troops of the Viet Nam People's Army sent in by the DRV President to discipline them.

Meanwhile, following the lead of Mao Tse-tung, who had opened the "Hundred Flowers" campaign,[3] Ho allowed his people to discuss their different points of view for a limited period of

[3]People were led to believe that Mao Tse-tung was liberalizing his regime when he said that art and science could progress only if people were permitted to express different ideas and approved such slogans as "let a hundred flowers bloom," "let a hundred schools of thought contend." Very soon, however, Mao made it clear that blooming flowers and contending ideas should be aimed at improving and strengthening socialism, not at undermining it.

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time. The regime suddenly found itself attacked from all quarters by prominent people in many fields, including those who had unswervingly believed in Marxism. Three months later and by then greatly alarmed, Ho decided to suppress the intellectual rebellion by closing down the opposition papers, which had argued too freely. Again Mao's ways prevailed. The four principles put forth by the Chinese communists to reform intellectuals were adopted in their entirety by the Lao Dong Party. These rules required intellectuals, artists and writers to change their old outlook on life and develop a revolutionary view, adopt the proletarian view, study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thoughts, and harden themselves through manual labor.[4]

If the failure of the agrarian reform and the "Hundred Flowers" campaign rested squarely on Ho Chi Minh's shoulders, it could also be attributed to Mao Tse-tung, who had devised them. This disappointing experience with the Chinese path caused the Lao Dong Party to reassess its position. The Maoist system of people's communes, introduced in the late 1950's and ridiculed by the Soviets, was not adopted in Viet Nam, and Ho similarly refused to imitate Mao's "leap forward."

The experiment with Chinese methods in the first few years following the partition of the country seriously aggravated the perennial food shortage in North Viet Nam. By the end of 1956, Ho realized that this problem could be solved only through large-scale industrialization, which would permit the DRV to export its manufactured goods and obtain foreign currency with which to buy rice and other foodstuffs. Large-scale industrialization required modern machines to equip new factories, and technicians to train people to run them. China, which had helped North Viet Nam with elementary restoration work, was not able to meet the new Vietnamese need. The Soviet Union and the East European countries, on the other hand, were in a good position to supply machinery, technical knowledge and trained specialists. A move toward Moscow was discussed in Hanoi, thus exacerbating factional divisions between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups in the Lao Dong Party.

Heading the pro-Peking wing was Truong Chinh, Secretary General of the Lao Dong from 1941 to 1956, and the party's leading theoretician. An ardent advocate of the Maoist line, Truong Chinh had been the guiding force behind the land reform

[4]See Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, Writers and Artists," *China Quarterly*, January-March 1962, pp. 47-49.

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campaign, transplanting into Viet Nam the barbarous Chinese system of trials and summary executions of landlords. In spite of the campaign's failure and his widespread unpopularity, Truong Chinh was too powerful and too important a person to be brushed aside. Less than two years later, he fought his way back to power, and was named a Deputy Premier; in July 1960 he was appointed Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, one of the most influential positions in the DRV.

Of the protagonists favoring the Soviet Union, General Vo Nguyen Giap appears to be the most articulate. A Deputy Premier, Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army, Giap has been one of the DRV's most popular figures, second only to Ho himself. It was the General who presided over the rectification campaign following Truong Chinh's discomfiture over the land reform fiasco. Giap rarely bothers to conceal his distrust for the Chinese. His celebrated quarrel with Truong Chinh began during the resistance days when as Commander of Viet Minh forces he stubbornly withstood the Party Secretary General's pressure and refused to use Chinese troops against the French.

In view of these clashing personalities, Hanoi's move toward Moscow was not achieved without a bitter struggle. The pro-Chinese faction, which had been in the ascendancy until 1956, did not idly watch their influence being eroded. Under a façade of unity, the men who held North Viet Nam's destiny in their hands were sharply divided in their orientation, struggling among themselves for power and Ho Chi Minh's favor, each trying to consolidate his position and increase his influence.

1957 TO MID-1962: PERIOD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE

The amount of aid given by one country to another usually reflects the degree of influence the donor state enjoys in the receiving state. It is therefore useful to compare Soviet with Chinese aid to the DRV. From 1955 to 1957, China's aid to North Viet Nam amounted to U.S. $200 million, most of which was spent on the reconstruction of run-down industrial installations, railways, bridges and roads that had been destroyed during the Indochina war. At the same time, the Soviet Union offered $100 million to be used in the building of industrial enterprises and public services. Up to 1957, then, the DRV had received much more help from China than from the Soviet Union and had been

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in closer collaboration with Peking. In the next three years, this trend was reversed. While China's aid slipped to $100 million, that of the Soviet Union went up to $133, in addition to $26 million in assistance supplied by the countries of Eastern Europe.[5] Beginning in 1957, therefore, Hanoi relied more heavily on Moscow than Peking for the solution of its economic problems. Externally, this shift passed almost unnoticed, but internally it caused a serious conflict within the Lao Dong Party.

After Soviet President Voroshilov's visit to Hanoi in May 1957, Chairman Ho embarked on an extended tour of North Korea, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, in July and August. The trip was obviously undertaken to strengthen North Viet Nam's ties with the Soviet Union and her satellites. Upon his return on August 30, however, the DRV President confronted a serious crisis. According to a French observer who lived in Hanoi at that time,[6] peculiar developments took place in the North Vietnamese capital. The intraparty feud had erupted into a major controversy. The pro-Chinese wing refused to yield.

Ho Chi Minh, failing to win the intransigent Politburo members over to his view — a slightly pro-Soviet "neutral" policy — secretly left for Moscow to participate in the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, and stayed out of the country for approximately two months. During his absence, Ho's name, strangely, was not mentioned by the DRV press and radio, and rumors were circulated that he was dead. General Giap, leader of the pro-Moscow faction, was not seen in public and his name was not mentioned by the mass media. Meanwhile, a hectic exchange of letters took place between the "exiled" Ho and other Politburo members. The founder of the DRV did not return until December 24, after he had received full satisfaction from all those who had disagreed with him. Thus, the first move toward the Soviet Union, necessitated by North Viet Nam's economic conditions, was strongly resisted by the pro-Chinese group in the Lao Dong Party. Peace and equilibrium within the Politburo were restored only after Ho Chi Minh had resorted to a self-imposed exile for two months and threatened to prolong it indefinitely.

Very seldom did Ho speak out on controversial ideological issues. Statements made by his associates represented his position. During periods when Hanoi leaned one way or another

[5]These figures were taken from William Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided, the Economy of North Vietnam," *China Quarterly*, January-March 1962, p. 92.

[6]Gérard Tongas, *J'ai vécu dans l'enfer communist au Nord Vietnam et j'ai choisi la liberté* (Paris: Les Nouvelles Editions Debresse, 1961).

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— toward Peking or Moscow — Ho tried to maintain his neutrality by making declarations favorable to the side with which North Viet Nam was not at the time closely identified. On the occasion of the thirteenth anniversary of the DRV's founding, for instance, when pro-Moscow views prevailed in Hanoi, the Lao Dong's First Secretary, Le Duan, praised Mao's methods:

> The extremely rich experience of China in Socialist construction has given us a very new conception about the path to build Socialism in the countryside. Without machines, the Chinese peasants could proceed to Socialism through co-operativization. Recently after a political remoulding drive, their mind being set free, they have progressed by leaps and bounds.[7]

The Sino-Soviet ideological discord, which had erupted in 1958, became critical in 1960 when the Kremlin recalled its technicians from China. Since the two sides failed to reach an agreement at the Moscow talks in July 1963, the dispute has grown in intensity and bitterness. Until the Lao Dong Party's Third Congress in September 1960, Ho Chi Minh had remained strictly neutral in the Sino-Soviet feud. Early in August 1960, he reportedly made a secret visit to Moscow, where he "bargained with Khrushchev, offering Vietnamese support for the Soviet line and closer links with Russia in the future in exchange for greatly increased economic aid from Russia in the industrial sphere."[8] In view of the ambitious five-year plan announced at the Third Lao Dong Congress, Khrushchev was assumed to have complied with Ho's request. In his opening speech at the Congress, which lasted from September 5 to 10, the DRV President made clear his support for the Soviet line:

> We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our warm feelings of gratitude toward the fraternal socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union. . . .
>
> Our people strongly support the foreign policy of peace and disarmament program advanced by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. . . . The peoples of the world, uniting closely with one another and struggling actively, will undoubtedly be able to prevent a world war and establish a lasting peace.[9]

The report on the revision of the party constitution, read by Politburo member Le Duan, also referred to dogmatism — i.e., the Chinese line — as limiting the creative power of the party and the

[7]Le Duan, *On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), I, 96.

[8]P. J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Party Congress," *China Quarterly,* October-December 1960, p. 73.

[9]Fall, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-318.

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masses and hindering the development of the wisdom and experience of the whole organization.[10]

In his address to the Congress, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap similarly emphasized construction instead of military preparedness, a line that echoed the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence: "At the present time economic construction in the North has become the central task of the Party. That is why our defense budget must be reduced and military effectiveness cut."[11]

The tone of the whole Congress greatly pleased the Kremlin leaders with whom Ho, for the first and only time, identified himself so unequivocally. At that point, however, the DRV President also decided to revive the revolution in South Viet Nam, hoping to bring it under communist control through subversion and armed infiltration. Contrary to his expectations, the election scheduled for 1956 had not been held. Such an election would no doubt have unified Viet Nam under Ho's rule, regardless of the outcome of the balloting in the South, because the North's population is larger and the DRV polls would have been supervised by communists. In view of the distressing political and economic conditions in the DRV in 1956, the disappointed Ho could not resort to force to bring about reunification. Not until September 1960, when the North had recovered from the land reform nightmare, was the DRV ready to create the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam (NFLSVN), uniting all anti-Diem forces, to overthrow the Saigon regime through armed insurrection.

Consequently, while publicly adhering to the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence, Ho followed an aggressive policy which was consonant with the Maoist position. His primary concern was not the ideological dispute but the absorption of South Viet Nam. In order to realize his ambition, Ho needed both Chinese and Soviet assistance and thus could not afford to identify himself completely with either communist colossus. Although Hanoi had publicly favored peaceful coexistence since the summer of 1959, beginning in 1961 it was the course of the war in the South and the amount of aid the DRV received from Peking and Moscow that determined its attitude toward China and the Soviet Union. To the practical leader of North Viet Nam the question of military and economic aid was of paramount importance, and the issue under dispute — revisionism or dogmatism, peaceful coex-

[10]Honey, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 69.

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istence or protracted confrontation — unless it affected the war, was to be minimized.

Peaceful coexistence began to appear less attractive to Ho when he decided to conquer South Viet Nam and Laos by force. Since the main obstacle to Ho's plan was "American imperialism," any détente between Washington and Moscow was resented by the North Vietnamese. In the winter of 1960-1961, the Soviet Union took an active part in the war in Laos. During and after the battle for Vientiane, for instance, Soviet aircraft parachuted supplies, ammunition and Vietnamese military personnel to reinforce Kong Le's and the Pathet Lao units.

After the signing of the second Geneva Accord on Laos in July 1962, however, Khrushchev discontinued his active policy in Southeast Asia and refused to increase military and economic aid to Ho Chi Minh. This Soviet decision, in addition to the Kremlin attempt to mobilize the collective support of the communist world for its position against Peking, made it increasingly difficult for Ho to endorse Khrushchev's line. The balance of forces within the Lao Dong Party began to shift in favor of China. Hanoi's alignment with Moscow during the 1957 to mid-1962 period had never been a total commitment by the North Vietnamese. As a matter of fact, at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October 1961, Ho, while leaning toward Moscow, refused to endorse the general condemnation of Albania, China's East European ally.

Mid-1962 to 1964: Period of Chinese Influence

As the Sino-Soviet discord grew in intensity, Ho continued to maintain his neutrality, making tireless efforts to prevent a split between the two communist giants that might force him to take sides. In view of his seniority and influence in the international communist movememt, both Peking and Moscow made serious attempts to enlist his support for their causes. This put the Lao Dong Party Chairman in an unenviable position and left him only one alternative: nonalignment. With a view to bringing about a rapprochement, or at least preventing an irreparable schism, Ho praised both China and the Soviet Union for their achievements and minimized their disagreements.

During the two-week visit of Soviet General Batov late in December 1962, General Giap, reflecting Ho's position, lauded the Soviet Union for solving the Cuban missile crisis and, in spite of his lukewarm feeling for Peking, praised China equally for solv-

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ing the Indian border dispute. Throughout his speech, Giap emphasized the need for solidarity among socialist states.[12]

At the East German Party Congress, which opened on January 15, 1963, it became apparent that a rupture between the two communist regimes was inevitable. Khrushchev defiantly defended his position on peaceful coexistence, warned that if a nuclear war broke out 700 million people (China's population) would be killed in a few hours, called for an end to mutual public recrimination, and demanded that pro-Chinese Albania cooperate more closely with the rest of the communist parties. Instead of being cowed into submission, the Chinese launched an attack against Yugoslav — meaning Soviet — revisionism. Their speech was met with shouting and desk-banging by most of the other delegates. The Vietnamese were obviously shaken by this lack of socialist tolerance and solidarity.

In late January Czechoslovakia's President Novotny, one of Khrushchev's strongest supporters, visited Hanoi. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the state visit emphasized the need for unity among socialist countries and supported the Soviet call for a cessation of open polemics in order to create an atmosphere favorable for mutual consultation among brother parties. Although the statement referred to the Soviet Union as the center of the socialist camp and to peaceful coexistence as the most correct policy under existing conditions, it was not entirely pro-Moscow at the expense of Peking. The communiqué praised the Soviet Union for the correct handling of the Cuban crisis, and it also lauded China for her willingness to settle the Indian border problem. Both Novotny and Ho declared their full support for Peking's just stand in regard to the liberation of Taiwan.[13]

After the East German Party Congress, Ho took upon himself the difficult task of keeping lines of communication open between Peking and Moscow, extolling the great achievements of the socialist bloc and blaming the United States for scheming "to sabotage the socialist camp and split the international Communist and Workers' movement." In its February 10, 1963 statement broadcast over Radio Hanoi, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee expressed its wish that discords between brother parties should not be permitted to harm the unity of the socialist camp, because "Communists have all the necessary conditions to overcome differences of views and firmly to maintain and enhance

[12]Vietnam News Agency (VNA), December 23, 1962.
[13]*Ibid.*, January 29, 1963.

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unity within their ranks."[14] The Central Committee also reiterated its view that the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement

> have laid down principles on the strategy and tactics of the international Communist and Workers' movement, rules guiding the relations among Communist and Workers' parties, methods to overcome divergences of views which may arise between parties, that is, to meet and consult one another in order to reach unanimous views. All Communist and Workers' parties must most scrupulously respect all stipulations of these declarations and statements which have been recognized by all.

In spite of the Lao Dong's apparent neutral position, Peking remained disturbed about the Czech President's visit to North Viet Nam. In an attempt to placate the Chinese, Ho invited President Liu Shao-chi to make an official visit, subsequently scheduled for May 10 to 16. The Chinese Head of State and his delegation were given an unusually warm and elaborate welcome. At the evening banquet honoring his guests, Ho made a speech supporting China's stand on Taiwan, the Sino-Indian dispute, and the United Nations issue, and pleaded for solidarity among socialist states. Liu's response was subdued.

On the third day of his visit, however, the Chinese President let loose a barrage of attacks against the Soviet Union in a speech delivered at a mass rally in Ba Dinh, Hanoi's Red Square. In reference to the Soviet position, he commented that peaceful coexistence "must not be reinterpreted at will or stretched to apply to relations between the oppressed and oppressor nations or between oppressed and oppressor classes. Peaceful coexistence must not be used to abolish the socialist countries' duty to support the revolutionary struggle of oppressed nations and people."[15] Liu added that if the socialist countries respected each other's independence and sovereignty, treated each other as equals, refrained from intervening in each other's domestic affairs, and cooperated on the basis of mutual benefit, the unity of the communist camp could "certainly be strengthened." In his second major speech delivered at the Nguyen Ai Quoc School for Cadres,[16] the Chinese guest launched a vehement attack against the modern revisionists, which must have greatly embarrassed his host.

The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit[17] seemed to indicate that Ho had gone only halfway toward pleasing Liu by

[14] *Ibid.*, February 10, 1963.
[15] New China News Agency (NCNA), May 12, 1963.
[16] *Ibid.*, May 15, 1963.
[17] *Ibid.*, May 16, 1963.

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agreeing to support Peking on some issues but avoiding statements that would offend Moscow. Ho endorsed Liu's position that "unanimity" instead of "single view" should be the principle regulating relations between socialist states. Both Presidents supported general disarmament, but "In the circumstances in which imperialism rejects disarmament and continues preparation for a nuclear war, it is highly necessary to strengthen the national defense might of the countries in the socialist camp, including the development of nuclear superiority of the socialist countries." While this statement apparently approved China's effort to develop her own nuclear weapons, it did not conflict with the Soviet view in this regard. Revisionism, or right opportunism, was condemned as "the main danger [to] the international Communist movement." However, the attack was not aimed directly at the Soviet Union because it was noted that "Yugoslav revisionism is the concentrated expression of the modern revisionist theories." Significantly, the communiqué was silent on the question of peaceful coexistence which the Chinese President had vehemently condemned. Thus, in spite of Liu's persuasive effort and stern warning that it was not possible "to act as onlookers or follow the middle course,"[18] Ho refused to commit himself irrevocably and continued to emphasize the need for unity.

Meanwhile, the DRV, together with North Korea, did not sign the Moscow Test Ban Treaty although its National Assembly, at the sixth session held in the winter of 1956-1957, had "approved a declaration welcoming the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the banning of atomic weapons and on reduction of armament."[19] Ho's decision not to sign the treaty caused Moscow to cut its aid to Hanoi, thus making it more difficult for the DRV to support the insurgents in South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia and forcing Hanoi to rely increasingly on China. Ho's disapproval of this unchivalrous Soviet treatment found expression in *Hoc Tap* (*Studies*), the Lao Dong's official paper, which began to carry articles critical of Tito's—meaning Khrushchev's—revisionism.

Throughout 1963, both China and the Soviet Union tried to gain support for their respective positions. By the winter of 1963-1964, all efforts having proved futile, the Sino-Soviet split became imminent. Mao Tse-tung had gone as far as to demand Khrushchev's ouster as a price for rapprochement. In a desperate attempt to prevent a schism, Ho dispatched a delegation headed by Le Duan, the Lao Dong Party First Secretary, to Peking to talk

[18] *Ibid.*, May 15, 1963.
[19] Fall, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

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with Mao and then to Moscow to see Khrushchev. The failure of the Le Duan mission was marked by the absence of a communiqué at the end of its visit to Peking and a routine statement at the conclusion of its stay in Moscow. In reply to a plea for stronger Soviet support for the war, the Soviet Communist Party vaguely stated that it resolutely supported the just struggle of the Vietnamese people against "U.S. imperialism" in South Viet Nam.

In spite of their efforts to promote a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, DRV leaders appeared at the end of 1963 to have committed themselves to Peking's approach to world affairs, agreeing with the Chinese that the Marxist-Leninist concept favored the use of violence to eliminate reactionary and counterrevolutionary regimes and defeat imperialist aggressors. According to Le Duan, "the Party's line is a revolutionary line which is incompatible with modern revisionism."[20]

In 1964 South Viet Nam was in the midst of a grave crisis. The fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 was followed by a series of coups d'état which plunged the country into a nearly chaotic state. The rapidly deteriorating situation in Saigon led many serious observers to believe that the United States, unless it decided to withdraw, had to increase its involvement drastically. Of the two U.S. alternatives the second seemed to be the less likely choice since 1964 was a presidential election year. Events apparently were favoring a communist victory in the South when, suddenly, the Tonkin Gulf incident provoked a sharp reaction from the United States. In retaliation against alleged attacks by North Vietnamese PT boats on U.S. vessels in international waters, President Johnson, on August 5, ordered air action against a number of DRV naval bases and oil installations. A joint resolution was subsequently passed by Congress permitting the President to take all necessary measures to maintain international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

The war was finally brought home to Ho Chi Minh, who grew increasingly worried about further bombing. On August 6, following the first air strike against the DRV, Peking warned Washington that the attack meant aggression against China, that the United States had gone too far and that "the Chinese people will not sit idly by without lending a helping hand." Mao also ridiculed the Soviet proposal to invite representatives of all the parties involved to the United Nations to discuss the incident; he asserted that the world organization had degenerated into a tool of

[20]Le Duan, *Some Questions Concerning the International Tasks of Our Party* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 51.

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U.S. imperialism and a forum of American-Soviet collaboration and had nothing to do with the Viet Nam problem.

At this juncture, the pro-Chinese wing within the Lao Dong Party seemed to come to the fore again. Khrushchev's announcement on August 10, 1964 that a preparatory meeting of all communist parties would begin in Moscow on December 15 fell on deaf ears in Hanoi. As expected, the Chinese Communist Party on August 30 reiterated its decision not to attend the international communist conference. Along with Albania, North Korea, and the Indonesian and Japanese communist parties, the DRV declined the invitation.

Meanwhile, President Johnson, after a resounding victory at the polls, decided to put the Saigon situation in order, deny the communists whatever advantages they might have gained from political instability in South Viet Nam, and strengthen the allies' bargaining position should negotiation take place. When rumors spread that the United States was considering retaliatory measures against both the DRV and China, Hanoi and Peking reacted frantically. For the first time since the Korean War China felt herself menaced. The arrival of two U.S. nuclear submarines in East Asia caused great concern in the two Asian communist capitals. The subdued tone of the Chinese protest seemingly reflected a genuine fear of American attack and an attempt to head it off. While condemning the sailing of the nuclear submarines into waters off the Asian mainland as "a brazen war provocation by U.S. imperialism against the Chinese and other peoples of the Western Pacific, and a most despicable act of nuclear blackmail and threat by the Johnson administration," *People's Daily* (Communist China's official paper) of December 31, 1964 took pains to explain that Peking entertained no aggressive aims in its attempt to become a nuclear power, but only a desire to strengthen its defenses and safeguard peace. With a view to dissipating any doubt regarding the Chinese desire for peace and denying the United States any pretext to attack China, Peking "solemnly declared to the whole world that China would never, at any time, and under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons," and challenged Washington to prove its sincerity for peace by reaching "an agreement with China on not using nuclear weapons."

Similarly, Peking's reply to Hanoi's request for support was unusually mild. It made no mention of Chinese intervention but merely expressed the firm support of the Chinese government for "the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their just and

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patriotic struggle against U.S. imperialism."[21] As the war escalated, Peking's apprehension that it might spill over into China also grew in intensity. This Chinese frenzy led to war preparations and numerous official statements.[22]

China's unexpectedly moderate pronouncements did little to heighten Ho's morale in the face of the new and serious crisis. He became painfully aware of the disastrous consequences of repeated U.S. bombings and of China's inability to provide his country with effective aid against aerial attacks. Gradually Hanoi veered toward Moscow. Again, the move was dictated by the DRV's need for military and economic aid, not by Ho's desire to get involved in the deepening ideological quarrel in which he had cautiously avoided taking a position. While swinging toward the Soviet Union, North Viet Nam took laborious steps to avoid antagonizing her giant neighbor, seizing every opportunity to extol Sino-Vietnamese solidarity.

In the meantime the Kremlin, anxious to keep Ho on its side, was not eager to help him continue his protracted "people's war" and thus risk becoming involved in a military confrontation with the United States in Southeast Asia. In a letter to DRV Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy, on December 30, 1964, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reiterated Soviet support for the national liberation of the Vietnamese people but made no definite commitments:

> The Soviet Government demands that the United States discontinue all interference in the affairs of South Vietnam, evacuate troops and armament from there, and allow the Vietnamese people themselves to settle their internal affairs. . . . The USSR, loyal as it is to the principles of proletarian internationalism, will not remain indifferent to the destinies of a fraternal socialist country and is prepared to give the DRV the necessary assistance should the aggressors dare encroach on its independence and sovereignty.[23]

With the visit of Kosygin, the new Soviet Premier, to Hanoi early in February 1965, another era of close Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration began.

1965 to 1969: Period of Soviet Influence

Ho's stance between Moscow and Peking as the Vietnamese conflict intensified may be analyzed best by a careful scrutiny of *Nhan Dan*, the Lao Dong Party paper. The issues published before and

[21]NCNA, December 31, 1964.
[22]*Red Flag*, April 25, 1965.
[23]*Nhan Dan*, January 2, 1965.

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after the Soviet delegation's visit to Hanoi undoubtedly brought considerable satisfaction to the men in the Kremlin. On January 31, for instance, *Nhan Dan* spoke of Kosygin's pending visit as one of "splendid significance," an event that would strengthen Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and invigorate solidarity among socialist countries. It expressed the feeling of the Vietnamese people who, "educated by their party . . . have a warm and profound sentiment toward the Soviet people and the Soviet Communists, the first in the history of mankind to rise up and carry out a socialist revolution and who have built the first socialist country in the world." The paper also paid homage to the Soviet heroes who had selflessly fought for the liberty of the proletariat all over the world, and praised the achievements of the whole socialist camp which, following the example of the October Revolution, had changed the face of the world. Ho, once again, pledged to do what he could to heal the breach in the communist camp.

Upon their arrival on February 6, Premier Kosygin and his delegation received a tumultuous welcome. At the grand reception given in honor of the Soviet guests, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong expressed Vietnamese admiration for the Soviet Union, the mighty socialist country with "the most advanced science and technology in the world, as shown by the wonderful flights of the spaceships Vostok and Voskhold," and voiced his confidence that the Soviet Communist Party and people would overcome all difficulties, achieve still greater successes in building communism and defending world peace, and make still greater contributions to the revolutionary cause throughout the world. Voicing DRV support for the Soviet leadership, Premier Dong added that, in their happy as well as trying days, the Vietnamese had always maintained their unshakable trust in the Soviet Communist Party and people.[24]

In contrast to Dong's profuse speeches, Kosygin's replies were noticeably restrained. In an address delivered in Ho's presence, Kosygin aired the Soviet wish for fraternal cooperation between members of the socialist family and cordial settlement of discords. While admitting that serious difficulties stood in the way of attaining these objectives, the Soviet Premier emphasized that unity would assure the ultimate victory of the Leninist principle of internationalism.[25] The reasonable tone of the Soviet leader's speeches greatly encouraged the DRV President, whose view was consonant with the Moscow line as expounded by Kosygin.

[24]VNA, February 7, 1965.
[25]TASS, February 7, 1965.

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Hanoi's realignment, necessitated by the changing course of the war, was thus made easier by the change of leadership in the Kremlin in October 1964. Ho, along with many other communist leaders, hoped that the new Soviet rulers would be more flexible and more successful than Khrushchev in solving the ideological dispute that had so seriously split the communist world. Brezhnev and Kosygin in fact made serious efforts to patch up their differences with the Chinese. With a view to reconciliation, the Soviet Premier stopped over twice in Peking, en route to and from Hanoi, to extend a personal invitation to the Chinese leaders to attend the meeting of all communist parties called for March 1. Mao Tse-tung, however, remained adamant. According to reliable communist sources, Chou En-lai coolly informed Kosygin on February 5 that China would not participate in the preparatory meeting on the grounds that it was based on a unilateral Soviet proposal and that additional preparations were needed for the convening of such a conference.[26]

While Kosygin was still in Hanoi, obviously to win the DRV to the Soviet side, and presumably to inform Ho of President Johnson's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem and persuade his host that a negotiated solution would serve as a smokescreen enabling conquest to proceed through political means, American aircraft on February 7 and 8 struck a number of bases in North Viet Nam. Ho seized this opportunity to ask for Soviet anti-aircraft missiles and MIG jets to strengthen his country's defense. The request was promptly granted by the Soviet Premier.

On March 15 the seventeen nonaligned nations meeting in Belgrade made an appeal for Viet Nam negotiations without preconditions. Subsequently, in his speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University on April 17, President Johnson proposed a negotiated settlement and offered one billion dollars in aid to Southeast Asia, including North Viet Nam. Hanoi, even though under Moscow's mantle, continued to parrot Peking's line, rejecting these proposals as "a deliberate attempt to absolve U.S. imperialism from its crime," a "ludicrous swindle," and a "cheating peaceful negotiation plot."[27]

In April Premier Pham Van Dong visited Kunming on two different occasions. At a banquet given in his honor in that Chinese city, exactly one week after President Johnson's Baltimore speech, the DRV Prime Minister said: "In the just struggle against U.S.

[26]Tokyo, Domestic Television Service, February 7, 1965.
[27]*Nhan Dan,* September 22, 1965.

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imperialism, we have an invincible and powerful weapon, that is, the theory of people's war."[28]

Equally uncompromising were the remarks made by the DRV National Assembly delegation in Peking in the summer of 1965. In a Chinese-like tone, it emphatically stated:

> To fight and win is the road that the Vietnamese people have chosen. If the struggle does not end in one year, they will fight for ten years. If the war does not end in one generation, the next generation will continue to fight. . . .
>
> China is our neighbor which shares with us nearly one thousand kilometers of borderline. The relationship between Vietnam and China is like lips and teeth. In our struggle against the United States for national salvation China considers Vietnam as the front line and China itself is the rear. Our Chinese friends used to say: 'Whatever is needed in the front, the rear will supply. If it needs weapons, there are weapons; if it needs food, there is food; if it needs manpower, there is manpower.'[29]

Thus, while veering toward Moscow, Ho adopted a balanced position by appearing to follow the Chinese bellicose line. *Nhan Dan* regularly published large excerpts from *People's Daily* editorials ridiculing Washington's peace talk proposals as a "trick of the U.S. imperialists to carry out their aggressive policy and to obtain what they failed to obtain on the battlefield," and "a trick to cover their criminal acts," and pledging the firm endorsement of the 650 million Chinese who "will spare no effort to support the Vietnamese people in defeating the U.S. aggressors." One is inclined to believe that these contentious pronouncements, made during the period of Hanoi's reliance on Moscow, were intended for Chinese consumption. Ho could ill afford antagonizing Mao, as he still needed Chinese small arms and ammunition and the Chinese railways for shipping Soviet aid to North Viet Nam, and he wanted to exploit the often expressed American fear that Chinese troops might enter the war. Thus studiously navigating the rough waters between Peking and Moscow, Ho continued to receive both Chinese and Soviet assistance and support. Hanoi signed agreements on economic aid with China and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1965.

In an attempt to convey the impression that the North Vietnamese position was also consonant with the Soviet view on such delicate issues as national liberation wars and peaceful coexistence, Hanoi's papers eagerly published excerpts from Kosygin's statements made in an interview with the *New York Times* columnist, James Reston, on December 6, 1965:

[28]NCNA, April 24, 1965.
[29]*Nhan Dan,* September 22, 1965.

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We [the USSR] hold that *wars of national liberation* are just ones, and that such wars will take place as long as there still exists oppression of nations by imperialist powers. . . . The war of national liberation is going on in South Vietnam because the people there do not want to be governed by the puppets of the United States.

. . . . . .

Coexistence between slaveholders and slaves is impossible. We have never imagined such kind of peaceful coexistence.[30]

Since 1966 the Kremlin has been accusing China of hampering the transit of Soviet aid and materials to North Viet Nam and complaining that Chinese assistance to Hanoi was "clearly insufficient."[31] Peking has denied the Soviet charge and belittled Soviet aid on the grounds that it was too inadequate and too poor in quality.

The heart of the matter is that the Soviet revisionist leadership group has already degenerated into an accomplice of U.S. imperialism. Its so-called aid to Vietnam is a sham. Its real aim is to oppose China and the people persevering in revolution. What it hankers after is world domination through U.S.-Soviet collaboration.[32]

These troubled waters benefited no one but Ho Chi Minh, the experienced fisherman, who continued to ask for and receive more and more assistance from both brotherly socialist countries. The temporary Chinese refusal to permit the shipping of Soviet materials overland and Peking's attempt to belittle Soviet aid had brought about what the Chinese dreaded most, closer Vietnamese-Soviet collaboration.

As the war escalated, serious efforts were made to put an end to this collaboration. The champion of protracted confrontation, Mao has consistently rejected all peace overtures made by the United States or third parties, and condemned the American-Soviet "conspiracy of forcing peace through bombing." Peking went as far as to accuse Moscow of helping Washington in its war in Viet Nam, calling it "the broker peddling the 'peace talks' scheme of U.S. imperialism, the accomplice helping U.S. imperialism to conduct a war blackmail, and the renegade selling out the cause of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation."[33] The Chinese Communist Party, instead, has pledged its firm support to the Vietnamese people "in fighting to the end until final victory is achieved,"[34] and stated that "the 700

[30]VNA, December 12, 1965. (Emphasis supplied.)
[31]*China Quarterly*, January-March 1968, p. 175.
[32]*Ibid.*, July-September 1966, pp. 217-218.
[33]NCNA, November 9, 1967.
[34]Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, adopted on August 12, 1966.

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million people of China will back the Vietnamese people to the hilt."[35]

The Soviet Union supported the DRV in a more subtle way. Radio Moscow gave extensive coverage to deserting American servicemen by broadcasting their open letters to the American people condemning U.S. action in Viet Nam. At the same time the Soviet government made frequent reference to DRV willingness to negotiate a settlement once the United States stopped its military provocation.[36]

The Chinese and Soviet charges and countercharges and their opposing views regarding negotiation made it increasingly difficult for North Viet Nam to accept peace overtures extended by the United States. Painfully aware of the consequences of a miscalculation, Ho bided his time. As the bombing continued to take its toll in the North and the ground war in the South became more and more costly, Ho was forced to make a difficult choice, either to follow Peking and carry on the people's war or to lean on Moscow and negotiate a settlement. A shrewd calculator as always, the DRV leader decided to please both communist big brothers by fighting (the Chinese way) and talking (the Soviet way).

Even in the conduct of the people's war, Ho did not adhere strictly to Maoist precepts. Mao maintains that when the enemy commands superior military power and a greater abundance in modern weapons, the people's army must fight a protracted war, a war of attrition to wear out the enemy, and avoid the temptation to achieve a quick victory in decisive battles that would determine the outcome. Ho paid only lip service to Mao's teachings. In contradiction to what he had said in an address to the nation over Radio Hanoi on July 17, 1966, that "the war may still last ten, twenty years or longer," the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in April 1967 adopted Resolution 13, urging its forces to seek "a decisive victory in South Vietnam in the shortest time possible." Consequently, Ho's soldiers have attempted to deal decisive blows to their better-equipped enemy in conventional attacks: Dak To, Plei Mei, Khe Sanh, Saigon, Hue.

The war was being fought furiously by both sides when, on March 31, 1968, President Johnson unexpectedly announced his decision not to seek renomination for another term and ordered a bombing pause in North Viet Nam as a gesture to bring about peace talks. After some initial hesitation and apparent suspicion regarding Johnson's move, on April 3 Hanoi responded:

[35]*China Quarterly*, January-March 1968, p. 175.
[36]Radio Moscow, December 5, 1967.

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The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that talks may start.

Peking's reaction was predictable. Government documents and articles published by official Chinese organs remained silent on the DRV statement. The Hongkong *Ta Kung Pao,* which has taken its editorial policy directly from Peking, advised its readers on April 3 that "A war of aggression can be ended only when the aggressor is totally defeated or is ready to withdraw from the country he tries to take over." According to the *Nihon Keizai* correspondent in Peking (April 4), the Chinese government interpreted the North Vietnamese pronouncement to mean not that Hanoi had agreed to hold peace talks but that it would prevent the United States from trying to "manipulate public opinion on the pretext that Hanoi is obstinately refusing to agree to U.S. peace efforts."

On May 11 the *Hongkong Star* reported that Xuan Thuy, the head of the DRV delegation to the Paris preliminary talks, during his stopover in Peking en route to the French capital, had asked for a meeting with Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese leader, however, refused to see him. Premier Chou En-lai similarly declined to host a dinner party in honor of the Vietnamese delegation, but made a brief appearance at the end of the reception to tell Xuan Thuy that Hanoi was more eager to follow Moscow's than Peking's advice.[37] The Chinese Prime Minister reportedly warned that the DRV agreement to the talks in Paris was a major tactical and diplomatic mistake and that North Viet Nam had fallen into an American trap.[38]

The Chinese government ignored the Paris negotiations which started on May 13, 1968. On June 5, however, the New China News Agency, commenting on President Johnson's speech delivered the previous day at Glassboro, made a direct reference to the Viet Nam problem:

In his speech, Johnson asked the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to continue to cooperate with the U.S. on the Vietnam . . . question in order to step up the suppression of the struggle by the Vietnamese . . . people. He particularly asked the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to help the United States push the peace fraud which is being stepped up on the Vietnam question.

Moscow, on its part, remained cautious. Fearing that any public

[37]Radio Seoul, May 12, 1968.
[38]Radio Delhi, May 12, 1968.

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Soviet endorsement of peace talks would be denounced by Peking as evidence of "American-Soviet collusion" and thus discourage Hanoi from entering into negotiation, TASS, the Soviet official news agency, limited itself to reporting the reaction of the world press and especially the response of the DRV as expressed in *Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army)*: "Our people want peace, but real peace must go with genuine independence and freedom. As long as our beloved homeland is overshadowed by American aggression, our country will not have genuine independence."[39]

On April 2 Radio Moscow quoted, without comment, from the same Vietnamese paper stating that "the U.S. is finding a pretext to stun public opinion. It does not yet want to completely and unconditionally suspend the bombing and other war activities against North Vietnam."

Following the Hanoi statement on April 3, the Soviet government acclaimed the Vietnamese stand as "unquestionable proof of a sensible and realistic approach to the problem of restoring peace in Vietnam," and a concrete proposal that shattered the American claim that North Viet Nam did not want to take any positive step toward peace negotiation.[40] In marked contrast to the Chinese silence, the Soviet communication media gave extensive coverage to the Paris talks. TASS continued to carry *Nhan Dan's* articles on the negotiation, while Radio Moscow filled the air with flattering comments endorsing Ho's position. Similarly, Soviet commentators competed with each other in praising the DRV stand, stressing that the Paris talks "are the result of Hanoi's peaceful initiative," a move supported by people throughout the world, with the exception of certain "warhawks" in Washington, the bellicose puppets in Saigon, and the Chinese leaders in Peking.[41] While attributing a peaceful intent to Ho Chi Minh, who "did not want war, because war meant death of people and destruction of national wealth," Moscow also jabbed at the Maoist leaders, who

> know that both the DRV Government and the NFLSV have a program for a political settlement, but political settlements imply talks. This means that while waging an armed struggle against the aggressor, the Vietnamese never ruled out negotiations. . . . Hanoi is for talks that guarantee an end to the U.S. aggression and freedom and independence for Vietnam. Peking, on the other hand, rules out this possibility. It advocates war at any cost. It is quite apparent that Peking cares least of all for the interests of the Vietnamese. What it wants is to use the sufferings

[39]TASS, April 2, 1968.
[40]Radio Moscow, April 4, 1968.
[41]*Ibid.*, May 15, 1968.

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of the people of Vietnam to promote Maoism. Desiring endless bloodshed in Vietnam, the Peking leaders shun the very idea of talks.[42]

By supporting the North Vietnamese and undercutting the Chinese position, Moscow seemed to pull Hanoi steadily away from Peking.

Thus, confronted with an increasingly devastating war and Soviet pressure and, perhaps, a Soviet promise of support for a peaceful absorption of South Viet Nam, Ho again leaned toward the Kremlin. The shrewd DRV President, however, managed to maintain friendly relations with Peking in spite of the Chinese rebuff. His loyal Prime Minister and long-time associate, Pham Van Dong, at the Fourth Session of the North Vietnamese National Assembly Third Legislature, still emphasized socialist solidarity and "warmly [acclaimed] the brilliant successes recorded by the peoples of the Soviet Union, China, and the other socialist countries in the building of communism and socialism, successes which contribute to increasing the might of the socialist camp and to the defense of world peace."[43]

The Sino-Soviet ideological struggle was matched only by the Viet Nam war in intensity. And it was the course of the war that determined Hanoi's orientation. Peking wanted the conflict to end with a complete American defeat to prove the correctness of the protracted confrontation theory, while Moscow hoped that it would result in a negotiated settlement so as not to compromise its peaceful coexistence policy. In his ambition to conquer South Viet Nam by force, Ho was in agreement with Mao Tse-tung. Faced with punishing American power, however, Ho had to turn to the land of Lenin for help.

With the exception of the agrarian reform period, during which the pro-Chinese Truong Chinh brutally applied Maoist methods, Ho managed to remain uncommitted to either the Peking or the Moscow line. Apparently, the pro-Chinese course followed by Hanoi until the land reform fiasco in 1956 could be attributed to Ho's feeling of indebtedness to Mao for the latter's assistance during and after the Indochina war, his admiration for the communist success in China, and his belief that, in view of the similar conditions prevailing in the two countries, a Chinese solution would work in Viet Nam.

From 1957 to 1962, after the failure of the land reform campaign, Ho turned to Moscow for the kind of aid that developing China was not able to provide. With the cessation of active Soviet participation in Indochinese affairs following the signing of the

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] Radio Hanoi, May 24, 1968.

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1962 agreement on Laos and the subsequent reduction of Soviet aid, Ho collaborated more closely with the Chinese: his own aggressive designs were more compatible with the Chinese revolutionary warfare theory than with the Soviet peaceful coexistence concept. In 1965, however, the American determination to prevent a communist subjugation of South Viet Nam suddenly changed the course of the war. In face of the escalation of the conflict and damaging aerial attacks against North Viet Nam, the Chinese inability to provide the DRV with effective and sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons pushed Ho closer to the Soviets. Confronted with the increasing devastation of his country and aware of the Chinese desire to have him fight to the bitter end, the aging Ho became reluctant to see most of his life's work destroyed. This explains Hanoi's swing toward Moscow during Ho's last years.

Conclusion

The North Vietnamese President was neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Soviet. In his relations with Peking and Moscow, the cunning communist leader followed a middle-of-the-road position, upholding the principle of the *mean*, a virtue advocated long ago by the Oriental sages and the ancient Roman thinkers who preached *In medio stat virtus.*

Will Hanoi continue to be able to retain its independence vis-à-vis Peking and Moscow? Very likely. In spite of China's geographical location and her "lips and teeth" relations with the DRV, she seems to be unable to dictate Hanoi's policies, as evidenced by the developments since 1949. The most serious obstacle to China's ambition to "vassalize" North Viet Nam is the traditional Vietnamese distrust of the Chinese. Every Vietnamese school child knows that most of his country's national heroes in the past collected their laurels through their wars against the Han conquerers.

Neither could the Soviet Union, in spite of Ho's attachment to the cradle of socialism, dictate Hanoi's alignment. If geographical location is one of China's advantages, it is one of the Soviet Union's disadvantages. As a Vietnamese adage says: "A close neighbor is better than a distant relative." The DRV would not in prudence forsake its colossal neighbor for distant relatives in the USSR.

North Viet Nam has everything to gain from her neutral policy toward the two communist giants. It has guaranteed Hanoi independence and abundant aid from both.

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Reviews

Asian Realities and American Interests*

by Norman D. Palmer

The value of Bernard K. Gordon's brief, clearly-written and eminently sensible book, *Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy,* is stated in the Foreword by former Ambassador Kenneth T. Young: "Since 1900, public understanding has not matched official commitments in East Asia, a dangerous predicament in a democracy. This book should greatly help to close that gap." Such a book is particularly welcome at the present time, when Viet Nam has absorbed a large part of official American thinking and policies regarding East and Southeast Asia and has become a divisive domestic issue almost divorced from the realities of the Viet Nam commitment; when significant new developments and trends are occurring in Asia; and when a new and realistic appraisal of basic U.S. national interests in that increasingly important part of the world is badly needed.

Gordon gives little attention to the Viet Nam war, and almost none to domestic American reactions to Viet Nam or other Asian developments, but he does delineate clearly some of the major new trends in Asia and he presents one of the clearest and sanest analyses available in print of the United States' national interests in Asia in general, and in Southeast Asia in particular.

In attempting "to operationalize the concept of national interest," Gordon develops a categorical "levels of interest" analysis. Level One interests are those regarded as so vital that a nation is willing to risk or, if necessary, resort to war to defend them. Level Two interests include those "which the U.S. neither ignores nor regards as likely to lead to war"; they will usually involve specific resources and/or commitments. Level Three interests "represent the most general concern of the United States in peace, in a modicum of political stability, and in a diminution of violence everywhere on the globe." With regard to the U.S. interest in Viet Nam, Gordon argues that prior to 1962 "whatever commitment did exist . . . was certainly not of the *Level One* variety. . . . Only later (after about 1962) . . . did the Vietnam conflict take on the characteristics of a *Level One* interest." Obviously interests have a way of escalating, and have to be carefully watched and continually reappraised. As Gordon points out, "it is vital that U.S. foreign policy be based more on an ordered concept of the priorities of national interest."

**Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy.* By Bernard K. Gordon. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 186 pp. $2.45 (paper).

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What, then, are Level One interests, if any, for the United States in East Asia? Gordon's answer is clear and concise: "to prevent one-nation dominance." This seems to smack of a balance-of-power interpretation, as would be expected of one who has been a close student of Hans J. Morgenthau. Gordon refers to Morgenthau's familiar thesis that the main interest of the United States in Asia has always been, and still is, the maintenance of a balance of power; but perhaps because he is much more familiar with the Asian scene than is Morgenthau, he does not fully endorse the Morgenthau thesis, although he obviously sees merit in it. To Gordon the Level One interest of preventing one-nation dominance in Asia is not precisely the same thing: "The U.S. has not always followed a balance-of-power policy, but it has generally sought in overall balance."

Basically, as Ambassador Young states in his Foreword, Gordon "suggests a new role for the United States to play in keeping with new trends in Asia." This will involve a much more realistic assessment of the nature and significance of the new trends, and of American national interests in the area. Specifically, it will involve the encouragement of regional cooperation in Asia, including perhaps cooperation for defense, and military disengagement from mainland Asia, but a continued concern for Asian security, with the possibility that the United States, Australia and Japan "could function as 'off-shore' suppliers to an ASEAN defense group."

A central theme of the book is the growth of regional cooperation, especially in Southeast Asia. According to Gordon, there has been "a considerable change in the Asian political environment" in recent years, characterized by such developments as a noticeable dissipation of Communist China's "favorable capital" in Southeast Asia; a growing interest on the part of Japan in economic cooperation and presumably, in time, other kinds of collaboration; and a renewed interest in a regional outlook. He welcomes the evolution of "new and *systematic patterns* of relationship among several Southeast Asian nations," and particularly the appearance of ASEAN, "the first *general, indigenous,* and politically *neutral* effort in Southeast Asian regional cooperation." He believes that in time ASEAN will provide a framework for a significant degree of defense collaboration among the member states. Certainly SEATO can never provide such a framework.

Although there can be no doubt about the growing interest in regional cooperation among some of the states of Southeast Asia, it is doubtful that this cooperation has gone as far as Gordon seems to think, and even more doubtful that it will embrace really "meaningful defense cooperation," as he foresees. Gordon seems to be gratified that the United States has been urging Japan to play a greater role in Southeast Asia. Unquestionably Japan is interested, but some deep-seated reservations still exist among the Japanese regarding their future role, and some equally deep-seated

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inhibitions and suspicions color the view of Southeast Asians, whose memories of Japanese occupation and exploitation are in some cases still keen. In such a delicate developing situation among Asians, the United States would be well advised to be discreet in its support of Japan.

Few other themes are developed in any detail. The focus is clearly on Southeast Asia, and on regionalism in that area. Even in this area little attention is given to developments other than evolving regional cooperation and the U.S. interest in promoting it. This may explain the scanty references to Viet Nam, which at the moment is the central concern of the United States in that part of the world. In a sense, like Edwin O. Reischauer's recent book, *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia,* this volume is primarily concerned with the situation in Asia and U.S. policy in Asia "beyond Vietnam." Reischauer takes much more note than Gordon of China and Japan, and much less of Southeast Asia. Both skim over Viet Nam and ignore the importance of India and Pakistan in the new Asia. Gordon, for example, refers only to India's role in Southeast Asia, which he dismisses as "negligible, and in some instances negative." This is a casual way to describe a complex relationship, especially in light of recent evidences of a new Indian interest in the region, to which no reference whatsoever is made.

In many ways this is a deceptively simple book, if only because it is clear, readable and concise. In reality, however, it is a highly sophisticated analysis. It does not attempt to provide the reader with essential background information and interpretation either about the evolving scene in Asia or about the Asian policy of the United States, which Gordon believes has been characterized by "remarkable constancy" but by "inconstant explanations." Nevertheless, it is the kind of book which can be read with profit by any intelligent citizen, and which all who are involved with present or future American policies in Asia should read with particular care.

For the casual reader the title may be highly misleading. Gordon does not in fact advocate "disengagement in Asia." "What is proposed," as he clearly points out, "is not a policy of American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, but a posture of declining direct American involvement in the defense and security of the region." This will help, in his judgment, to develop "an ordered concept of the priorities of national interest," which he believes has been lacking in the past. It is badly needed if the United States is to avoid more Viet Nams and prepare itself adequately for its new role in the changing Asian scene, a role more in keeping with its true interests and with Asian realities.

Menon's Images and India's Policies*

by Richard L. Siegel

McGill University professor Michael Brecher's presentation of

**India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World.* By Michael Brecher. New York: Praeger, 1968. 390 pp. $10.00.

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the results of a series of talks with Krishna Menon offers students of South Asia, and of international politics, an excellent alternative to a Menon autobiography. The reader is informed that no formal self-analysis is to be expected from the pen of the former Indian diplomat and Minister of Defence.

Each of four components of *India and World Politics* requires evaluation: first, interviewer Brecher's part in the published discussions with Menon; second, Menon's answers and discourses; third, Brecher's effort to summarize those answers and place them within the context of recent academic theory in the field of international politics; and, finally, Janice Gross Stein's formal quantitative content analysis of Menon's words. The latter two sections represent an effort to combine in the volume a unique blending of discourse and analysis.

Brecher leaves a strong imprint on all sections of this work. His areas of responsibility include the choice of topics and questions, the manner of interrogation, and the depth of the probes. In addition, by offering his own views to the reader and occasionally challenging the main subject's views, he goes beyond the ordinary role of the interviewer. From the viewpoint of the needs of political analysis, his interventions are usually welcome ones. Menon, not unlike many personages in his position, requires some provocation and argument to elaborate his ideas in sharpest focus. Having authored major works concerning Jawaharlal Nehru and Indian political succession, Brecher is able to expose inconsistencies in Menon's views.

Menon's replies make clear that neither his personality nor his world view was greatly altered by his sudden separation from the highest councils of government in 1962. Brecher ably captures the quintessential Menon self-view that is based on supreme self-confidence (though he tells Brecher of some sense of inferiority to Nehru) and enormous pride in his private and public diplomatic skills and accomplishments. Although he is here somewhat more humble and less demagogic and iconoclastic than at times of previous exposure, he has retained his fiery and self-righteous personality.

Menon's strict sense of propriety concerning the divulgence of official business severely limits the amount of new information to be found in his responses. Among the more interesting facts or claims presented: (1) Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not ask for his resignation in 1962; (2) leaving the question of timing at least in part to Menon, Nehru did not know when the invasion of Goa had begun; and (3) Washington propagandized the rumored Menon deal with conservative Morarji Desai in 1964 in order to damage the political careers of both men.

The validity of the first contention probably depends upon what is meant by asking for a resignation. In the given circumstances of major military defeat, no formal request to the Defence official was really necessary. The second point challenges the general assumption that Nehru was always in control

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of Indian foreign policy. However, Menon notes that his own area of independence extended only to the question of timing and not to the choice of whether to invade. Even in regard to this grant of discretion, he acknowledges that Nehru had earlier suspended the invasion.

The question of Washington's preferences among National Congress factions and personalities is quite relevant to India's present situation. At the time this is written Indira Gandhi is locked in an intense struggle with "The Syndicate" and India's political future is less predictable than at any time since independence. If Washington was less than enthusiastic about Desai in 1964, does that view reflect on him personally or on the fact that he was then (and again in 1966) opposed by "The Syndicate?" If the stability represented by the Congress chieftains is the bedrock of American preference, Washington's subtle influence in India will presumably be used in their support. Of course, Washington would prefer a mutual return from the precipice of National Congress bifurcation.

The lack of revealing new information can partially be attributed to the nature of the interviews, particularly Menon's spontaneous answering without reference to notes or files. However, the substance of the interviews was primarily influenced by Brecher's decision to emphasize Menon's "image" of his political environment. To those who seek major new details or thoughts about Menon's associates and Indian policy this book may turn out to be a lost opportunity.

The work must stand or fall as a contribution to political science largely on Brecher's analysis of "Krishna Menon's View of the World." This analysis relates Menon's views to a tripartite systems conception of international politics. References to "global," "subordinate" and "bilateral" systems and subsystems (called "zones of interaction") provide the author with both a sound organizational technique and an instrument for discovering meaningful patterns and variations in the Indian statesman's approaches. The McGill professor is one of the few scholars to apply systems concepts to concrete situations. A broader application is promised in Brecher's forthcoming study of Indian and Israeli foreign policy.

The discussion of Menon's global view accurately defines the ex-Congress politician as a fervidly nationalistic, intensely anti-American noncommunist. However, the analyst moves into debatable ground when he asserts that Menon's "intense emotional antipathy" and "intellectual disdain" for the United States led to irrational behavior and deficient decisions in the policy areas he most influenced. Although Menon's antipathy toward Washington is more than adequately documented, the negative consequences of that adverse attitude are not. For example, Brecher cites Menon's contribution to making Indian nonalignment unpopular in Washington as evidence of irrational and deficient activity. Yet, the Indian diplomat's one-sided criticism of Washington, even as it furthered the de-

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velopment of Indian leadership of the Afro-Asian and nonaligned camps, failed to impede major improvement in Indo-American economic and political relations between 1956 and 1962. Few diplomats representing so little military power ever equaled Menon's influence or his contribution to numerous mediation efforts.

Brecher contends that Menon regards Asian problems as "mere extensions" of global problems, not related to any conception of a South Asian "subordinate state system." He suggests that the lack of a regional view by Menon and the Indian government as a whole contributed to major policy errors concerning regional diplomacy and defense. However, Brecher acknowledges that New Delhi's comparative noninvolvement in its own region coincided with a "rational and successful" global policy. The question needs to be raised whether a more active Asian policy would have brought India into earlier conflict with Peking and have impeded the development of "bi-alignment" with Moscow and Washington. New Delhi lost a degree of leadership in Afro-Asia after 1962 as much because of its assumption of a role as China's antagonist as from military defeat. On the other hand, Brecher is correct in his view that India has paid a high price for its policy failures in Asia.

The discussion of local bilateral relations focuses on Pakistan and China. Menon's antipathy toward Pakistan and his position regarding Kashmir, reeking inflexibility and chauvinism, contrasts sharply with the tone of even his post-1962 stance toward China. One can't help suspecting that a demagogic motivation influenced his attitude toward Rawalpindi. However, Menon's moderate positions on China, less than popular even in some communist circles, are certainly not those of a demagogue. Brecher notes that despite his strong emotions Menon expresses willingness to settle both disputes on a practical basis reflecting something close to the status quo on Kashmir, and less than complete Chinese withdrawal in the two main regions of Peking's 1962 advance into disputed territory. The Indian government has recently indicated that it is moving toward Menon's position in relation to China.

Brecher concludes with a view of foreign policy analysis which should stir considerable debate among students of foreign policy. His central contention is, "Policy choices flow inexorably from the composite images of the decision-making elite, modified only by the counter-images of competing elites within the political system." Elite images are presented as the foundational data enabling the social scientist to move toward prediction of foreign policy.

The problem raised by Brecher is central to the development of behavioralistic interpretations of foreign policy formulation. Avant-garde theorists have suggested that a large number of factors have a causal or influential effect on the determination of foreign policy outputs. Yet Brecher presents perception as an all-important factor.

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Snyder, Bruck and Sapin sought to overcome this problem by proposing that although it is up to the decision-maker to develop a "range of alternative projects," these are inherently limited by such varied elements as the availability of information and resources, the nature of the situation, and the organizational system in which the decision-maker operates.[1] Of course, each of these factors may be "perceived"; but do policy choices "flow inexorably" from the perception or the situation that is perceived? We should hesitate to submerge each of the "limiting factors" under the image-perception intervening variable.

Assuming that Menon had become Prime Minister in 1964, he could have turned only to Washington for massive food aid on bearable terms when drought and famine visited India between 1965 and 1967. His particular image structure would probably have produced little more than symbolic and verbal policy variations from those actually pursued under Shastri and Indira Gandhi. Elite images can only marginally alter the largely unpleasant realities that offer any Indian decision-maker narrow choices in basic foreign policy.

Brecher's impressions are generally strongly supported by Janice Gross Stein's capable quantitative analysis of Menon's references to actors, symbols, systems, values, strategies and issues. For example, Brecher's reference to Menon's lack of an Asian regional conception is reinforced by Stein's determination that Menon referred to Africa much more often than to Asia in the course of the interviews. Stein opens new ground when discussing such aspects of Menon's thinking as his minimal concern with strategy, the large number of objects toward which he expresses hostility, and the predominantly moderate character of his policy preferences.

In tandem, Brecher and Stein provide a commendably able and wide-ranging analysis of the views of one highly influential man of the decolonization era. The main shortcoming is their effort to broaden unduly the implications of their findings.

[1]Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, editors, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 92.

Moscow and the Middle East*

by Alvin J. Cottrell

Professor Walter Laqueur, a prolific writer on communist and Middle East affairs, has given us another well-balanced and objective book, *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1958-1968.* In large measure, this is an updating of his previous work, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East,* published in 1959. Before that he wrote his classic study, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (1956). Currently the Director of the Institute of Contemporary History (Wiener Library) in London, he also commutes between England and the United States to con-

**The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1958-1968.* By Walter Laqueur. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 360 pp. $7.95.

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duct a course at Brandeis University.

The book under review is a relatively short study of 195 pages, plus a bibliography and over 140 pages of important documents.

In Laqueur's view, the Soviets have inherited a great many problems in the Middle East thanks to their deep political, military and economic involvement in Egypt and Syria. Until recently the Soviet Union had no past in that area; only the West had a past, and hence only the West was the target for Arab criticism and hostility. But particularly since the June 1967 war the Soviets have begun to encounter increasing difficulties with their Arab clients. It is correct to say that they, too, are beginning to acquire a past in the Middle East—a point brought out quite imaginatively by the author.

Laqueur is one of a small group of scholars and commentators on the Middle East—others are Bernard Lewis of the University of London and Robert Hunter of the Institute for Strategic Studies — who believe that the Soviet Union has *not* won a great victory in the Middle East as a result of its prominent presence, particularly in Egypt, since the June 1967 war. This view runs counter to the thinking of many, such as General Sir John Bagot Glubb, former head of the Arab Legion, who is convinced that the Soviets actually provoked the June 1967 war in order to create the opportunity to gain greater control over Egyptian policy. If Glubb is correct, then the Soviet leaders displayed ineptitude in crisis management. It is more than likely, however, that this is not an accurate description of the Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli dispute leading up to the fighting.

On the present Soviet position in the Middle East, Laqueur writes: "When the Western powers were the dominating force in the Middle East, they had the monopoly of committing mistakes, whereas the Soviet Union, not being involved in Middle East affairs, enjoyed a great deal of prestige precisely because of its apparent position as a dispassionate, seemingly remote onlooker without any specific interests in the area. But as it became involved in Middle East politics, it had to make choices: it could no longer please everyone, and the aura of disinterested altruism began to disappear. . . .

"The establishment of client states had a logic and a momentum of its own. . . . The Arab defeat in 1967 thus adversely affected Soviet prestige. The re-equipment of the Arab armies became necessary, regardless of cost, and has thus involved Soviet prestige even more than in the past. Yet another Arab defeat by Israel must appear well-nigh intolerable in Soviet eyes, but since it has no full control over the armies of the UAR and Syria, and since its capacity to intervene in a war is probably still limited, the Soviet position is not without hazards." (pp. 183-184.)

Laqueur also points up another dilemma for the Soviets. While in many respects the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean must be considered a growing political asset, at the same time it

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poses serious problems in crisis management for the Soviet leadership. "The build-up of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet entails similar problems . . . it enhances the risks: in the event of a conflict Soviet policymakers face the choice of backing down or of escalating a local conflict into a much wider confrontation." (p. 184.)

As Laqueur suggests, there is some question whether the Soviets could afford to let their clients in the Middle East go down to defeat again at the hands of Israel. They could not "sit on their hands" and watch another Egyptian collapse without great humiliation and loss of face. While they were able to sit by passively when they were not present in the Mediterranean and not so deeply involved militarily in the UAR, their large naval presence in the Mediterranean now appears to rule out any excuses for failing to act.

This aspect of the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East should be given some consideration; there are far too many writings by commentators, scholars and pundits on world affairs that portray Soviet "successes" in the area without adequately weighing some of the wider implications of Soviet involvement. Such writings tend to present a kind of "wave of the future" image of the USSR which furthers the Soviet objective of convincing Middle East nations—particularly the Northern Tier countries, Turkey and Iran—that the Soviet Union will eventually be the dominant power in the region. The Kremlin has already had some success with Turkey and Iran.

These two important nations, despite their long and abrasive experience with Soviet external activism (Iran in the case of Azerbaijan after World War II, and Turkey in the same period as a result of Soviet efforts to establish footholds in the Bosporus), have reached a détente of sorts with their erstwhile antagonist. This has been due in no small measure to the growing and ostensibly permanent Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and recent flag-showing visits into the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area. Laqueur appropriately devotes a sympathetic chapter to these two much-neglected Northern Tier countries, which have become increasingly hostile toward the United States. Turkey has become disgruntled mainly because of U.S. policy in the Cyprus dispute, while Iran was alienated by U.S. policy in the Pakistan-Indian conflict (the Shah was unable to give military assistance to Pakistan, and Washington stopped shipment of military equipment to both combatants).

Although the importance of the two countries has been overshadowed by the Arab-Israeli conflict, they obviously loom large in overall Soviet policy in the Middle East. Indeed, it can be argued that Turkey and Iran, standing geographically athwart the Kremlin's direct route to its Arab client states to the south, are the key to Soviet strategy in the area. For example, the Soviets have tended to favor Turkey's position in the Cyprus crisis, to the consternation and dismay of the large Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL), and they

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have supplied arms to Iran despite the fact that their leading client, Egypt, is the Shah's bitter enemy. At present, both nations appear to be reinsuring themselves against the possibility that the USSR may one day replace the United States as the dominant power in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. They are concerned about a U.S. pullback around the globe in the wake of the intense criticism over Viet Nam.

In the chapter, "Russia, Zionism, Israel," Laqueur shows the large element of cynicism in Soviet policy vis-à-vis Israel by pointing out that in choosing sides between the Arabs and Israel the Soviets quite simply chose the "bigger battalions." "What in the last resort prevented a rapprochement between Moscow and Jerusalem was not anti-Semitism, but the simple fact that Israel was small. Size has always been of great significance in shaping Soviet attitudes toward other countries; more than once this has been the source of political mistakes." (p. 183.)

In his discussion of oil, the author focuses attention on another area, the Persian Gulf, which until recently has been almost completely obscured by the Arab-Israeli conflict. The impending British withdrawal of forces from the Persian Gulf, part of Prime Minister Wilson's decision to withdraw all British forces east of Suez by 1971, will open the doors of the region to serious conflict — conceivably as volatile as the Arab-Israeli dispute is today. Laqueur correctly points out that the many unresolved claims in that region advanced by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (to mention only the larger Gulf nations involved[1]), may lead to war once British forces have been withdrawn. Already "national liberation" forces have been formed in Saudi Arabia with the objective of overthrowing the sheikdoms. And there are reports that the Shah and King Feisal have reached a clandestine agreement on spheres of influence in the Gulf—King Feisal recognizing Bahrain as falling under the Shah's sphere of influence, in return for the Iranian ruler's agreement that Qatar and the smaller Trucial sheikdoms would be within the Saudi sphere of influence.[2] Laqueur's book would be valuable if it did nothing else but remind us that, in addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, a number of other potentially explosive conflicts remain unsettled, such as the Yemen, the conflict over south Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and the question of Cyprus which, although presently dormant, could flare up again.

Laqueur's views on the Arab-Israeli problem are somewhat muted because he sticks to his objective of discussing Soviet foreign and military policy in the Middle East. Thus, he does not indicate whether he disagrees with recent official U.S. positions which suggest

[1]For example, there is Iran's claim to Bahrain, Iraq's claim to Kuwait (forestalled in 1961 by British military intervention), and Saudi Arabia's claim to the Buraimi Oasis (partly in Abu Dhabi and partly in Muscat and Oman). In addition, there is the Iranian-Iraqi dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab, a body of water at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

[2]Ronald Payne, *The Daily Telegraph* (London), November 30, 1969.

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a declaratory — if not an operational or substantive — shift away from what has always been assumed to be the pro-Israel policy of the United States.

On the subject of Israel and Zionism, he makes this observation: "Zionism had two basic aims: to restore dignity to the Jewish people and to give it security. It has succeeded in the first part of its program, but security is as far away as ever. Immigration remains the cardinal problem, but a mass influx of American or Soviet Jewry, the two great remaining reservoirs, is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. That being so, the historical mission of Zionism has come to an end and the state of Israel will have to come to terms with its new function, not on the basis of some ultimate goal, but in its present shape and prospects." (pp. 192-193.)

Laqueur casts considerable doubt on the idea held in many quarters that the Soviet Union can successfully replace Western hegemony in the Middle East. He does this by an imaginative analysis of the many obstacles lying in the path of Soviet domination. The greater threat is that the Soviet Union—through her naval presence in the Mediterranean, and in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area if the Suez Canal is reopened — will heavily influence the political orientation and behavior of the countries in that region, much as she affects Finland in the Baltic. It may be argued that the Middle East is of declining strategic importance to the West, especially in its historic role as a communications link between Europe and Asia: Britain is withdrawing her military forces east of Suez by 1971, and the United States has always met her commitment to Asia via the Pacific. It is, however, of growing importance to the Soviet Union, whose efforts to act as a great power require her to break out from her so-called encirclement.

USIA: Information or Propaganda Agency?*

by Reuben S. Nathan

While reading John W. Henderson's *The United States Information Agency* and Robert E. Elder's *The Information Machine* for the purpose of reviewing them in these columns, I received a letter from a young lady who lives on a small island in the Aegean Sea. In the past she had normally been inclined to trust my political judgment; now she had her doubts. How can you continue to support an administration, she asked, that insists on the evil of an anti-ballistic-missile system and tries to provoke another war in Korea? My reply was: Where do you get the kind of information that makes you feel the way you do? Her answer: I rarely have a chance to read newspapers here, but I do listen to the Voice of America.

This incident may help to explain why the image the United States presents to the world is no

**The United States Information Agency.* By John W. Henderson. New York: Praeger, 1969. 324 pp. $6.95.
The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy. By Robert E. Elder. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. 356 pp. $10.00.

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better than it is. When Wendell Wilkie returned from his flight around the world in 1942, he called the existence of a great "Reservoir of Good Will" for America "the biggest political fact of our time." He spoke of general recognition that this country has "no sinister designs." Why has this reservoir run dry? Why are we suddenly suspect?

There are, apparently, many reasons. The United States is rich, powerful and — although many abroad and at home like to forget about its unprecedented foreign aid programs—benevolent. Few people truly like benevolent rich uncles. One seeks protection but resents the protector. The United States has, of course, committed its share of blunders. We are involved in a war in Viet Nam. We have a race problem. We are beset by internal violence. Domestic criticism runs rampant. Emotionally and intellectually retarded "revolutionists," incapable of grasping that revolutionary action in a nonrevolutionary situation is *ipso facto* counterproductive, supply the cues to critics abroad.

Still and all, is there one nation that has no troubles, does not blunder? What of the blunders inspired by less good will than ours? What about the rape of Czechoslovakia, censorship in the Soviet Union, war in Nigeria, religious troubles in Ulster, race problems in England, the murderous tyranny in China, riots and social tensions in France, anti-Semitism in Poland, discrimination in India, conflict in the Middle East? The list is endless.

Perhaps it is more difficult to understand the United States than most other countries. People abroad keep having trouble trying to comprehend the nature of a political system based on the interplay of opposing nonideological parties, both of which run the gamut from Right to Left (if these are still meaningful terms). Is it possible to explain it by piling fact upon fact and trusting that somehow, miraculously, the "objective truth" will emerge on top?

Take the election of November 5, 1968 and the multitude of facts, all highly reportable and reported, which encumbered the truth. They added up to a nation tottering on the edge of an abyss—race poised against race — youth rebelling against intellectually and materially corrupt politicians—riots and assassinations — police overreacting against idealists who pelt them with garbage—an imperialist establishment, fronting for oil and napalm interests, determined to hang on by its teeth and employing dirty tricks to delay the wave of the future—secret deals with segregationists.

The party conventions which, the pundits agreed, so horribly reflected the nation's sickness and immaturity, produced two candidates neither one of whom could have been considered a catastrophe by even his most determined detractors. The election was a miracle of political sophistication. A pragmatist Republican won by a small plurality. Nobody contested his election. His predecessor, his party defeated, arranged for a smooth, amicable succession. But a substantial percentage of the citizens who

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voted for the Republican decided to buy reinsurance. They limited the potential of change by keeping the Congress Democratic. They wanted to make sure of a balance, so they split their tickets—which is not a simple operation and often involves a conflict of conscience; there are habits, traditions, loyalties to be overcome. The third-party candidate, who had all the facile slogans and greater "savvy" than the other two combined, was soundly trounced. Did this side of the picture show through the sensationalism?

How is the world to know what the truth is? From the facts the press and TV consider newsworthy because they are departures from the norm? How can it judge the significance of facts that matter against the deluge of colorful news items drowning them out?

These are questions to which neither Henderson's nor Elder's books on the United States Information Agency provide the answers. Both works are, each in its way, excellent and perceptive—Henderson's perhaps more elegant as becomes the writing of a former Foreign Service Officer; Elder's more thorough, chock-full of details. Both authors describe an incredibly complicated organization in the throes of constant reorganization. Both have no doubt that it is well administered and staffed by brilliant and devoted men—conclusions that may well be correct but that hardly come as a surprise since they reflect the opinions and statements of the USIA staff itself. The impression conveyed is that if there is anything wrong with USIA, it can easily be cured by the addition of a few professionals in this or that section and by less interference with the Information Specialists who alone seem to know what the truth is. Against interference by those who look on USIA as an instrumentality of statecraft, USIA tradition says: we speak for the people, not the government; we are the voice of America, not of the administration. That is a lovely position to be in if one can get away with it, and USIA apparently can. Actually the people have no way of controlling USIA's output. As both authors emphasize, USIA is severely restricted in communicating with the people of America, so they can hardly know what USIA tells the world in their name.

Of course, USIA tells the truth. The news with which it is concerned, and which it confuses with the truth, may be good or bad. If it is bad, that is good because it contributes to a better understanding of democracy and freedom. To broadcast bad news to the world has the further advantage of adding credibility to USIA's output. Credibility for what?

What USIA doctrine appears to disregard is that USIA does not operate in a vacuum. Our detractors flood the world with information on everything that is wrong with us. It should be USIA's business to secure a balance, to put facts in perspective, to clarify that we are both Americans and humans and that our human fallibility is greatly alleviated by fundamental American values which differ from those of most other political systems because they are closer to the

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highest aspirations of man everywhere.

The case of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, for instance, was a human tragedy but an American triumph. It is not significant that a country has its substandard rednecks and female hyenas, for all countries have them. It *is* significant that this country, unprecedented in history and unparalleled in the world, mobilized its armed forces to secure the constitutional rights of a handful of little children. The obsession with news buries the one significant story under an avalanche of essentially insignificant items, already headlined all over the world.

It is that obsession which confused the young lady in Greece. An official policy statement adds up to one item; in the best of cases it is explained by a commentary. Criticism of the administration's position produces scores of stories that collectively overshadow the reasoning on which the nation's policy is based. Who cares how much of that criticism is incompetent? It is there, like the Himalayas. Ergo, it must be reported.

The point is that "information," as USIA interprets it, is not an acceptable substitute for propaganda as an instrument of statecraft; nor is it "objective truth." Americans, for example, have access to more or less the same information. They read the same syndicated reports and columns, watch the same network TV news shows. But they draw different, often diametrically opposed, conclusions from that information. Half of them vote Republican, half Democratic. The business of propaganda, on the other hand, is to rally people to your side, and to commit them, if possible passionately, to the purposes your country tries to achieve.

The "objective truth" about a country emerges from the millions of facts each and every day brings forth. These facts make up the normal life and are not "copy" for either editors or propagandists. "Information" is composed of events that somebody considers newsworthy and turns into news. The vast majority of news is concerned with the abnormal. This means, in the first place, that news does not cover the whole truth but only part of it—and generally the part that does not explain the true nature of a country. It means, secondly, that the decision on what is newsworthy is by its very nature subjective. The reporter, the news services, the newspapers, the networks decide which news is "fit to print," and that is the end of the objective truth right then and there.

Thus, selected news, not some mythical objective truth, is what serves as the basis on which USIA operates. Translate the result into a newscast. The Information Specialist may have fifteen minutes to play with. That is just enough time to use a handful of items subjectively culled from millions of facts. They will, of course, be supplemented by commentaries and features providing a few additional insights. And they will, at least in principle, reflect policy guidelines suggesting emphasis on one and de-emphasis of another point. However, the Information Specialist, in

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making his choice, is subject to some of the peculiar strictures to which American propaganda (if that's the correct word) has fallen victim. He must establish credibility. To do so, he includes several items which reflect unfavorably on the United States (look, how honest we are!), and several others that credit governments antagonistic to the United States with positive achievements (how fair we are!). It is hardly necessary to spell out the result.

This leads us to the fundamental question. What is the point USIA is trying to make? Even after reading Henderson and Elder on the subject, we do not really know. It is not the fault of the authors. They tell the story of the unending controversy over USIA's purpose in great detail. There are half a dozen definitions, all of them vague generalities: the full and fair picture; better understanding; mutual understanding; campaign of truth (this one begging all questions); the American story. . . . For a fleeting moment under President Kennedy, while Edward R. Murrow directed the agency, the idea was more concrete. Kennedy saw USIA as an instrumentality of policy, of political action, an agency designed to influence public attitudes in favor of U.S. policy. But the Kennedy-Murrow vision yielded all too soon to the fallacies of traditional USIA concepts so deeply ingrained in the staff: information for the sake of information as we see it. When Carl T. Rowan tried to revive the Kennedy-Murrow concept, he encountered determined resistance, even resignations, and lost.

Reading about the U.S. information program makes one feel like Alice in Wonderland. The image of the United States is a major factor in world affairs. If the people of a country admire and respect another country, their government will have difficulty following policies adverse to that country. Should it then not be obvious what USIA's business is? It cannot be in business to issue a glorified global newspaper. It must be in business to persuade its audiences of the incontrovertible truth: as fallible as we are, the 200 million American people, through their government, are trying to do what they can to create the kind of world for which all mankind yearns.

Whatever the correct answer to the controversy about USIA's legitimate objective, can there be much doubt, in view of today's harsh realities, that it has not been very effective in advancing U.S. interests? Henderson and Elder, reflecting USIA's own position on the question, disagree with me. They offer us the same old chestnut USIA has always used in rebutting criticism: look at how many of our libraries abroad have been sacked and burned! Is that not proof that at least our enemies think highly of our effectiveness? One would wish that this transparently false argument could one day be laid to rest. The simple fact is that the libraries are a highly visible symbol of the United States and often have more inviting plate glass windows than the Embassy.

Then we are told of Viet Cong

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warnings against dangerous U.S. propaganda. But these warnings are, in the first place, designed to disguise the fact that Viet Cong morale has been slipping: the enemy does not care to admit that the slippage is due to U.S. firepower, fatigue, illness, and the increasing alienation of a population on which the VC depend for support but which has begun to lay the blame for its insecurity on VC infiltration into its villages. Second, most of the effective psychological operations in Viet Nam are conducted by the U.S. Army.

USIA does have a legitimate complaint: How can the agency be as effective as it should be if it is not in on the political takeoffs, only at the crash landings? Why is its advice not solicited and considered as decisions are made that affect the climate of public opinion with which it must later contend? Both authors deal with this problem at length. There can be no question that most of the top-level decisions made in the U.S. government are reached without full consideration of decisively important psychological implications. But this fact cuts both ways. Individuals tend to take advice only from people whose accomplishments they respect. If we examine the qualifications of USIA's changing top echelons over the years, did they—do they—perform so as to inspire confidence in their judgment of political and psychological affairs? Granted, there may have been a few exceptions, such as Edward R. Murrow. Murrow was listened to; his advice was taken seriously.

Henderson's and Elder's books commend themselves to students of government who are interested in finding out how the United States handles or mishandles its propaganda efforts. But they hardly scratch the surface of a field so vital to this country's future. They are also given, on occasion, to misleading reasoning. It may be true, for instance, that USIA by itself is only third in broadcasting capabilities—behind the Soviet Union and Red China. But USIA is not alone. If we add the capabilities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, not to mention the activities of other agencies, the United States may well be first.

Finally, anyone who was ever part of JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) in Viet Nam would hardly recognize it from the authors' descriptions. JUSPAO is a veritable battleground on which the information concepts of USIA and the psychological operations concepts of the Army clash. One wishes that Henderson and Elder had discussed JUSPAO not only with USIA personnel but also with some of the military officers who served there as Chiefs of Planning (of whom this writer was the first). The result might have been to temper the optimism which colors the views of both authors.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Agents of Change: Professionals in Developing Countries. Edited by Guy Benveniste and Warren F. Ilchman. New York: Praeger, 1969. 252 pp. $13.50. Delivered at an international conference held at Berkeley in 1968, the papers in this book provide an excellent review of the problems created by a lack of expertise in developing countries. Some attempt has been made to connect the theory of development and case study experience.

Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. (Third, revised edition.) By Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Ann Patricia Simons. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 732 pp. $22.00. Taking account of changes in the UN since the writing of the second edition of their work in 1949, the authors demonstrate, article by article, how alterations have been made in the original Charter.

The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume I: Trends and Patterns. Edited by Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 618 pp. $15.00. In this first volume of a projected five-volume series, the editors focus on aspects of the international environment that are beginning to achieve prominence, such as challenges to the historically evolved international legal order, constitutional structures and processes, collective security, participation of new states in the international system, and prospects for regionalism and regional security arrangements.

Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences. Edited by Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif. Chicago: Aldine, 1968. 360 pp. $9.75. A collection of original papers which seek to demonstrate effective means of achieving interdisciplinary coordination in studying human behavior and delineating promising areas for cooperative research. The writers emphasize the importance of such specific research areas as group interaction, political attitudes, and intergroup relations in providing the basis for interdisciplinary collaboration to produce valid formulations of theory.

Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions. By Jorge Castaneda. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 243 pp. $10.00. In an effort to define as far as possible the legal effects of UN resolutions, the author finds that in addition to the typical "recommendation"—implying no legal obligation on the member—there can be identified at least six categories of nonrecommendatory resolutions that produce true juridical effects against which members have no legal recourse.

McLuhan: Pro & Con. Edited by Raymond Rosenthal. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. 308 pp. $1.45 (paper). A collection of writings by adversaries and sup-

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porters of the Prophet of Media. The list includes Hugh Kenner, Dwight Macdonald, John Simon, John M. Culkin and Richard Kostelanetz.

The Multinational Corporation in the World Economy. Edited by Sidney E. Rolfe and Walter Damm. New York: Praeger, 1970. 169 pp. $10.00. This important volume is a summary of a conference on "Direct Investment in the Atlantic Area." Unlike other works on the subject, it gives full treatment to European direct investment in the United States. The book will be a standard work for anyone interested in multinational corporations as they operate in the United States and Western Europe.

Neutralization and World Politics. By Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran R. Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 195 pp. $7.50 ($1.95, paper). A tentative examination of the concept of neutralization, of its potential utility as a means of settling conflicts in Southeast Asia, such as Viet Nam. The authors conclude that neutralization, as a flexible instrument of statecraft, has limited usefulness in removing minor states from destructive regional and global competition.

Peace on the March: Transnational Participation. By Robert C. Angell. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 205 pp. $2.45 (paper). An exploration of the possibility that the threat of nuclear war and the increase in internation contacts may have initiated a cumulative process leading to world peace. In addition to noting a decline in the importance of ideology in international affairs, the author stresses the significance of nongovernmental contacts and relationships as a means of ultimately forcing accommodation among national societies and the peaceful solution of international problems.

Political Analysis & Public Policy: An Introduction to Political Science. By Joyce M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. 685 pp. n.p. Intended as a new approach to acquaint students with political problems and their solutions, this volume is divided into two major sections, analytical and normative, and is based on recent information derived from findings in such areas as systems analysis, public finance, welfare economics, and decision and conflict theory. Each chapter includes several problems or questions for study and analysis as well as a bibliography.

Political Inquiry: The Nature and Uses of Survey Research. By Herbert McClosky. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 163 pp. $2.95 (paper). This book, made up of three previously published articles, seeks to evaluate the contributions of survey research to political inquiry, the assumptions underlying its use in political science, and the reasons for and against its use. The last two chapters, one on foreign policy attitudes and the other on the social-psychological aspects of anomic belief and alienation, illustrate the use of survey methods in investigating problems which previously might not have been amenable to study.

The Politics of the Coup d'Etat. Edited by William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 153 pp. $2.45 (paper). Five case studies of abortive and successful coups in Ecuador in 1963, Indonesia in 1965, Iraq in 1958 and 1963, Ghana in 1966, and Bulgaria in 1965.

Politics of Social Research. By Ralph L. Beals. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. 228 pp. $6.95. A timely assessment of a matter important to all social scientists, namely, the appropriate behavior for those conducting government-sponsored research. After discussing the general kinds of problems encountered in such research, the author places them in historical and ideological perspective and examines different views of the relationship between social scientists and gov-

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ernment and the meanings and uses of various kinds of research. His concluding chapter contains solutions and guidelines for these problems.

Public Policymaking Reexamined. By Yehezkel Dror. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968. 370 pp. $8.75. Directed to political scientists as well as public officials, this book is concerned with closing the gap between the way policy is actually made and the more intelligent way policies can be made when officials have access to available knowledge. Based on his optimal model, the author presents detailed proposals for improvement in public policymaking.

The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902. By C. J. Lowe. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 417 pp. $7.95. An analysis of an ambivalent era—when Britain, superficially at the peak of her territorial, economic and political power, was already beginning to manifest signs of eventual decline. Individual chapters deal with the Eastern Question, 1878-1882, the Egyptian "lever," the defense of India, the Mediterranean alliance, the partition of East Africa, 1885-1891, the Franco-Russian alliance, 1888-1892, Liberal foreign policy, 1892-1895, the Near East and Africa, and the Far East.

Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence. By E. V. Walter. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 385 pp. $8.50. In an effort to discover why tyrranical rulers choose to rule by violence and fear, the author has focused upon evidence of terrorism in certain primitive African societies. From his analysis, he challenges the idea that systems of terror are related only to advanced societies. It is his belief that a regime of terror is instituted to deal with political resistance and with crises of social integration.

The World Beyond the Charter. By C. Wilfred Jenks. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 199 pp. $6.50. An analysis of four stages of international peacekeeping by the Principal Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Office. He traces the development of peacekeeping efforts before World War I, under the League of Nations covenant, and under the UN Charter, and looks to the future "beyond the Charter." He attempts "to set in historical perspective some of the dilemmas which we must now resolve in order to carry a stage further the quest for a just peace," and to describe how "the functions and structure of world organization have developed and matured in the last fifty years. . . ."

The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1969. New York: Praeger, for the London Institute of World Affairs, 1969. 352 pp. $12.50. A useful collection of eleven articles on current topics—among them "The World Strategic Balance," by J. Erickson; "Belgium: Two Clashing Cultures," by E. R. C. Van Bogaert and P. Vermeylen, and "Restoring the Ecological Balance," by G. W. Dimbleby. Also included is a section of reviews on various topics pertaining to world affairs.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

In the Name of Science. (Revised edition.) By H. L. Nieburg. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. 429 pp. $2.95 (paper). A revised version of an analysis of the "Contract State," Professor Nieburg's name for the military-industrial complex.

Limited War and American Defense Policy: Building and Using Military Power in a World at War. (Second edition, revised.) By Seymour J. Deitchman. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 302 pp. $3.95 (paper). An analysis, from the point of view of defense planning, of the problems of limited wars, such as Korea and Viet Nam. The study seeks to answer the question of how best to build and use armed forces most effectively in limited encounters.

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Space: A New Direction for Mankind. By Edward B. Lindaman. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 158 pp. $4.95. Mr. Lindaman attempts to convey to a popular audience his own convictions on the worth of the space program. According to him, joint activities in space by the nations of the world contribute to world peace.

Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality. By Victor C. Ferkiss. New York: George Braziller, 1969. 336 pp. $7.95. A semi-philosophic treatise on man and his relationship to technology. The author, a professor of government, covers most of the current schools of commentary.

III. United States

America Since 1920. By Daniel Snowman. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 192 pp. $5.95. In this overview of the social, rather than political, developments of American history from Harding to Johnson, the author probes the constant tug-of-war between those forces making for social conflict and those making for social stability. Mr. Snowman is a Britisher, who did graduate work at Cornell University, and is now a lecturer at the University of Sussex and a producer of current affairs programs for the BBC.

The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution. By Richard B. Morris. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 238 pp. $6.95. The distinguished historian of the American Revolution traces the revolutionary movements and broad patterns of social reform during the past two centuries with a view to determining whether the American Revolution has meaning and message for our age. He concludes that it does, "not only for the enduring political and constitutional changes that it effected but also because the profound transformation of American society that it sparked has touched the lives of all peoples everywhere." He warns that as a powerful and affluent nation we must guard against becoming a counterrevolutionary force and hold onto one of the most precious values we gained from our revolutionary background—the tolerance of change.

Genesis of American Nationalism. By Richard W. Van Alstyne. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1970. 192 pp. $2.75 (paper). An exploration of the sources and evolution of American nationalism from colonial times to 1826. Professor Van Alstyne examines the contributions of the Romans and Elizabethans; the experiences of the New England colonists; the influence of Protestantism, the frontier, and the Revolution; and the writings of many early Americans, especially those of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and John Quincy Adams. "When I reached the year 1826 I stopped, persuaded that an American national creed by this time had been formulated and propagated. Very little if anything that could be labelled unique has been added to the American *Weltanschauung* since this year of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of national independence."

Roosevelt and World War II. By Robert A. Divine. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 107 pp. $5.95. In this collection of four essays, Professor Divine examines Roosevelt's foreign policy role before and during World War II. He views Roosevelt as essentially an isolationist who only gradually and reluctantly saw the necessity for U.S. entry into the war, and whose later attitudes toward the United Nations were based on political expediency rather than international concerns.

Selective Service and American Society. Edited by Roger W. Little. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969. 220 pp. $7.50. Beginning with the assumption that some system of conscription is still necessary to maintain effective military

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manpower levels, the contributors to this volume examine such topics as the recruiting services within the current system; the historical background of Selective Service; a social profile of local draft board members, using Wisconsin as a case study; decision-making in local boards; juvenile delinquency and military service; the Negro and the draft; military service and occupational mobility; and the prospects for, and implications of, change.

The United States and International Organization: The Changing Setting. Edited by Lawrence S. Finkelstein. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 216 pp. $12.50 ($2.95, paper). The essays in this volume, focusing on the problems U.S. policy-makers face today in regard to regional and international organizations, originally appeared in a special Summer 1969 issue of the journal, *International Organization*.

War, Peace, and the Presidency. By Henry Paolucci. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 241 pp. $6.95. Dr. Paolucci, Professor of Political Science at St. John's University and Conservative Party candidate for the U.S. Senate from New York in 1964, examines the issues of world peace and national security from the point of view of the American President's powers and responsibilities.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Belgium. By Vernon Mallinson. New York: Praeger (Nations of the Modern World Series), 1970. 240 pp. $7.00. The writer traces Belgian history and deals with present-day domestic problems such as the language dispute, education, and the impact of urbanization on society.

The Chasm Ahead. By Aurelio Peccei. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 297 pp. $7.50. A leading Italian businessman and economist discusses the problems and consequences of what he perceives to be a growing technological gap between the United States and Europe.

Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War. By Max Jakobson. New York: Praeger, 1969. 116 pp. $5.95. Written by Finland's Ambassador to the United Nations, this book seeks to explain Finland's particular brand of neutrality. After discussing Finnish foreign policy between the two world wars, the author focuses on relations with the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era. It is his conclusion that Finland's foreign policy fits no easy mold; rather, the country "has turned a mutual assistance pact with a great power into a prop for neutrality."

France and the Africans: 1944-1960. By Edward Mortimer. New York: Walker, 1969. 390 pp. $8.50. A detailed account by a London *Times* correspondent of French policy toward the African dependencies from the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 to the final stages of independence in 1960.

Italy's Austrian Heritage: 1919-1946. By Dennison I. Rusinow. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 423 pp. $10.50. A thorough, scholarly analysis of the impact of the addition of Venezia Giulia and Venezia Tridentina to Italy as a result of the 1918 peace settlement. It is the author's view that these districts damaged Italian parliamentary democracy and harmed Italy's interests abroad. He also examines how the new provinces shaped and inspired Italian fascism.

The Legislative Process in Great Britain. By S. A. Walkland. New York: Praeger, 1969. 109 pp. $5.00. A thoughtful study of the British legislative process which concludes that modern British legislation is almost exclusively a function of the Government; the traditional role of Parliament has been reduced to a

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merely supportive function. Parliament's former role is today played by powerful pressure groups which cooperate with the Government in formulating legislation.

Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action. Edited by Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. 378 pp. $1.25 (paper). Published in cooperation with the *New Left Review*, this collection of essays examines the nature of British student activism and its impact on international affairs.

The Tragedy of Nazi Germany. By Peter Phillips. New York: Praeger, 1969. 241 pp. $6.95. An Australian historian, survivor of three concentration camps, traces the cause of German atrocities in World War II to the impact of such factors as the Industrial Revolution, World War I, and several economic crises which dissolved German morality, civilization and culture. He finds parallels in present-day circumstances, under which morality appears to be breaking down.

V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

East Germany. By David Childs. New York: Praeger (Nations of the Modern World Series), 1969. 282 pp. $7.50. Dr. Childs discusses East Germany's political evolution, her party system, the constitution, the New Economic System, education, the place of women in society, the People's Army, the communist elite, and the building of the Berlin Wall. He also assesses East Germany's policy vis-à-vis her Warsaw Pact partners and her efforts to achieve recognition from Western nations.

Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government. By David T. Cattell. New York: Praeger, 1968. 171 pp. $12.50. The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, sketches Leningrad's history and traditions; describes the city's political structure and the role of the party; discusses planning agencies and efforts; treats briefly of such services as water and sewerage, air pollution, public transportation, militia, fire prevention, and culture and education; devotes considerable space to an examination of the city's housing program; and points out problems and prospects for the future.

The Other Germany: Europe's Emerging Nation Behind the Berlin Wall. By John Dornberg. New York: Doubleday, 1968. 370 pp. $6.95. An account of life in East Germany by *Newsweek's* Bureau Chief for Eastern Europe. Dornberg emphasizes the pride with which East Germans regard the economic and social accomplishments they have made since 1945 and judges that this factor is one of the reasons for the East Germans' lack of enthusiasm for reunification.

Siberia: The New Frontier. By George St. George. New York: David McKay, 1969. 374 pp. $7.95. An exciting and loving portrait of Siberia by an American citizen, born in Russia, raised in Siberia, currently living in Paris, who has been a gold miner, lumberjack, screenwriter and film producer. He writes of Siberia as a land of great promise, hydroelectric plants, overnight cities, productive farms, huge mineral deposits; a land where vast amounts of water flow uselessly northward while southern agriculture thirsts and continues to be wildly erratic; a land where 80 per cent of the doctors and half of the engineers are women.

Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967. By William Zimmerman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 336 pp. $9.50. Professor Zimmerman describes Soviet international relations perspectives during Khrushchev's rule and the three years following his removal from power in 1964. Basing his study on specialized Soviet international relations literature, as well as the

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policy statements of the Russian leaders, the author concludes that the Soviet perspectives of the world scene in the 1960's differ markedly from the traditional Bolshevik view of politics and correspond closely to the Western view of international reality.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968. Edited by Richard V. Allen. Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1969. 1165 pp. $25.00. This second in a series of yearbooks covers the calendar year 1967, draws upon hundreds of communist and noncommunist publications in many languages, and was researched and compiled by a staff of area specialists at the Hoover Institution and abroad. It provides a profile of individual communist parties, their domestic and international political activities, their policies and attitudes toward each other, and their concerted and separate responses to world events.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism. By Vincent Bakpetu Thompson. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 412 pp. $10.00. Thompson traces the development of the Pan-African movement from its genesis in slavery, imperialism and racism to the creation of early Pan-African organizations. His later chapters treat the conflicts between nationalism and Pan-Africanism in independent Africa.

The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962). Volume I. By John Marcum. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970. 380 pp. $12.50. In this first volume under the series title "M.I.T. Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution," absorbing the titles previously published under the series "M.I.T. Studies in International Communism," the author has presented an exhaustive study of the Portuguese African colony of Angola and the rebellion movement there between 1950 and 1962. He furnishes a detailed portrayal of the rebel organizations, their leaders, programs and rivalries, much of it based on his personal knowledge and acquaintance through meeting the rebel leaders at their exile bases in the Congo and Zambia. In a planned second volume he will treat the period between 1962 and 1968.

Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. By Eliezer Be'eri. New York: Praeger, 1970. 514 pp. $9.50. In this translation from the Hebrew, revised and shortened, Eliezer Be'eri covers in depth the role of the army officer by country and social typology. It is required reading for those who would understand the Arab Middle East.

Economic Development and Regional Cooperation: Kuwait. By Ragaei El Mallakh. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968. 265 pp. $7.75. Analyzing the Kuwaiti experience in the economics of rapid development and its implications for the Middle East, the author treats of the "economics of oil"; the government's policies for financing domestic development and planning for balanced growth; the motives, successes and shortcomings of regional economic cooperation; Kuwait's operations as a economic aid donor; and the problems and prospects for maintaining economic development and strengthening regional cooperation.

Libya. By John Wright. New York: Praeger (Nations of the Modern World Series), 1969. 304 pp. $7.50. Until recently one of the world's poorest nations, Libya has the promise of a more prosperous future because of oil revenues. In this study, the author presents a thorough account of Libya's past, including many interesting facts on the Italian conquest and occupation, and assesses her place in modern Middle East politics.

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Manpower Development in Africa. By Robert D. Loken. New York: Praeger, 1969. 152 pp. $12.50. In this examination of the planning and implementation of various African programs, Mr. Loken, who is Program Specialist, Middle East and Africa Division, The Ford Foundation, provides realistic guidelines for the designing and administration of manpower development projects in all developing countries. He explores the practical implications of changes now being effected in such areas as education, agriculture and productivity improvement in many African countries, and treats Ghana as a case study.

The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter. By Zdenek Cervenka. New York: Praeger, 1969. 253 pp. $7.00. A legal analysis of the OAU Charter elucidated by a political assessment of the Organization's handling of such major problems as Rhodesia and the Nigerian conflict.

Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma. By Hisham Sharabi. New York: Pegasus Books, 1969. 224 pp. $6.95. Believing U.S. Middle East policy since World War II to have been mistaken, Dr. Sharabi analyzes what he considers to be the biases and misunderstandings which have characterized American attitudes toward the area and its people. He also examines the social and psychological factors that influence Arab behavior and presents a portrayal of the two leading Palestinian commando organizations, *al-Fateh* and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In addition, the special problems of Jerusalem, the Suez Canal, and the Palestinian refugees are assessed.

Party and People: A Study of Political Change in Tunisia. By Lars Rudebeck. New York: Praeger, 1969. 285 pp. $9.50. In this detailed study of Tunisia's experience in social transformation, the author asserts that mass involvement in development planning is crucial for success. He illustrates this theme by probing the relationship between Tunisia's ruling party, the Parti Socialiste Destourien, and the nation's student and labor sectors; examining the procedures of economic planning, and tracing the influence of the party to regional and local levels.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

China Since 1911. By George Moseley. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 192 pp. $5.95. A new chronological account of the nearly six decades of upheaval in China since the overthrow of the Manchus. Dr. Moseley, who teaches Asian affairs and International Relations at Goddard College, treats of Sun Yat-sen's leadership, the rise of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to unify the nation, the Sino-Japanese war and the ensuing Nationalist-Communist conflict, the consolidation of the communist regime and the first five-year plan, the Sino-Soviet split and Peking's foreign relations, and the Cultural Revolution designed to ensure a Maoist China after Mao's departure.

Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism. By Michael Gasster. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969. 288 pp. $9.50. An examination of the ideas of Chinese revolutionaries from 1898 to 1911—intellectuals who participated in the movement to overthrow the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912) represented the dominant trends in the thinking of the time, and formed the core of the intelligentsia of Republican China.

The Communist Collapse in Indonesia. By Arnold C. Brackman. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 264 pp. $6.95. The author of *Indonesian Communism: A History* recounts the events of the abortive communist putsch on September 30, 1965 and relates this major communist setback and the subsequent decima-

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tion of the Indonesian Communist Party to developments in Viet Nam, Sino-Soviet relations, and the Cultural Revolution in China. On the reasons for the putsch, Brackman asserts: "Indonesia's President-for-Life was privy to the plot. Sukarno and the PKI shared a relatively uncomplicated objective: the wholesale purge of the Army general staff, the only effectively organized group standing between Sukarno and the Communists and their desire to establish a 'socialist' state."

The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. (Second edition.) Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 424 pp. $4.95 (paper). This revised standard text on communism and communist parties in East Asia contains contributions by Chalmers Johnson on China; M. T. Haggard on Mongolia; Chong-Sik Lee on North Korea; John C. Donnell and Melvin Gurtov on North Viet Nam; Bernard B. Fall on the Pathet Lao; Hans H. Baerwald on Japan; Frances L. Starner on Singapore and Malaysia; Guy J. Pauker on Indonesia; John H. Badgley on Burma; Ralph Retzlaff on India; Leo E. Rose on Nepal; and Robert N. Kearney on Ceylon. The editor provides an overview and comparative analysis of communism in East Asia.

Contemporary China. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. 138 pp. $4.00. A collection of papers presented at a University of Guelph Conference in April 1968. The topics range from an historical perspective on, and the prospects for, China to examinations of the Cultural Revolution, trade and economic development, science and technology, and Canada's relations with Communist China.

The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response, 1859-1905. By Milton E. Osborne. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. 370 pp. $9.50. Dr. Osborne, Senior Lecturer in the Department of History, Monash University, Australia, examines the manner in which the French governed their Southeast Asian colonies, contrasts the Vietnamese and Cambodian societies, and shows the effects of French rule on them as well as their differing reactions to colonial policies. In Cochinchina the French, spurred on by the idea of a "civilizing mission," sought to refashion Vietnamese society, while in Cambodia the basic social forms of the country were preserved and the symbolic power of the monarchy was even enhanced.

Japan's First General Election, 1890. By R. H. P. Mason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. 254 pp. $7.50. Dr. Mason, Lecturer in Asian Civilization at the Australian National University in Canberra, surveys political trends in Japan between the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the establishment of constitutional government in 1889, and then examines the parties, candidates, principles, issues and outcome of the 1890 election campaign.

Modern Japan's Foreign Policy. By Morinosuke Kajima. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1969. 327 pp. $5.50. The author, who has held several governmental positions since the 1950's, writes with competence on Japanese foreign policy since World War II. In addition to essays on current foreign policy issues, he makes suggestions regarding Japan's future role in international affairs.

Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution. By Neale Hunter. New York: Praeger, 1969. 311 pp. $7.95. A sympathetic account of the Cultural Revolution from its beginning in 1965 until 1967, the period during which the author taught at the Shanghai Foreign Languages Institute. Fluent in Chinese and free to roam all over Shanghai to make friends with students and workers and to attend rallies and meetings, Mr. Hunter reports on the changing atmosphere and mood of the city during this time of turmoil.

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He concludes that "the elevation of Mao's ideas . . . opens up new dimensions for the future. . . . China has passed through a self-imposed ordeal by fire. It has emerged, not unscarred by the experience but stronger and more sure of its future. In a world where acts of political courage on a national scale are rare, the Cultural Revolution is a challenge to every society."

Tibet. By Thubten Jigme Norbu and Colin M. Turnbull. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968. 352 pp. $7.50. An interpretive history of Tibet by the elder brother of the present Dalai Lama and the distinguished anthropologist, author of *The Forest People.* They describe the peoples of Tibet, their long battle to remain independent, the harsh struggle for survival in the cold and barren highlands of the Himalayas, the ancient customs of a venerable theocracy, daily life and traditions, religion and literature, and the final ordeal of Tibet's seizure by China.

VIII. Latin America

The Latin Americans. By Victor Alba. New York: Praeger, 1969. 392 pp. $10.00. In this interesting treatment of Latin America's historical background and of the possibilities for future change, Mr. Alba's objective is not to inundate the reader with facts but rather to provide him a useful framework with which to understand the facts about Latin America he may subsequently encounter. The author believes most Latin Americans desire a society similar to that of the United States. Yet Latin American-U.S. relations have been affected by anti-Americanism. Causes for this state of affairs are to be found in U.S. policy as well as in the actions of the ruling minorities in Latin American governments. It is to the majorities outside the mainstream of Latin American life that the United States should direct its attention and assistance.

The Latin American Tradition. By Charles Wagley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 242 pp. $6.75. A collection of previously published essays written between 1951 and 1964 by the author, a professor of anthropology and Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia University. In addition to describing those traditions, institutional values and aspects of behavior shared in common by Latin Americans, Dr. Wagley discusses the regional variations within the area resulting from environmental differences, historical factors and differing stages of economic and political integration within each society.

Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America: A Study of Chilean Political Culture. By Francisco Jose Moreno. New York: New York University Press, 1969. 197 pp. n.p. Challenging the view that Chile's stability has resulted from pluralistic democratization, the author asserts that the legitimization of the political system is due to its appeal to traditional monistic tendencies and veneration of charismatic leadership.

Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America. By Stanislav Andreski. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 310 pp. $2.45 (paper). The paperback edition of this 1966 publication contains a new postscript bringing the findings up to date in the light of recent elections and coups d'état. The author believes such groups as landowners, civil servants, the military and the clergy represent parasitic groups preventing necessary social change in Latin America. The only recourse is to attempt change through subversive action by revolutionary leaders, who themselves often fall into the old pattern.

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Monographs and Reports Received

Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts. By Geoffrey Kemp. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation,* No. 577, March 1970. 80 pp. 60 cents.

As Peking Sees Us. By Yuan-li Wu and H. C. Ling. Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1969. 98 pp. $2.00.

The Awakening of Mainland Youths from Mao's Exploitation and Persecution. By Wang Hsueh-wen. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, July 1969. 92 pp. $1.00.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution of the Decision-Making Process. By David C. Phillips. Santa Monica: System Development Corporation, SP-3462, November 1969. 63 pp. n.p.

Challenge of Rhodesia. By Ralph Zacklin. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation,* No. 575, November 1969. 72 pp. 60 cents.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Process of Conflict and Current Policy. By Daniel Tretiak. Waltham, Mass.: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Studies Group, Monograph No. 2, February 1970. 36 pp. n.p.

Cities in a Changing Latin America: Two Studies of Urban Growth in the Development of Mexico and Venezuela. By David J. Fox and D. J. Robinson. London: Latin American Publications Fund, July 1969. 48 pp. 7/6.

Communications Satellites. By Ingemar Dörfer, for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 54 pp. $1.25.

The Dilemma of a Ministate: Anguilla. By William J. Brisk. Columbia: University of South Carolina, Institute of International Studies, Studies in International Affairs, No. 7, 1969. 93 pp. $4.00; $2.00, paper.

German Recovery and the Marshall Plan. By Herbert Carleton Mayer. New York: Edition Atlantic Forum, 1969. 121 pp. n.p.

Iceland: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 1970. 66 pp. 80 cents.

Indonesia: The Gestapu Affair. By Arnold C. Brackman. New York: The American-Asian Educational Exchange, November 1969. 46 pp. n.p.

An International Survey of Interest Rates: Patterns and Differentials. Zurich: Union Bank of Switzerland, January 1970. 43 pp. n.p.

Mao Tse-tung's Politburo and "New Powerholders." By Li Cheh. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, August 1969. 109 pp. $1.20.

NATO: Past, Present, Prospect. By Klaus Knorr. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 198, December 1969. 62 pp. 85 cents.

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Regional Development Banks. By Manmohan Singh. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation,* No. 576, January 1970. 83 pp. 60 cents.

Select Bibliography: Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America Supplement, 1969. Edited by Teg C. Grondahl. Hanover, N.H.: The American Universities Field Staff, February 1970. 88 pp. $3.00.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute. Keesing's Research Report No. 3. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. 119 pp. $4.95; $2.45, paper.

Southeast Europe in Contemporary International Politics. By Franz Ronneberger. Kansas City: Park College, Governmental Research Bureau, East Europe Monographs, No. 1, November 1969. 84 pp. $2.00.

Spain: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 1970. 79 pp. 80 cents.

A Student's Guide to United Nations Documents and Their Use. By John Bothwell McConaughy and Hazel Janet Blanks. New York: United Nations Association of the USA, 1969. 17 pp. 75 cents.

Switzerland: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 1970. 63 pp. 80 cents.

Wanted in India: A Relevant Radicalism. By John P. Lewis. Princeton: Princeton University, Center for International Studies, December 1969. 49 pp. $2.00.

Who's Who in Mexican Government. Edited by Marvin Alisky. Tempe: Arizona State University, Center for Latin American Studies, 1969. 64 pp. $2.00; $1.00, paper.

Why the Ussuri? Reflections on the Latest Sino-Soviet Fracas. By Peter Mayer. Waltham, Mass.: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Studies Group, Monograph No. 1, December 1969. 21 pp. $1.25.

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Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

Constituency Labour Parties in Great Britain. By Edward G. Janosik. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 222 pp. $6.50.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00.

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

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